Chiquitano and the State

Negotiating Identities and Indigenous Territories in Bolivia

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by

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Abstract

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This thesis analyses how Chiquitano people engage with the state and to what effect, based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out between September 2006 and August 2007 in the Bolivian Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío municipalities, in the eastern Bolivian lowlands. It focuses on the most contentious areas of Chiquitano-state relations, namely the emergence of the Chiquitano social movement, the struggle for territory and territorial autonomy and participation in the local state bureaucracy. While Chiquitano interact with the state in order to protect their socio-cultural communal reproduction, this thesis finds that in many ways the Chiquitano organisation acts as part of the state and replicates its neo-liberal multicultural rhetoric. The state remains the main shaper of forms of political engagement and collective identification (such as indigeneity), resonating with Fried's (1967) and Scott's (1998) notions that the state implies some sort of process, one of 'restructuring' and 'making legible'. Consequently, this thesis argues that from the Chiquitano perspective, the election of Bolivia's first indigenous president in 2005 and his radical state reform project through the 2006-2007 Constituent Assembly, has not fundamentally transformed previous patterns of indigenous-state engagement. It posits that the more successful resistance continues to reside, perhaps more subtly, in *comunidades*' socio-cultural relations.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADN	*Acción Democrática Nacionalista* (National Democratic Action)
ALAS	*Asesoría Legal y Asistencia Social* (Legal Consultancy and Social Assistance)
APCOB	*Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano* (Support for the Indigenous Peasant of the Bolivian East)
APG	*Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní* (Assembly of the Guarani People)
BOLFOR	*Programa de Manejo Forestal Sostenible* (Program for Sustainable Forestry Management)
CABI	*Capitanía del Alto y Bajo Izozog* (Captaincy of the Alto and Bajo Izozog)
CANOB	*Central Ayorea Nativa del Oriente Boliviano* (Central of Native Ayoreos of Eastern Bolvia)
CEADES	*Colectivo de Estudios Aplicados al Desarrollo Social* (Collective of Applied Studies on Social Development)
CEDIB	*Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia* (Documentation and Information Centre Bolivia)
CEJIS	*Centro de Estudios Jurídico Investigación Social* (Centre for Legal and Social Studies)
CEPAC	*Centro de Promoción Agropecuaria Campesina* (Centre for the Promotion of Peasant Farming and Stockbreeding)
CEPAD	*Centro para Participación y Desarrollo Humano Sostenible* (Centre for Participation and Sustainable Human Development)
CEPEM-B	*Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni* (Central of Ethnic Mojeño People of the Beni)
CEPIB	*Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni* (Indigenous Central of Indigenous Peoples from the Beni)
CGTI-MV	*Comité de Gestión del Territorio Indígena de Monte Verde* (Management Committee of the Indigenous Territory of Monte Verde)
CICC	*Central Indígena de Comunidades de Concepción* (Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Concepción)
CICOL	*Central Indígena de los Comunidades Originarios de Lomerío* (Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Lomerío)
CIDDEBENI	*Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el Desarrollo del Beni* (Investigation and Documentation Centre for the Development of the Beni)

CIDOB	*Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia* (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the West, Chaco and Amazonia) Also: *Central Indígena de Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano* (Central of Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Western Bolivia).
CIMA	*Comisión International del Medio Ambiente* (International Commission for the Environment)
CIMAR	*Centro de Investigación y Manejo de Recursos Naturales Renovables* (Investigation Centre for the Management of Renewable Natural Resources)
CNTCB	*Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (National Trade Union Organisation of Bolivian Peasants)
CIPCA	*Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado* (Peasantry Investigation and Promotion Center)
CIP-SJ	*Central Indígena de Paikonecas de San Javier* (Indigenous Organisation of Paikonecas of San Javier)
CIPYM	*Consejo Indígena de Pueblo Yuracaré/Mojeño* (Indigenous Congress of the Yuracaré/ Mojeño People)
COB	*Central Obrera Boliviana* (Bolivian Workers' Confederation)
COICA	*Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica* (Coordinating Body for Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin)
CONAIE	*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador)
CONAMAQ	*Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo* (National Council of the Ayllus and Marcas of Qullasuyo)
CONFENAIE	*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana* (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon)
COPNAC	*Central de Organizaciones de los Pueblos Nativos Guarayos* (Coordinating Body for Guraryos Native People)
CORDECRUZ	*Corporación de Desarrollo de Santa Cruz* (Santa Cruz Development Corporation)
CPESC	*Coordinadora de los Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz* (Coordinating Body for the Ethnic People of Santa Cruz)
CPIB	*Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni* (Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the Beni)
CPTI	*Centro de Planificación de Territorios Indígenas* (Planning Centre for Indigenous Territories)

CSCB	*Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia* (Union Confederation of Colonizers of Bolivia)
CSUTCB	*Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (Single Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers)
CV	*Comité de Vigilancia* (Oversight Committee)
DED	*Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst* (German Development Agency)
DMI	*Distrito Municipal Indígena* (Indigenous Municipal District)
FAM	*Federación de Asociaciones Municipales* (Federation of Municipal Associations)
GANPI	*Gran Asamblea Nacional de los Pueblos Indígenas* (National Assembly of Indigenous Peoples)
GTZ	*Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (German Technical Development Agency)
IDT	*Instituto Departamental de Tierras* (Departmental Institute of Lands)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IPSP	*Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (Political Instrument for the sovereignty of the Peoples)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INRA	*Instituto Nacional de La Reforma Agraria* (National Institute of Agrarian Reform)
Inwent	*Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH* (Capacity Building International)
KFW	*Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* *(Instituto de Cedito para la Reconstrucción)* (Credit Institute for Reconstruction)
LDA	*Ley de Descentralización Administrativa* (Administrative Decentralisation Law)
LPP	*Ley de Participación Popular* (Law of Popular Participation)
MAS	*Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement Towards Socialism)
MINGA	*Asociación de Grupos Mancomunados de Trabajo* (Association of Mancommunal Work Groups)
MNR	*Movimiento Revolucionario Nacionalista* (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement)
MST	*Movimiento Sin Tierra* (Landless Movement)

NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
OICH	*Organización Indígena Chiquitana* (Chiquitano Indigenous Organisation)
OTB	*Organización Territorial de Base* (Territorial Base Organisation)
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PADEP	*Programa de Apoyo a la Gestión Pública Descentralizada y Lucha contra la Pobreza* (Programme for the support of the Decentralised Public Management and Fight against Poverty)
PDM	*Plan de Desarrollo Municipal* Municipal Development Plan
PEI	*Programa de Educación Bilingüe* (Bilingual Education Programme)
POA	*Plan Operativo Anual* (Annual Operating Plan) or *Programa Operativo Anual* (Annual Operating Programme)
SAN-TCO	*Saneamiento Especial de Tierras Comunitarias de Origen* (Special Indemnification of Original Communal Lands)
SENALEP	*Servicio Nacional de Alfabetización Educación Popular* (National Service of Popular Education Alphabetisation)
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
TAN	*Tribunal Agrario Nacional* (National Agrarian Tribunal)
TCO	*Tierra Comunitaria de Origen* (Original Communal Land)
UJC	*Unión Juvenil Cruceñista* (Young Men's Civic Organisation)
UN	United Nations
VAIO	*Vice Ministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Originarios* (Vice Ministry for Indigenous and Originary Affairs)
VAIPO	*Vice Ministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios* (Vice Ministry for the Affairs of Indigenous and Originary Peoples)
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WWF	World Wildlife Fund
ZFD	*Ziviler Friedensdienst* (Civil Peace Service)

Glossary of Frequently Used Spanish Terms

alcalde político	A post introduced into *comunidades* and *ranchos* during the 1953 agrarian reform with the function of representing indigenous/peasant communities before the state (or vice versa), looking after the communal infrastructure as well as organising other aspects of communal life. The *cabildo* assisted in these tasks.
cabildo	Authority system originally introduced through the Jesuit Mission system. Today a *cabildo* is composed of anything between two and twelve *comunarios* (depending on the number of people that live in the *comunidad*) who are elected by their fellow *comunarios* generally for a certain period (3-5 years). The *cabildos'* tasks are administration, organising communal work efforts and upholding the justice system. In some *comunidades*, it also (or exclusively) has religious functions.
cacique	Members of *cabildos* are often called *cacique*. It is also a term used to denominate the leaders of some of the Chiquitano organisations.
camba	'*Camba*' was a once derogatory term used for indigenous peons. Today many residents of Santa Cruz department use the term to express their lowland origin or residence, in juxtaposition to highlanders (*kollas*). The term has been appropriated to express Cruceño regionalist sentiments.
central	The term can refer to the Chiquitano organisations, to the people who run the organisation, and is also used to describe the actual building where they meet.
chaco	Field, plot, allotment.
kolla	A (generally derogatory) term for people from the Bolivian highlands.

comunario/a	A *'comunario'* is a man who lives in a *'comunidad'*. *A 'comunaria'* is a woman who lives in a *comunidad*.
comunarios	Corresponding to the Spanish use of male/female nouns, the term is used to denote groups composed of men, or men and women who live in, or are from a *comunidad*. *'Comunarias'* refers to a group of females.
comunidad	A place where Chiquitano *comunarios* live communally; also the group of people that live together in Chiquitano settlements.
Concepceño elite	The white and *mestizo* economic and political elite of Concepción. Members of the elite are predominantly members of the three most powerful Concepceño families.
Concepceño	Here used to refer to the white and *mestizo* population of Concepción. Although it should be noted that also Aymara, Quechua, Chiquitano (or other) residents, at times identify as Concepceño.
corregidor	Administrative officials named after the Spanish colonial officials that used to administer the *cantón*. Serving under the *corregidores* were *agentes* ('agents'), who had quasi-judicial and quasi-executive functions at the grassroots level. Today '*corregidor*' is the term for provincial legal agents in charge of settling disputes in the *cantón*, and appointed by the departmental prefect. There are assistant corregidores ('*corregidor*' or '*sub-corregidor*') in each *comunidad*, in charge of conflict-mediation that mediate the authority in the *comunidades*.
Cruceño elite	The term generally refers to the departmental business and agro-industrial elite of Santa Cruz department.
Cruceño	Here used to refer to the white and *mestizo* population of Santa Cruz department. However, also Chiquitano, Aymara, Quechua or Guaraní people (or any other) resident of Santa Cruz department at times might identity as Cruceño.

empadronamiento	Generally used to refer to debt servitude. More recently: working for a wage on the land of a *patrón* (boss).
indígena	Indigenous person.
mestizo	People with Spanish and indigenous heritage, although less a physical category than a social one. People might move between self-identification as *mestizo* and indigenous.
minga	Communal work party.
patrón/ patrones	Here translated as 'boss' and 'bosses'. Chiquitano generally refer to landowners, owners of cattle ranchers, or owners of logging concessions as *'patrones'*.
ranchos	Small Chiquitano settlements tied to the cattle farms and agrarian enterprises generally via a system of patronage (*empadronamiento*)
técnicos	Here translated as 'technicians'; support staff and expert personal employed by *Centrales*.
terceros	'Third party intruders'. Chiquitano and NGO workers often use the term *'tercero'* to refer to individuals or associations that have economic interests (I.e. logging or cattle ranching) on lands Chiquitano own or claim.
usos y costumbres	Generally translated as 'customary practices' and entails an element of rules, norms an exerting justice.

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Chapter I

Introduction

In order to answer the question how Chiquitano people engage with the state and to what effect, I carried out ethnographic fieldwork between September 2006 and August 2007 in the Bolivian Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío municipalities. The municipalities are situated in the Chiquitanía region, Santa Cruz department in the eastern Bolivian lowlands. One the one hand this thesis focuses on how Chiquitano-state interaction leads to antagonisms, that stem from the need to interact with the state in order to protect their lifeways, while resisting the homogenising and assimilating pressures that this entails (Sider, 2003). This is most obvious in the areas of self- and group-identification (especially indigeneity), political organisation and territoriality. Chiquitano *comunarios* (people that live in, or are from a *comunidad*) attempt to challenge and interact with the state on a political level and through their organisations. This thesis finds that in many ways the Chiquitano organisation acts as part of the state and replicates its neo-liberal multicultural rhetoric. The more successful resistance continues to reside, perhaps more subtly, in the *comunidades* social relations and modes of identification. This thesis questions whether from the Chiquitano perspective, the election of Bolivia's first indigenous president in 2005 and his radical state reform project through the 2006-2007 Constituent Assembly, has really transformed previous patterns of indigenous-state engagement.

Missing the State in the Eastern Bolivian Lowlands

Much literature has emerged on state-citizen relations in Bolivia, especially with respect to changes in Bolivian citizenship regimes since the 1990s (e.g. Albro, 2010; Canessa, 2005, 2007a; Goldstein, 2004; 2003; Kohl, 2003b; Lazar, 2004a, 2008; McNeish, 2008; Postero, 2007). Along with other very recent contributions (Brathurst, 2005; Lepri, 2006; Postero, 2007), this thesis seeks to contribute to this literature by focusing on lowland Bolivia, in contrast to the heavily researched highlands or valley regions. By shifting the gaze towards indigenous people in the lowlands, I also seek to contribute to the growing literature on Amazonian peoples political struggles (e.g. Conklin and Graham, 1995; Jackson, 1995; Rosengren, 2003; Rubenstein, 2001; Sawyer, 1997; Veber, 1998), and substantial body of literature on

indigenous rights struggles throughout Latin America (Maybury-Lewis, 2002; Sieder, 2002; Urban and Sherzer, 2001; Van Cott, 1994a, 2005; Warren and Jackson, 2002; Wearne, 1996; Yashar, 2005). My thesis diverges from studies that treat indigenous organisations as a type of intermediary between indigenous communities or urban residents and the state, while acknowledging that they at times take over it's functions (e.g. Falcon, 1994; Lazar, 2008; Nugent, 1994a, 1994b; Postero, 2007). Instead, I argue that Chiquitano organisations may act as part of the state, along with NGOs and other organisations.

To allow for a consideration of the diverse actors that historically and currently form part of state power, this thesis conceptualises the state as a power structure, that is an ongoing accomplishment and made meaningful through particular imaginative and symbolic devices that lead to its legitimisation (Abrams, 1988; Comaroff, 1998; Gupta and Ferguson, 2002). Such a view accords 'centrality to the meanings of the everyday practices of bureaucracies and their relation to representations of the state' (Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 277). Accordingly, to account for this fragmented nature this thesis conceptualises citizenship as a set of practices (also see Jelin, 2003; Lazar, 2008; Ong, 1999; Salman, 2004; Sassen, 2002; Sawyer, 2001; Yuval-Davis, 1997).

Most publications addressing Bolivian state reforms, social change or state-citizen relations produced by anthropologists, historians and sociologists alike, has focused on the highland areas (e.g. Grindle and Domingo, 2003; Hylton and Thomson, 2007; Klein, 1992). The relative absence of studies regarding these relations when it comes to the lowland areas suggests a lack of understanding with respect to what constitutes the state in this area. The following comment by historian Herbert S. Klein highlights why historical and other accounts concentrate primarily on the highlands:

> Although some two-thirds of Bolivia's territory consists of tropical and semi-tropical lowlands, from the Pacific coasts deserts of the Atacama region (until this recent past) in the west, to the vast stretches of eastern lowlands and floodplains forming parts of the Amazonian and Pilcomayo river basins in the east, humanity has been concentrated in the highlands from the remotest times until today. … While the lowlands may have offered better soils and the potential for a richer life, the inaccessibility until modern times *rendered them useless* to all *but a small number of semi-nomadic hunters and gatherers isolated from significant contact with major centres of advanced civilisation*s. On the other hand, the high plateau was well articulated with the dense populations and advanced culture areas of coastal and

> central Peru. Thus, despite it limitations, the *broad expanse of its arable lands, its potential as a major grazing zone, and its deposits of accessible minerals made the Bolivian highlands the logical centre for human settlement* (1992: 3-4, emphasis added).

Along with others, he perceives the lowlands as 'marginalised from state building and the expansion of economic markets' (Yashar, 2005: 62, also 191-193). In contrast, the highlands were the focus of colonial and republican economic exploitation, along with being the site for the development of state administrative structures. Conversely, people who discuss the state and its administration do often not consider the populations within the lowland national territory.

However, the lowlands were not deemed 'useless' by everyone. While employees of the colonial or republican state were indeed absent from the missions and Chiquitano settlements over long periods of time, indigenous individuals did not escape their influence: *Encomenderos*, priests, tradesmen or entrepreneurs filled the gaps in administrating the populations. While Spanish colonisers concentrated on establishing a colonial administrative structure in the highlands, Jesuit missionaries were granted the right to convert 'uncivilised' eastern lowlanders to Christianity and pacify the various groups. They attempted this from 1692, through setting up mission settlements. Not only did this provide a buffer zone of protection against Portuguese attacks, the hope was also that the 'reduced' groups could be made functional to the colonial economy (see de la Peña, 2005: 720; Freyer, 1997: 13; Krekeler, 1993: 81-85). Another form of indirect government in the lowlands, (like the highlands), were *encomiendas* 'through which the monarchy authorised *conquistadores* to appropriate for themselves and redistribute to their followers grants of Indians from whom they had the power to exact both labour and tribute' (Radding, 2005: 125).

The Jesuit Mission period (1690-1767) had a profound impact on the Chiquitanía region, sparking off an ethnogenesis and shaping the socio-political and economic practices on the peoples living in the region. It has been well documented by the Jesuit priests themselves. Historians have addressed the period either through focusing solely on the mission times and immediate pre- and post-Jesuit presence (e.g. Radding, 2006b; Tomichá, 2002), or in the context of constructing a history of Santa Cruz department up to more recent times (e.g. Finot, 1978; Radding, 2005;

Roca, 2001; Tonelli, 2004).[1] Also, the limited numbers of anthropological studies on Chiquitano people overwhelmingly emphasise the Jesuit and immediate post-mission period (see Balza Alarcón, 2001; Freyer, 1997; Krekeler, 1993; Schwarz, 1994). Seeking to highlight the Chiquitano ethnogenesis sparked through the mission system, they focus on descriptions of Chiquitano 'culture', on the economic and political practices of groups' resident in and around the missions, in order to highlight continuities to present times. However, they draw conclusion on the back of little recent ethnographic data. Exceptions are the studies by Burkhard Schwarz (1994) and Roberto Balza Alarcón (2001) that mainly examine Chiquitano patterns of spatial occupation, and Jürgen Riester's (1976) treatment of Chiquitano culture, which address the mission period more briefly and rely on ethnographic data.

In contrast, more sparsely documented are the socio-economic and political practices of people at the eve of the arrival of Spaniards in the region, along with the effects of colonisation.[2] Similarly, although post-Jesuit priests, administrators and travellers elaborated numerous reports and accounts, few scholars have addressed life in the ex-missions and surrounding Chiquitano settlements (or the lowlands in general) from the 1800s onwards and into republican times. Additionally, indigenous people virtually 'disappear' as significant actors in writings about the Chiquitanía (and the Santa Cruz department in general) that deal with the nineteenth century and into the 1950's (Lema, 2006a: 47). While historians and anthropologists have amply explored the contested meanings of postcolonial political practices and ways in which indigenous communities renegotiated their relationships to the state in the Bolivian highlands during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Kicza, 2000a;

[1] The missions have also been of interest to those writing about the mission architecture. See, for example, the work of Antonio Eduardo Bösl (1988). Some of the Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries' accounts have been published. See, for example, the work of Fransico Burgés (1726), Julian Knogler (1970), Martin Schmidt (1981), Juan Patricio Fernández (1994) or Lucas Caballero (1933).

[2] Authors who address the mission period often include a brief account of the initial Conquest and summarise the different lifeways of groups resident in the area at the time of conquest (from 1530 onwards) (Krekeler, 1993; Radding, 2005, 2006b; Riester, 1976; Schwarz, 1994; Tomichá, 2002; Tonelli, 2004). Excepsions are the works by Mario Arrien (2006) and ethnographer Bärbel Freyer (2000) who focus on Chiquitano groups socio-political, cultural and economic practices before the arrival of the missionaries (which they reconstruct through the use of eighteenth century sources) and the changes introduced through residence in the *reducciones*.

Kuenzli, 2009; Larson, 2004; Platt, 1984, 1993; Rasnake, 1988; Stern, 1987; Thomson, 2002), this is not the case for the lowlands.[3]

Historian Cynthia Radding reasons that this is because the 'changing political and social structures within communities and the wider Creole society, their relations of mutual dependency, and their different points of reference to the institutions of the state' were less discernible than in the highlands (2005: 282). Instead, most studies on this period in Santa Cruz department generally concentrate on the region's economic growth, development initiatives launched by private or governmental actors, and the region's incorporation into the wider Bolivian nation, for example, through settlement initiates, the establishment of military outposts and communication routes (García Jordán, 2001; Radding, 2005; Roca, 2001). In this literature, Chiquitano and other indigenous peoples feature primarily under the term 'workforce' for agricultural activities, the rubber boom in the Amazon region or the north of the department.[4]

Exceptions are excellent and detailed contributions by Cynthia Radding (2001; 2002; 2005; 2006a; 2006b). Radding focuses on such themes as the mission and secular mission history, emphasising changes triggered in ecology and environment, settlement patterns, and economic, social and political practices of Chiquitano peoples. She highlights the negotiated character of such changes, as well as continuities to the present day.[5] Further, her work she sheds light on the commercial mission activities, which have connected the settlements with forest communities in the lowlands, the wider Andean colonial society, and later, the republican socio-political sphere. Radding also addressed the emerging citizenship regimes in the Chiquitanía and the Santa Cruz region in general, which have, as in

[3] Discussions addressing the highlands have focused on 'the material and ceremonial dimensions' of 'tribute payment, public works, and the *fiesta-cargo* system of religious and political office holding at the village level' (Radding, 2005: 281). See, for example, the studies by Sinclair Thomson's (2002) of political practices in Aymara communities during the colonial and republican periods, Roger Rasnake's (1988) on divisions among socio-cultural and political roles in Yura in Potosí' , or Tristan Platt's (1984; 1993) work.

[4] For example, José Luis Roca (2001) emphasises the importance of economic processes, the fluctuations of the internal market, the rubber economy, alternative responses of the local economy and, in the political sphere, regionalism. His description does not cover the socio-political and economic affects on the department's population.

[5] Especially insightful is Radding's (2005) comparatative history of Chiquitos (Bolivia) and the Sonoran Desert (Mexico) – two colonies on the frontiers of the Spanish empire – focused on the relationship between human societies and the landscape they live in, as well as create.

other Latin American countries, been closely tied economic patterns, landholding regimes and discourses around race.[6]

Some recent studies focus on Santa Cruz's autonomy claim, which has caused much political debate, public protest and some violent clashes over the past ten years. They provide a largely economic analysis of the region post 1950 in order to explore the roots of regionalism (Antelo, 2003; Peña et al., 2003; Plata Quispe, 2008; Soruco et al., 2008). For example, the edited volume by Ximena Sorruco, Wilfredo Plata and Gustavo Medeiros (2008) examines the emergence of Santa Cruz economic elites and the different boom and bust cycles of agricultural commodities (mainly rubber, soya, cotton, to a lesser extent cattle ranching and sugarcane cultivation) and natural resource extraction (gas, oil and logging). Lowland indigenous people feature in this literature, but again solely in their role as a cheap workforce in Cruceño economic boom and bust cycles.[7] However, more recent contributions on lowland peoples socio-economic systems and political practices and state engagement have somewhat counteracted this trend (see Brathurst, 2005; Lepri, 2006; Postero, 2007).[8]

Situating Chiquitano People

Chiquitano have had a long-standing engagement with international and state actors. After the Jesuits followed secular mission administrations, the rubber barons, railway

[6] Another exception to be mentioned is the study by historian Oscar Tonelli (2004), who covers the region's history in some detail until recent times, albeit providing only a brief coverage of the period 1880-1920.

[7] However, some studies addressing the emergence of the departmental autonomy claim not only focus on the claims' historic routes, but regard the political mobilisation of Bolivia's indigenous population in the 1990s as a key factor, as this 'directly challenged the privileged position of economic elites within the national political institutions' (Eaton, 2007: 71, also Gustafson, 2006). Anthropologist Bret Gustafson (2006) also adds other factors behind the rise of the 'elitist' and 'civic' autonomy movement in Santa Cruz. It is not only a 'response to the growing strength of the indigenous-popular and nationalist power' (2006: 351), but is also the expression of a 'new urbanism' in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, which 'responds to a crisis of social, political and economic power of the traditional elite' (2006: 419).

[8] Valuable contributions wih respect to lowland people have been made in other aspects, such as self-identification and group formation, kinship and ethno-botany. See Isabella Lepri (2005; 2006) and Daniela Peluso and Miguel Alexiades' (2005; 2009) on the Ese-Eja; Allan Holmberg (1969[1950]) on the Sirono; Jürgen Riester on the Ajoreode (1997), Chimanes (1993) and Chirriguano (1994); Laura Brathurst (2005) on the Tacana. On the Chiquitano, see Riester (1968; 1970; 1971; 1976) and the recent contribution *'La voz de los chiquitanos: historia de comunidades de la provincia Velaso'* (2006b). With this edited volume a group of historians and anthropologists have intended to address the lack of ethnographic accounts and historic analysis of the Chiquitanía region, intending to shift the focus to the very Chiquitano *comunidades* (in contrast perhaps, to the more prominent focus on the missions themselves).

constructors, and the owners of *estancias* (cattle ranches) and haciendas who all claimed their share of Chiquitano labour. The Chiquitano ethnic identity emerged initially with the arrival of the Jesuits and resettlement of different group's resident into the mission compounds, which sparked an ethnogenesis in each mission (see Chapter IV). After the departure of the Jesuits, Chiquitano communities emerged outside the mission settlement. While these maintained their internal governance structures, *comunidades* have generally had links to the state bureaucracy and other state actors which imposed labour demands (or outright enslavement, in the case of the rubber boom) (Radding, 2005; also see Riester, 1976: 125-129).

It is precisely their long historical engagement with state actors which, to a certain degree, differentiates Chiquitano socio-political and economic practices, as well as the way that Chiquitano remember and construct their history, from those Amazonian people for whom this is a more recent process, and often linked to the defence of their living spaces and livelihoods against colonisers, logging, mining, or oil exploitation interests.[9] The latter include, for example, the Shuar (e.g. Rubenstein, 2001) or Huaorani (e.g. Ziegler-Otero, 2007) in Ecuador; the Pajonal Asheninka (e.g. Veber, 1998) and Matsigenka (e.g. Rosengren, 2003) in Peru; the Kayapó (e.g. Turner, 1988; Turner and Fajans-Turner, 2006) in Brazil and Tucanoans in south-eastern Colombia (e.g. Jackson, 1995, 2001).

Instead, the Chiquitano situation is more comparable to other native peoples who have experienced life in mission settlements or rubber areas (see Hill, 1988b; Radding, 2005; Taylor, 1999), or those living in central and highland South America and the Western Amazonia, like the Canelos Quichua, the Lamista Quechua, the Cocamilla of the Peruvian Bajo Urubamba river (Gow, 1991, 1993), as well as the different groups living in the Putumayo foothills, Colombia (Taussig, 1987). Dissimilarities between the former and these latter groups materialise in various areas, whose discussion would exceed the scope of this thesis. Relevant to the argument forwarded here, however, is that the organisational structures of the latter groups are often more hierarchical and centralised, contrasting with those of more egalitarian groups, who have experienced more recent relations with the state (see Brown, 1993; Clastres, 1989; Rosengren, 2003; Rubenstein, 2001).

[9] Note that this is not about 'contact', which many groups have had for centuries, but indigenous-state relations.

As its linguistic root suggests, it was with the arrival of the Spanish that the term *'Chiquitano'* started to circulate to denominate previous separately named groups (see Chapter IV). Scholars generally give three different accounts regarding its origins. The first points to the Spanish *conquistadores* coining the term when they saw the small entrances to Chiquitano huts (*chiquito* = small) (Krekeler, 1993: 26; Riester, 1976: 122). The second claims it derives from the *Guarani* word *tapuy miri*, which Krekeler (1993: 26) translates as 'small enemy' and Radding (2005: 139) as 'slaves of small things', which resulted in the use of the term *'chiquito'* (small).[10] The third points to an anonymous eighteenth century source, that attributes the name's origin to the *Chiquitos* word *chiqui-s* (egg or testicle). The author proceeds to explain 'that the Indians thus named (perhaps by others) strove to change their designation to *M'oñeyca*, meaning "the men" or "the people"' (see Radding, 2005: 140). These interpretations are debatable. What has been established, however, is that the term was already in use by 1595 when the Spanish settlers employed it to denominate the different groups they encountered (Freyer, 1997: 10). More recently, Chiquitano leaders have sought to adopt a new name for self- and group identification, one selection being the term *besiro*, meaning 'correct speech' or 'the right way' (Radding, 2005: 140). At the time of fieldwork, many Chiquitano leaders and *comunario*s used the term *besiro* for the Chiquitano language.

Most Chiquitano today live in the Ñuflo de Chávez, Chiquitos, Velasco and Ángel Sandoval provinces of Santa Cruz department (Krekeler, 1993: 27). Together with the Germán Busch and Guarayos provinces, these comprise the region 'Gran Chiquitanía'. The entire region presents a high diversity of forest (*bosque*), savannah, and wetland vegetation.[11] While the region can be described as 'sub-tropical', with a rainfall that ranges between 1,000 and 1,600 millimetres, temperatures can vary significantly throughout the year. The average is 24˚C, but from around March to August temperature can plummet to about 3˚C with cold winds (the so-called *'sur'*) and heights reaching up to 38˚C in the hot and humid months (see Radding, 2005:

[10] Radding records that this version goes back to early Spanish sources that point to tribal wars between Chiriguanos and Chiquitos. The former feared the Chiquitanos' use of lethal poisonous herbs (2005: 139).

[11] According to Radding, *'bosque'* is generally understood 'as uncultivated forestland for gathering or for clearing gardening plots' (Radding, 2005: 37).

35).[12] Census data indicates a rise in the total self-identified Chiquitano population from 72,500 according to the 1992 census (McDaniel, 2002: 70), to 112,271 in 2001 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001). Therefore, the Chiquitano constitute the largest of the 36 different ethnic groups resident in lowland Bolivia (McDaniel, 2002: 70).[13]

Travel from the departmental capital Santa Cruz de la Sierra to the main fieldwork site in Concepción (the capital of Concepción municipality), required taking the bus – the main mode of transport connecting the cosmopolitan city with provincial towns. The bus travels northeast via El Pailón, where it crosses the Rio Grande on the street that leads to San Ignacio de Velasco and proceeds to San Matías at the Brazilian Border (see Map 1, below). The 290 km of road to Concepción is paved; the travelling time to neighbouring San Javier is about five and a half hours, with a further thirty to forty minutes to Concepción. Around San Julián and El Pailón, the bus travels past the many small shops and businesses that sprawl along the main traffic routes, especially where obstacles to moving traffic might force travellers to take a break. That the small businesses are overwhelmingly owned by highland immigrants, is testament to the large amount of highland-lowland migration that Santa Cruz has seen over past decades.[14] Past El Pailón, there are occasional settlements along the road, but the scenery becomes increasingly dominated by agricultural fields and large cattle ranches, dotted with white zebus and some shade trees: testimony to that cattle ranching is one of Santa Cruz's main economic pillars. Landownership, cattle and cropping are an important source of status and wealth among the Concepceño elite. Towards San Javier, the otherwise very flat landscape

[12] Radding further describes the region as follows: The Chiquitanía is located 'approximately within fifteen and nineteen degrees latitude (north-south) and fifty-eight and sixty-four degrees longitude (east-west) between the tributaries of the Amazonian and Paraguayan river basins and the Andean highlands. … Comprising 370,621 square kilometres (143,098 square miles), its geography centers on the western portion of the Brazilian Precambrian shield, forming low outcroppings of mesas, buttes, and ranges that extend form southeast to northwest' (Radding, 2005: 35).

[13] For purposes of comparison, the 2001 census recorded 78,438 Guarani, and 43323 Mojeño people, which are the two other relatively numerous ethnic groups in the eastern Bolivian lowland area and the Chaco region (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001).

[14] On highland–lowland migration see MacLean Stearman (1985), Urioste and Kay (2005), Gustafson (2006).

gives away to rolling hills, in which San Javier is located. Then the street slopes down towards the small town Concepción, where the terrain becomes even again.[15]

Map 1: Bolivia

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/bolivia_pol93.pdf [16]

[15] Concepción municipality is less hilly than both the neighbouring San Javier or Lomerío municipalities, its elevation varying between 250 and 485 meters above sea level. The ex-mission settlement Concpeción itself is at 380m (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 13).

[16] Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.

Photo 1: Zebus Crossing the Road

Zebus crossing the road on the ascent to San Javier (approaching from Santa Cruz de la Sierra)

Together with the San Javier and Lomerío municipalities, Concepción municipality is situated in Ñuflo de Chávez province (see Map 2, below).[17] The municipalities of Concepción and San Javier incorporate savannah areas which are largely deforested, except for shade trees. They are dotted with cattle ranches and small human settlements, some dry forest and tropical rain forest *(bosque húmedo)*.[18] In contrast, the neighbouring municipality of Lomerío is almost exclusively covered by savannah and dry forest *(bosque secco)*. Concepción municipality has a population of around 18,900 inhabitants, with a rural population of around 10,200. While some Chiquitano

[17] The Ñuflo de Chávez province, along with those of Angel Sandóval, and Velasco, formed part of Chiquitos province which was formerly the largest in Santa Cruz department and the country, an original province of Bolivia created at independence (1825). Ñuflo de Chávez province was founded on 16 September 1915 during the Presidency of Ismael Montes, and Concepción established as its capital. Previously, the territory belonged to the Velasco and Chiquitos provinces. The province was initially created with three municipal sections, Concepción, San Javier and San Julián, later followed by the establishment of the municipalities of San Ramón, San Antonio de Lomerío y Cuatro Cañadas (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 2-3).

[18] According to the municipal survey, tropical rain forest covers 40 per cent of the surface of Concepción municipality, compared to around ten per cent in San Javier (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 11).

in Concepción municipality live in the small town (and ex-mission settlement) of Concepción, which they often refer to as *'el pueblo'* (here: the village), Chiquitano comprise most of the rural population and live in forty-two legally recognised 'indigenous communities', or in other words, Chiquitano *'comunidades'* (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 3-4, 49-51).[19]

Map 2: Santa Cruz Department, Chiquitanía and Ñuflo de Chávez Province



Source: Map by Patricia Heyda (in Gustafson, 2006: 358).[20]

In general, *comunidades* are located at varying distances from Concepción, from twenty minute walks to six hour pick-up drives. Most have a population between 150

[19] Apart from the forty-two (generally Chiquitano) indigenous communities, three communities exist which are in the process of 'consolidation'. All these communities are distributed across the two cantons that the municipality comprises: Concepción and San Pedro. Additionally to these cantons, the municipality contains one indigenous district: Zapocó. Within Zapocó live around 330 Ayoreode people (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 3-4, 60). The figures that the municipal government of Concepción provides with regards to languages spoken in the municipality are as follows: the most common language is *castellano* (82.99 per cent), followed by *chiquitano* (also: *bésiro*) (12.66 per cent), and the ayoreo language *zamuci*, accounting for 4.35 per cent (2007b: 75).

[20] Used by permission of Patricia Heyda, Washington University in St. Louis.

and 300 people. While the smallest contain around 50 inhabitants, and the largest (one of which is Candelaria, founded in the 1960s), holds around 500 inhabitants (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 51-52). Except for the *comunidades* located within the Monte Verde territory, which comprises most of the forested area of the municipality and also part of the neighbouring San Javier and Guarayos municipalities, *comunidades* are enclosed by non-Chiquitano owned cattle ranches and large-scale food crop producing estates. This attests to the encroachment of such properties on Chiquitano settlements. However, Chiquitano *comunarios* rely on a access to land and forest as they generally obtain their main stables (rice, yucca, maize, beans and plantain) from their *chacos* (fields), which Chiquitano clear through slash and burn techniques, and from their forest gardens.[21] Where Chiquitano have the possibility, they also collect forest fruits and undertake hunting and fishing for meat. As will be addressed in the following chapters, the increasing land shortages Chiquitano have suffered presents one of the main reasons for their political organising. It underpins demands for legal title to the Monte Verde territory, which Chiquitano of Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío have claimed as their own.

While *comunarios* largely rely on their land for subsistence, they may also sell surplus produce for cash to merchants who travel to the *comunidades*. More commonly, they take foodstuffs to the closest market town, i.e. Concepción or San Javier. Some *comunidades* engage in communal animal husbandry projects, generally cattle ranching or keeping sheep, to generate extra cash. Chiquitano rely on such income to purchase items they do not produce themselves, such as sugar, salt, or coffee. Money is also needed to send children to college in Concepción, or to pay for hospital bills. Several *comunidades* undertake communal projects with the aim of buying medical equipment or improving infrastructure. Consequently, Chiquitano life is in many ways (not only economically, but also politically and socially) closely connected to the municipal capitals, as well as other *comunidades*.

In this thesis the term '*comunidad'* is not translated as community or settlement, to highlight that a *comunidad* forms a certain type of Chiquitano community, and to make a distinction to the concept of 'indigenous community' as it

[21] For a more detailed description of Chiquitano agricultural techniques, see Balza Alarcón (2001: 212-217).

appears in Bolivian legal codes.[22] Chiquitano *comunarios* describe their *comunidade*s in terms of a *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* (a feeling of belonging together), where several families live together, possess communal land, work collectively and follow communal norms. A more detailed description of the meanings *comunarios* attach to 'being a *comunario*' features in Chapter V.

An important aspect of the *comunidades* is their organisational structure to organise work, uphold and enforce norms or rules. While their exact formation varies, most *comunidades* count with a *cabildo* of between two and twelve members, a *corregidor* and a *Organización Territorial de Base* (OTBs – Territorial Base Organisation). Their roles include the administration of communal affairs and arranging communal work efforts, overseeing religious ceremonies and upholding the norms of the *comunidad*. OTBs also have the role of liaising with non-*comunarios*, such as members of different levels of the Bolivian state administration, NGO workers, or sometimes business people. All these authorities are elected by *comunarios* for fixed terms, with periods in office, electorate composition and form of election, varying among *comunidades*. The role of OTBs in Bolivia's state administrative structures and the responsibilities of communal authorities will be addressed more extensively in Chapter VII.

While for most Chiquitano in the municipality, *comunidades* are the more immediate political, economic and social sphere, like many other lowland (and also highland) peoples, another important aspect of Chiquitano life are their grassroots organisations. Each organisation involves the Chiquitano that live within the boundaries of the respective municipality. The *Central Indígena de Comunidades de Concepción* (CICC – Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Concepción) dates from 1985. *Centrales* were first established in response to sub-prefectural labour tributes, to mobilise against their continued exclusion from basic rights, as well as abuses perpetrated by local white and *mestizo* town dwellers, cattle ranchers and *patrones* (bosses). Two further organisations were founded in the region: the *Central Indígena de los Comunidades Originarios de Lomerío* (CICOL – Indigenous

[22] It should be pointed out that some of the literature regarding Chiquitano people, refers to the aforementioned Chiquitano settlements as '*rancho*' (e.g. Schwarz, 1994: 37). However, Chiquitano *comunarios* themselves make a difference between the two terms, referring to *ranchos* as Chiquitano settlements which are or were tied to agrarian enterprises. While Chiquitano *ranchos* were tied to cattle farms and agrarian enterprises via a system of patronage (*empadronamiento*) until the late 1970s, at the time of fieldwork no ranchos existed in Concepción, and as no mention was made of their existence, it is unlikely that they existed in San Javier or Lomerío.

Organisation of Communities of Lomerío) in 1982, followed by the *Central Indígena de Paikonecas de San Javier* (CIP-SJ - Indigenous Organisation of Paikonecas of San Javier) created in 1992 (ALAS et al., 2001: 18). Today, many Chiquitano and NGO workers simply call the CICC, CICOL and CIP-SJ '*la organización*' ('the organisation'). Together, the three organisations represent 117 *comunidades* (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 8).[23]

The organisations are headed by the '*centrales*', the group of people who run the organisation.[24] These are elected Chiquitano leaders and hired *técnicos* (here translated as 'technicians'; i.e. support staff and expert personal employed by the *central*). Their meeting place in Concepción comprises a small building in a part of town predominantly inhabited by Chiquitanos. The CIP-SJ has its meeting place in San Javier, while the CICOL is sited in San Antonio de Lomerío. Since their foundation, the role of the *centrales* has been to assist the Chiquitano population in political, organisational, and economical matters, to pass on information and provide support in resolving their general problems.

Citizenship and the 'Indian' Challenge

Viewing the state as multi-sited and emphasising the actors and bundle of practices that constitute it, also has repercussions on the way we may conceptualise 'citizenship'. It requires a re-thinking of Thomas Humprey Marshall's (2009 [1950]) often cited definition, which stresses individual ownership of a set of rights and duties, bestowed upon full members of 'a community', read: the nation (state).[25] In order to locate state actors and analyse citizen's interaction with them, attention has to be shifted to the set of practices that comprise such interaction. This thesis therefore emphasises 'citizenship' as a set of practices, a view shared with anthropologists (e.g. Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Lazar, 2008; Lukose, 2005; Salman, 2004; Salman and de Munter, 2009; Sawyer, 2001), as well as certain political scientists and sociologists, who stress the participatory and negotiated

[23] Notably, this thesis focuses primarily on the Organisation in Concepción (Chapter V). While I draw on data regarding the CIP-SJ and CICOL or statements from *comunarios* from the respective municipalities for comparative purposes, the emergence of the other organisations are beyond the scope of this thesis and will be addressed elsewhere.

[24] In its third meaning, '*central*' can also refer to the CICC's headquarter.

[25] Although he does not specifically mention this, he writes with respect to 'England' and mentions that a sense of citizenship implies a 'sense of community membership', in his case this sense is 'national consciousness' (2009 [1950]: 151).

dimension of citizenship and democracy (e.g. Foweraker, 1995, 2001; Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Jelin, 2003; Yuval-Davis, 1997). This also involves recognising the multi-tiered, or rather multi-dimensional, nature of citizenship. The experience of citizenship may vary between individuals belonging to one type of community, as they may engage in different practices and interact with different state actors.

Nevertheless, it is the (lack of) substantive rights as citizens that many groups and individuals have struggled with in Latin American countries (Alvarez et al., 1998; Dagnino, 2003, 2005; Sawyer, 2001). Since the late 1980s and 1990s, Latin American popular actors (from trade unions, to women's' movements and human rights activists) have employed the language of 'citizenship' to demand equal rights (Alvarez et al., 1998; Dagnino, 2003, 2005; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Foweraker, 2001; Foweraker and Landman, 1997). Moreover, they moved beyond this to demand the recognition of the pluralist character of society (the political relevance of cultural, gender, class, race, etc.). They struggled for 'differentiated citizenship' and the recognition of minority rights, including group rights, deemed necessary to break entrenched power-structures (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka and Wayne, 2000; Leydet, 2009: 6; Little, 2002).

Thus, citizenship (and discussions around it) provides a reference point for debate about how a de-facto participation in society can actually be achieved and what this should look like. It also provides a 'tool' which those demanding inclusion or redefinition can rally around (Dagnino, 2003). Marshall (2009 [1950]: 150) himself pointed out that citizenship contains an ideal of what 'should be' everyone's rights, thus acting as guide for the direction in which social and political change should move (Lister, 2005: 476; McKinnon and Hampsher-Monk, 2000: 1).

Demands for collective rights and more inclusive citizenship regimes are particular relevant in countries like Bolivia, where a small Creole elite controlled government from republican times until December 2005, when Evo Morales, Bolivia's first indigenous president came to power (Lazar, 2008: 6).[26] Notably, according to the most recent Bolivian Census, the Bolivian indigenous population

[26] I follow Deborah Yashar's definition of citizenship regime: 'citizenship regimes define *who* has political membership, *which* rights they possess, and *how* interest intermediation with the state is structured. The state, in general, and citizenship regimes, in particular, play a key role in *formally* defining the intersection between national politics, political membership, and public identities' (2005: 6, emphasis in original). She adds that 'as citizenship regimes have changed over time, so too have the publicly sanctioned players, rules of the game, and likely (but not preordained) outcomes' (2005: 6).

amounts to 62 per cent (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001). Local and national organisations representing indigenous peoples all over Latin America, their NGO allies and actor in international governing bodies such as the UN, have developed a common discourse around the 'recognition as peoples entailing the constitutional recognition of multiethnic or plurinational character of the state, the demand for territory, and the demand for autonomy or self-determination' (Assies, 2000: 8). Organisations' demands are also often framed in terms of the recognition to 'cultural difference', encompassing the right to land and titles, freedom from human rights abuses, preserving their languages and 'cultural practices' (including customary law) (Brysk, 1994: 33; Postero and Zamosc, 2004a: 15). Land rights are especially crucial for minority groups (often Amazonian peoples) whose very livelihood and survival depends on territory and the resources within (Postero and Zamosc, 2004a: 16; Van Cott, 1994b: 16). The claim for 'land' encompasses the others.

The first of such ethnic movements emerged in 1964 in Ecuador with the Shuar Federation (Rubenstein, 2001; Whitten et al., 1997), followed by other powerful mobilisation all over Latin America, most prominently in the Ecuadorian highlands, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia (Assies et al., 2000; Postero and Zamosc, 2004b; Van Cott, 1994a; Warren and Jackson, 2002; Wearne, 1996; Yashar, 2005). Together with other social movements, indigenous organising gained momentum during the late 1970s and 1980s, as Latin American countries moved from dictatorships to democratic political regimes. Local and national indigenous organisations have developed strong international connections, leading to the emergence of a pan-American alliance and links to the international indigenous rights arena (Brysk, 1994, 1996, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Increasingly, these dynamics fed back into national and local political spheres and asserting 'Indianness' became an important tool to assert the right to 'self-determination' and 'culture' within nation-states (Jackson, 1995, 2001; Maybury-Lewis, 2002; Warren and Jackson, 2002).

In Bolivia, indigenous actors have also challenged prevailing citizenship regimes. The first contemporary movement to emerge in Bolivia was the highland-based 'Katarist movement' (*kataristas*). It was formally consolidated through the 1973 Manifesto of Tiwanaku, which marked a separation from the economic orientation of the state-organised peasant organisations. Instead, leaders stressed

'cultural identity' as a unifying political force and developed a 'cultural and ethnic ideology', which made clear reference to the ethnic basis of the discrimination suffered by native peoples. Katarista leaders' began demanding organisational independence, democratic rights, equality and recognition of the multitude of indigenous cultures (Behrendt, 2000: 6; McKee, 1999: 1; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 75-76; Van Cott, 1994b: 9). While Katarism as an organisational force did not sustain political momentum or unity, it brought indigenous matters to political attention, leading presidential candidate Sánchez de Lozada (MNR) to choose Aymara Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as his vice-presidential running mate in the 1993 elections (see Albó, 1996: 4; McKee, 1999: 3; Yashar, 2005: 24-25).

In the Bolivian lowlands the ethnic organisational drive did not start until the Izoceño-Guaraníes organised in 1979. It was a reaction to increased pressures on the lands they occupied and resources they depended on (water, fauna and flora), triggered by colonisation and development projects, as well as to several laws promulgated in the 1970s, which granted private concession to exploit natural resources.[27] Izoceño-Guaraní leaders began contacting other groups in the Chaco and Santa Cruz region (including Chiquitano peoples) to form a regional alliance in 1982, the *Central Indígena de Pueblos y Comunidades Indigenas del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB – Central of Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Western Bolivia). The CIDOB became the largest umbrella organisation in the Bolivian lowlands, representing more than thirty indigenous peoples in the Tarija, Cochabamba, Pando, Beni and Santa Cruz departments (ALAS et al., 2001; Yashar, 2005: 198-199). The lowland movement achieved visibility through the 1990 'March for Territory and Dignity' from the Amazon lowlands to the La Paz, which protested against the destruction of lowland peoples' living spaces and launched territorial demands. This led to the recognition of 'indigenous territories' as an official concept, and Bolivia became one the of the first Latin American countries to ratify ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Albó, 2002: 77; Ströbele-Gregor et al., 1994: 106). The emergence of ethnic movement in Bolivian is subject of Chapter V.

[27] These included the *Ley Forestal* (Forestry Law), *Ley de Fauna y Vida Silvestre* (Fauna and Wildlife Law) and the *Ley Mineral* (Mineral Law) (Yashar, 2005: 198), which had most impact in lowland areas.

State Responses: Neo-liberal Multicultural Reforms

Indigenous organisations' demands have generally been phrased in terms of the recognition of the multi-ethnic nature of the country and 'group rights', implying the recognition of 'special status'. All over Latin America, governments have responded to indigenous demands and pressures from international organisations like the United Nations, by ratifying the ILO Convention 169 (1989), which recognises some form of 'self-rule', as well as the right to retain customs, institutions and customary law, if need be, promoted through constitutional reforms (for example, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia). Reforms largely aimed at providing some degree of self-determination with regards to territories, education and law, by acknowledging customary practices and traditional authorities (Assies, 2000; Sieder, 2002; Van Cott, 1994a, 2000, 2005; Yashar, 2005). Also, the Bolivian government reacted to pressures for reform from domestic and indigenous organisations. Their demands converged with the interests of elite groups in the country, who sought to counter the problem of political exclusion, political and economic instability, and enhance state domestic and international legitimacy (Van Cott, 2000). The government of Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997), instituted a series of multicultural constitutional and legislative reforms in the 1990s, starting off with the recognition of Bolivia as a 'multiethnic' and 'pluricultural' nation.

These reforms were partly aimed at expanding citizenship to include previously 'marginalised' indigenous peoples, and partly at off-setting the negative impact of the neo-liberal reform package instituted in the mid-1980s – hereafter they are also referred to as the 'second generation of neo-liberal reforms'.[28] The legal reforms that were supposed to spearhead this change were the 1994 *Ley de Participación Popular* (LPP – Popular Participation Law), the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) Law and the Intercultural Bilingual Education Law. The administration especially promoted the LPP as a way to actualise citizenship and stabilise political democracy, by opening up the municipal level of the state administration to electoral competition, increasing citizen participation in municipal-level political processes and budgeting (Behrendt, 2000; Blanes, 1999a; Faguet,

[28] The 'first generation' neo-liberal reforms were launched in 1985, when the *Movimiento Revolucionario Nacionalista* (MNR – Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) ended the state-led development model that had been established more than thirty years earlier, by introducing the New Economic Plan (NEP), a neo-liberal reform package (see Healy and Paulson, 2000: 5-16).

2003; Lema et al., 2001; Van Cott, 2000). This was, again, part of a wider trend in Latin America, where international development agencies promoted decentralisation policies with participatory elements at municipal level (Assies, 2000; Cammack, 1994: 186; Gray Molina, 2002; World Bank, 2002).[29]

The outcomes of these reforms have been hotly debated in academic and development agency literature, in terms of their effects on indigenous populations, expansion of citizenship and resource distribution. Opinions moved from earlier optimistic opinions (Van Cott, 1994b; Wearne, 1996) by those whose prime focus was increase in participation and a change in resource distribution in favour of local needs (Faguet, 2001; Gray Molina, 2002), to more critical voices who pointed to dependence of successes on local conditions and difficulties in policy implementation (Assies, 2000; Faguet, 2003; Hiskey and Seligson, 2003; Rowland, 2001; Sieder, 2002). Outright criticisms have, among other things, focused on the reform's promotion of a 'universalist, Western state model' (Blanes, 1999b; Calla, 2000; Lema et al., 2001).

Recent scholarship has argued that what governments achieved through such 'neo-liberal multiculturalism' (Hale, 2002), is an expansion rather than delimitation of their discriminatory powers (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007; Povinelli, 1998). Charles Hale (2002; 2004) has called this the '*indio permitido*' ('permitted Indian') syndrome, a way for governments and international institutions to use cultural rights to divide and domesticate indigenous movements. The reforms offer a limited recognition of indigenous peoples' rights – one in which 'indigenous citizens' can be functional to the governmental agenda. Such reforms adhere to the neo-liberal format of passing over responsibility for resource allocation to private individuals and groups. Indigenous citizens solve their own local problems (ideally limited to resource distribution and deliberations over infrastructure projects), which appears to resonate with a degree self-determination. While certain rights are enjoyed, others remain unaddressed (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007; Povinelli, 1998). Furthermore, 'while indigenous culture is now 'permitted', the interests and demands of the native populations remain subordinate

[29] Another prominent case being the participatory budget in Porto Alegre, Brazil (see, for example, Abers, 1998; de Sousa Santos, 1998; Souza, 2001).

to those of the *mestizo*/ *ladino* (mixed race) society, the dominant national identity, and the wider international community' (McNeish, 2008: 45-46).

Popular Opposition to Neo-liberal Multiculturalism

However, this 'divide and incorporate' tactic has not been entirely successful in Bolivia. Instead, opposition emerged to the neo-liberal restructurings that accompanied the 1990 reforms. Moreover popular actors framed their challenge to the government and its policies by drawing on the very indigenous label and some of its legal content through which the government sought to institutionalise indigenous-state relations. On the one hand, this is linked to the fact that highland and lowland movements had increasingly become aware that to gain access to the neo-liberal multicultural rights framework, concerns had to be presented in the language of indigeneity. On the other, it is influenced by the pan-American and global indigenous movement and its allies, paralleling the situation in other countries where ethnic movements have used the 'indigeneity' rhetoric, and the 'strategic essentialism' that this may entail, to express their grievances and demands (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006 also Brysk 1994, 1996, 2000).

McNeish and Postero posit that it is implicit in the concept of '*indio permitido'* that these policies gave rise to critiques of their shortcomings and ambiguities (McNeish, 2008: 38; Postero, 2007: 16-17). On the one hand, they provided political openings at local and national level, which indigenous peoples took advantage off in order to influence local politics and decision-making. But soon they realised that the spaces remained narrow and fraught with limitations (McNeish, 2008: 45). The reforms did not sufficiently alter structural inequalities and failed to provide for real participation and oversight, thus heightening discontent among indigenous groups, and other 'excluded or downwardly mobile sectors' (McNeish, 2008: 48; also Postero, 2007: 6). Another set of reasons for growing discontent was linked to the neo-liberal economic project and auctioning off of state-owned firms, which led to rising prices for consumer goods and resources and laying-off of workers. Grievances were also caused by coca eradication policies, which threatened the destruction of livelihoods of growers in the Yungas and northern highlands.

The most prominent protests that thus ensued were the 'water wars' against the privatisation of water supplies, in Cochabamba in 2000; the tax riots and 'gas

war' of 2003 and the 2005 protests demanding the nationalisation of hydrocarbons. These mobilisations spawned the involvement by a broad range of actors, from urban neighbourhood federations (most prominently those of El Alto), market vendors associations, students, trade unions, miners federations, Aymara and Quechua communities, coca growers from the Chapare and Yungas, to the middle class (Assies, 2003; Crabtree, 2005; Hylton and Thomson, 2005, 2007; Kohl and Farthing, 2006; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2005, 2007). Also lowland people protested. In September 2000 the Chiquitano staged a protest against a pipeline that would run through the fragile eco system of the Chiquitano dry forest. While they did not manage to derail the project, they received monetary compensation (see Postero, 2007: 202-204). In 2002, Chiquitano and other lowland groups participated in the in the national march or the Constituent Assembly.[30]

While these mobilisations involved many different movements, organisations, and probably individuals belonging to neither, authors remark that the protests have been portrayed as 'indigenous' mobilisations by the domestic press and movement spokespersons alike (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006; Lazar, 2008). This indicates how much the indigeneity rhetoric has taken the political centre stage. While the fact that Bolivia's 'indigenous' population formed the core of protesters helped promote this interpretation (Postero, 2007: 4), this image was consciously fostered by certain movement leaders. During the 2000 'water war', the primarily creole and *mestizo* middle class organisers strategically framed their protest against privatisation as an indigenous issue, by pointing to water's sacred nature, link to 'traditional beliefs' and *usos y costumbres*. This not only meant that they could demand water as a right according to the multicultural state reforms, which recognised existing *usos y costumbres*, but also broaden their popular appeal to urban and rural Quechua speakers and the international press (Albro, 2005: 435; Canessa, 2006: 248; Laurie et al., 2002).

Additionally, Aymara leader Felipe Quispe (also called the *Mallku*), leader of the *Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti* (MIP – Pachakuti Indigenous Movement) who took a prominent role mobilising his support base of Aymara from the highlands around La Paz during the 'gas war', and Evo Morales and his party *Movimiento al*

[30] Notably, since 1990, Chiquitano have regularly engaged in protest marches, generally with the objective or altering the INRA legislation and advance their territorial claims.

Socialismo (MAS – Movement Toward Socialism), have framed their political projects in terms of 'indigenous issues'. Quispe's 'indigenous' rhetoric is radical and 'racialised', his project being aimed at overhauling the Bolivian nation-state through an 'Indian revolution' (Canessa, 2006: 149, 251). While this initiative found limited support, the far more successful project has been that of Evo Morales and MAS, whose ascent paralleled the mobilisations and strengthening of indigenous and popular movements (Albro, 2006: 409, 419).

The MAS project is based on the use of 'indigeneity' for an inclusive political rhetoric (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006). Through this message MAS seeks to reach out to a broad popular base, by aligning indigenous issues with an anti-globalisation discourse, one that stresses the defence of national resources against global forces (especially US interests) (Canessa, 2006: 50-52). It allows for national and international coalition building and to articulate urban with rural concerns (see Chapter V). As anthropologist Andrew Canessa notes, in the national domain Morales presents: 'national issues that affect everyone … as indigenous issues … offering a language of political engagement for a much broader public' (2006: 254). Further, Morales is 'well aware of the strategic uses of the language of indigeneity. … At the root of this is an understanding of the power and appeal of the globalised idea of indigenous people as authentic and as victims of injustice' (2006: 253).

Some authors see the increase of indigenous identification and emergence of this new kind of political activism in Bolivia in positive light. For example, Postero posits that 'the current forms of challenge combine historical struggles against racism with new indigenous subjectivities and rationalities' (2007: 6). This challenge, she notes, is formulated in 'the language of citizenship, rights, and democracy, reflecting both Bolivians' experiences and their frustrations with the neo-liberal and multicultural reforms of the 1990s' (2007: 5). She argues that thus emerge new kinds of citizenship practices and demands for changes in the meaning of citizenship. This she refers to as 'postmulticultural citizenship':

> First, new protagonists are drawing attention to the ways Indians and the poor have been excluded from political participation in Bolivia's multiethnic society. … Second, Bolivia's new activists are pushing beyond traditional notions of substantive rights to rethink what they consider their rights to be. Central to this is an understanding that the political arena must be redefined to include not only questions of access to power, but also contestations over cultural meanings embedded in the unequal and hierarchical organisation of social relations (2007: 6-7).

What supports such a positive outlook and confirms that this new activism has gained significant public acceptance is, of course, Evo Morales' election as President in 2005 and re-election in 2009, as well as the fact that he managed to adhere to his campaign promise to hold a Constituent Assembly in 2006-2007, aimed at radically altering the role of the state to provide for different routes to regional and ethnic autonomy (Albro, 2010; McNeish, 2008; Postero, 2007). The new Bolivian Constitution that was born out of the long and conflictive negotiation process was finally accepted by the Bolivian public by referendum in January 2009. According to Albro, the constitution presents a 'historical transformation' and a 'landmark in the effort to decolonize public administration in this country' (2010: 72).

Although McNeish is also largely positive about the MAS project, he is more cautious and points out that while with the indigenous political victory of the MAS and Evo Morales, there remains significant opposition from the 'traditional elite' especially in the Santa Cruz department, and political parties (2008: 51). He suggests that:

> … while the government is fulfilling its pledges to reform the structure of land and resource ownership in the country, the ongoing public debates seem to indicate that the broad political platform of the MAS is crumbling at its edges as worker and peasant organisations express their frustration with the pace and scope of policy implementation (2008: 52).

The ratification of the Constitution has certainly not dampened many of the social tensions that the country has faced. At the time of writing, rifts were emerging among sectors of society that the MAS project had sought to unite. In some sectors, quarrels emerged among peasant and indigenous organisations over land, resources and access to new levels of 'autonomy' as provided by the new constitution.[31] Against this backdrop, criticisms of the MAS project were rising, indicatively from previous supporters.

Important for the Chiquitano case, the MAS political project faced much opposition from white and *mestizo* agro-industrial elites of the lowland before, during and after the Constituent Assembly. More specifically, from the political leaders and Civic Committees of the lowland departments Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija, known as the *media luna* ('half crescent'). These actors have articulated

[31] See various articles in news bulletins by *Fundación Tierra* (e.g. 15 September 2009a; 15 September 2009b).

demands for departmental autonomy since the 1990s and calls had intensified in response to the growing strength of the Bolivian indigenous movement and other popular sectors. In Santa Cruz department, elites wealth depends on soya cultivation and, to a lesser extent, cattle ranching, cotton and sugarcane cultivation (Urioste and Kay, 2005: 45-46). Apart from resenting that the indigenous movement challenges their traditionally privileged position within national political institutions, they are especially opposed to redistributive land reform which Evo Morales has been promoting (Eaton, 2007: 71; Gustafson, 2006: 360; Urioste and Kay, 2005: 45-47). They are hostile to the MAS stipulation that natural resources will belong to 'citizens' or the central state, and maintain that prefectures should have control over resources within their boundaries.

Therefore, they have pre-empted the acceptance of the 'indigenous first-people peasant autonomy' *('autonomía indígena originaria campesina')*, alongside departmental, regional, municipal autonomies by celebrating the ratification of their own 'autonomous statutes' (which, it should be added, had not gone through a public consultation process). Tellingly, the chosen date to do so coincided with the MAS government's celebration of the final draft of the new Bolivian Constitution on 14 December 2007 (Plata Quispe, 2008: 155-157). The Santa Cruz statutes contradict the Constitution approved in Oruro and lays claim to departmental jurisdiction over the management of natural resources. It envisages 'indigenous territories' as a form of agrarian property that can be recognised as indigenous municipal districts, but entities that should be subordinated to departmental regulations (Plata Quispe, 2008: 161). Clashes between the supporters of the new constitution and departmental claims have been ongoing.

The Multiple Meaning of Indigeneity in Bolivia

As demonstrated above, the label indigenous and indigeneity in Bolivia as elsewhere carry multiple meanings. These meanings matter precisely because 'being indigenous' (or for the matter, '*originario*') in Bolivia has through the 1990s neo-liberal multicultural reforms become a rights and resource-bearing identity and is closely linked to citizenship rights and practices. Further, it links the struggles of different groups' to global support networks and facilitates alliance building with powerful NGO allies and others who find themselves in similar situations (Canessa,

2007b; Kenrick and Lewis, 2004; Maybury-Lewis, 2002; Merlan, 2009: 204; Olesen, 2004; Warren and Jackson, 2002). Also the Chiquitano case shows a clear link between multicultural state policies and the spread of the 'indigeneity' marker for groups and self-identification (CICC et al., 2007). The CICC was originally founded as 'peasant' movement, but CICC leaders adapted the term 'indigenous' as part of the organisations name, parallel to the leaders' decision to claim the Monte Verde territorial title and participate in the 1995 municipal elections (CICC et al., 2007). Through adopting the label, Chiquitano leaders aimed to stress their entitlement to rights as 'Bolivians' and 'indigenous peoples'.

However, more recently, new meanings have become attached to the 'indigeneity' in Bolivia (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006, 2007a; McNeish, 2008). Through the articulation of a more inclusive urban-based indigeneity as articulated through the MAS political project, 'indigeneity' and 'indigenous issues', previously marginal to the Bolivian political sphere, have taken centre stage (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006, 2007a). This, in turn, filters through into the area of self-identification, which is evidenced, by the increase of indigenous self-identification among urban dwellers in the 2001 Census. Many of those who declared themselves 'indigenous' comprised Aymara migrants to the city, who in the past would have been likely to start identifying as '*mestizo*' to mark their increasing disassociation from rural culture (Canessa, 2007a: 199). This indicates that in contemporary Bolivia, 'indigenous' has replaced the twentieth century's '*mestizo*' as the 'iconic citizen' (Canessa, 2006: 255). Even urban creoles or *mestizos* self-identify as 'indigenous' to express their support for the MAS political project. This not only includes those who may be able to claim a degree of indigenous decent (which, as Canessa points out, in a country like Bolivia is 'the vast majority'), but also some individuals who are children of European immigrants (2007a: 208).

Notably, the 2001 Census also showed a de-coupling of 'indigeneity' from 'language', which according to definitions circulating in the international indigenous rights arena (see, for example, the 1989 ILO Convention 169) is seen as one of the key indicators for 'indigeneity'. While only 49.4 per cent indicated that they spoke

an indigenous language either as mother tongue or second language, many more Bolivians self-identified as indigenous (Canessa, 2006: 256).[32]

Views on this development are mixed. Anthropologist John McNeish perceives this increase in indigenous self-identification as a positive development and a 'sign that the idea of the indigenous is expanding into social sectors that, in the past, would never had considered the possibility of identifying with what has always been a negative, highly racialised category' (2008: 49). However, others have pointed out that the rise of indigeneity as political tool should not detract from the fact that the term's meaning varies starkly according to who employs or articulates the concept (Canessa, 2006, 2007a). National, regional or local leaders may employ it differently, they may alter their discourses according to the audience, and attach very different meanings to the term than other urban or rural people who may or may not identify as indigenous (see Albro, 2010; Canessa, 2006: 242). For example, Canessa (2006) points to the case of Pocobaya, an Aymara speaking highland community whose inhabitants associate 'indigenous' with less civilised lowland peoples.

But 'lowland Indians' might also not so readily be labelled 'indigenous' either. Some Chiquitano reject the label for self-identification outright. Comments by some Chiquitano reveal that while they may accept 'indigeneity' for *indio-permitido* style claims-making and to establish a difference to Concepceño white and *mestizo* 'others' deemed as 'more privileged' and therefore not eligible for special rights (most importantly, to communal land and to a territory), they consider the term as unacceptable for the purpose of self-identification. They are aware that although communicating with the state through the language of 'indigeneity' carries benefits, it also entails certain pitfalls (Suzman, 2003: 399-400), namely their continued subordination to 'white' ideas, concepts and policies. In their eyes, 'indigenous' has simply come to replace other labels (such as '*indio*') in their function of categorising and subordinating Chiquitano, revealing additional layers of the meaning of 'being indigenous' in Bolivia. A further discussion of these meanings features in Chapter V.

[32] Canessa remarks, that this confirms what is true for many Chiquitano, as well as many others who self-identify as indigenous, namely that 'language is a very poor indicator of indigenous identity' (Canessa, 2006: 256). In line with many other international and national actors who link 'language' to ethnicity', some Chiquitano perceive that speaking *chiquitano* would identify them as 'true Chiquitanos' (see Chapter V). For example, Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.

Chiquitano and the State: Antagonisms and Paradoxes

What this latter point reveals is how the engagement of Chiquitano activists and *comunarios* with the state leads to antagonisms (see Sider, 2003). Anthropologist Gerald Sider (2003) makes a compelling argument that the European onslaught has confronted Native American peoples

> … with *an unavoidable and irresolvable antagonism between their past and their present*. This antagonism is usually forced on Native Americans by their vulnerability in a larger society that simultaneously insists both on the "otherness" of dominated peoples and on their compliance with a larger set of constantly changing standards, laws, and practices (2003: 9).

Such 'antagonisms' are visible in different areas. Sider highlights, for example, contradictions between 'continuity and tradition', between 'work and production' and those that 'have become completely enmeshed in native social organisation' (2003: 9-16).

Antagonisms become apparent, for example, when individuals or their political organisations take on state-recognised forms of organisation and phrase their demands in a way that resonates with the official legal framework and citizenship regime (for example, by stressing 'indigeneity'), while on the other hand, they struggle against the 'assimilation' that this entails. My argument here draws on Morton Fried's (1967) and James Scott's notions that the 'state' implies some sort of process, one of 'restructuring' and 'making legible', which is for Scott 'a central problem for statecraft' (1998: 2). The aim at increasing 'legibility', is to simplify the 'classic state functions of taxation, conscription, prevention of rebellion' (1998: 2). Albro, who has recently also turned to Scott to describe the Bolivian scenario, holds that 'state efforts to standardize legal language and to consolidate particular citizenship rights are among the most important ways that states keep track of their subjects' (2010: 72-73; see also Friedlander, 2006; Sider, 2003).

Increasing the 'legibility' of population, territory and, we may add, resources, must necessarily be reifying, as it involves a process of legal codification. In turn, if citizens want to engage with the state to advance claims around rights or resources, they must fit into state defined categories to be 'legible' from the side of state actors. This not only restricts the population to using state terminology, but also state organisational forms. A similar case has been made by a number of Amazonian anthropologists when explaining the emergence of ethnic federations among

Amazonian peoples in response to state pressures (Brown, 1991; Rosengren, 2003; Rubenstein, 2001). As Albro points out, in the case of 'indigeneity' this renders 'some forms of indigenous identity more "legible" than others' (2010: 72), i.e. state-sanctioned forms, which are in turn, linked to the enjoyment of indigenous citizenship rights (also Conklin and Graham, 1995; Povinelli, 1998). A further consideration of this issue, alongside a conceptual clarification of the uses of 'state' and 'citizenship' in the context of this thesis, forms the subject of Chapter II.

Chapter III provides the methodological discussion regarding the multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork I carried out from September 2006 until August 2007 mainly in the eastern Bolivian municipality of Concepción. My research of Chiquitano-state relations was necessary multi-sited, reflecting the multi-sited character of the state itself. The chapter reflects on this, the advantages and difficulties in carrying out research as part of research teams, as well as on the challenges of side-taking in a research environment with entrenched power structures.

A thread running through the different chapters of this thesis is that state impositions do not go uncontested from the side of Chiquitano *comunarios*. Apart from the attempt to challenge and interact with the state on a political level and through their organisations, Chiquitano resistance continues to reside in the *comunidades* social relations and modes of identification. Chiquitano history shows the emergence and reproduction of social relations in the face of *empadronamiento* (forced labour on *haciendas*) and displacement, as Chiquitano settlements continued to re-emerge and exist. The historical aspects of Chiquitano-state relations and of different Bolivian citizenship regimes are the subject of Chapter IV.

In the Chiquitano case, this paradoxical relationship with state actors becomes especially obvious, when considering three interlinked areas: self- and group identification, territoriality and local political participation. Chapter V addresses the first area, self-identification. The Chiquitano case demonstrates that while the use of the term 'indigenous' does not preclude pragmatism and agency from the side of those who employ it, it should not be forgotten that adopting such an essentialising state-sanctioned label entails dangers. Indeed, in a municipality like Concepción, where white and *mestizo* Cruceños have controlled access to politics, land and other resources, 'indigeneity' has been the *only* tool available to gain access to certain rights, such as land titles and access to the political sphere. The chapter

addresses this, together with the above-mentioned criticisms that some Chiquitano reserve for the label, in the broader context of the rise of Bolivian ethnic movements since the 1960s and the emergence of the Chiquitano organisation of Concepción.

Chapter VI addresses how Chiquitano-state interactions have given rise to antagonisms with respect to Chiquitano future visions regarding the Monte Verde territory.[33] Jointly with their sister organisations in San Javier and Lomerío, the Chiquitano organisation of Concepción has been struggling for the territory since the mid-1990s. The mobilisation for Monte Verde was primarily fuelled by the above-mentioned INRA Law, passed in 1996 as part of the Bolivian government's neo-liberal multicultural policy. The Law stipulated that Monte Verde, along with other lands claimed by indigenous groups, could gain status as *Tierras Comunitarias de Origen* (TCO – Original Communal Lands). It inspired Chiquitano leaders to formulate their political project in terms of indigeneity to be able to legally lay claim to the territory.

This prolonged dispute has left its mark on Chiquitano territoriality. This becomes obvious, not least when considering that many Chiquitano not only construct the land as ancestral (compare Hill, 1988a; Reeve, 1988), but also as 'indigenous territory' that will be ordered according to 'zones of use' and whose resources will be 'sustainably exploited', reflecting terminology of the INRA law. Paradoxically, in order to 'keep' the territory and justify the claim, Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* have to construct in a way that state actors accept it. While some leaders and *comunarios* embrace the sustainability logic, others mistrust the emphasis on productive projects.[34]

Chapter VII focuses on a third type of Chiquitano-state relation: Chiquitano involvement in municipal politics. Chiquitano have taken advantage of the 1994 decentralisation reforms and participated in local elections, with the main aim of gaining political leverage in order to advance their territorial claim. The Chiquitano *central* of Concpeción managed to get their candidate, Justo Seoane, elected as

[33] This struggle is particularly noteworthy, because it's lengthy and conflictive nature and because the territory has formed the centre of Chiquitano-state engagement over the past fifteen years. It has repeatedly received press coverage and the legal process has been documented in significant detail by CEJIS (1999; 2000; 2001; 2006) in the organisation's publication series *'Artículo Primero'* .

[34] Chiquitano share these dilemmas with many other peoples in South American countries where 'modern resource management schemes' might actually distort indigenous peoples 'territorial vision' that might be based in 'relational spaces' rather than a space 'divided into zones of utility' (see García Hierro and Surrallés, 2005: 10-11).

mayor in the 2005 poll and Chiquitano *comunidades* have gained access to the local political sphere through their OTBs. Nevertheless, power politics in the locality remained entrenched, and paradoxes have merged in two main areas. The first is visible in the way that once in power, Chiquitano politicians found that they had to articulate their projects in the language of neo-liberal multiculturalism which overlapped with that of the local elite: the marginal Chiquitano communities have to be 'developed' and turned into market producers.

Secondly, Chiquitano politicians have participated in the local election since 1995, and in 1999 and 2004 through MAS affiliation. This paralleled the situation of other indigenous candidates throughout the country, who needed to be formally registered with a political party to be able to participate.[35] This posed a problem for Chiquitano, because the Concepceño elite (like the rest of the Cruceño elite) was strongly opposed to the MAS project from the start, especially fearing that MAS proposals for land reform would fuel Chiquitano claims for land and resources. This fear was heightened during the Constituent Assembly debates, especially when the lowland umbrella federation, CIDOB, started to demand 'indigenous autonomies'. The Concepceños' rhetoric fused the above factors into a scenario in which they perceived Chiquitano to be in 'cahoots' with 'left-wing highland *indios*'. In consequence, Chiquitano people engaged in 'political activities' were seen as trouble makers, and that 'being indigenous', and especially a politically active '*indígena*' in Concepción was automatically linked to the Morales project. At the end, the local political elite managed to derail the Chiquitano project completely, by ousting mayor Justo Seoane through a coup-style manoeuvre in August 2007.[36] The chapter therefore argues that the ascent of the MAS and developments in the Bolivian national political sphere has not necessarily lead to the advancement of 'indigenous rights', in Concepción this rather served to provide further ammunition and justification to delegitimise Chiquitano claims in the eyes of Concepceños.

The third part of the chapter focuses on the introduction of new state structures in the form of OTBs into the *comunidades*, here the evidence suggests that

[35] Nearly indigenous candidates participated in the elections through allegiances to one or another of the larger existing parties because the electoral court had rejected the application to attain 'legal personality' of Indian parties (Behrendt, 2000: 14; McKee, 1999: 5)

[36] See *El Deber* (6 September 2007). The term 'Concepceño' is employed to refer to the white and *mestizo* population of Concepción. The white and *mestizo* economic (and political) elite are also referred to as the Concepceño elite. The elite are predominantly members of the three most powerful Concepceño families.

Chiquitano *comunarios* have resisted homogenising tendencies. Instead they have made the structure functional to their communal organisations. Evidence suggests a levelling effect on communal power structures, than creating a hierarchy which increased state interaction might suggest (see Clastres, 1989; Fried, 1967, 1975; Rosengren, 2003; Rubenstein, 2001).

In sum, while Chiquitano have enjoyed certain successes in gaining access to the local political sphere and to communal and territorial titles, it is generally state actors who have had the final word on the terms of this engagement. I argue that this means that the '*indio permitido*' has indeed *not* been circumvented in Bolivia. It continues to exist, especially in those parts of the country where the state bureaucracy is controlled by individuals whose interest it to keep 'Indians' out of the political sphere and away from controlling resources, especially land. Despite this, resistance resides, more subtly, in the Chiquitano *comunidades* which keep reproducing Chiquitano social relations and beings (cf. Conklin and Morgan, 1996). Finally, this thesis throws up the question of whether it is ever possible, that 'indigenous people' can be incorporated into the state power structure in a meaningful way, i.e. one that truly accommodate ways to secure Chiquitano sociality.

Chapter II

Chiquitano and the State: Conceptualising the State and Citizenship

This chapter outlines the conceptual framework employed throughout this thesis. To shed light on the different state actors that Chiquitano *comunarios* in Concepción Municipality interact with, it problematises the treatment of state and civil society as dichotomous – a view that hides the close connection between civil society actors (Foweraker, 1995; Foweraker and Landman, 1997; for example, McAdam et al., 1996; Offe, 1985; Tilly, 2004). It posits that a conceptualisation of the state as a power structure (Abrams, 1988) facilitates the analysis of civil society – state relations, as it allows for an examination of the processes that constitute the local political arena. It reveals this as a sphere of intense interaction between diverse international, national and local actors that might all act as part of the state. As the case of Chiquitano demonstrates, multiple actors, such as local governmental agents, the Chiquitano social movement (the *central*) and NGOs at times form part of the state. They are all also at times involved in the process of making Chiquitano socio-political and economic practices and the land they live on, more 'legible' (Scott, 1998: 2).

The first part of this chapter focuses on conceptualisations of the state. Especially pertinent when considering the emergence of new forms of organisation and modes of identification among Amazonian people, is Scott's (1998) notion of 'legibility through simplification', which resonates with Morton Fried's notion that 'the state is devoted to expansion – of its population, of its territory, of its physical and ideological power' and that states, 'quickly set about converting its environing societies into parts or counterparts of itself' (1967: 240).[1] Philip Abrams (1988) abandons the idea of the state as a 'thing' and argues that what actually expands, is the state idea and organisational forms, rather than its territory.

Such notions help explain why interaction with state actors in the case of Amazonian populations has often resulted in the creation of more hierarchical (or 'taproot') structures (Rosengren, 2003). Nevertheless, the section also highlights that populations may resist attempts to make them legible, or re-structure their forms

[1] Also see Fried (1975).

organisation, in diverse ways. This may be subtle and take the form of re-shaping, or attaching new meanings (or labels) to organisational forms.

The second part of this chapter addresses the concept of citizenship. Viewing the state in such a fragmented way, as located at different sites, and embodied by various actors, signifies normative definitions of citizenship (i.e. Marshall, 2009 [1950]) have to be rethought. In order to analyse citizen's interaction with the diverse state actors, this thesis views citizenship as a set or practices. Furthermore, attention needs to shift from the nation-state as the sole political community to other communities that are relevant to peoples' citizenship practices. Still, I argue that this should not shift attention entirely away from normative conceptions of citizenship that focus on 'rights and responsibilities'. After all, citizenship provides an important tool that citizens employ to address state actors and demand changes to prevalent citizenship frameworks. In the case of indigenous peoples, this has entailed demands for 'special rights' and collective rights into state's citizenship frameworks.

The penultimate section of the chapter addresses the Bolivian neo-liberal multicultural citizenship regime, which transformed the citizenship practices of many indigenous groups, as they intended to make use of the new sets of rights. It follows the arguments of authors that such policies entail an expansion, rather than delimitation, of the states discriminatory powers (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007; Povinelli, 1998). The final section of the chapter provides a brief overview over the citizenship practices Chiquitano of Concepción municipality may engage in. This is followed by a description the state actors Chiquitano *comunarios* in Concepción municipality engage with on a regular basis.

Theories of the State

Current debates on the state have been influenced by the writings of Max Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx. According to Weber (1994) the modern state monopolises the means of legitimate physical violence over a well-defined territory (which may include the armed forces, civil service or state bureaucracy, courts and police). Moreover, the legitimacy of this monopoly is of a very special kind – a 'rational-legal' legitimacy, based on impersonal rules that constrain the power of

state elites.[2] The toquevillian perspective percieves the state as an autonomous structure of power in its own right, with distinct properties of its own, that cannot be reduced to any single set of social interests outside the state (Nugent, 1994a: 334). Skocpol summarises Alexis de Tocqueville's view:

> … states matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials. They matter because their organisational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others) (1985: 21).

In turn, Karl Marx saw the modern state as emerging out of bourgeois interests and saw the state as opposed to civil society – it is made up of (bourgeois) administrators who look after their own interests, i.e. they 'administer the state against civil society' (1992: 111). Consequently, Marxist scholars generally assert that state formation in modern states can be explained primarily in terms of the interests and struggles of social classes, and the state as tool in the hand of capitalist classes (see Skocpol, 1985: 25-27).

Political scientist Theda Skocpol's views of the state are mainly inspired by Weber and de Tocqueville. She reads the state as an autonomous actor while paying attention to the 'capacity' of states to implement official goals 'especially over the actual potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances' (1985: 9). From this perspective, 'the investigator looks more macroscopically at the ways in which the structures and activities of states unintentionally influence the formation of groups and the political capacities, ideas, and demands of various sectors of society' (1985: 21). Consequently, analysing forms of collective action through which groups make political demands (or political leaders seek to mobilise support), gives an indication of the different ways in which states 'conduct decision-making, coercive, and adjudicative activities' (1985: 22). While this is a useful notion, allowing inferences about the nature and goals of states, describing a state as a fixed entity, or a certain set of formal and informal institutions or agencies, leaves much to the imagination of what these institutions or agencies actually entail and how they function.

[2] Criticism of this perspective has come from writers who noted that this definition of state clashes with realities in countries where states may not have a complete monopoly over the means of legitimate physical violence over a definite territory, or their legitimacy may not be adequately described as 'rational-legal' (for example, Evans et al., 1985).

In this regard, Marx-inspired sociologist Philip Abrams' (1988) perspective is more insightful. He criticises political sociology and some Marxian perspectives for researching the separation of state and civil society and argues for a move away from the perception of the state as a distinct entity apart from society. This, he argues, serves to 'collapse the identity of state rather than clarify it' (1988: 60). He notes that: 'both academic and practical political research tend towards the conclusion that there is a hidden reality in politics, a backstage institutionalisation of political power behind onstage agencies of government … and that it may plausibly be identified as "the state"' (1988: 63). His view holds that the reification of the state as a 'thing' should be abandoned while the state 'idea' should be taken 'extremely seriously' (1988: 75). According to Abrams, the state:

> … is a third order object, an ideological project. It is first and foremost an exercise in legitimation – and what is being legitimised is, we may assume, something which if seen directly and as itself would be illegitimate, an unacceptable domination … what is legitimised is, insofar as it is legitimated, real power (1988: 77-78).

He makes a distinction between the state-system ('a palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centred in government and more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given society') and the state-idea ('projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies at different times') (1988: 82). Further, he argues that:

> The state comes into being as a structuration within political practice; it starts its life as an implicit construct; it is then reified – as the *republica*, the public reification, no less – and acquires an overt symbolic identity progressively divorced from practice as an illusory account of practice (1988: 82).

The question remains why states require to be imagined in a certain way and why they seek to shape populations in a way that is functional to the state. Here it is insightful to draw on Morton Fried's (1967) and James Scott's (1998) notions. Both emphasise that states aim at expansion and making society 'legible'.[3] Marxist Fried described the 'state' as a specific type of stratified society, a 'complex of institutions by means of which the power of the society is organised on a basis superior to kinship' (1967: 229). The state is then:

[3] In fact, Fried does not dismiss 'state' as a term, as he notes others have done. He argues that: 'it is not a matter of determining the "true" meaning of a word but stating clearly what that word is to mean in our usage and why it is advantageous to use it that way' (1967: 229).

> a collection of specialised institutions and agencies, some formal and others informal that maintains an order of stratification. … The state must maintain itself externally as well as internally, and it attempts this by both physical and ideological means, by supporting military forces and by establishing an identity among other similar units (Fried, 1967: 235).[4]

He takes the Weberian view the state must establish and maintain sovereignty, which may be considered the identification and monopoly of paramount control over a population and an area' (1967: 237). Sophistication brings the realisation that this can be created through legitimacy, i.e. controlling sources of information and means of communication, rather than a reliance on 'naked power' (1967: 238). This notion also underlies the *indio permitido* (Hale, 2002, 2004) and the Bolivian neo-liberal multicultural reforms, which aimed to create state legitimacy and establishing hierarchical structures at the periphery. Fried further notes that 'more than any other from of human association, the state is devoted to expansion – of its population, of its territory, of its physical and ideological power' (1967: 240).

This resonates with James Scott's (1998) argument that the emergence of the 'modern state' meant increasing attempts at legibility and simplification in areas such as weights and measures, cadastral surveys, population registers, the invention of freehold tenure, standardisation of language and legal discourse, the design of cities and organisation of transport. He argues that sedentarisation is the 'state's attempt to make a society more legible, to 'arrange' the population in ways that simplifies the 'classic state functions of taxation, conscription, prevention of rebellion', this

[4] Fried disputes Hoebel's claim that the state (like political organisation) is universal, and sets out to describe the differences between kinds of societies in terms of their political structures. He describes what he calls 'egalitarian society', 'rank society', 'stratified society' and 'the state'. He does not deny 'power' or 'politics' in any of the different types of society, but points to the multiple ways that they are constituted. Apart from the title of the book, he also sees the emergence less in terms of a 'natural evolution' towards states, but in a shift away from kinship relations as a prime organiser. This occurs as a result of weakening bonds of kinship in the face of an enlarged population, and in a shift from ways of containing power to a move of power concentration. As he notes: 'it is the task of maintaining general social order that stands at the heart of the development of the state' (1967: 230).

legibility he sees as 'a central problem for statecraft' (1998: 2).[5] However, this does not mean that a population's relation to the state cannot be productive or must necessarily be oppositional. As the notion of *indio permitido* and spread of 'indigeneity' as mode of identification under neo-liberal multicultural reforms show, states might also foster the formation of communities, 'identities' or organisations (Anderson, 1991; Fried, 1975; Nugent, 1994a; Sider, 1987)

The Ethnography of the State

Taking up some of the above ideas, anthropologists have highlighted the symbolic nature of the state, which like communities (see Anderson, 1991; Cohen, 1985a), need to be imagined: 'The state system is a congeries of functions, bureaus, and levels spread across different sites. Given this institutional and geographical dispersion, an enormous amount of culture work has to be undertaken to construct "the state" as a singular object' (Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 281).[6] This work involves circulating governmental and popular representations of the state through the mass media, political mobilisation and rumour. Such representations may be created by elections, wars and national crises, but also everyday material objects like money, certificates that bear the stamp the state (Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 278-279).

These practices also serve to establish state actors as somehow above the ordinary citizen. They foster an imagine of the state as entity with spatial properties of verticality and encompassment to produce a 'taken-for-granted spatial and scalar image of a state that both sits above and contains its localities, regions, and

[5] Scott notes, that such schemes have generally failed, because the 'designed or planned social order is necessarily schematic and it always ignores central features of any real, functioning social order' (1998: 5). Furthermore, he argues that 'formal schemes of order are untenable without some elements of the practical knowledge that they tend to dismiss' (1998: 7). Notably, Foucault disagrees with attempts to deduce the modern activities of government from 'essential properties and propensities of the state, in particular its supposed propensity to grow and swallow up or colonise everything around itself' (Gordon, 1991: 4). Foucault holds that the state has no such inherent tendencies as the state has no essence. Instead, he sees the nature of the institutions of the state as 'a function of changes in practices of government, rather than converse' and maintains that 'political theory attends too much to institutions, and too little to practices' (Gordon, 1991: 4). However, viewing the state as a 'power structure' (constituted by a set of practices) and a symbolic construction does not distract from the fact that this power structure might be able to shape populations or individuals in certain ways, and most likely in a fashion that is functional to the state.

[6] This also means that a construction of a state as a singular object can never be achieved. As Benei notes: 'regardless of what goes on within the state pyramid, what most social actors experience is the *fragmentary* nature of the nation-state's project in the production of the nation, the region, or the locality' (2006: 295).

communities' (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 982).[7] Authors have called this the 'spatialisation' of the state or as 'spatial practice' (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 981-982; Lefebvre, 1991; Rubenstein, 2001). Such images of stacked, vertical levels permeate descriptions of many political processes. For example, institutions of global governance such as the IMF and the WTO, are commonly viewed as being 'above' national states, as much as states are seen 'above' the grass-roots, or 'local' level (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 990).

This imagery also has specific implications for the idea of 'civil society'. Gupta and Ferguson note that it often involves 'a quite specific, if often unacknowledged, image of vertical encompassment, one in which the state sits somehow "above" an "on the ground" entity called "society"' (2002: 982). Western political theory has opposed civil society to the state. [8] Prominent sociologists, political scientists and historians often seen it as 'non-state, non-market and non-family' zone, or 'intermediary entity', in which social movements, institutions or other types of formal or informal association are located (see Diamond, 1994: 5; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 29; Volk, 1997: 16; Waisman, 1999: 43).[9]

However, such imagery can be problematic. Firstly, the supposed location of international actors 'above' the state may hide the way that transnational

[7] Verticality 'refers to the central and pervasive idea of the state as *an* institution somehow "above" civil society, community, and family. Thus, state planning is inherently "top down" and state actions are efforts to manipulate and plan "from above", while "the grassroots" contrasts with the state precisely in that it is "below," closer to the ground, more authentic, and more "rooted"' (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 982). While *encompassment* is the notion that 'the state (conceptually fused with the nation) is located within an ever widening series of circles that begins with family and local community and ends with the system of nation-states. This is a profoundly consequential understanding of scale, one in which the locality is encompassed by the region, the region by the nation-state, and the nation-state by the international community' (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 982).

[8] For Hegel, 'the state was literally "mind objectified", and civil society precisely the intermediary between the foundational natural particularity of the family and the ideal universality of the state. The state was therefore "higher" than civil society (ethically as well as politically) and also encompassed it' (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 983)

[9] There are, of course, other issues with such often broad and vague civil society definitions and 'non-state, non-market and non-family' - notions. For example, Larry Diamond goes on to say that 'it excludes individual and family life, inward-looking group activity (e.g. for recreation, entertaining or spirituality), the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms and political efforts to take control of the state' (1994: 5). The notion of the supposed 'inward looking' nature such certain groups is problematic. For example, reasons for participation in sports or religious groups can be complex. It might be tied to constraints that individuals experience to participation in other entities. One scenario is that participation in a women's football team might challenge the prevailing gendered rules of behaviour existing in a society. There is nothing to suggest that getting together in supposedly 'recreational settings' does not involve a reflection on the wider political sphere of the country, or personal constraints in everyday live. There is also an issue regarding Diamond's public and private dichotomy, a topic amply discussed in feminist literature and research on women's movements (for example, Thornton, 1991; Wright, 1997).

organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and 'First World' governments often work closely together. Or rather, as Gupta and Ferguson point out, such actors actually 'rule' 'Third World states' through imposing policies on 'Third World' states against a backdrop of structural adjustment (see Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 992). Secondly, it hides the role Western development agencies, charities, transnational grassroots organisations and voluntary organisations may become involved in governing populations, as well as providing services to people at the 'local level' and therefore taking over the role as welfare providers (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 990; Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 280).

Furthermore, a perceived state-civil society dichotomy created through such a vertical state imagery, hides the close connection between civil society actors (such as social movements) and governments, a close connection that many scholars concerned with social movements have long acknowledged (Foweraker, 1995; Foweraker and Landman, 1997; for example, McAdam et al., 1996; Offe, 1985; Tilly, 2004).[10] For example, social movements may emerge as a reaction to the failure of institutionalised forms of interest mediation (parties, parliaments, etc.), or due to state enablement, for instance when governments promote corporatist structures (Foweraker, 1995: 62, 66). Additionally, in the Latin American context, social movements often develop close contact with (especially local) state administrations, because they are the main source of scarce resources (Foweraker, 2001: 842). As addressed below, an overlap between civil society and state functions has also been fostered through the restructuring of civil society-state relations as part of neo-liberal policies (Foweraker, 2001: 850 see also Cammack, 1995 and Taylor, 1998).

Apart from social movements, there are a host of other so-called civil society organisations, whose activities make it difficult to judge where civil society ends and the state starts: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the supposed 'paragons of development action' (Macdonald, 1995: 32).[11] These proliferated in developing countries throughout the 1980s, when multilateral and bilateral development

[10] Variously, authors see such close links as either necessary and desirable or detrimental (see Offe, 1985).

[11] In terms of defining NGOs, there is a consensus among authors that the generally agreed basic definition of 'non-governmental' and 'non- profit' is very vague (Fisher, 1997: 442; Krut, 1997: 7). As Krut notes: 'due to its loose meaning, the term (NGO) can be used quite loosely to describe any association of people, from youth groups to the Mafia' (1997: 8). For attempts to define NGOs, see Macdonald (1995: 32), Clarke (1998: 36-37) and Murphy and Bendell's (1999: 5-6)

agencies used them to channel increasing amounts of funding (Clarke, 1998: 37).[12] The concerns of NGOs are diverse: from the promotion of human rights, to issues around democratisation and service delivery.[13] That NGOs may not be so non-governmental becomes clear when considering that governmental and international agency policies and financial backing has encouraged the growth of many NGOs, and they often function as quasi- sub-contracted agents of governments in carrying out development policies (Gideon, 1998: 311-112; Grugel, 2000: 95; Hulme and Edwards, 1997: 964).[14] Other close ties between governments and NGOs exist in areas such as policy making, service provision at local level (as NGOs often take over service provision), the sharing of information and even exchange of personnel (see Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 993).[15]

Indeed, as can be observed in the case of the Chiquitano organisations and their NGO allies, not just the NGO-state distinction is increasingly blurred. Social movements may share personnel with NGOs and the local state administration, while NGO-social movement everyday practices are often tightly interwoven. In sum, when paying attention to the practices state and civil society actors engage in, the state may look like civil society and vice-versa (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 991). Actors spatialised as 'international', 'national', 'or 'local' may engage in very similar practices and can simultaneously constitute the state with respect to certain population.

[12] They earned this reputation due to their alleged efficiency, small size and commitment for helping 'the poor', as well as closeness to the 'grassroots'. This portrays them as 'people-to-people organisations capable of creating direct links between people in the 'North and South' and a tool for 'providing a human face to the problems of development' (Macdonald, 1995: 32). Also Ewig (1999: 76).

[13] For a discussion of the 'evolution' of the agenda of the European 'NGO community', see Grugel (2000: 87-88)., Macdonald (1995) and Ewig (1999: 86)

[14] Authors have also questioned the supposed non-profit nature of such organisations. As NGOs expand they increasingly resemble businesses, especially larger and international NGOs, which manage funds, employ staff and pay wages 'which a medium sized company would envy'. *The Economist* (27 January 2000). Also see Murphy and Bendell (1999: 5).

[15] For example, Bebbington notes that due to crisis instigated by lack of financial sustainability, increasing dependency, staff loss and legitimacy crisis, Andean NGOs seem to be in a process of institutional transition, shifting towards implementing programmes designed by governments and donor agencies. Thus, the difference, between them and commercial subcontractors becomes blurred (1997: 1759). In term of information sharing, between governments and NGOs, see *The Economist* (27 January 2000).

The State, Legibility and Amazonian Peoples

The notions of Abrams (1988), Fried (1967; 1975) and Scott (1998) are especially pertinent when considering issues of group formation and political articulation among Amazonian peoples. The process of extending state sovereignty into Amazonian areas has taken place through diverse state actors, whose activities generally involved making Amazonian peoples functional to the countries' political economy. During colonial and republican times, this meant that the generic 'Indian' sufficed as denominator for the workforce in many geographical areas. This changed, especially during the twentieth century, with the arrival of missionaries, bilingual education projects and increasing struggles for communal and land titles. Ethnic identities gained new importance, as rights to land, resources and distinct treatment by state authorities in areas such as education, became linked to membership in distinct ethnic groups: 'tribal boundaries and affiliations emerged as powerful political categories' (Brown, 1993: 316).

The notions of ethnic identities that consequently emerged from colonial to contemporary times are often essentialising, as they are based on a what anthropologist Dan Rosengren calls the 'taproot model', a 'Western geo-political' perception of Amazonian society as 'an ethnic mosaic formed by autonomous and self-reproducing groups' which disregards the 'links that interconnect the various groups' (2003: 222). It also assumes an organic link 'between people, place, and language' (Rosengren, 2003: 222). This may contrast starkly with the 'rhizomic model' that more closely describes many Amazonian groups' modes of self-other distinction, which is based on:

> a nonbounded and expansive relational identification process with multiple points of rooting. The rhizomic metaphor provides a perspective on society that stresses similarities and links, as well as the complementarity of differences; culture is, in accordance, associated with history and no crucial distinctions are made in regard to origins (Rosengren, 2003: 223).

In such models, speaking the language and descent are often subordinate to following the rules of sociability.[16]

Through portraying themselves as distinct ethnic entities, indigenous people could engage with the state and, in turn, the state extended its sovereignty and policies over the now 'legible' peoples. Thus, through creating 'difference', the state paradoxically 'claims sovereignty over an undifferentiated subject' (Rubenstein, 2001: 287). This can be exemplified by considering the case of the Ecuadorean Shuar. As Rubenstein describes, interaction with Salesians in the twentieth century sparked the conversion of Shuar into 'citizens'. While Salesians began to established a difference between Shuar and non-Shuar through their differential treatments of Catholics and those to be converted, the establishment of a Shuar reserve in 1935 'codified' the ethnic boundary. The reserve created a clearly defined Shuar region, and allowed for the defence of 'Shuar land' against non-Shuar settler 'intrusion' (Rubenstein, 2001: 279). This resembles the Chiquitano situation, where the land struggle led to the adoption of the 'indigeneity' marker for group-and self-identification, a more exclusive Chiquitano identity (see Chapter V), and the identification of a defined 'Chiquitano territory' (see Chapter VI).

The emergence of such ethnic identities has frequently gone hand-in hand with the development of ethnic movements that formed to demand or defend land and resources. While such movements are portrayed as a way to 'defend indigenous peoples' rights, as in the case of other civil society groups attention has to be paid to the way in which these may 'constitute the state'. To exemplify this point, we may refer again to Rubenstein's study of the Shuar. The Shuar Federation was established in 1964 with the help of a Salesian Priest who saw the need to create an institution to deal with missionaries, local settlers and government. Apart from having the responsibility of building infrastructure and chapels, the organisation soon took on the role of organising education, registering births and in general, 'to provide an

[16] Rosengren describes for the case of the Matsigenka, who live in the *montaña* of southeastern Peru whose engagement with state actors is relative recent, that the two models coexist, but conflict with each other. He compares this to the situation of the Kayapó of central Brazil, concluding that the: 'frequent disruptions within Amazon ethnopolitical movements are produced by the imposition of an alien mode of defining social groups, which conflicts with fundamental tenets in Amazonian world views. Accordingly, the organizational problems follow from neither bad leadership nor from peoples' irresponsibility and indifference as they, in these conflicts, usually act in accordance to locally expected norms of behaviour' (2003: 236-237). Note that Tim Ingold (2000, Chapter 8) puts forward a similar argument.

institutional basis for economic modernization' (2001: 280). Consequently, the Shuar moved from a rhizomic to a hierarchical taproot model (Rosengren, 2003) – from an egalitarian social organization to one with a democratically elected leadership. It thus became what Morton Fried calls a 'secondary tribe': a 'socio-political phenomenon, brought about by the intercession of more complexly ordered societies, states in particular' (1975: 114).

Chiquitano history also demonstrates the simultaneously coercive but enabling nature of state power. As will be addressed in Chapter V, the Chiquitano *central* of Concepción emerged in 1985 due to state pressures in the form of excessive demands for Chiquitano labour, allied to white and *mestizo* encroachment on their land. Their organisational efforts were facilitate by union organisers who provided valuable political experience. Chiquitano also received support from departmental development corporations, NGOs and indigenous umbrella groups whose foundation preceded that of the *central*. Like the Ecuadorean Shuar Federation, the Chiquitano *central* of Concepción is hierarchically structured and interacts with different state levels. It carries out many of the functions that the sub-prefecture and municipality fulfil for non-Chiquitano citizens in the locality. It provides legal aid, registers births, organises identification documents and arranges diverse productive and infrastructural projects. It has also been the main legal entity to take forward the claim for a Chiquitano territory. In short, like the Shuar federation, it often functions as a state institution.

The Chiquitano case also shows that populations might structure themselves in a state-like manner in order to interact with the state, or to be taken seriously by it. The organisations are 'state like' and hierarchical, or 'fractal' to the state, which simultaneously facilitates interaction with other elements of the 'state' power structure – the state cannot 'see' or engage with rhizomic organisational forms.[17] This becomes obvious when considering the comment of Chiquitano *comunario* Tomás Parachai, from the small *comunidad* San Juan de Limones in San Javier Municipality, regarding the transformation of communal organisational structures in response to the 1994 Law of Popular participation (to be discussed below):

[17] In a way states can only see organisational forms that are 'fractal' to it, i.e. that to certain degree resemble its own organisational form. An analogy might be the nature of the military hierarchy, where each brigade has the same conformation as the next level; this is supposed to simplify communication (and control) amongst the different levels. The idea of 'fractal' was coined by Benoît Mandelbrot in 1975 and derives from the Latin fractus ('broken', 'fractured'), see Mandelbrot (1982).

> Well a *comunidad* is where there are various families and all the families get together and plan and choose their leaders and so like this they are recognised [by] the municipality, or [by] an organisation. Through the authorities, the very *comunidad* … represents itself, and so they say that "they are a *comunidad* that is organised", or "it is organised so that we take [the *comunidad*] into consideration".[18]

Group Formation and Identification: Pressures, Negotiations and Pragmatism

Nevertheless, as Gerald Sider notes, ethnic group formation ('the creation of cultures and peoples') is more complex, less planned and more resistance permeated. It involves a process of 'create and incorporate', as well as distancing in which both, resistance and collusion take their variant shapes (1987: 11, 17). Sider argues that acquiring a deeper understanding of the history of ethnic group formation, involves an appreciation of 'the paradoxes, contradictions, and disjunctions' that can be seen in the process (1987: 4). At stake is 'not simply the creation of ethnic identities within domination, but the creation and self-creation of peoples who genuinely stand apart, outside-as well as within' (1987: 23). After all, internal group dynamics and agency might aim to resist state pressures, or divert the pressures by transforming them.

This can be exemplified by considering the areas of external- and self-identification. While colonial authorities employed rigid racial labels to denote different population groups to facilitate social control and maintain the social differences necessary to ensure the workings of the colonial economic system, the emerging ethnic identities remain fluid. No matter how hard state actors try to create identities, cultures, or organisational forms, they may not resonate with the groups they are trying to identify, nor can such categories be essential. There is no essential 'culture' and 'identity' or some ideal cultural purity which can be 'dressed up' and then eventually 'be unearthed' (see Gow, 1993; Veber, 1998). In Raddings' words, they are 'processes of becoming' (2005: 121).

Hanne Veber proposes that instead of viewing 'change in native culture … as involving processes where the distinct characteristics of the original native are gradually dissolved' we can conceive it via recourse to new social movements

[18] *'Bueno, una comunidad es donde hay varias familias y dentro de todas las familias se reúnen y planifican y ponen su dirigentes para que así mismo sea reconocida, o sea al municipio, a una organización. Mediante las autoridades que la misma comunidad pone entonces la persona va y se presenta, entonces ya dicen que ellas ya son una comunidad que también se han organizado, o esta organizada entonces para tomarla en cuenta'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.

theory, which helps seeing 'these phenomena as socially constructed and continuously negotiated processes and action systems through which the world is being reimagined and reshaped' (1998: 382-383). As Alberto Melucci posits:

> Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place. … Collective identity formation is a delicate process and requires continual investments (1989: 34-35, italics in original)

Additionally, if we perceive collective identities, and the communities they stand for, as socially constructed and shared definitions, attention has to be paid to how such identities and communities are experienced by its members.[19] For example, in the case of the Chiquitano, colonial administrators realised that they 'could not reduce colonized peoples to one homogenous category', such as '*los naturales*' ('the natives'), but had to 'deal with multiple and shifting ethnic polities in negotiations for trade and labour, and in warfare' (Radding, 2005: 160). After all, 'cultural identities and political affiliations changed over time through concurrent patterns of congregation and migration that brought different linguistic and kin groups into the pueblos' (Radding, 2005: 137). Consequently, in the Chiquitanía a number of other categories continued to be used in mission records and those of provincial governors. Among these were: Manazica, Manapeca, Paiconeca, Paunaca, Mococa, Morotoca, Zamuco, Covareca, Piñoca, and Guarañoca (Radding, 2005: 124).[20]

Also the way that contemporary Chiquitano employ the label for self-identification and expressing commonalities and groupness demonstrates how 'colonized people reworked these categories into cultural identities that connoted lines of commonality and affiliation, as well as boundaries of difference and exclusion – expressed through territorial claims, linguistic patterns and societal

[19] Such a view also fares well with the symbolic approaches of Anderson, Barth and Cohen. Symbolic approaches conceptualise the boundary of communities as the 'mask' (or in other words the 'identity'), presented by a community to the outside world (Anderson, 1991; Barth, 1969; Cohen, 1985a). The various members of a community ascribe different and shared meanings to it (or 'symbols'). Viewing the collective identity as a common boundary of a community ultimately constructed out of diverse symbols, allows us to recognise that community members attach their own meanings to communities and identities just as they attach distinct meanings to the respective symbols. As Cohen notes, it is the ambiguities of symbolic discourse that allows members to unite behind it (1985a: 20, 89). Some of the analysis in this thesis is inspired by this approach.

[20] Some of these are still in use today, albeit with variations in spelling: e.g. Paikoneka and Moncoca: On similar lines as Radding, Schwarz argues that 'shared identities' emerged within each mission settlement, rather than being 'constituted at a global level of the whole of the Chiquitanos' (1994: 34-36). While this is a reasonable statement, it ignores that there was also a movement of groups between missions (see Radding, 2005: 68-69).

norms' (Radding, 2005: 121). In short, while the state has the potential to transform modes of identification, it is not the only 'identifier' that matters; such identifications and categories states produce may be contested (see Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 16; Hale, 2009: 323). In Chapter V, this case will be made for the 'indigenous' label. Chiquitano ascribe their own meanings to the term and use it for certain purposes, while it is not deemed an appropriate label for self-identification by all. In a way, such forms of resisting state pressures add another dimension to Scott's (1985) concept of 'everyday resistance'.[21]

Another example of such resistance can be found in the area of Chiquitano political and communal organisation. As noted, Chiquitano communal authority structures have changed in relation to the prevalent model of Indian-state relations. However, while the Chiquitano adopted elected councils, or *cabildos*, as introduced through the mission systems, they 'moulded these offices to their own purposes' (Radding, 2005: 162-163) (see Chapter IV).[22] In recent times this has also been the case with the organisational structures that Chiquitano *comunidades* adopted through the Law of Popular Participation (see Chapter VII). Therefore, while Chiquitano history demonstrates negotiated and pragmatic processes of accommodation, it also shows how resistance resides 'in their social relations to each other and in the culture that grows out of, and expresses, these social relations' (Sider, 1987: 20).

Citizenship Practices and the Citizenship 'Tool'

To view the state in such a fragmented way and as an ongoing accomplishment, while paying attention to the practices that constitute it, also affects how we may conceptualise citizenship. Authors broadly emphasise three different dimensions or aspects of citizenship. Firstly, the legal status, which emphasises the framework of political and social rights that allows citizens to participate in the political process (see Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Taylor, 1998: 27).[23] Secondly, they stress

[21] This is, of course, a far more subtle form than the social movements that rise against intrusion in Habermas'(1981; 1989) lifeworlds.

[22] Nancy Postero also makes this point with relation to Guarani leaders. Leaderships models and 'ideal leadership model' depend on the 'political and economic contexts as well as the dominant models of state-Indian relations' (2007: 96).

[23] Taylor points out that these are citizenship rights derived from a normative statement of democracy and conversely accepted to be fundamental for the effective functioning of democracy. A further fundamental attribute of citizenship is seen to be sovereignty, or 'the maintenance of the integrity of the self-determined individual' (1998: 25).

citizenship as involving 'membership in a political community', which entails a 'distinct source of identity'. Thirdly, there is the perception of citizens as political agents, who actively participate in a society's political institutions (Leydet, 2009: 1).

Thomas Humprey Marshall's (2009 [1950]) famous definition focuses on the first two dimensions: 'a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community [read: the nation]. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed' (2009 [1950]: 149-150).[24] Second: 'citizenship requires… a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. … Its growth is stimulated both by the struggle to win those rights and by the enjoyment when won' (2009 [1950]: 151). According to Marshall, citizenship also contains an ideal of what 'should be' everyone's rights (2009 [1950]: 150).[25] While the ideal may be hard – or impossible – to achieve, it acts as a guide for plotting the direction in which social and political change should move (Lister, 2005: 476; McKinnon and Hampsher-Monk, 2000: 1; Sassen, 2002).

In turn, the perception of citizens as political agents has been emphasised by republican concepts of citizenship. This goes back to the Athenian model of democracy, as described in the writings of Aristotle and others. Elements can also be found in republican Rome and the Italian city-states and workers' councils; its elements were also emphasised by writers such as Machiavelli and Rousseau (Lazar,

[24] He differentiates these rights into different categories by providing 'an account of the development of citizenship in Britain; how civil rights were introduced in the eighteenth century, political rights followed in the nineteenth century and social rights in the twentieth century' (Lister, 2005: 475). 'Civil rights' include personal liberties, the right to own property and other rights associated with individual freedom. Political rights are those that enable individuals to participate in the exercise of political power and social rights refer to a certain level of economic wellbeing and a share in society. Marshall states citizenship should be seen as a unified concept when he talks about the practical interconnections of citizenship rights. He realised that the 'political rights, the right to participate in the exercise of power either directly or indirectly, is dependent upon both civil rights, in terms of individual freedoms and social rights, in terms of levels of literacy and material well-being' (Lister, 2005: 477).

[25] Authors have regularly adopted Marshall's influential definition. For example, Catriona McKinnon and Iain Hampsher-Monk advocate moving away from a purely rights-based definition and note that: 'Citizenship comprises the qualities and conditions – and also the ideals – in and through which individuals who share membership of a political community can act as political equals' (2000: 1).

2008: 5; Leydet, 2009: 2-3; Magnette, 2005).[26] Later, the republican model 'influenced the revolutions in America and (in part) France, both of which were inspirational for early republicans in Latin America. Through the nineteenth century, it was sustained by Hegel and de Tocqueville, and the most distinguished twentieth-century proponent of civic republicanism was Hannah Arendt' (Lazar, 2008: 5). Its key principle is civic self-rule, through such practices as rotation of offices. Notably, Aristotle characterised the citizen as an individual capable of ruling and being ruled in turn. Citizens are primarily 'those who share in the holding of office' (Aristotle quoted in Leydet, 2009: 3).

Anthropologists draw on these latter conceptions, while tending to find more problems with Marshalls' definition. As anthropologist Sian Lazar points out, in the Latin American context a view of citizenship that awards centrality to the nation is problematic, as citizenship has historically had a very local dimension, with citizenship being granted on the basis of demonstration of 'loyalty to the local community' – the community often being formed by a 'town' (2008: 27). In fact, as many authors remind us, creating and maintaining a community is a laborious and difficult task, especially if they are as large as the 'nation' (Anderson, 1991; Cohen, 1985a; Latour, 2007: 34-37; Lazar, 2008: 5; Melucci, 1985: 792; Tilly, 1984: 305). Further, in this regard, citizens can only claim rights from government institutions and legal agents, if they have knowledge of those rights and are aware that they exist (Salman, 2004: 856-857).

In the case of Chiquitano *comunarios*, it can be assumed that they have only during the late 1960s developed a sense of the 'national community'. The trigger was the rise of rural unions in the area, which recruited Chiquitano. Another factor consisted of the activities of Chiquitano organisations, whose creation went alongside workshops aimed at educating *comunarios* about their current 'marginal position' in Bolivian society, along with raising awareness about the rights they could potentially enjoy (ALAS et al., 2001; CICC, n/d). Even so, citizenship practices for most Chiquitano are focused towards local state actors, such as the

[26] As Lazar summarizes: 'Aristotle considered the state to be an aggregation of its citizens, and the citizens to be those eligible to participate in office, or government' (2008: 5). Also see Magnette (2005: 10-19). This idea also feature in Rousseau's social contract, where he stresses that the citizen co-authors laws via the 'general will': 'Active participation in processes of deliberation and decision-making ensures that individuals are citizens, not subjects' (Leydet, 2009: 3). Also see Magnette (2005: 87-93).

Chiquitano Organisations, the various NGOs operating in the area and the Catholic Church. In Chiquitano everyday lives, it is certainly their local *comunidades* which they are striving to be a full member of, rather than the hard-to-imagine Bolivian nation.

More useful then, is a view of citizenship that emphasises citizenship as a set of practices and stresses the participatory and negotiated aspects of citizenship. Such a view has been taken by authors from the anthropological camp, along with a number of and some political scientists and sociologists (Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Jelin, 2003; Lazar, 2008; Lukose, 2005; Ong, 1999; Salman, 2004; Salman and de Munter, 2009; Sassen, 2002; Sawyer, 2001; Yuval-Davis, 1997). For example, Jelin notes that the concept of citizenship 'refers to a conflictive practice connected with power that reflects struggles over who will be able to say what in the process of identifying the problems of the community and the way in which they will be tackled' (2003: 314). Lazar adopts a similar view, emphasising the 'bundle of practices' of state-citizen encounter which 'make someone a full members of a given community', which does not have to be the nation state (2008: 5). Like Marshall, she emphasises the process rather 'than the end result itself' (2008: 5).

As Ritty Lukose (2005) notes, viewing citizenship in this way provides anthropologists and other social scientists with an analytical tool. By paying attention to citizenship practices, more light can be shed on the question of how changes in citizenship regimes have impacted on populations and their imaginations of citizenship, feelings of belong and modes of identification. This, in turn, can indicate a lot about the political system. Consequently, for many anthropologists: 'the framework of citizenship has become a lens through which to explore the changing and dynamic processes of sovereignty, belonging, and politics at the interface between nation-states and transnational movements of capital, labour, media, and commodities ' (Lukose, 2005: 509).

However, the lack of substantive rights has been the focus of struggle for many Latin American. Since the 1980s and 1990s, diverse Latin American popular actors, from trade unions, left parties, to a multitude of grassroots movements (including women, those organised around access to services, environmentalists, human rights activists and ethnic minorities), have employed the language of citizenship in their political struggles. They have employed it as a 'tool' to make

demands and a focal point to rally around and link their diverse struggles (Alvarez et al., 1998; Dagnino, 2003, 2005; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Foweraker, 2001; Foweraker and Landman, 1997). In consequence, citizenship (and discussions surrounding it) has provided a reference point for debate about how a de-facto participation in society can actually be achieved and what this should look like – i.e. it functions as Marshall's 'ideal' (2009 [1950]: 150).

In this process, talk of 'citizenship' signals that 'the general demand for equal rights embedded in the predominant conception of citizenship has been extended and specified in accordance with the demands in question' (Dagnino, 2003: 211). A challenge to prevalent citizenship regimes does not only come from those who seek to include those previously excluded, 'so that all people become "full members" (a universal category of citizenship)' (Lazar, 2008: 6), but also from those sceptical that a universal citizenship model would lead to an extension of citizenship to marginal and excluded groups (including women and indigenous people). Critics proposed that to break the entrenched power-structures, not only the pluralist character of society had to be recognised and respected, but 'differentiated citizenship' was needed, to acknowledge the 'political relevance of difference (cultural, gender, class, race etc.)' (Leydet, 2009: 6), and allow for the recognition of special minority rights, including some form of group rights (Leydet, 2009: 6, see also Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Wayne 2000, Little 2002). A 'strong emphasis has been placed on citizenship's cultural dimension, incorporating contemporary concerns with subjectivities, identities, and the right to difference' (Dagnino, 2003: 211, also Alvarez et al. 1998, Dagnino 2005, Escobar and Alvarez 1992).

In sum, as sociologist Saskia Sassen notes, prevalent citizenship regimes are challenged by those they exclude, and their demands for inclusion and everyday practices 'partly produce' citizenship (2002: 11).[27] In Bolivia, like other Latin American countries where citizenship regimes have been exclusionary and until recently the formal political sphere was heavily controlled by a small Creole elite, demands for collective rights and more inclusive citizenship regimes are particular

[27] In the Latin American context, the transition of many Latin American states to 'democracy' since 1980 has been linked to social movement activity (Foweraker, 1995; Foweraker and Landman, 1997). Foweraker and Landman (1997) argue that social mobilisation under military regimes comprised part of a struggle for rights, which did not cease at the moment of transition. According to Held, citizenship was a result of 'the way in which different groups, classes and movements have struggled to gain degrees of autonomy and control over their lives in the face of various forms of stratification, hierarchy and political oppression' (quoted in Foweraker and Landman, 1997: 2).

relevant (Lazar, 2008: 6). Equally relevant is an analysis of the everyday 'citizenship practices' involving citizens and different state actors, which shed light on the prevalent citizenship regime ad nature of the Bolivian state.

Bolivia's Neo-liberal Multicultural Citizenship Regimes

The Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993-1997) produced fundamental change to Bolivia's citizenship regime as set up after the 1952 Revolution (see Chapter IV), by rewriting the constitution to recognise Bolivia as 'multiethnic' and 'pluricultural' nation.[28] Lozada implemented a range of reforms that were aimed at countering the negative impact of the neo-liberal reform packet instituted in the mid-1980s, by addressing problems of political exclusion, instability, and enhancing state domestic and international legitimacy (Van Cott, 2000: 32). Bolivian governments (mainly under the MNR's Víctor Paz Estenssoro) had implemented neo-liberal reforms since 1985 to tackle the economic crisis under way since the 1970s. This was produced by complex problems involving mismanagement of a state-led economy, international recession and hyperinflation (see Grindle, 2003b; Healy and Paulson, 2000: 5-16; Klein, 1992; Kohl, 2003a; Kohl and Farthing, 2001, 2006). As in other Latin American countries that implemented similar reforms at the time, this had large human costs. The dismantling of state-owned enterprises and bureaucratic state apparatus, heightened unemployment and this, combined with a reduction in social expenditures such as housing and health, increased social and economic hardship (see Arze and Kruse, 2004).[29] Such a situation prompted authors to suggest that neo-liberal restructurings served to undermine the universal and equal nature of citizenship Latin America-wide, as they reduced the state's role as grantor as social rights (Cammack, 1994; Taylor, 1998).

This links back to Marshall's (2009 [1950]) conception that civil, political and social rights must be treated as a 'unified concept', as he recognised that political rights (the right to participate in the exercise of power), is dependent upon both civil rights (individual freedoms) and social rights (literacy and material well-being). Lucy

[28] Article I of the Bolivian Constitution subsequently read as follows: 'Bolivia, free, independent, sovereign, multi-ethnic and multicultural constituted as a United Republic, adopts representative and participatory democracy as its form of government, based on the union and solidarity of all Bolivians'.
[29] The most notable among these measures was the dismantling of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL), leading to the redundancy of more than 20,000 workers (Arze and Kruse, 2004: 24).

Taylor points to the fact that neo-liberal interpretations of citizenship take the emphasis away from political agency and towards freedom and equality of the individual before the market (1998: 25).

Lozada's reforms, nevertheless, did not divert from the neo-liberal course and are therefore often referred to as the 'second generation of neo-liberal reforms'.[30] Legislation that aimed to carry the 'multicultural' trend, included the 1994 *Ley de Participación Popular* (LPP – Popular Participation Law), the 1996 National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) Law and the Intercultural Bilingual Education Law. The laws intended to expand citizenship to 'marginalised' indigenous peoples whose 'social and cultural vulnerability' had increased, not only through the austerity measures and rollback of state services, but also the growing exploitation of natural resources and commodification of land (McNeish, 2008: 36).

Pressures to adopt such reforms came from various sides. First, there was growing domestic pressure from politically mobilised indigenous groups, who demanded the government address the above-mentioned issues. The first to organise were highland groups in the 1960s: the Katarists. They stepped up their organisational efforts through their 1973 Manifesto of Tiwanaku, in which they proposed an 'alternative model of state-society relations based on the recognition of ethnic difference' as 'the solutions to chronic political instability and endemic poverty' (Van Cott, 2000: 128). They expressed this desire through the idea of 'pluriculturality' and 'unity in (ethnic and cultural) diversity' (Van Cott, 2000: 129). From around 1986, lowland indigenous movements started occupying a prominent role in challenging the Bolivian state. The *Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía* (CIDOB – Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Orient, Chaco and Amazonia) started to develop legal proposals to incorporate the rights of 'indigenous peoples' into the constitution. Pressures resulted in the fact that after the 1990 'March for Territory and Dignity', the government accepted that use of the term 'indigenous territory' in official documents, and ratified the ILO Convention 169 in 1991 (Albó, 2002: 77; Balza Alarcón, 2001: 35; Lacroix, 2005: 74; Ströbele-Gregor et al., 1994: 106). (See Chapter V).

[30] The first generation of neo-liberal reforms was launched in 1985, when the *Movimiento Revolucionario Nacionalista* (MNR – Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) ended the state-led development model that had been established more than thirty years earlier, by introducing the New Economic Plan (NEP), a neo-liberal reform package (see Healy and Paulson, 2000: 5-16).

Pressures to incorporate indigenous demands also heightened in the international sphere throughout the 1980s. Domestic claims were greatly strengthened by international organisations (such as the UN and the World Bank) as they pushed for the recognition of ethnic diversity and to bring indigenous peoples under the umbrella of state and international institutions. The UN firmly established 'native' peoples as subjects of rights in the international legal order and had passed the ILO Convention 169. By the end of the decade, the UN had instituted a permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, with offices throughout the world. This, in turn, significantly empowered indigenous groups to raise claims against states, which consequently inspired NGOs to step up 'their efforts to introduce the ideas of "rights-based development" in Bolivia' (McNeish, 2008: 39).

Additionally, NGOs, human rights organisations, along with large international actors such as the World Bank and UN increasingly saw a need to off-set the negative effects of neo-liberal reforms. The solution was believed to lie in increasing citizen participation in development and political life. In this vein, development agencies promoted 'participatory development' and 'rights based' strategies. In particular, the World Bank in the 1980s promoted decentralisation policies with participatory elements as a way to increase citizens' involvement and promote the inclusion of different population groupings (e.g. based on ethnicity of religion). This was supposed to make government more accountable and citizen oriented and, consequently, enhance state legitimacy diminishing problems and tensions (Assies, 2000; Cammack, 1994: 186; Gray Molina, 2002; World Bank, 2002).[31] The Bolivian Government promoted the LPP with these aims in mind: by increasing popular participation in municipal-level political processes and budgeting, citizenship and a more stable political democracy would be attainable (Behrendt, 2000; Blanes, 1999a; Faguet, 2003; Lema et al., 2001; Van Cott, 2000).

Another domestic pressure group clamouring for political reforms comprised the Regional Civic Committees. While opposed to indigenous claims, they had been lobbying for political and administrative decentralisation since the restoration of democracy in 1982. Pressure from this source led to the direct election of mayors,

[31] For evaluations of the practicalities and effects of decentralisation see, for example, Adams (2003), Faguet Furniss (1974), Kälin (1999), Litvack et al. (1998) , Llambí and Lindemann (2001), Lockwood (1998), Willis et al. (1999). For articles by economists that include some critical views on decentralisation, see Schneider (2003) and Treisman (1999). A prominent case is the participatory budget in Porto Alegre, Brazil (see, for example, Abers, 1998; de Sousa Santos, 1998; Souza, 2001).

counsellors and the approval of the Statutory Law of Municipalities in 1985, which recognised municipalities as independent local governments (see Finot, 1990). In 1991, diverse political actors, including political parties, Civic Committees, syndicates, and neighbourhood organisations, made progress in developing a proposal for a decentralisation law. In 1992, the Senate approved the draft of the proposed law despite the reservations of the House of Representatives, and it came to form part of the 1994 Reforms (Seemann, 2003: 13; Thedieck, 1994).

As can be expected, these reforms significantly impacted on the Bolivian citizenship regime and Bolivians' citizen practices. The recognition of Bolivia as a 'multiethnic' and 'pluricultural' nation entailed the Bolivian state's recognition of the 'juridical personality of the indigenous and peasant communities' and their organisations (Article 171.II of the Bolivian Constitution).[32] Significantly, through Article 171, the government recognised the 'social, economic and cultural rights of the indigenous … to their original communal lands [*Tierras Comunitarias de Origen* or TCOs], guaranteeing the sustainable use and exploitation of the national resources, their identity, values, languages and costumes, and institutions' (Article 171.I). Lastly, it recognised the right of indigenous and peasant authorities to exercise 'administrative functions and apply their own norms as alternative solution to conflicts, according to their customs and procedures, if these do not contradict this Constitution and the laws' (Article 171.III). Thus, it enshrined the figure of 'indigenous people' as a rights- and resource-bearing identity in Bolivian Law, granted territorial rights and a degree of self-determination.

The decentralisation process instigated on 20 April 1994 by the MNR government, in conjunction with the LPP, restructured the formal aspects of citizens' participation in their localities. Similar to the decentralisation reforms implemented in other Latin American countries, it aimed to 'refocus public decision making from the national capital to local areas, and from central to municipal levels of government' (Rowland, 2001: 1374). The LPP 'municipalised' the country by establishing new municipalities and expanding existing ones to around 320. It allocated funds to them according to the number of their inhabitants and handed them responsibility in areas such as rural development, healthcare provision and local

[32] This article was included in the Bolivian Constitution through Law 1617, passed on 6 October 2005.

infrastructure (Calla, 2000; Faguet, 2001; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001; Seemann, 2003).

The LPP introduced two mechanisms to institutionalise civil society oversight and participation in the municipal sphere. The first comprised the *Comités de Vigilancia* (CVs – Oversight Committees), created to 'monitor' the performance and spending of municipal government (Calla, 2000: 80)[33] They were also to serve as a mechanism to channel citizen demands, new project proposals and oversee the spending of popular participation funds, complete with the power to remove corrupt officials or withhold municipal funds (Faguet, 2001: 4; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 7). CVs are elected by the *Organizaciones Territoriales de Base* (OTBs - Territorial Base Organisations) in each municipality (Behrendt, 2000: 4).

OTBs formed the second mechanism to institutionalise relations between civil society and the state. These are legally recognised grassroots entities, i.e. territorial organisations, indigenous organisations, peasant organisations and neighbourhood councils, which would provide further oversight, as well as constitute a vehicle for channelling national resources for sustainable development to local communities. They were also supposed to be involved in a process of defining the needs of the municipality, and collaborate with local government to develop a five-year strategic plan upon which expenditures would be based. In total, the government recognised over 15,000 grassroots organisations, along with 1,600 OTBs (Behrendt, 2000: 4-6; Gray Molina, 2002: 8; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 7; Seemann, 2003: 15).

Naturally enough, implementation varied significantly from municipality to municipality. In some cases, citizens took advantage of these opening and the reforms led to increased expenditure on 'pro-poor initiatives', increased citizen participation and oversight (see Faguet, 2001; Gray Molina, 2002). In other instances, municipal politics and recourses remained under the control of local elites, who managed to co-opt CVs and block oversight. Most OTBs remain unable to articulate joint projects, while the discrimination and marginalisation of elected indigenous people continues (see Behrendt, 2000; Blanes, 1999b; Lacroix, 2005; Lema et al., 2001).

[33] Also called 'Watchdog Committees' (for example, Seemann, 2003: 13), or 'Vigilance Committees' (for example, Faguet, 2001: 4).

Indigenous candidates across Bolivia have also sought to take advantage of the new political openings at the municipal level by participating in municipal elections. The 1995 elections showed that such strategies proved successful. Of the 1,624 municipal council members elected, 464 were indigenous (28 per cent of the total).[34] In the 1999 elections a significant increase in the number of indigenous candidates (including many women) occurred. However, this did not translate into automatic election success. Indigenous individuals faced difficulties in the registration and voting process, due to the distance of their residences from polling booths, illiteracy and other bureaucratic problems. Additionally, according to the 1992 Census, more than 50 per cent of Bolivian women were not registered to vote (Albó, 1996: 20).

Another reason for the lower election figures related to the fact that highland and lowland indigenous groups had worked to create a joint organisation (a 'political tool'), for which they hoped to get official approval. In March 1995 the CSUTCB, CIDOB (*Central Indígena del Oriente Boliviano*) and other indigenous representatives organised a conference in Santa Cruz entitled *Instrumento Político - Tierra Territorio* to created the *Instrumento Político - Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (IP-ASP) as a representative body (McKee, 1999: 5). The Federation of *Campesinos* of Cochabamba (FSUTCC) defined the *instrumento politico* (political instrument) as 'a means and an end; both a tool for political participation and a new form of governing body for the country' (McKee, 1999: 9-10). The leaders hoped to circumvent the rule that individuals had to run as candidates affiliated to one of the legally registered parties, which the electoral law demanded.[35] Relying on the established larger parties often compromised a candidate's agenda, as they had to strike bargains to get onto the party list. To compound matters, when elected, candidates' alternative agendas were often sidelined due to the parties' political manoeuvrings.

However, the 'political tool' leaders (Evo Morales and Alejo Véliz) began to clash personally in 1998 and Evo Morales formed a breakaway group, entitled the *Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (IPSP – Political Instrument

[34] It has to be noted, however, that there were great departmental variations. While Oruro registered a high of 62 per cent of indigenous *concejales*, La Paz recorded a surprising low of 13 per cent (Behrendt, 2000: 14).

[35] This aspect of electoral law changed after the 2004 elections. Civil society organisations could now register themselves if recognised by the National Electoral Court (Lacroix, 2005: 9).

for the Sovereignty of the Peoples), which would in 1999 become the MAS. Neither group managed to gain legal recognition as political party and both allied with existing parties – this factionalism negatively affected indigenous participation at this juncture (Albó, 1996: 20; Behrendt, 2000: 14; McKee, 1999: 5-6). This scenario changed in the 2004 municipal elections, when the government allowed the registration of candidates that were not registered through parties but through legally recognised indigenous or peasant organisations. Nevertheless, many candidates still ran on the MAS ticket, hoping to gain wider support from a broader base.

There was another area where Lozada's reforms sparked the activity of indigenous citizens. As noted, after the 1990 'March for Territory and Dignity' the Bolivian government made some concessions to the countries' indigenous groups by ratifying the ILO 169 Convention. Significantly, it introduced 'indigenous territory' into the Bolivian legislation and took steps to legally recognise eight 'indigenous territories'. These were, however, never consolidated through legal titles, due to a lack of political will from the involved government officials (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 33-35). Even so, in 1994, territorial claims gained renewed vigour as the government recognised the right of indigenous groups to lay claim to TCOs. It was not until 1996, when another march (for 'Territory, the Right to Political Participation and Development') departed Santa Cruz to head for La Paz, that the government finally passed Law 1751 (the INRA Law) – the legislation that would make it possible for indigenous groups to claim the TCOs (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 45, 47-50; Flores, 2006: 3).[36] This, in turn, meant that engaging with the state bureaucracy and the INRA office to drive forward their claims to territorial rights became one of the main aspects of engagement with the state for groups seeking to gain legal titles over their territory.

In sum, the neo-liberal 'multicultural state' project had its pitfalls. Importantly, obstacles to indigenous political participation remained due to structural inequalities and continuing discrimination against indigenous candidates. In many areas, the reforms never achieved real participation and oversight, leading to a lack of trust in government and parliamentary institutions. The territorial promises long

[36] Law 1715 reaffirmed the constitutional provisions of article 171 and guaranteed the rights of indigenous peoples to their TCOs, as well as the sustainable use of renewable natural resources within them. Similarly, the law established that preference should be given to indigenous peoples' rights on their lands, over those of others in cases of overlapping or conflicting rights. See Chapter VI.

remained unfulfilled. By 2006, claims for fifty-six TCOs in the lowlands had been filed, but only 31.9 per cent of the area claimed had been titled (Romero Bonifaz, 2006: 212, 220). Moreover, as will be addressed in Chapter VI, the mechanisms set up by INRA to establish size, location and governance of the territories proved severely flawed on several levels. Lastly, these reforms did not signify that successive governments abandoned the neo-liberal economic project of coca eradication policies, the auctioning off of state-owned firms, which led to rising prices of consumer goods and laying-off of workers. All this would fuel the protests that would shake the country from 2000 onwards, give impetus to the ascent of the MAS party and underpin the 2006 Constituent Assembly.

Indigenous Citizenship or: the Multicultural Menace

The seemingly flawed nature of these reforms also stems from the fact that the very legislation only partially responded to the demands of Bolivian indigenous movements. In line with a neo-liberal agenda, the laws endorsed 'a substantive, if limited, version of indigenous cultural rights' (Hale, 2002: 487). Anthropologist Charles Hale (2002; 2004) has called the resulting framework the '*indio permitido*' ('permitted Indian'). While the government that embrace neo-liberal multiculturalism launch 'reforms in language and educational policy, anti-discrimination legislation, devolution of responsibility for governance to local institutions … these initiatives also come with clearly articulated limits, attempts to distinguish those rights that are acceptable from those that are not' (Hale, 2002: 490). Certain rights are enjoyed and others remain unaddressed: no further demands are to be raised and the status quo of the economic paradigm and state power are not to be questioned.

At a first glance, these reforms seemed to respond to indigenous demands. Indigenous citizens could, to a degree, solve their own immediate problems, which appeared to resonate with some aspects of cultural rights and self-determination. It provided enough room for the neo-liberal citizen to take up the responsibility for resource distribution and aspects of his/her own development (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007). However, at the same time, the government offered fewer services and funding. As Postero remarks, the reforms were aimed at a more efficient and conflict-free economic system: 'citizens engage in deliberations over local projects rather that 'fighting in the national government over large issues

of resource allocation' (Postero, 2007: 16). In line with Abrams (1988) notion of the state, the ideology of these policies promoted an expansion of the state at the local level and attempts to draw citizens into resource-distribution processes, assuming that citizens are willing participants.[37]

Consequently, recent scholarship has argued that what governments achieved through such 'neo-liberal multiculturalism', is an expansion rather than delimitation of their discriminatory powers (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007; Povinelli, 1998). In practise, this means that those who 'conduct themselves within this logic and are appropriately "modern" and "rational" are rewarded and empowered', while 'unruly, conflict-prone Indians … are condemned to the racialised spaces of poverty and social exclusion' (Postero, 2007: 16). The implication is that 'indigenous communities, rather than being destroyed, become, alongside other entities of civil society, mechanisms for remaking the Indian as similarly self-made, but also governed citizen-subjects' (McNeish, 2008: 46). As McNeish argues, 'while indigenous culture is now 'permitted', the interests and demands of the native populations remain subordinate to those of the *mestizo*/ *ladino* (mixed race) society, the dominant national identity, and the wider international community' (McNeish, 2008: 45-46).

Further, this presents a profound menace to many indigenous groups, as it provides states with tools to 'structure the spaces that cultural rights activists occupy: defining the language of contention; stating which rights are legitimate, and what forms of political action are appropriate for achieving them; and even, weighing in on basic questions of what it means to be indigenous' (Hale, 2002: 490). Consequently, the logic of the *indio permitido* entails the notions of Fried (1967) and Scott (1998) that the 'state' implies some sort of process, one of 'restructuring' and 'making legible'.

This becomes especially obvious in the question of what it means to be 'indigenous'. Through the neo-liberal multicultural framework, the term has gained new significance, as it is through adopting this label and other 'indigenous' markers

[37] Celina Souza calls this mindset the 'voice' -current of participation (2001: 174; also see Thiel, 2003: 179). All in all, the 'voice' current sees participatory practices as a rather instrumental way for improving policy effectiveness and gaining access to information about the real needs of citizens (Abers, 1998). In contrast, those who view participation as 'empowerment', argue that 'in a democracy, people should deliberate collectively and determine government decisions, to the extent possible, directly rather than through elected representatives' (Hammond, 2003: 5).

that previously marginalised ethnic groups are able to access the rights framework. The term has particular relevance with regards to land rights, as the INRA Law reserves TCOs for 'indigenous' and 'originary' peoples. To gain access to these special rights, you have to portray yourself – and more importantly your group – to the state as 'indigenous citizens'. In turn, the status depends on the states recognition. Consequently, as Elizabeth Povinelli points out, such policies 'empowered states to prohibit and (de)certify cultural difference as a right – and resource – bearing identity' (1998: 582).

The way that many nation states define indigeneity is heavily influenced through meanings that circulate in the international rights arena. As noted, it was the fact that domestic ethnic groups reached out beyond their nation-states and created links to actors in the global indigenous rights arena, which pressured national governments to ratify international indigenous rights conventions (see Kymlicka, 2009; Merlan, 2009; Sissons, 2009: 326).[38] The 'indigenous' label acquired specific meanings in this arena, which then filtered back into the nation states. On the one hand, the label provided local and national movements with a collective identity that they adopt (often in combination with other more visible markers) to make claims against nation-states and assert self-determination and to gain solidarity from other groups and allies (Albó, 1996: 2; Brysk, 1994, 1996, 2000; Canessa, 2006; Jackson, 1995, 2001). On the other, states started to incorporate the terminology in their legal frameworks. Consequently, the meanings that many nation-states have attached to 'indigeneity' heavily draw on those articulated in the international indigenous rights arena, such as those articulated in the ILO Convention 169.

Several definitions of 'indigeneity' have emerged in the international sphere that drop in and out of popularity over time. Broadly, definitions can be categorised into those based on certain fixed criteria, and those that are 'relational', although these often intersect in some ways. Under the relational rubric fall definitions such as that of David Maybury-Lewis: 'indigenous peoples are defined as much by their relations with the state as by any intrinsic characteristics that they may possess'

[38] One of the reasons for this is that the stimuli for internationalisation of the 'indigenous' category originated principally in the settler states Australia, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and (non-settler state) Scandinavia (see Kymlicka, 2009; Merlan, 2009; Sissons, 2009: 326). As 'otherness' was only permitted, as long as it was compatible with dominant liberal democratic values, groups reached out to 'higher authority' in order to overcome them (2009: 304).

(quoted in Merlan, 2009: 305).[39] This view is based on the recognition that modes of identification evolve in relation to other 'identities' (or modes of identification) and 'cultures' (Wilson, 1995: 3).[40] In contrast, the definition featured in the ILO Convention 169 from 1998, is based on certain 'criteria'. It drew on the working definition that Martínez Cobo designed for the United Nations in 1986 (Saugestad, 2004: 264).[41] It defined indigenous peoples as '(*a*) "tribal" people whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community; (*b*) people descended from populations that inhabited the country, or parts of it, at the time of conquest or colonisation; (*c*) people retaining some or all of their own institutions' (quoted in Merlan, 2009: 305). Merlan notes that the current emphasis of the UN is on social mobilisation and that neither 'intrinsic properties nor relational ones are foregrounded' (2009: 305).[42] That the meanings that circulate in the international sphere adhere largely to a liberal rights framework (Kymlicka, 2009; Merlan, 2009; Povinelli, 1998: 582), is testimony to the way that authorities like the UN subsystems are 'not independent of states or of liberal democratic universalist values and procedural forms' (Merlan, 2009: 320).[43]

While the Bolivian legal system does not define the notion of 'indigenous', it is nevertheless outlined in Article 1 of the LPP:

> The human collectivity descended from populations settled prior to the conquest and colonization, and who are found within the current borders of the State; possess

[39] Also in 1994, Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Former UN Special Rapporteur and anthropologist) delivered an influential and relationally oriented definition: 'indigenousness, independently of biological or cultural continuity, frequently is the outcome of governmental policies imposed from above and from the outside' (in Merlan, 2009: 305).

[40] According to Barnard, 'what most defines indigenous people according to this view is the relation of dominance of one group over another [presumably in the political sphere] and especially the relation of groups to the state, where the state is perceived as protecting the values of non-indigenous over indigenous peoples' (2006: 2). In fact, many of the respondents to Kupers' article, point to their preference for a 'situational understanding' of 'indigenous people', as they argue that this can overcome the 'essentialism' that is otherwise attached to the category or concept of 'indigeneity' (see, for example, Barnard, 2006: 2; Kenrick and Lewis, 2004: 263).

[41] In his 'Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations' Martínez Cobo (1986) defined indigenous communities, peoples, and nations as 'those which have a historical continuity with preinvasion and precolonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves as distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories … and are determined to preserve and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples' (in Merlan, 2009: 305).

[42] For a more comprehensive – but concise – summary of definitions of 'indigenous' and 'indigeneity' that circulate in the international sphere see Canessa (2007b: 202-203).

[43] According to Kymlicka, this became obvious when indigenous advocates did not contest or transcend liberal democratic states' insistence that indigenous governments comply with international human rights standards during the negotiations for the latest UN conventions: the 2007 UN 'Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (2009: 324).

> history, organization, language or dialect and other cultural characteristics, through which they identify themselves as members, recognizing themselves as belonging to the same socio-cultural unit, maintaining a territorial link through the administration of their habitat and their social, economic, political, and cultural institutions (quoted in Canessa, 2007b: 203-204).

Among the (many) problems that arise from these notions, one arises from the emphasis on 'tribal' people or collectivities who need to be 'different' from the mainstream society. This means that individuals have to prove that they all adhere to one collective identifier and form a bounded group, so that they are liable for rights, possibly sparking off processes of group formation (as addressed above). However, as the Chiquitano case shows (Chapter V), such groups with homogenous boundaries might be hard to create or maintain. A second problem stems from the 'priority' criterion for land occupation. What happens if groups move around between different areas, or have been displaced from lands they formerly occupied? What happens if different land claims might overlap? What happens to 'European' settlers on the land?[44] Such issues, incidentally, caused some problems during Bolivian processes of titling indigenous lands (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 53-54, Chapter VI).

Despite their problematic nature, such conceptualisations have not only influenced governments and international agencies, but also anthropologists. This has led to criticisms regarding the essentialising ways in which the term may be employed by these actors. In the academic sphere, one of the concept's most vehement critics is Adam Kuper, who started off a heated debate by questioning its' usefulness as an analytical category. He suggested that it is a 'new name for (very) "primitive people"' and criticised that, 'policy makers assume that they are dealing with descendants of hunter-gatherers and they commonly fall back on some sort of racial classification' when it comes to identifying indigenous people (2006: 148). Furthermore he criticised the fact that the indigenous rights movement and it's supporters identify indigenous people' 'as facing a common situation ("relegated to

[44] Adam Kuper raises similar issues in his criticisms of the 'indigeneity' concept (see Kuper, 2003: 392).

reserved territories or confined to inaccessible or inhospitable regions", "doomed to extinction" and so on)' (2003: 390).[45]

Sidelining this occasionally confusing and contradictory debate, we can agree with Kuper to the extent that some people may indeed wield the term with the connotation that indigenous people are 'very primitive people'. Nevertheless, this thesis is concerned with the different meanings of 'indigeneity' and their effects, rather than engaging in a debate about how the term *should* be defined academically, or with regards to its usages in domestic or international rights frameworks.[46]

Indeed, a number of authors have pointing to the problematic aspects of linking rights to such essentialising notions of indigeneity, and it's use for political claims making (e.g. Conklin, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995; French, 2004; Jackson, 1995; Povinelli, 1998; Ramos, 1994, 1998). While multicultural discourses stress recognition of difference and equality, such notions of indigeneity are often based on a reductionist framework in which 'specific indigenous histories, memories, and practices' are irrelevant' (Povinelli, 1998: 585). This renders 'some forms of indigenous identity more "legible" than others' (Albro, 2010: 72; also Conklin and Graham, 1995; Povinelli, 1998). I.e. more 'authentic' ones, expressed through special dress or language, or those organised in hierarchical 'legible' structures. Authors have noted that this may lead to the creation of hierarchies in which some 'identities' are deemed to be more 'indigenous' than others, and therefore more worthy of special treatment, support and rights. Others might be excluded from

[45] Authors' responses to Kuper fell into different camps. While some agreed with him (Robins, 2003: 398), others rejected his criticism and accused Kuper of blaming the victim (Asch and Samson, 2004: 261; e.g. Dahre, 2006: 147; e.g. Ramos, 2003: 397), generalisations about and inaccurate analysis of the history of the 'indigenous movement' (e.g. Kenrick and Lewis, 2004; Ramos, 2003; Turner, 2004), poor argumentation (e.g. Ramos, 2003: 397-398; e.g. Turner, 2004: 264) and for disregarding 'the point of differential power' and 'social location', which might legitimate 'indigenous' peoples claims (Plaice, 2003: 397; e.g. Ramos, 2003: 397; also see Suzman, 2003: 399).

[46] Of course, a body of literature has engaged in the way that academics and legal frameworks should or should not define 'indigeneity' and 'indigenous people'. See Kupers' (2003; 2006) arguments and the arguments of those who responded to his criticisms of the usages of the term by policy makers, the indigenous movements and academics (e.g. Asch and Samson, 2004; Dahre, 2006; Kenrick and Lewis, 2004; Plaice, 2003: 397; Ramos, 2003; Robins, 2003; Suzman, 2003; Turner, 2004). The debate is an important one. It may have severe consequences to the individuals and groups labelled or self-identified as 'indigenous'. Nevertheless, I see the role of academic researchers in analysing the different meanings attached to the concept and the implications that this may have, rather than deciding who should be labelled how and why. This is especially the case when groups have/ have not chosen to identify as 'indigenous'. As anthropologist Peter Gow fittingly noted, albeit in another context: ' the last thing we should do is to decide in advance what such people are, and then interrogate them for their failure to live up to our images of them' (1993: 341).

qualifying for such rights altogether (e.g. Conklin, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995; French, 2004; Graham, 2002; Jackson, 1995; Ramos, 1994, 1998).

Apart from governmental actors, also others are complicit in this legibility project. For example, NGOs are also often interested that their 'grassroots' clients fit into certain 'identity boxes' which allow them to pitch their project to their funders – consequently, to receive NGO support, people have to act up to their and their funders (western) vision's of what an 'authentic indigenous group' constitutes. They are therefore complicit in constructing a 'hyperreal Indian', a mould that fits the organisations needs and western moral and aesthetic criteria of what 'Indians' should be like (Ramos, 1994, also Conklin, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995).[47]

For the 'indigenous' groups and individuals such state engagement tends to be antagonistic. While it generally lies at the heart of indigenous struggles that they seek to preserve the continuity of their everyday lives (especially in the case of Amazonian peoples) or to overcome everyday racism, exclusion and discrimination from the political system, they are forced to ascribe to new denominators, adapt state-recognised forms of organisation and phrase their demands in a way that resonates with the state legal framework and citizenship regime (see Sider, 2003: 21). As will be discussed in Chapter V, this is also the case for Chiquitano people in Concepción municipality. Chiquitano struggles to secure the continuity of their communities can only do so by adhering to state discourse – which threatens to undermine this very goal. However, the chapter also shows that the state legibility project was not entirely successful: while the term has also found a broader use among Chiquitano leaders and wider circulation among *comunarios*, some Chiquitano see the label as unfit for self-identification.

Post-multicultural Citizenship

The question arises whether Hales' '*indio permitido'* can actually be overcome. In the current climate, opinions range from positive (Postero, 2007) to more cautious (McNeish, 2008). There has been optimism from some authors, who point to the organisational vigour in the country since 2000, the election of Bolivia's first indigenous president, the holding of a Constituent Assembly with the scope of

[47] This resonates with what Sider calls the 'contradiction between deception and self-deception whereby the Europeans wind up parroting their own fantasies of the other' (1987: 7).

fundamentally altering the role of the state and the country's citizenship regime. They also point to the debates surrounding the recognition of regional and ethnic autonomies. Postero (2007) and McNeish (2008) point to the criticisms that emerged due to the limitations of the multicultural neo-liberal reforms. McNeish notes that citizens grew increasingly weary of what they perceived as the government attempts to 'cajole' them into 'a prescribed methodology of participation in public policies that remained controlled by the state' (2008: 38).[48] In other words, they were aware of the pitfalls of the state legibility project that they had to subject themselves to gain rights (cf. Fried, 1967; Hale, 2002, 2004; Scott, 1998). However, despite this, the system remained flawed and exclusive. Important issues of contention were control over natural resources (as could be seen in the Gas and Water Wars), while these were linked to broader questions of productive and consumption rights (such as the cost of services, wages, property and exclusion), fused with challenges to global capitalism (McNeish, 2008: 48; Postero, 2007: 17).

McNeish and Postero posit that it is implicit in the concept of '*indio permitido'* that these policies gave rise to critiques of their shortcomings and ambiguities (McNeish, 2008: 38; Postero, 2007: 16-17).[49] Postero and McNeish point out that to mount these challenges, actors (among them indigenous citizens, neighbourhood associations, and workers organisations) drew on the new political and institutional channels that the Lozada reforms had created. Citizens utilised them to 'break with the polarised political culture of the past and generate a more complex, and also more nuanced, political culture in which a primary aim is to rethink the representativity and responsiveness of state structures' (McNeish, 2008: 48). Two examples of this are, firstly, the neighbourhood groups which had been organised in response to the LPP and that formed the backbone to the October 2003 uprisings in El Alto; and secondly, the way that the MAS's strength ultimately grew through

[48] McNeish holds that, 'the formulation of municipal development plans was heavily influenced by external consultants belonging to the Regional Development Corporation – CORDES. The duties of these consultants included facilitation and training in participatory methodologies to help local people articulate needs, perceptions and priorities. However, they were also required by the government to fit local priorities into a standard format to be presented to departmental authorities' (2008: 38).

[49] McNeish develops Hale's thesis. Rather than solely referring to a project of neo-liberal governance and control, McNeish argues that recent events reveal the partial failure of this project, and thus the thesis also articulates a critique of the shortcomings and ambiguities of these reforms. He argues that 'as much as the idea of the *indio permitido* criticises the shortcomings of the neo-liberal reforms, it also points to the causes and shape of the recent mass protests against government economic policies and the subsequent political shifts in both Bolivia and Guatemala' (2008: 34).

participation of its candidates in the municipal elections that the LPP had implemented (Postero, 2007: 17).

Consequently, the reforms facilitated the creation of new strategies and political formations. For Postero, that 'neo-liberal multiculturalism' led to the emergence of a public that raised its demands in 'the language of citizenship, rights, and democracy, reflects both Bolivians' experiences and their frustrations with the neo-liberal and multicultural reforms of the 1990s' (2007: 5). The outcome, she maintains, is that a 'new state of political activism' is forcing radical changes in the meaning of citizenship, as actors question the status-quo of access to power, unequal social relations and re-consider what their rights should be (Postero, 2007: 6). Postero (2007) calls these newly emerging citizenship practises 'post multicultural citizenship'. McNeish coincides with Postero in arguing that current political activism in Bolivia, is actually seeking 'something better' rather than something 'radically different', or even an overthrow of the state: 'a new social pact between the state and the people' (McNeish, 2008: 52). Contemporary protesters strive for a true recognition of cultural and regional identities and a renegotiation of the 'terms of trade' (McNeish, 2008: 51).[50]

However, McNeish is more cautious than Postero, pointing to ongoing opposition from traditional elite and parties, especially in the Eastern Lowland regions (2008: 51). He also points out that there has not been a clear break with the neo-liberal economic model: 'Since taking power, the Evo Morales government has been extremely careful to balance its radical discourse of economic nationalism with pragmatic efforts to remain in favour with foreign investors' (2008: 52). He adds that while the Water and Gas Wars were sparked by rejections of global economic policies (the free trade model and granting of concessions by the government), protesters did not oppose the idea of modernisation or the notion that it is worthwhile to take advantage of new opportunities in the international market (2008: 51).

Drawing on evidence from the Chiquitano case, this thesis suggests that in Concepción municipality, the *'indio permitido'* still persists and I question whether

[50] Notably, this is also an argument put forward by political scientist Deborah Yashar (1998; 1999; 2005), who notes that this is not only the case in Bolivia, but also other Latin American countries that have lived through similar trajectories of state reform and indigenous organising.

the contradictions arising from indigenous engagement with the state can actually be overcome.

Chiquitano Citizenship

Chiquitano citizenship practices may be directed towards the national government, departmental institutions, local municipal governments, or other individuals that represent the state in the locality. Chiquitano *comunarios* or their representative's interactions with the state generally evolve around gaining access to productive or infrastructure projects, or to arrange the maintenance of paths leading to their *comunidades*. *Comunarios* look favourably upon those actors who adhere to their promises to deliver projects or resources – which means that they might also give their signatures to their political campaigns.

For people whose political manoeuvring has centred on clientelist relationships in their localities, there has been a remarkable continuity in these practices over the past century. Thus, perspectives like that of Cammack who emphasises the weak Latin American party system and exclusive tactics of political leaders for creating 'democracy without citizenship' (1994: 193), are less relevant in areas were meaningful formal political participation is a very recent phenomenon and one prone to clientelism. The way that the Chiquitano approach these local state actors, means such citizenship practices may not look very different from the traditional patron-client relationships so prevalent in the Chiquitanía since republican times. Hierarchies along ethnic and family lines, clientelism and servitude have been entrenched in local social relations, while indigenous and mixed-race popular classes excluded from formal citizenship rights, have fought to exercise such rights on local issues, as well as joining shifting political alliances with caudillos and political parties (Radding, 2005: 181-282). Viewing citizenship as a set of practices, therefore allows for emphasis on 'the ambiguities of citizenship as these are lived in the cultural politics of everyday life', as well as the expansion of what 'constitutes the proper domain of citizenship' (Lukose, 2005: 509). Also other authors have argued

that such clientelistic practices can be described as political relationships or citizenship practices (see Auyero, 2000; 2002; Lazar, 2004b, 2008).[51]

While for many Chiquitano, engagement with state bureaucratic and NGO actors has been closely linked to access to projects, resources and land, rather than the exercise of political rights per se, citizenship and its exercise featured prominently in the discourses and statements of Chiquitano leaders. The multicultural rights framework Chiquitano can access as 'indigenous citizens' inspires their political actions and rhetoric. Still, rather than valuing political participation *per se*, it is, above all, the prospect of land titles which has inspired Chiquitano leaders to get involved in the local political arena.

As addressed in Chapter V, Justo Seoane, Chiquitano Mayor in Concepción at the time of my fieldwork, described that leaders decided to combine the territorial with a political strategy, because they realised that they needed to participate in the municipal government in order to have more political leverage on the territorial question. While he also mentions access to health and education, he stressed that the basic political vision of the *central* was 'to get the landowners, the *hacendados* out of local power'.[52] The basic premise of the Chiquitano struggle is to secure the continuity of life of Chiquitano *comunidades* in the face of resource depletion and land-loss. Therefore, access to land has been the nodal point of Chiquitano-state interaction, especially since 1994, when the *central* of Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío decided to jointly claim the territory of Monte Verde.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the conceptual framework employed in the thesis. It suggests that a conceptualisation of 'state' as power structure allows for the problematisation of the civil-society – state dichotomy. This also allows for a closer look at the processes involved in creating the state and a more detailed analysis of what

[51] For example, Javier Auyero (2000; 2002) has stressed the political dimension of the clientelist practices which members of Argentinean Peronist networks engage in. Sian Lazar (2004b; 2008) has also argued that citizenship in the Bolivian city of El Alto might involve clientelist practices, especially in a pre-election environment, when neighbourhood associations attempt to trade votes for projects or goods that might serve the collectivity of the neighbourhood. She argues that clientelism is engaging with the state via the politician

[52] '*…de sacar los propietarios, los hacendados de este poder local…*'. Interview: Justo Seoane Parapaino, Concepción, 17 July 2007.

citizenship practices local populations engage in. Morton Fried's notion that 'the state is devoted to expansion' (1967: 240) and Scott's argument, that the 'modern state' attempted to make a society more 'legible' (1998: 2) help explain the nature and success of Hale's (2002; 2004) *indio permitido*. It sheds light on how and why indigenous organisation at times act as part of the state, and how state activity impacts on the way that groups of the population can self-identify and organise.

While this thesis emphasises citizenship as a set of practices, I argued that the normative aspect of citizenship remains important, as it provides an important tool, which people employ to address state actors and to demand changes to the prevalent framework of rights. In Bolivia, as in other Latin American states, citizenship is closely linked to 'indigeneity' – after all the special rights instituted under the neo-liberal multicultural framework are reserved for those who self-identify and are officially recognised as indigenous or *originario.* In turn, Chiquitano leaders have come to employ the neo-liberal multicultural citizenship framework as a tool to organise their political campaigns, claim rights to territory, education and healthcare. As will be discussed in Chapter V, stressing 'indigeneity' became a tool to gain access to these rights and position Chiquitano in the wider sphere of the struggle for rights in Bolivia and Latin America as a whole.

However, as authors have pointed out, this also means that states make the population, in this case the Chiquitano, more 'legible' through pressuring groups into taking up a state-sanctioned identity. This renders a significant part of a group's cultures and histories invisible. Furthermore, while recognising certain rights the government denies other aspects of local indigenous struggles. Different state actors are complicit in creating this *indio permitido*-condition state bureaucratic bodies, NGOs allied to indigenous groups like the Chiquitano and even the Chiquitano leaders themselves.

Lastly, the issue arises about how Chiquitano-state relations might changed and evolve further under the government of Evo Morales and MAS. This thesis suggests that in the locality of Concepción, the change in government has not led to a fundamental alteration in the relations as defined by the multicultural state reforms. Following the introduction of the conceptual framework, the next section introduces some key actors that form part of the state for Chiquitano *comunarios*. The

subsequent chapter introduces the methodological tools employed during fieldwork and the fieldwork setting.

Interlude: The State for the Chiquitano

Among state actors in Concepción municipality are certain members of the Concepceño elite, the municipal government, some members of the sub-prefecture and prefecture, employees of several NGOs operating in the locality, Church actors, as well as the Chiquitano *central* itself. The following attempts to provide a clearer picture of the power structure that Chiquitano living in Concepción and the surrounding *comunidades* encounter.

The power structures in Concepción are to a certain extent, mapped onto the spatial characteristics of the town. The centre forms the *plaza* with its imposing mission church complex and the two important state administrative institutions – the Mayor's office and the Sub-prefecture's office located on either side. Also around the main square are located several artisan shops, selling Chiquitano woven goods and wooden artefacts, a mission museum, a wood workshop, a shop and workshop producing and selling embroidery and weavings run by catholic nuns, a Cotel telephone shop, a hotel and several restaurants. After all, the church is a UNESCO world heritage site and Concepcion's' main tourist attraction, however, most tourists will not venture far from the main square.

Photo 2: Concepción Mission Church

Concepción mission church, with protesters demanding Indigenous autonomies, 30 June 2007.

The unpaved red dust streets run in a grid pattern, which means that buildings form blocks, with patios out the back. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, this layout is a heritage from the Jesuit Mission period. While the buildings close to the main square are well build and generally well kept buildings, resembling those around the main square, some blocks further away are less elaborate (see Photo 3, below). This is partly because several of the houses closer to the square a have rooms to rent to tourists, and because the more affluent Concepceños live there. The population that lives in blocks closer to the plaza are predominantly European descendant whites or *mestizos*.

Photo 3: Southern Side of Concepción Main Square

The central and northern area of town, contrast with what I refer to as 'Chiquitano area of town'. This starts about five or six blocks towards the south-east of the main square. Here, Chiquitano families live in most houses and the *casas comunales* (communal houses) are also located there. These are buildings paid for by the Church, which house Chiquitano students that study in Concepción, or any *comunario* who comes to Concepción and needs a place to stay. Most of the *comunidades* have their own communal house. Generally, houses in this area of town are less elaborate – with the exception of the newer buildings occupied by some of the NGOs and the one large hotel located towards the west of this area. The Chiquitano organisations and the NGOs cooperating with them (see below) all have their offices in this area. The *Comité de Gestión del Territorio Indígena de Monte*

Verde (CGTI-MV – Management Committee of the Indigenous Territory of Monte Verde) (see Chapter VI), is the exception and it's office is in a different part of town – around three blocks north of the plaza close to Concepción's hospital.

Photo 4: A Street in the 'Chiquitano Area' of Town

Apart from Chiquitano also other ethnic groups live in the municipality. The total indigenous population is 53.3 per cent. Apart from 5061 Chiquitano (34.9 per cent of the municipal population), the 2001 Census counted 321 Quechua *Originarios* (2.2 per cent of the overall population), 90 Aymara Originarios (0.6 per cent), 87 Guaranies (0.6 per cent of the overall population), 85 Mojenos (0.6 per cent) and 143 (1 per cent) 'other originary native' among which are also Ayoreo people. Most Ayoreo people (around 330 in total) live, however, in Zapacó TCO and Indigenous Municipal District (DMI), which lies in the South of Concepción Municipality (see Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 3-4, 60; Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001).

While Ayoreo have their own communal house directly next to that of the CICC headquarter, there is no frequent interaction between CICC leaders and Ayoreo visitors to and residents in the communal house. The CICC will, however, at

times coordinate with the Ayoreo federation to arrange transport to political activities, such as marches.[53] Quechua and Aymara people live at the south-western outskirt of Concepción, in an area rich with small businesses (from general- to clothing- and hardware stores) and close to the only gas station in town. Several small businesses (again, small general stores or second hand clothing stalls) closer to the main square are also owned by Quechua and Aymara people.

The Concepceño Elite

The more affluent part of Concepción's society also play a politically a mayor role. I call them 'Concepceño elite'. According to Lacroix, the three most important and largest families are the Suarez, the Castedo and the Antelo who came to the area with the rubber boom. He observes that 'they have maintained permanent interparty fighting that hides a fairly equal distribution of power. Every one of these large families maintains strong relations with related powerful families in Santa Cruz' (2005: 46). This connection is especially visible during the yearly carnival celebrations, when many Santa Cruz families come to stay with their relatives in town. There are also several families of German decent. Some attracted two or three generations ago by the agricultural and cattle ranching opportunities, others are descendants of Jesuit Priests.

The Concepceño elite displays pride in their European decent and their 'modern', city-oriented outlook on life. This also involves regarding the Chiquitano population as lazy, backward and in need of development. A summary of a conversation I had with two Concepceño men (one of them my landlord) one warm evening in November 2006 outside a karaoke bar, exemplifies such attitudes. The men blamed Chiquitano for not being interested in money and 'refusing to become developed'. They also repeated another common stance, namely that they did not see why the Chiquitano should have more land, if they were not putting it to 'proper use': they did not have a lot of cattle and were not planting crops in commercial quantities. Another common stereotype aimed to discredit Chiquitano political leaders. They maintained that the indigenous leaders were corrupt and that they were

[53] While this thesis does not cover the relationship between Chiquitano *comunarios* and other indigenous or *originario* groups in the municipality in depth, I acknowledge that this topic deserves more attention in a future study. The present study focuses more on the relations of Chiquitano and other groups via the lowland umbrella organisation.

exploiting the communities. Some Chiquitano leaders, they told me, owned land in the TCO Monte Verde and other places. They added that these leaders were clandestinely quite rich and kept on enriching themselves 'abusing the trust of the *comunarios*'.[54]

Discrediting Chiquitano leaders is not just talk. The *concepceño* elite are clearly interested in destroying confidence in Chiquitano leaders as they seek to maintain hold of the local political arena – and keep Chiquitano out of it. This was painfully evident in 2007, as they staged a successful coup against Chiquitano Mayor Justo Seoane (see Chapter VII). Lacroix delivers a damming verdict summarising his fieldwork experience in 2003. He notes that the elites have established

> … a caste system, in which it is hard to enter if you do not fulfil certain criteria: European blood, economic resources, and ambition for power. We could add dishonesty, because these families frequently act illegally (systematic embezzlement of funds in the political and economic institutions, illegal appropriation of lands, illegal commerce, quickly resorting to violence etc) and they live in secured impunity from the local institutions. From the cattle ranchers' association to the *barrios*, all the organisations are directed or controlled by three powerful families (2005: 46, my translation).

Further, he notes that members of the local Civic Committee (*Comité Cívico*) hold posts in all local institutions, while the Committee itself remains closed to Chiquitano people. Chiquitano leaders participation in elections for the Committee have so far been unsuccessful (2005: 47). As CICC President Manuel Peña pointed out:

> Generally, the Civic Committee is against us, is against the indigenous movement. There are problems above all with regards to the issue of land, the Original Community Land. The Civic Committee has lend itself to supporting the businessmen, calling the people to a *paro cívico* (strike) to mobilise against the indigenous *central* and their demands, against the rights of communal lands. This Committee supports the cattle ranchers (in Lacroix, 2005: 47, my translation).

An interesting fact is that Concepción is the birthplace of former Bolivian right-wing dictator Hugo Banzer Suárez.[55] This is a matter of pride for the local elite, which is testament to their political stance. The house where he was allegedly born has been

[54] Field note: Concepción, 6 November 2006.
[55] Hugo Banzer Suárez held the Bolivian presidency as dictator from 1971 to 1978 and a second time as elected President from 1997 to 2001. He is the founder of the conservative party *Acción Democrática Nacionalista* (ADN – National Democratic Action).

turned into a museum and a giant statue was erected for him on one of the main street crossings just outside town. It features Banzer with a Chiquitano-style carved pillar.

Photo 5: Hugo Banzer Suárez Statue

Giant Banzer statue erected on the outskirts of Concepción, Bolivia. Author in the photo for a sense of scale.

Photo by Lewis Taylor

The Catholic Church in Concepción

Apart from the Concepceño elite, the Catholic Church plays an important role in Concepcion's' social and political life and that of many Chiquitano *comunidades*. Travellers to Concepción, as well as to other ex-mission towns in the Chiquitanía mission circuit, cannot easily miss this importance. After all, their centres are formed by a *plaza* and the visually striking Mission Church with adjacent priests' living compounds and wooden bell towers. In Concepción, these lie to the eastern side of the church (see photos 3 and 6). The Parish owns many of the houses close to the main plaza, some of which it rents out to businesses such as cafes, restaurants or

souvenir shops. Like the mission church, these buildings are painted with brown, ochre and black 'Chiquitano' designs around their base, windows and door frames. Wooden pillars support the overhanging roofs, which are welcome for shade or refuge against torrential downpours, which might occur from October until March - the wettest and hottest months in the lowlands in the Eastern Lowlands in general.

Photo 6: Side View of Concepción Mission Church

Concepción Mission Church, with protesters demanding indigenous autonomies, 30 June 2007.

The priests and local bishop play an important religious role in Concepción and the *comunidades*. At times, they visit *comunidades* for the patron-Saint festival but also train *comunarios* in delivering church services in their own *comunidades*. Further, they are among the actors which provide productive and infrastructure projects to Chiquitano *comunidades*. These range from financing the installation of wells and health posts to loans and technical support for cattle and weaving cooperatives.

The Church owns several artisan workshops which produce goods that are sold as 'Chiquitano' artefacts and they train Chiquitano in the production of these

objects. While the church helped set up small weaving projects primarily for women in a few *comunidades,* most artisan goods are produced in Concepción by the workers affiliated to the *Asociación de Artesanos de Concepción* (Associations of artisans of Concepción). The association provides technical assistance, credit and commercialises the goods. 80 per cent of all artisanal goods are bought by the Parish who then exhibits and sells them in their own shops. 20 per cent are sold in the artisan shops in other ex- missions (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 67). The Church also supported *comunidades* in building chapels and new school buildings. In the TCO Monte Verde it was supporting the c*omunidades* Palestina and Makanaté in building new adobe family houses to replace the ones made of wood and mud. In such projects, the Church helped with raw materials and the *comunidad* provided the manpower (‘*dar aporte’*). *Comunario* Miguel stated with regards to the projects that the Parish had supported in his *comunidad* Candelaria, one of the larger *comunidades* outside the TCO Monte Verde:

> I rather thank this institution that is the Parish because they were the ones that were helping, because of them we have the large school, we have a parish home, that we are also using as school rooms for the students, if we would not have this, until now we would have nowhere for the them to get lessons.[56]

According to Lacroix, the business-orientation of the Priests causes ‘regular conflicts between the Church and the population, as the church is more interested in its financial affairs than in the maintenance of good relations with its believers’ (2005: 47). *Comunarios* never mentioned to me that they had any types of ‘conflicts’ with the church. However, there is evidence that the priests share prejudices against Chiquitano with members of the *concepceño* elite and they certainly did not see their economic dealings with the *comunidades* as charitable acts. The few times I visited the local German Franciscan priest, he expressed that he thought that Chiquitano *comunarios* were lazy and that they only came to the Church when they wanted to borrow money. He stressed how much the Church had done for the *comunidades* and how ungrateful and forgetful Chiquitanos were in respect to these favours.[57]

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[56] *‘Más bien yo agradezco a esta institución que es La Parroquia por que ellos fueron los que ayudaron, por ellos tenemos el colegio, el grande, tenemos el hogar parroquial que lo estamos utilizando de aulas también aurita para los alumnos, que si no tuviéramos eso, hasta el momento no tuviéramos donde pasen clases los alumnos’*. Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

[57] For example, field notes: Concepción, 28 February 2007.

Apart from being concerned about its own finances, Lacroix maintains that the Church intervenes in the local political sphere and decision-making, and is therefore 'caught in constant political struggles' (2005: 47). Certainly, the local catholic priests did not keep their political opinions to themselves. When I first met the German Franciscan Priest in October 2006 and he asked me what I was doing in Concepción, I told him that I was carrying out research with the Chiquitano Organisations. He responded: 'with these MAS supporters, these communists?'. Some weeks later, I witnessed that in his mass he was preaching against Evo Morales and the MAS government, saying that MAS wanted to weaken the Catholic Church, for example, by undermining their role in education. Various sources confirmed that this was not a single incident, but that the priests liked to mix political messages with their service.

State Bureaucratic Institutions

To the right of the Mission church, on the southern corner of the square, is the *Alcaldía Municipal* (Mayors' office), at the time of research occupied by MAS Mayor Justo Seoane, a veteran of the Chiquitano movement (Seoane's rise to power and the functioning of the municipal system will be addressed in Chapter VII). This was the local state bureaucratic instance that that Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* had most contact with. Frequently, groups of Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* were standing outside the building and often leaders would say that they were off to meet with Justo Seoane or other Chiquitano municipal officials – or with those local politicians sympathetic to whatever cause they were pursuing. The interaction generally focused on coordinating the different productive and infrastructure projects for *comunidades* which the town hall was supporting.

For instance, *comunarios* from Santa Ana mentioned that the municipality financed their teacher, supported a housing project and a cattle ranching initiative.[58] Cattle ranching initiatives are quite popular among *comunarios*, one reason being

[58] Workshop: Santa Ana, group 2, 20 April 2007. Housing projects generally aimed at constructing houses that were made of adobe bricks and would then be plastered and painted. The parish and the national government through the 'presidential fund' were also carrying out 'housing projects' in some *comunidades* in the TCO Monte Verde. Generally, the *comunarios* are in charge of making the adobe bricks, while the project provider gives advice on how to build the houses and supplies any additional materials needed. These houses are supposed to provide better shelter and fewer habitats for the beetle that carries Chargas disease, which is known to live in *paja* roofs and between the wooden slats of Chiquitano houses. Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007.

that they provide milk for the children and allow *comunarios* to produce cheese.[59] Additionally, the *comunarios* see cattle as a source of cash income to turn to in case of harvest failure, which signifies that they do not need to seek employment on a local cattle ranch. The sale of cattle also pays for the costs incurred by sending children to college in the ex-mission settlements (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 229). Nevertheless, from the *comunarios* perspective, the utility of such development schemes will depend on the impact on their ability to subsist (see below).

Another state bureaucratic instance with seat in the locality was the Sub-Prefecture, at the time of fieldwork led by PODEMOS-backed sub-Prefect Nataniel Castedo Trujillo. *Comunarios* stated that they had no direct contact with the Sub-prefecture, as c*omunario* from Makanaté noted: '…we hardly have coordination and they do not visit us'.[60] The lack of interaction is likely due to the very opposing political views that the sub-prefect – a member of the Concepceño elite – and Chiquitano leaders hold. At the time of fieldwork, these opposing views were being publicly played out through the sub-prefects and Chiquitano leaders opposing claims to autonomy. The sub-prefect, in line with other members of the *concepceño* elite and departmental leaders, was a supporter of the departmental autonomy claim. He made his position abundantly clear when staging a pro-autonomy rally in the sub-prefecture on 2 July 2007 to support the departmental wide *paro cívico* (civic strike) aimed at pressuring the Bolivian government into acknowledging departmental autonomies in the new constitution. Green- and white Cruceño flags adorned the building (and the neighbouring Church, perhaps attesting to the political allegiance of the priests) and large speakers blasted out pro-autonomy songs.

A further state bureaucratic instance that some Chiquitano interact with is the Prefecture of Santa Cruz. Those *comunarios* who mentioned that they had contact with the Prefecture where from San Javier municipality – *comunarios* from Concepción, in contrast, were adamant that they had no such contact. *Comunarios* from Rosario in San Javier municipality specified that the Prefecture was helping

[59] Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. Generally, through such projects the *comunidad* receives two or more cows and one bull. After a certain amount of time, usually five or six years, the *comunidad* returns the original number of cattle that they received and then these are passed on to another *comunidad*. Such projects often involve some credit to buy wire to enclose pastures and veterinary implements. See Balza Alarcón for similar projects among Chiquitano communities (2001: 229). Apart from the municipality, the 'presidential fund', parish and *central* with the help of NGOs, and some years previously the Bolivian milk company PIL, also supported such projects.

[60] *'…casi no tenemos coordinación y no nos visitan'*. Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007.

them in the maintenance of the paths and had built a bridge for them. They had also asked for electricity and water provision.[61] The *comunarios* saw it as positive change that the Prefecture was now considering them:

> Before they did not come and we did not even know them. Now they come here and here one asks them for things that one needs, as we asked them for the path… and it will be done in two months from this date, it will be evened out.[62]

Another *comunario* noted 'yesterday we talked about that now we are not alone any more, now we have…that the Prefecture comes and keeps an eye on whether things go well, if they are carried out'.[63] The *comunarios* further explained that Rubén Costas – the departmental Prefect – had even come to the *comunidad* twice in person.[64] This sudden interest from the side of the Prefecture in the affairs of Chiquitano *comunidades* in San Javier municipality did not go unnoticed from Chiquitano leaders. Such maintenance work was usually carried out by the municipality or with NGO funding. Margarita the coordinator of the CGTI-MV suspected that this had to do with convincing *comunarios* to support the departmental autonomy campaign in an effort to de-politicise the *comunidades*.[65] Such political manoeuvres are a testament to ongoing and persistent clientelist tactics employed by different political actors operating in the department.

Non-Governmental Organisations

NGOs also formed an important state actor for many *comunidades*. They provided welfare, agricultural advisory services and juridical aid and attempted to promote the *comunidades* economic development.[66] The following description limits itself to the three NGOs that were most active in the area at the time of fieldwork. The NGO with the longest presence in the area is *Apoyo Para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano* (APCOB – Support for the Indigenous Peasant of Eastern Bolivian). The NGO was founded in Santa Cruz de la Sierra in 1980 by German Jesuit Jürgen

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[61] Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.
[62] *'Antes no venían ni siquiera lo conocíamos. Ahora ya llega hasta aquí y aquí uno le piden las cosas que necesita, como decir aquí le pedimos que el camino… y será cumplida de aquí a unos meses más va a estar rispiado'*. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.
[63] *'… ayer hablábamos que ya no estamos solos, ya tenemos que…la prefectura viene y vigila si las cosas andan bien, si se cumplen'*. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.
[64] Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.
[65] Field notes: San Javier, 17 April 2007.
[66] This following description excludes the CEJIS, as the role of this NGO is amply addresses in the Methodological Appendix.

Riester. It has since engaged in supporting lowland indigenous groups in campaigning for the recognition of territorial rights, customary rights, formulating ethnodevelopment strategies and through productive projects. APCOB has also carried out and provided a platform for research regarding lowland indigenous peoples with the aim of raising awareness and respect for lowland groups.[67] Even before Riester founded APCOB, he has been active in promoting organisational activities among lowland groups and he was key figure in the emergence of the Bolivian lowland federations (see Chapter V).

APCOB has its headquarters in Santa Cruz, but has some regional offices, one of them in Concepción. The Concepción office is a beautiful large white-washed building with wooden beams and carved pillars, and a large carved wooden APCOB sign over its entrance. The building houses offices for the local APCOB staff, a documentation centre and a radio room. In the latter, a Chiquitano radio engineer worked on creating programmes for the Chiquitano radio station which the regional Chiquitano Umbrella Organisation *Organización Indígena Chiquitana* (OICH – Chiquitano Indigenous Organisation) was getting up and running.

APCOB had supported *comunidades* in Lomerío with forestry management projects (albeit with questionable success, see McDaniel (2003)), and had in 1999 started to help *comunidades* in the TCO Monte Verde, by establishing communal forestry management plans (see APCOB, n/d).[68] At the time of fieldwork, such plans were functioning in only one or two *comunidades* within the TCO. Comments from *comunarios* from Santa Ana, a small *comunidad* in the TCO Monte Verde in San Javier municipality, serve to highlight why such plans may be contentious and fail. APCOB had proposed a forestry management project to them some weeks before, and the *comunarios* were debating the pros and cons of such a plan. One *comunario* noted:

> We will have to see because we have to analyse between all of us if it will benefit us, if it is good … because on the one hand is good to also have [it] and partly it is also bad, because the truth [is] that we have to be very careful with the management

[67] APCOB's main funders and partner include the European Union, different German, Dutch and Belgium development organisations and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). See APCOB (www.apcob.org.bo) and Yashar (2005: 201).

[68] Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007. APCOB was founded by German anthropologist Jürgen Riester, had interacted with the CICC since its foundation. It was generally active in the Bolivian lowlands, in aiding the organisational efforts of the lowland indigenous movement.

> because it is not just having it, we have to be very careful. On the other hand it is good because it creates a source of work for the sector.[69]

Another *comunario* added: 'We have to be very careful with the management. Then you cannot *chaquear* [make and work your fields], you cannot burn … we have to analyse it'.[70] Thus, the possibility to have a 'source of work' and 'resources' was measured against 'not being able to clear the forest to make fields'. Despite such set-backs, APCOB was still aiming to provide such projects.

A further NGO with constant presence in Concepción was the Bolivian *Centro de Estudios Jurídico Investigación Social* (CEJIS – Centre for Legal and Social Studies). CEJIS is an NGO that specialises in the promotion of human rights and was founded in 1978. Its' staff is composed mainly of lawyers and social scientists and the NGO's work has focused on raising awareness about collective and individual rights and on supporting different population groups in exercising these rights and developing political strategies.[71] Throughout the 1990s, CEJIS has been involved in organising workshops to inform different 'disadvantaged' groups about the content of the LPP and the decentralisation law, to advise them on how to use the newly opened political spaces and on how they could gain access to municipal resources. CEJIS has also developed a specialism in providing legal support to different indigenous, peasant and landless groups to support their struggles for titles to land and territory.

It publishes books on highland and lowland indigenous political issues and has documented indigenous and peasant territorial and land struggles. A *comunario* from the *comunidad* Rosario in San Javier Municipality summed up APCOB's and CEJIS' roles:

> … if we look at the top, there are the NGOs that go with the *central*, ALAS and the CEJIS … where we can voice our concerns about how we live in our *pueblo*, which

[69] *'Habría que ver porque nosotros tenemos que analizar entre todos si es que nos va a beneficiar, si es bueno…por que en parte es bueno también tener y en parte también es malo, porque la verdad hay que tener mucho cuidado con el manejo porque no es no más tenerlo, hay que cuidar mucho. Por otra parte es bueno porque cría fuentes de trabajo en el mismo sector'*. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007.

[70] *'…hay que tener mucho cuidado con el manejo. Ya usted no puede chaquear ya no puede quemar…hay que analizar'*. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007.

[71] The NGO is largely dependent on international funding organisations, such as Oxfam Great Britain and America and Danish and German development corporations, as well as EU funding.

> suffering we feel, how they exploit us, and where we are also going to learn and they teach us also what an autonomy is.[72]

At the time of fieldwork, the NGO was run by Argentinean human rights lawyer Leonardo Tamburini. A team of about six CEJIS employees was working permanently on advising indigenous and *campesino* leaders and Constituent Assembly members on policy proposals and the wording and content of proposals for the constitutional text. Another team were supporting the Chiquitano *centrals* in Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío in the last phase of their territorial claim, and THEY were running a project that focused on developing a proposal for the future governmental structures that would be implemented in the claimed territory (see Chapter III). This last area – research, or elaborating *diagnósticos*, for example on communal justice procedures, leadership election, or the trajectory of political struggles – is another area CEJIS specialises in. While the CEJIS headquarter is in Santa Cruz, it has some regional offices – one of these in Concepción. The Concepción office is located away from the town centre close to the Chiquitano *central*. It is an inconspicuous small concrete building, surrounded by high concrete walls. That this building is marked by a very small and inconspicuous wooden sign is testimony to the tense relation that CEJIS staff has with many *Concepceños* and Cruceños. They denounce them as 'lefties' who stir up trouble by politicising the indigenous population. This issue is addressed in more detail in the following chapter.

The British NGO Plan International was also very visible in the area, especially through their white four-by-four vehicles with the blue 'Plan' logo on the side. The NGO generally provided support in the area of infrastructure, education, early child development, health and leadership workshops. Don Víctor, from Candelaria one of the larger *comunidades* in Concepción municipality outside Monte Verde, proved very positive about the interaction with the NGO: 'It works very well, coordinates with us and has carried out projects that benefit us'.[73] While Plan did not run projects in all *comunidades*, this particular *comunidad* had especially benefitted

[72] *'Si vamos por arriba, está la ONG's que va con la central, ALAS y la CEJIS … donde vamos a dar la inquietud de cómo vivimos en nuestro pueblo, que sufrimiento sentimos, cómo nos explotan y en donde vamos también a aprender y nos enseñan también que es una autonomía.'* Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.

[73] *'…que trabaja muy bien y coordina con nosotros, y a hecho obras que nos benefician a nosotros'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

from Plan activities, counting with a Plan-financed 'library' and water-piping system built 2003 – 2004 with the help of Plan and the municipal government.

NGOs do not only interact with individual *comunidades*, but also with the Chiquitano *centrales*. These cooperate very closely with NGOs in delivering different projects to *comunidades*. NGOs either provided finance to the *central* leaders who would then implement the project, or implemented the projects themselves, but under *central* control. In fact, the CICC leaders often insisted that no activities should happen in the *comunidades* without their consent and cooperation.[74] This interaction with NGO and other state instances was crucial task of Chiquitano leaders as the following comments by Hugo Hurtado, the CICC Communication and Health Secretary, indicates: 'we are always knocking at the doors of other organisations, so that they collaborate with us in logistic matters [and] in training'.[75] *Comunarios* also stressed that it was the *central*'s tasks to help 'acquire' projects for the *comunidades*. For example, Miguel a *comunario* from the Candelaria *comunidad* in Concepción municipality noted during a workshop sessions:

> Well, currently the Organisation CICC represents all the *comunidades* of Concepción, through them, they canalise the projects for the *comunidades*, or let's say for the benefit of the *comunidades*.[76]

The *central* advised *comunidades* on projects – or on rare occasions also business deals – which they had arranged themselves. A *comunario* from Rosario, a *comunidad* in San Javier municipality explained:

> [The leaders] are there to advise us, to know what a forestation is, to know how you can live in a *community*, which trees you have to fell or how you can solve a problem or which business [to do] or how this *comunidad* can carry on doing it's business…[77]

[74] Field notes: Palestina, 1 March 2007. See, Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.
[75] '*Siempre nosotros tocamos puertas a otra instancia, para que nos colaboren en lo logístico, en capacitaciones*'. Interview: Alta Mira, 23 Januray 2007.
[76] '*Bueno actualmente la organización CICC representa a todas las comunidades de Concepción, a través de ellos, ellos canalizan proyectos para las comunidades, o sea en beneficio de las comunidades*'. Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.
[77] '*Están para asesorarnos, para saber que es una forestación, para saber cómo se puede vivir dentro de una comunidad, que de desmonte hay que hacer o como se puede arreglar un problema o qué negocios o cómo puede continuar esa comunidad haciendo sus negocio…*'. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.

NGOs like Oxfam Great Britain and America provide finances not only for projects, but also to keep the organisation running. Some of their initiatives were aimed at improving the *central's* role in the management of service and project provision.[78]

Further, APCOB and CEJIS staff was frequently present in *central* meetings. For example, Lorenzo Pasabare a CEJIS employee and former *central* leader, often dropped in to see what was going on in the CICC to coordinate activities and discover whether items of the agenda needed to be discussed or be organised jointly. Further, once a year APCOB and CEJIS held planning meetings with the *central*, in which *central* leaders, OICH leaders, CGTI-MV and NGO personnel discussed the programmes that they carried out in the Chiquitanía. New projects and proposals are introduced, criticised or approved. Meetings also occur at the start and end of projects, as well as other stages within project cycles to fulfil planning and evaluation criteria. These are either held in the *centrales*, the office of the respective NGO in Concepción, or the regional headquarters in Santa Cruz. That APCOB and CEJIS cooperated with the *central* closely was also obvious from the fact that they shared personnel. At the time of fieldwork one of the *central* technicians also worked for APCOB, who paid his wage. As CICC leader Mauro Cuasace summed up: 'we have support from the *technicians*, for example CEJIS, and other institutions, not just in the economic [matters] but also to help in organisational [matters]'.[79]

Lowland Indigenous Umbrella Organisations

Other actors to add to the web of agents Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* interacted with are the lowland indigenous umbrella organisations, i.e. the *Coordinadora de los Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz* (CPESC - Coordinating Body for the Ethnic People of Santa Cruz), the *Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia* (CIDOB – Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the West, Chaco and Amazonia), both with offices in Santa Cruz, and the OICH, which is based in Concepción. The OICH is the umbrella organisation of the twelve

[78] Interview: Mauro Cuasace (CICC leader) Concepción, 23 January 2007.
[79] *'Tenemos apoyo de los técnicos como, por ejemplo CEJIS, y otras instituciones, no solo para ver lo económico si no para coadyuvar en lo organizativo'*. Interview: Concepción, 23 January 2007.

Chiquitano organisations of the Gran Chiquitanía and was founded in 1995. The OICH in turn, forms part of the CPESC, which again is affiliated to the CIDOB.[80]

OICH leaders and their technicians were at the forefront of the struggle for indigenous rights in the lowlands and provided their affiliated *centrales* with assistance in their territorial and political struggles. The leaders of the OICH and the *central* in Concepción were in frequent contact to coordinate political activities and projects. At the time of fieldwork, OICH leaders were constantly liaising with CPESC and CIDOB leaders to discuss the progress of the Constituent Assembly and organise marches and protests to pressure for the inclusion of their demands into the constitutional text. As another *comunario* from Las Abras explained:

> … like the *central* they get together, they say 'we are going to gather in the OICH', no? … the leaders get together and from there they leave to report to us, all these organisations, the OICH gets together with all those in the surroundings, for example, all the *centrale*s of this area…[81]

Central leaders at times also liaised directly with the umbrella organisations CPESC and CIDOB. Leaders of the umbrella organisations and the *centrales* regularly meet to discuss political ideas, elaborated strategies, define political concepts and plan direct political actions, such as marches. For example, in 2007, CPESC and CIDOB leaders and leaders from the affiliated organisations repeatedly met and debated and defined the concept of 'indigenous autonomy'. They also developed a strategy to lobby for the inclusion of the CIDOB's proposals into the Constituent Assembly debates. Again, after meetings with the umbrella organisations, leaders were expected to share relevant information among other leaders and the *comunarios*.[82]

The Chiquitano Central *of Concepción*

The last important actor that Chiquitano *comunarios* had frequent contact with was their grassroots Organisation, or '*central'*. It encompasses the forty-five Chiquitano *comunidades* of Concepción municipality and represents these legally established *comunidades* before local, departmental and national state authorities. *Comunarios*

[80] The CIDOB at international level is affiliated to the *Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica* (COICA – Coordinating Body for Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin).
[81] *'… también como central se reúnen, dicen 'vamos a reunirnos en la OICH' no? … los dirigentes se reúnen y de ahí ya salen para que nos comuniquen, todas esas organizaciones, la OICH se junta con todos los alrededores, por ejemplo de todas las centrales de esta zona…'*. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.
[82] Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.

often stressed that it is also the legal entity that carries the territorial claim.[83] As a *Comunaria* from Tierra Nueva, a small *comunidad* in San Javier municipality noted: 'they have searched for us where we can work and the slavery like before has finished. And this is why I thank them because of them we have our land'.[84] (The aspect of 'freedom from slavery' and emergence of the organisation will be addressed in Chapter V).

The *central*'s headquarter is in the Chiquitano area of town, in a white-washed brick building with a metal roof, which *Comunarios*, leader and their allies also refer to as 'the *central*'. The *central* in Concepción has four rooms. One of them is larger and is where the *central* holds *asambleas* and other meetings. There is also a yard, which sometimes serves for meetings as well. It also has a documentation room, in which birth certificates, land titles, a variety of books and other documents were held. There are also copies of studies and documents on the territory, indigenous politics and territorial management, as well as children's books written in Chiquitano. It also has a computer room and internet access.

[83] See, Workshop: Turux Napez, 19 April 2007; Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007; Interview: Guillermo Cuasase (OTB Santa Mónica), Santa Mónica, 22 Januray 2007.

[84] *'…la gente de la central para mi esto es bien no, por que ellos nos han buscado donde nosotros tengamos para trabajar y se acabe la esclavitud como antes, por eso yo les agradezco por que, por ellos es que tenemos nuestra tierra'*. Workshop: *Comunaria* form Tierra Nueva, Turux Napez, 19 April 2007.

Photo 7: The CICC Headquarter (*Central*)

The *central* building (right) in Concepción, Bolivia.

The organisation is composed of 'base' and 'leaders'. The 'base' includes every *comunario* or *Chiquitano* who does not hold a leadership position within the organisation. Chiquitano leaders *(dirigentes*) occupy different roles or offices within the organisation. They are also often referred to as the 'secretaries' of certain working areas, e.g., 'Secretary for Gender' or 'Secretary for Land and Territory'.[85] They can be men or women; however in all three *centrales* more men occupy these positions. The highest office in the *central* in Concepción is the 'president'. The president is also the legal representative of the Chiquitano organisation.[86] The directory (the leaders and the president of the *central*), are elected every four years in a Great Assembly of representatives of the various *comunidades* affiliated to the

[85] In the following, I translate '*dirigente*' as 'leader', but '*dirigente/ secretario de salud*' as 'health secretary'. Many *comunarios* also use the term *'líder'* to refer to the religious leaders of a *comunidad*. A *comunaria* from Santa Ana noted that she got confused by the use of the term *liderazgo* by personnel of the NGO Proceso in a leadership workshop for women. She thought that *'líder'* had a religious function until she was told that the NGO used the term *liderazgo* and *'líder'* to refer to political leaders. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007. *Comunarios* generally refer to political leaders as *'dirigente'* or *'autoridades'*.

[86] Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007.

CICC.[87] The leaders work closely together with the so-called '*técnicos'* or '*técnicas'* (technicians). They are either hired by the *central* or provided by NGOs and support its activities by providing outside expertise, either permanently or for the duration of a certain project. For example, there are several forestry engineers (at least one is an APCOB employee) and a technician, who help the *central* in organisational matters. They helped organise meetings, structure them, write important items on the white-board and took the minutes.[88] Another post in the *central* was that of the coordinator, who performs an administrative function and the leaders appoint him or her internally. Lastly, there were the secretaries that the *central* employs. Leaders, technicians and administrative staff – who can often be encountered in the *central* building – are also often referred to as the '*central'*.

Apart from everyday interaction between the people who form the *central,* activities are organised by the *central* through 'open' or 'closed' meetings. 'Open' meetings are those that *comunarios*, leaders, technicians and NGO members can attend. The *central* held weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually 'planning' or 'evaluation' open meetings. They are held to plan the leaders' and technicians' activities, to announce important events, inform the grassroots about political processes at department or national level, or are called to coordinate group action, such as assemblies or marches.

Besides arranging projects for the *comunidades* the *central* also fulfilled other important roles. It was generally there to 'solve their problems' and 'looked after' the affiliated *comunidades.*[89] In this respect, *comunarios* and leaders often stressed that the *central* advanced their causes and solves their problems on a more political level, not least because it can 'bring the *comunarios* together'. As a *comunario* from Candelaria noted:

> When the CICC was founded it was with the idea that it had to support the indigenous people, because by ourselves we could not. Now with our organisation

[87] Lorenzo Pasabare explained that the idea is that the first year is to learn and the other three years 'to exercise' the post. Every *comunidad* presented their candidates and the one with most votes would become President. The first three or four most important posts, such as President and Secretary of Land and Territory, were elected in a secret ballot. The others were elected in an open vote, by a simple show of hands. Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[88] Most lowland indigenous organisations have such technicians, who provide support or for certain projects as coordinators or consultants.

[89] Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007; Interview: Lorenza Rodriguez (CICC technician), Candelaria, 19 Januray 2007.

> we can start a fight, because with all the *comunidades*, they call an assembly to solve the problems.[90]

Nicolás from the same *comunidad* stated something similar:

> Well, for me the *central* is above all, the principal matrix, whose obligation it is to strive for all the *comunidades*, those that are affiliated as well as those who are not, also to defend the rights that correspond to everyone as a human being. Also amongst all the *comunidades* we support the CICC, so that it stands up firmly. Up to the moment the CICC is working vey well.[91]

Further, as already mentioned, the *central* was supposed to 'provide information' to the *comunidades* and keep them informed about any political and economical developments in the area (and at national level) that might affect the *comunarios*.[92] As the CICC Health and Communication Secretary Hugo Hurtado noted: 'one as leader has the obligation to inform the base'.[93] As a *comunario* noted:

> … it is like the *compañero* says, that we always have to direct ourselves after the *leaders* of our *centrales*, because we are [here] for that, that they direct us and we also understand that they inform us.[94]

The *central* also organises training workshops in the *comunidades*, for example to enhance female *comunarios*' leadership skills, as well as providing stipends for children to attend schools and university.[95] Consequently, many of the leaders and technicians mentioned that the *central* had been an important 'training ground' for their professional and political careers. For example, the OTB of Santa Rita, Pedro Solis Pinto, a former *central* leader and at the time of fieldwork helping out in a CEJIS project (see Chapter III), explained to me how important the formal and

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[90] *'Cuando recién se fundó la CICC, fue con el sistema que tenia que apoyar a la gente indígena, por que solo no podíamos. Ahora con nuestra organización tenemos como empezar una lucha, por que con todas las comunidades ellos llaman a asamblea para resolver los problemas'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

[91] *'Bueno para mí la central es más que toda la matriz principal, la cual su obligación es velar por todas las comunidades, tanto por las que están afiliadas como las que no están, también para defender los derechos que le corresponden a cada uno como ser humano. También entre todas las comunidades le ponemos el hombro a la CICC para que se pare fuerte, hasta el momento la CICC esta trabajando muy bien. Esta ayudando en la carnetizacion, en salud … ayudando con becas de estudio a los jóvenes para otros países'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

[92] Workshop: *Comunario* from Tierra Nueva, Turux Napez, 19 April 2007; Interview: Hugo Hurtado (CICC Health and Communication Secretary), Alta Mira, 23 January 2007.

[93] *'Uno como dirigente tiene la obligación de informar a las bases*'. Interview: Alta Mira, 23 Januray 2007.

[94] *'…es como dice el compañero que nosotros siempre debemos dirigirnos a los dirigentes de nuestras centrales, por que para eso estamos para que ellos nos dirijan, y nosotros también comprendamos lo que ellos nos informan'*. Workshop: *Comunario* from Tierra Nueva, Turux Napez, 19 April 2007.

[95] See, Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007; Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

informal training he had received through the *central* had been for his political awareness:

> … so, in this moment I was exercising a post in the [*central*] directory which was my first experience, for example, of fighting and seeing so many problems that have presented us, no? and there I kept learning many things… and having contact with older and professional people, like lawyers, engineers… also the Organisation has been a part of school for me, because there I have learned many things that I did not learn in college. So I have learned many things, and also training in many different areas, for example, how to defend your own organisation. I did not know what my rights were but thanks to the assessors we have learned.[96]

Also many CGTI-MV and CICC *técnicos* expressed in interviews that *central* made it possible for them to go to university and that they continued learning when working for the *central*.

Furthermore, *comunarios* asked the *central* for help if problems arose between *comunarios* or *comunidades* which could not be resolved at the *comunidad* level. *Comunarios* also approached the *central* if a *comunario* was seriously ill and needed medication or transport. The *central* also assists *comunarios* in legal matters: if a *comunario* has trouble with the law, officials of the municipality call in. *Central* leaders to help resolve the matter.[97] Moreover, the *central* aids *comunarios* in getting legal documents, such as identification cards.[98]

As can be concluded from the above, the *central* fulfils many functions for *comunarios* that state bureaucratic institutions fulfil for other citizens in the locality. As such they fulfil 'state' functions. That Chiquitano interact with such an array of actors that form part of the state power structure in Concepción also determined my methodology for exploring Chiquitano-state relations, addressed in the following chapter. It was of a necessarily multi-sited character reflecting the fragmented nature of the state power structure, as well as the geographical dispersion of Chiquitano *comunidades* in the municipality.

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[96] *'Entonce en ese momento yo estaba ejerciendo el cargo en la dirigencia y fue mi primera experiencia ejemplo de lucha y ver tanto problema que se no ha presentado ¿no? y ahí fui aprendiendo mucha cosa… y tener contacto con persona mayores y profesionales, como ser abogados, ingenieros… también la organización ha sido como una parte de escuela para mi, por que de ahí he aprendido mucha cosa que yo en el colegio no la aprendía ¿no? Entonce he aprendido mucha cosa y también capacitándose uno en diferente área ejemplo no, como defender a su misma organización. …no sabia era mi derecho pero a través de los asesores que gracia a ellos hemos aprendido…'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[97] Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[98] Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

Chapter III

Methodology: Of Multi-Sitedness, Shifting Positionalities and the Politics of Research

Following the clarification of concepts employed in this thesis, this chapter aims to ground this study by providing a methodological discussion, regarding the 'multi-sited' ethnographic fieldwork I carried out from September 2006 until August 2007, mainly in the eastern Bolivian municipality of Concepción. A fieldworker should lay open their activities in the field and methods used, so the reader gains enough clarity about the conditions in which the research was carried out and about the origin of the featured data. This is, as Firth's noted in the 1930s, because:

> … even the simplest record of what purports to be the "facts" of a native culture has involved a considerable amount of interpretation, and every generalization about what the people do has meant a selection from the immeasurably wide field of their activity, a comparison of items of individuals behaviour (1936: 3).

In this spirit, this chapter provides a personal narrative of how I developed my research question, as well as explaining methodological choices I made. It reflects upon the multi-sited nature of my research, which allowed for the study of the state power structure for Chiquitano as enacted by different actors and in different sites.[1] While many of the state actors reside in Concepción, the Chiquitano *comunidades* themselves are distributed throughout the rest of the municipal territory. Further, state actors may move around and engage with other state and non-state actors in different geographical settings. Two of the sites I conducted research in, were distinct research projects: one run by *Comité de Gestión del Territorio Indígena de Monte Verde* (CGTI- MV – Management Committee of the Indigenous Territory of Monte Verde) and the other, by the NGO *Centro de Estudios Jurídico Investigación Social* (CEJIS – Centre for Legal and Social Studies). The projects not only formed part of state actor activities, but my cooperation with the project researchers also provided me with access to data gathered through more structured methods of data collection.

[1] Also compare Lucero's (2008) methodology for investigating state-indigenous relations in Bolivia and Ecuador. This also led him to carry out fieldwork in different sites, follow indigenous leaders around and spend time working in NGOs collaborating with indigenous movements.

Additionally, the chapter reflects on the multiple subject positions I adopted, or that were ascribed to me, in the field. I argue that research ethics depend on the social and cultural context that a researcher encounters. In other words, 'ethical conduct', presentation of self, and what constitutes appropriate research methods, are all linked to the socio-cultural context of a researchers field sites. For this reason, this chapter goes beyond dealing with methodological issues to describe how different actors in the locality presented themselves to each other. This is also a further introduction to the local socio-political structures. The final section reflects on the implication of working on the 'side' of 'the Chiquitano' and their allies. I argue, that taking up the position of an advocate as a methodological choice, must be distinguished from a personal moral position, while I acknowledge that these may coincide. I hold, that by treating the state as a power structure and focusing on the relations between actors, allows me to move beyond my advocate position during fieldwork in the writing up process.

What I Set out to Research, Why and How

My choice of research question and case study location were informed, apart from scholarly literature, by experiences I had before I was a graduate student and a pre-fieldwork mission to Bolivia. In 2003 and 2005, I worked as an intern and seminar assistant for a German NGO.[2] It organised workshops for members of different Bolivian state agencies during which the delegates compared the Bolivian decentralised system to that of the German one. They were supposed to find ways of facilitating the coordination between the Bolivian decentralised state instances and making the institutions more citizen-friendly. Reflecting on what I learned developed into a research interest in how (decentralised) political institutions impact on

[2] The NGO *Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH* (Inwent – Capacity Building International) Inwent was founded in 2003 through a merger of the Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft e.V. (CDG) und the German Foundation for International Development (DSE). Inwent has it's headquarter in Bonn, Germany, and operates in the field of international development. It is one of the decentralised implementing institutions of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 60 per cent of the work Inwent carries out is commissioned by the Ministry. However, Inwent may also get commissioned for projects from other actors, such UN institutions, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the German business sector (see Inwent, 2010). Due to its close relationship with the German Government the 'non-governmental' nature of the organisation is highly debatable.

populations and in turn, how populations interact with and perceive state bureaucratic levels.[3]

To find a research location to investigate indigenous-state relations, I set out in May 2006 for a one-month long pre-fieldwork mission to Bolivia. Initially, I relied on Bolivian contacts resident in La Paz, who I had met at the workshops in Germany, and some of the staff of German international development institutions.[4] I decided to concentrate my reconnaissance efforts on the Chiquitanía in the Santa Cruz department, along with two other departments. I travelled to the capital of Santa Cruz department: Santa Cruz de la Sierra (generally simply referred to as Santa Cruz). Here, I received help from Carlos Echegoyen, an employee of the *Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst* (DED – German Development Service), who later helped me gain 'access' to the Chiquitano organisations.

Carlos was a sociologist trained in conflict mediation and deployed by the DED to work for the Santa Cruz-based NGO CEJIS.[5] He had supported CEJIS and the Chiquitano Organisations in the protection and execution of indigenous rights and conflict mediation since 2005. I learned from Carlos and his colleagues that among 'hot topics' in the region were land-problems, the conflicts surrounding claims to *Tierras Comunitarias de Origen* (TCOs –Original Communal Lands) and

[3] Initially, I was particularly interested in the validity of claims by scholars that decentralisation would promote and enlarge democracy, stimulate social and economic development, make states more accountable and accessible to civil society (for example, Litvack et al., 1998; Llambí and Lindemann, 2001; Lockwood, 1998; Schneider, 2003). Such claims had also led some analysts to consider its potential in reducing levels of conflict and ethnic tensions within states (e.g. Licha, 2002; Treisman, 1999). Bolivia seemed to undermine such optimistic claims, as the introduction of decentralisation reforms in 1994 had had some success in such issues as re-directing of public investment in favour of 'poorer districts' (for example, see Faguet, 2003: 1), but not stabilised central government, proven by such episodes as the 2003 ousting of President Sánchez de Lozada in 2003.

[4] Especially helpful and accommodating was Aymara Raúl Maydana, *Federación de Asociaciones Municipales* (FAM – Federation of Municipal Associations) coordinator, resident in La Paz. Most of these German organisations have useful libraries, where I could obtain studies and general information about the current state of affairs in different Bolivian municipalities, as well as knowledgeable staff with some of who I discussed my research ideas.

[5] The DED was founded in 1963 and has its main seat in Bonn, Germany. Like Inwent it implements part of the German Federal Governments' international development strategies and has the 'legal form of a non-profit-making, limited liability company' (see DED, n/d). On their website, the DED explains that it 'is owned jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the working group "Learning and Helping Overseas", a registered association. DED is financed by the federal budget' (n/d). It operates through placing specialist development workers in local civil organizations and municipal structures at the request of governmental and nongovernmental organisations. These specialists engage mainly in training, advisory capacity and planning tasks, if required supplemented by financial support (see DED, n/d).

the question of departmental autonomy.[6] A conflict of particular longevity and gravity was that surrounding the TCO Monte Verde in Velasco Province. Chiquitano from the region had claimed the territory since the 1990s and, as later materialised, the territorial struggle presented the main subject of Chiquitano-state engagement. Not long before my arrival in Bolivia, President Evo Morales had announced that he wanted to hand over the legal title for the TCO, to three local indigenous organisations who had jointly claimed the land: the *Central Indígena de Comunidades de Concepción* (CICC – Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Concepción), the *Central Indígena de Paikonecas de San Javier* (CIP-SJ – Indigenous Organisation of Paikonecas of San Javier) and the *Central Indígena de los Comunidades Originarios de Lomerío* (CICOL – Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Lomerío). Opposition came from some forestry concessions, which were still fighting to keep land within the TCO, the PODEMOS party, the Cruceño Civic Committee and the Departmental Prefecture, who were all on the side of the concessions.

That such issues were of concern to the local indigenous organisations became apparent when I travelled to the small Jesuit mission, Concepción and San Javier and talked to Chiquitano leaders. In Concepción, I spoke to Manuel Peña, the CICC's President and the first Cacique of the *Organización Indígena Chiquitana* (OICH – Chiquitano Indigenous Organisation) Rodolfo López, and in San Javier I spoke to CIP-SJ's Secretary of Land and Territory Andrés Morobanchi.[7] The three leaders coincided in explaining that the most pressing issues, which concerned their organisations', were territorial conflicts, obtaining pending territorial titles and the Constituent Assembly.[8]

In terms of the first issue, territory, Morobanchi explained further that the Organisations were involved in a territorial management process (*gestión territorial*), which involved developing guidelines for the use of natural resources, as well as thinking about how the territory should be governed in the future. The leaders expressed that the Constituent Assembly was important, because it would possibly

[6] For a brief definition of the figure of TCO, see Chapter VI.
[7] The umbrella organisation OICH encompasses the Chiquitano Organisations of the five Provinces Chiquitos, Velasco, Ñuflo de Chávez, Ángel Sandoval and Germán Busch. See Introduction for a further specification of the activities of the OICH.
[8] Fieldnotes: Concepción, 8 June 2006; Interview: Rodolfo López, Concepción, 8 June 2006; Interview: Andrés Morobanchi, San Javier, 8 June 2006.

re-define TCOs in terms of territorial governance and control over resources. These issues remained hazy in the legislation as it stood, i.e. they were not clearly defined in the INRA Law (see Chapter VI).

That the issue of how the TCO was currently tied into the state administrative system was not very clear, was evidenced by the fact that none of the leaders could clearly explain the relation. For example, when I asked Morobanchi what role the municipal governments played in governing the TCO and the communities within, he replied:

> A: No, the municipalities are not administrating it now; the [Chiquitano] Organisations are administrating it.
>
> Q: So, the TCO is something that is outside the municipality and the municipality has nothing to do with its management?
>
> A: It is also part.
>
> Q: So there are two municipalities that…
>
> A: … Of course, for example, the improvement of paths, all that sort of thing for the *comunidades*, some school projects, sanitary posts, which is what is part of [what] the municipality [does].[9]

My conversation with Morobanchi also shifted to one further issue of concern for the Organisations: the campaign for autonomy by Bolivia's lowland departments. He explained to me that this also had to do with control over resources. Therefore, the indigenous organisations were asking for a different type of autonomy:

> Of course, if it is an indigenous autonomy, the *Originarios* [originary people] themselves manage their natural resources, which are within their territorial claim. … Well, the autonomy which they are thinking of is to take advantage of the natural resources that are within Monte Verde, of the entire [territorial] claim.[10]

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[9] *'R: No, más que todos los municipios no lo están manejando ahora, si no lo están manejando las organizaciones.*
P: ¿Entonces las TCO es algo que es afuera del municipio y el municipio no tiene nada que ver con el manejo?
R: Si, también es parte.
P: Entonces ya hay 2 municipios que…
R: …Claro, por ejemplo el mejoramiento de caminos, todo eso para las comunidades, algunos proyectos de escuelas, postas sanitarias, eso ya dentro de lo que es el municipio.' Interview: San Javier, 8 June 2006.

[10] *'O sea, es muy diferente, ¿no? La autonomía de la ciudad que es Santa Cruz, a lo que nosotros aquí hemos pedido que sea una autonomía indígena, eso es muy diferente. … Claro, si es autonomía indígena, que los mismos originarios manejan sus recursos naturales, los que hay a dentro de su demanda territorial. …Bueno, la autonomía que ellos piensan es aprovecharse de los recursos naturales que tiene dentro de Monte Verde de toda la demanda'*. Interview: San Javier, 8 June 2006.

Chiquitano-state relations, with their focus on gaining territorial rights presented an interesting, and little researched topic of inquiry (see Introduction). As my research would entail repeated contact to the *central* and carrying out research in the *comunidades*, permission to do so depended on the leaders' consent. Conversely, the leaders were very adamant that people who wanted to carry out research or other activities in *comunidades* would require their approval.[11] Both, Manuel Peña and Rodolfo López approved of my planned research, as it could be of some use to the *comunidades* and the *central.* Andrés Morobanchi simply noted:

> Of course. Every study is important, right?[12]

Researching the Chiquitano 'Governance' System: A so-called Multi-Sited Ethnography

To collect data on Chiquitano-state relations, I planned to combine long-term observation and conducting interviews with members of the local indigenous organisation, civil society organisations, municipal governmental institutions and Chiquitano *comunarios*.[13] This is an approach followed by many anthropologists, who see fieldwork carried out in close contact with people (often in the form of some type of 'community' or communities) and communicating in the peoples' own language, as the core of anthropological practice (see, for example Davies, 1999: 4-5; Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Keesing and Strathern, 1998; Malinowski, 1960; Powdermaker, 1966).[14] Observation of, participating in and 'recording' everyday life, or what Malinowski calls 'the *imponderabilia of actual life and typical behaviour*', should be supplemented by 'the native's views and opinions and

[11] That indigenous umbrella organisations take such a stance is very common, see, for example, Jackson (1999: 291).
[12] *'Claro. Todo estudio pues es importante ¿no?'*. Interview: San Javier, 8 June 2006.
[13] A holistic perspective maintains that 'an isolated observation cannot be understood unless you understand its relationships to other aspects of the situation in which it occurred' (Agar, 1980: 75). This calls attention to the fact that, in Malinowski's words 'all social, cultural and psychological aspects of the community… are so interwoven that not one can be understood without taking into consideration all the others' (1960: xvi). Researchers who conducted their research in a more holistic manner in the Bolivian context of Bolivian decentralisation policies are Ricardo Calla and, Lema et al (2001).
[14] Some authors note that fieldwork should be 'long' generally meaning at least a year, to allow the fieldworker to live and experience social life at every season of the year, and hold that successful fieldwork is seldom possible in a period much shorter than a year, especially when a new language and culture must be learned (e.g. Keesing and Strathern, 1998: 7-9). However, I would argue that this very much depends on the type of study conducted and where it is conducted. Some 'sites' might be very temporary phenomena which do not allow for a continued length of observation. After all, studies may focus on some type of gatherings, meetings or project.

utterances' (1960: 19-22).[15] Similarly, I planned to conduct mainly semi-structured and informal interviews, which I would record, in order to collect interpretations of events and opinions and obtain 'richer accounts of daily life' (Agar, 1980: 105).

Data collection focused especially on such elements as Chiquitano perceptions of space and place, collective identities, and politics, authority and leadership, freedom and autonomy. After all, negotiating different views of and different meanings attached to such concepts generally lie at the heart of indigenous-state relations.[16] Attention to these elements would shed light on the Chiquitano political or 'governance' system, as well as areas of accommodation or resistance against state pressures.[17] Further, I aimed to establish Chiquitano organisations' and communities' interactions with each other and governmental and non-governmental actors (in other words, to trace Chiquitano state actors), I had to conduct research in different sites: Concepción, a Chiquitano *comunidad*, the CICC, the CGTI-MV and CEJIS. In the case of the latter two, more precisely, research projects which members of each were carrying out. Thus, my field research had, what Marcus (1986; 1995) would call a 'multi-sited' character.

Reflections on Multi-Sitedness

George Marcus (1986; 1995) conceived the term 'multi-sited fieldwork' to differentiate this type of fieldwork from that carried out in different sites for comparative purposes. He stressed that in contrast to the latter, it is at the heart of this type of 'mobile' multi-sited research to quite literally follow 'connections, associations, and putative relationships' (1995: 97, 103).[18] Consequently, he highlighted that this type of ethnography is often practiced by those who get their theoretical inspiration from postmodernism. While Marcus is certainly the approaches' most eloquent advocate, it has to be acknowledged that many

[15] Some ethnographers have noted the incompatibility of the two notions and have noted that they could either 'observe' or 'participate' in a given activity (see Evans, 2008: 125).
[16] See, for example, the essays in the edited volumes of, Assies et al (2000), Urban and Sherzer (2001) Warren and Jackson (2002) and Surrallés and García Hierro (2005).
[17] In a personal communication, Steven Rubenstein reminded me that these areas were of special importance when addressing state-indigenous relations – or in fact, when analysing the relation of any individuals to the state as power structure.
[18] Multi-sited ethnography has most prominently emerged in such areas as media studies (e.g. Ginsburg, 1994), the social and cultural study and science and technology (e.g. Haraway, 1991a; Latour, 2007), migration studies (e.g. Ong, 1993) and development studies (e.g Escobar, 1994; Ferguson, 1990).

ethnographers before him have conducted fieldwork that involved tracing actors and covering different sites. This includes, to name a few, such prominent pioneers of ethnographic fieldwork such as Malinowski (1960), when he followed the Kula ring and Evans-Pritchard (1940) when he studied the Nuer and carried out research in different geographical spaces.[19]

Recognising that multi-sitedness is, in fact, not a 'new' concept. It means we can refute worries that some who have engaged in this type of research have expressed. Hannerz (2003: 208) points to concerns about the potentially 'dubious quality' of multi-site studies, stemming from a perceived lack of depth and breadth of research, perhaps stemming from the fact that such studies almost always entail focusing on some of the sites, actors and aspects of culture and social life of those that could potentially be included (Hage, 2005: 466; Hannerz, 2003: 207-209; Marcus, 1995: 99-100). We may simply reply that fieldwork always involves focusing on some aspects of 'culture' or social relations over others. Further, also in studies that are not labelled 'multi-sited', selection of sites and research focus develop gradually, 'as new insights develop, as opportunities come into sight, and to some extent by chance' (Hannerz, 2003: 207). That fieldworkers have always improvised and adapted their methods to their object and subject of study, is perhaps most obvious in cases where fieldworkers have encountered conflict situations and cannot rely on rigid or fixed methodological frameworks.[20] As Kovats-Bernat notes in such cases fieldwork must be seen 'as an elastic, incorporative, integrative, and malleable practice' (2002: 210).

In fact, the label 'multi-sitedness' may disguise that the sites of investigation in such studies are closely connected, since such studies are 'designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations, in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of association or connection among sites that defines the argument of the ethnography'

[19] The point about multi-sited nature of Malinowski's fieldwork has also been made by Markus (1995: 106) himself, Hannerz (2003: 202) and Hage (2005: 467). This leads Ghassan Hage (2005: 464) to label 'multi-sitetness' as a 'buzzword' because its signification and ramifications are not explored by many of its users.

[20] Room for flexibility and improvisation is arguably the very nature of a less structured ethnographic data collection process which seeks to avoid the imposition of the researcher's assumptions about the social world and 'consequently reduces the chances of discovering evidence of the discrepant with those assumptions' (Hammersly, 1992: 11). Also see similar comments by some of the many authors who write on methodological issues (e.g. Agar, 1980; Davies, 1999; Robson, 1993).

(Marcus, 1995: 105). This leads Hage (2005) to argue that the idea of multi-sitedness is 'not practically feasible'. His reasoning is, that if the concept of a site is 'something one has to spend an inordinate amount of time and labour on in order to become familiar with', then he himself did not study a multi-sited reality (2005: 466). His study on Lebanese migrants focused on a studying a 'transnational family or village as a global phenomenon', which meant he had to 'treat all these locations, dispersed as they were, as just one site… a globally spread, geographically non-contiguous site, but it was nevertheless one site' (2005: 466).[21] My own fieldwork required research in different geographical sites, but also different sites in Hage's sense (2005): phenomena that take place in one non-contiguous site, i.e. the CEJIS and CGTI-MV projects, the *central* and arguably even the *comunidades*. I refer to the latter type of sites simply as 'site', and the former as 'geographical site'.

Tracing Chiquitano-State Relations and the Governance System: The Sites

Concepción

Firstly, I carried out fieldwork in the ex-Jesuit mission town of Concepción, which formed the 'base' throughout my fieldwork period in Bolivia: I returned there after different research activities in other locations. As noted, Concepción is the capital of Concepción municipality and forms the seat of the local state administrative institutions in the form of the *Alcaldía Municipal* and the Sub-prefecture and other state actors (see Interlude).

My presence in this geographical site was imperative, firstly, as it allowed me to frequently pay visits to the CICC, OICH and the CGTI-MV and I carried out observation and interviews in these organisations. Being situated in Concepción, also allowed me to observe public political, as well as major social events in town. The main square was the stage for the local carnival celebrations, as well as political rallies and protests by Concepceño elite and Chiquitano activists alike. For instance, it was the site where the *Gran Encuentro de los pueblos indígenas de Santa Cruz* (the

[21] It should be added that not all ethnographies that are 'multi-sited' require the researcher to move around. Marcus calls these 'strategically situated ethnography', and argues that they should be 'distinguished from the single-site ethnography that examines its local subjects' articulations primarily as subalterns to a dominating capitalist or colonial system. The strategically situated ethnography attempts to understand something broadly about the system in ethnographic terms as much as it does its local subjects (1995: 111). One example he mentions is example is Anna Tsing's (1993) ethnography. Whether labelling such ethnographies as multi-sited is open for debate.

Big Encounter of Santa Cruz Indigenous Peoples), a pro-indigenous autonomy rally, was held in June 2007, and where departmental autonomy supporters staged their counter rally – to accompany a pro-autonomy *paro cívico* – about two days later. Such events provided insights into how local power relations are acted out in Concepción and mapped onto public spaces, as well as insights into questions of Chiquitano governance and Chiquitano political claims. I supported such observations with semi and unstructured interviews and informal conversations with members of the Municipality, Church, Vigilant Committee and Sub-Prefecture, in order to gather individual's opinions and interpretations of certain events and the general local, departmental and national socio-political situation.

The Comunidad *Palestina*

Another site where I carried out research was the Chiquitano *Comunidad* Palestina. Palestina is one of the forty-two legally recognised 'indigenous communities' in Concepción Municipality. It is located in the TCO Monte Verde, a four-hour drive from Concepción and is composed of 135 people, 31 families in total (see 2006 census, CGTI-MV, 2007: 5-6). This makes it one of the smaller *comunidades*, as most *comunidades* have a population of between 150 and 300 people (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 51-52). I chose to stay in Palestina after a discussion with CICC and CGTI-MV leaders, who pointed out that the *comunidad* was fairly easy to access, despite it being the rainy season. The CGTI-MV consulted the *comunarios* from Palestina, as to whether they agreed to my staying there, and had arranged for me to stay with the household of Pedro and Hilda Massaí. I stayed in Palestina for one week (1-8 March 2007).[22]

As noted in the Introduction, *comunidades* are the more immediate political, economic and social space for the Chiquitano *comunarios* (also see Chapter V and VI). Research in a Chiquitano *comunidad* was necessary in order to gain a greater insight into the functioning of communal political structures; the way *comunidades* interacted with each other, and how *comunarios* perceived the *centrales* and other

[22] Although staying in one or two *comunidades* for about a month or longer would have allowed me to collect more detailed ethnographic data, engagement in other research activities meant that I did not have the time to do so. I recognise that spending longer in Palestina or another *comunidad* would be very beneficial to complement the data I gathered. It would have allowed me to collect more in depth data on little-researched 'rhizomic structures' in Chiquitano *comunidades*, for example, kinship ties and community power structures.

state actors. It was also necessary to gain a deeper insight into the 'imponderabilia' of communal life – aspects of which, would also shed light on the way Chiquitano act and view themselves in the local socioeconomic and political context (including interactions with external actors) the way authority and leadership work in *comunidades*, and how they perceive landscape and space.

I stayed in a room within the families' housing complex, where I pitched up a little tent, in which I slept to protect myself from stinging insects. Apart from the two-room house in which I slept, the complex consisted of a house made of wooden slats, covered with a palm-leaf roof, where the family members slept in hammocks or on wooden beds, and a small hut (again with wooden slat walls and palm roof), which contained the cooking facilities of the family (see photo 8). In front of the house and small hut there was a construction of wooden beams with a palm-leaf roof (see photo 9). This sheltered a wooden table and some chairs and stools, the wooden *tacú* – a large mortar carved out of a piece of tree-trunk, which served to peel rice, for instance.

I carried out observation and informal interviews, on which I took notes. I also recorded some of the interviews with a digital recorder. The main daily activities I engaged in, were helping the Chiquitanas with their household chores: for example, taking the twenty-minute walk to the *chacos* (fields) in order to collect firewood, cut down plantains, papaya and harvest rice. This meant I spent most of my time around the families' housing complex or in the *chacos*. As one woman in the *comunidad* pointed out to me:

> …women never really leave the community to go far. They move more around the community and in the *chacos*. Men go further, as they may go hunting and stay for some days in the forest or some may go off to work for cash.[23]

I also attended communal meetings and a communal work effort (*minga*), to cut the grass around church and school buildings, together with other male and female adult family members. Once, I accompanied members of another household to recover the meat of a tapir (*anta*), which they had shot in the thicket of the forest, roughly two hours' walk away from the *comunidad*. For my help, the hunters gave me a share of

[23] Field notes: Palestina, 1 March 2007. This thesis does not contain an in-depth analysis of gendered role in the household, however, the issue of what are seen to be male and female activities does feature in some of the *comunario's* comments about what they perceive 'a *comunidad*', and 'being Chiquitano' to be (Chapter V).

the meat I carried to the family. In the evenings, the families' neighbours, brothers or father would come past, and we would sit at the table and talk to each other.

Photo 8: The Massaí Families' Kitchen

Hilda Massaí is roasting maize for *chicha*. Above the fireplace meet is drying.

Photo 9: Part of the Massaí Families' Housing Complex, *Comunidad* Palestina

Photo 10: Path to *Chacos* of *Comunidad* Palestina



Photo 11: Plantain Grove in the *Comunidad* Palestina

The Chiquitano Central - CICC

A further site was the CICC, the Chiquitano grassroots organisation with headquarter in Concepción municipality (see Interlude). During my fieldwork period, leaders frequently travelled to meetings with the umbrella organisations in Santa Cruz or Sucre, to debate policy and law proposals and to pressure for the inclusion of their demands in the Constituent Assembly (see photos 12 and 13).

Gathering data in the CICC and about the activities of *central* leaders was vital, as they can be important state actors. They fulfil certain administrative and normative functions for the *comunidades* but also legally represent *comunidades* before local, departmental and national state authorities. They interact with other state administrative actors, NGOs and indigenous umbrella organisations. They are important in securing services for *comunidades*, are active in the local political sphere and were the main group of people to advance the territorial claim. Through observation, I gathered data about their activities of individuals working in the *central* and gained a picture of their functions, the way they related to *comunarios*, and other Chiquitano associations, as well as the different state agencies on varying state levels. I supplemented this data by carrying out informal interviews.

Photo 12: VIth March of Indigenous People of the Lowland, Santa Cruz

VIth March of Indigenous People of the Lowland, Santa Cruz, 7 July 2007. CIDOB and affiliates demands the inclusion of their proposals in the constitutional text.

Photo 13: The Constituent Assembly Autonomy Commission, Sucre

OICH first Cacique Rodolfo López demanding the inclusion of indigenous autonomies in the new constitutional text in a session of the Autonomy Commission of the Constituent Assembly, Sucre, 12 July 2007.

Two Further Sites: Research with the CGTI-MV and CEJIS Teams

I carried out research in two further 'sites': the CEJIS and CGTI-MV research projects. Research with the CEJIS and CGTI-MV research teams took the form of

what could be called a 'collaborative approach'. Not in the sense that Lassiter (2005a; 2005b) describes it, where researchers and 'subjects' collaborate in the production of ethnographic texts, but I cooperated with others in the gathering data.[24] The research projects themselves, however, aimed to be 'collaborative' in Lassiters' sense. Collaborative and other participatory techniques often entail an epistemological critique (that draws on Foucault's writings) about the ways of research and knowledge production, which drowns out local knowledge, reduces the complexity of human experience and may thus reinforce the status-quo of societal power relations.[25] Ideally, through more participatory techniques, local knowledge is not filtered through an outsider researcher's 'preconceptions', but rather 'emerge' or can be accessed through, in a participatory relationship (see e.g. Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 74; Reason and Bradbury, 2001: 4). The two projects followed a collaborative logic in two main areas. Firstly, the research teams were mainly composed of Chiquitano researchers and that they heavily drew on their local knowledge in designing the question frameworks and adapting the methodology in a way that they deemed suitable for the local context. Secondly, they aimed to elaborate the research output (the final documents) in close collaboration with Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* and incorporate their feedback into the final product.

[24] Lassiter points out that ethnography is by definition collaborative in the sense that 'we cannot possibly carry out our unique craft without engaging others in the context of their real, everyday lives' (2005a: 16). Nevertheless, a collaborative approach moves collaboration '*deliberatively* and *explicitly*' to the centre state and emphasises it 'as very point in the ethnographic process, without veiling it … Collaborative ethnography invites commentary overtly part of the ethnographic text as it develops. In turn, this negotiation is reintegrated back into the fieldwork process itself' (2005a: 16). According to Lassiter, collaboration falls in general 'into six (not mutually exclusive) categories: (1) principal consultants as readers and editors, (2) focus groups, (3) editorial boards, (4) collaborative ethnographer/ consultant teams, (5) community forums, and (6) coproduced and co written texts' (2005b: 94, for a more in-depth explanation, see pages 94-96). A number of ethnographers have consciously adopted a collaborative approach as they argue for a more critical, engaged or collaborative ethnography that should serve 'humankind more directly and more immediately' (Lassiter, 2005: 83, see for example Cook, 2005; Peacock, 1997; Rose, 2005; Scheper-Hughes, 1995; Singer, 2000)

[25] More participatory and collaborative approaches are consequently also a favoured in feminist methodology that follows the idea that the relationship between researcher and researched should be a reciprocal one, 'that "hierarchical distinctions" between researcher and researched should be broken down' (Hammersly, 1995: 48). Advocates of Action Research follow a similar reasoning, as they criticise conventional research strategies as they perpetuate entrenched structural relationships of power and maintain 'monopolies of knowledge'. They argue that 'participatory knowledge strategies can challenge deep-rooted power inequities' (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 71). Also see Reason and Bradbury (2001), David (2002) and Rahman. (1993: 195-196).

A combination of factors contributed to my decision to do join the CGTI-MV and CEJIS research projects. Firstly, both projects were part of Chiquitano-state interaction. They were aimed at increasing the Chiquitano c*omunidades* legibility (Scott, 1998) and thus part of the phenomenon I was researching. Secondly, both projects were aimed at gathering socio-economic and demographic data on how *comunarios* plan for the territory (see below). This overlap in research agendas meant that project staff and I might ask Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* similar, if not the same questions. While there might be an argument that collecting the same information twice by different researchers might yield different results and therefore be great for triangulation purposes, CEJIS staff, CGTI-MV staff and I felt that in our case it would be an unethical burden on those 'researched'. The project leaders (and I) saw my working as a project researcher in return for gaining access to the data as an ethical trade-off. We collected the data together and then used it for our distinct purposes: for meeting the projects' aims of elaborating documents to be read by Chiquitano *comunarios*, leaders and NGO personnel and I would use it to write my thesis for an academic audience. Collaborating on the projects also fulfilled the *central* leaders' requirement that research carried out with themselves or the *central* should benefit the leaders in some way.

This also coincides with my own ethical stance, which I share with many other researchers (see for example, Postero, 2007: 19). My ethnical stance was initially formed during fieldwork for my Bachelor dissertation (Weber, 2003) in the Ecuadorean highlands in 2001-2002. The research focused on the role of the radio in the development of political consciousness amongst indigenous women. During the fieldwork, I was affiliated to the DED as an intern and the indigenous radio station *Escuelas Radiofonicas Populares del Ecuador* (ERPE – Popular Radio Schools of Ecuador). The research was of interest to ERPE, who wanted to use part of the material for a book that they were writing on their 40-year history. The indigenous women that I interviewed frequently asked me what they would get back in return for the information that I got from them and I referred to my collaboration with ERPE. Most found this acceptable, as they respected the popular radio and its work. Without the backing of and collaboration with ERPE, I would have felt uncomfortable in my role as a researcher and therefore sought a similar collaborative relationship for my PhD research. However, I agree with David (2002: 17) and others that knowledge

production should not *only* be determined by 'vested social interests' driven by 'liberal market or communitarian identity models' and that knowledge construction by universities university should be defended.

The CGTI-MV project

The CGTI-MV project was called the '*Ordenando Nuestro Territorio*' ('Putting Our Territory in Order'). It involved conducting, what CGTI-MV staff called, a 'social census', This inquired about the origins of the settlements, mapping of the 'borders' of communal areas, collecting census data, data on belief systems, agriculture systems, social organisation, governance and community justice and so on. Much of the collected data would inform each of the communities' (development) plans (*planes comunales*). The plans would also include maps of the communal areas and establish 'zones of use'. I.e. zones where *comunarios* can establish houses, practice agriculture, obtain wood etc.[26]

The research team was composed of six to eight people, including CGTI-MV and *central* leaders and technicians. Numbers varied slightly from trip to trip, as some leaders and technicians were engaged in other commitments at times. However, CGTI-MV technician Gabriel Montaño, an agricultural engineer in his mid twenties, and self-identified *mestizo* from Concepción, was present on all research trips. He was in charge of the research project and subsequent elaboration of documents.

The team carried out research workshops (*talleres*) that lasted several days and included a variety of methods. A first technique was focus groups. For this, the research team split the *comunarios* randomly into three to five groups, which would each fill-in prepared tables or matrixes (*matrices*) on different themes, including the types of plants, forest fruits and wood collected and their uses, the types of animals hunted, the lengths and reasons for migration, the types of communal authorities and their functions etc.[27] Each group would then present the results to the other groups in a plenary. This gave *comunarios* the possibility to elaborate or correct each others matrixes; a method which the CGTI-MV team members had agreed would be 'more participatory' and would generate more complete matrixes.

[26] This will be treated in more retail in Chapter VI.
[27] In order to divide the *comunarios* up into different groups, each *comunario* was given numbers from one to three and made to join the matching group.

Another method was the use of unstructured interviews to gather information about the founding and development of the *comunidad*. These were conducted with two to four *comunarios*, chosen by the CGTI-MV staff for being deemed knowledgeable about these issues. Research team members carried out most of these interviews as 'group interview' with two or three *comunarios*. Experience taught the team that this meant *comunarios* felt more at ease to answer the questions, as they could help each other out, when they forgot something, or consult others on the verity of information. As a final technique, the team carried out a population census.[28]

I participated in the project during the first months of fieldwork. I frequently visited the CGTI-MV office and participated in the leaders' and technicians' daily meetings and activities and I accompanied the CGTI-MV research team on two of their research trips. The first one was a week-long trip (9-14 October 2006) to the *comunidades* Monte Verde, Palestina and Makanaté within the TCO Monte Verde. The second research trip to the *comunidad* Puerto San Pedro (also in the TCO Monte Verde) did not happen until February 2007 (13-16.).[29] Reasons for the delay included the holding of 'Olympic games' by the *comunidades*, quarrels with the support personal that the CGTI-MV had hired for the project, and preparations for a march of the indigenous lowland movement aimed at – once more – altering the INRA law (see Chapter VI). I participated in the team as a research workshop co-facilitator and photographer. Apart from carrying out observations and conducting some unstructured interviews; I was in charge of gathering data on the issues of community justice and political structures of the *comunidades*, areas that were also of concern to my research.

[28] To carry out the census of the population of the *comunidad* the research team members asked *comunarios* to return to their housing complexes, to avoid collecting data for the same family several times (for example, wife and husband and an elder child). Often, several family members sat together answering the census questions and helped each other recall birthdates and whether the different family members had identification cards (*carnets*). While the census recorded the names of family members that were absent from the *comunidad* at the time, it excluded those that did not 'permanently' reside in the *comunidad*. 'Permanently resident' were those that only left to other places for visits, short periods of work or study. Nevertheless, children who had left to Concepción or other places in order to study and only came to the *comunidad* for short visits were excluded. Further, the emphasis was on the amount of 'households' in the *comunidad*, counting family members living in their own housing complex with or without spouses or children of their own as distinct 'household'.

[29] As will be addressed in the following chapters, Puerto San Pedro is the only non-Chiquitano 'immigrant' community within the TCO, members originating from the Chaco Chuquisaqñeo region.

Photo 14: CGTI-MV Research Workshop in Palestina, TCO Monte Verde

CGTI-MV technician Elmar Massaí (right), facilitating a workshop in Palestina.

Photo 15: CGTI-MV Workshop in Puerto San Pedro, TCO Monte Verde

Comunarios in plenary, explaining the matrixes to each other.

The CEJIS project

What the CEJIS team, the *centrales* and the CGTI in short called '*projecto gobernanza*' (governance project), was an Oxfam America financed project that would run for one year. CEJIS was to carry out the project jointly with the CGTI-MV, CICC, CICOL and CIP-SJ. Through a '*sistematización participativa'* (participative systematisation), which sought to 'include the interpretations of the people, the voice in which they speak about their experiences and future visions', the project staff aimed to record Chiquitano experiences of the struggle for territory and the territorial management process, establish the status quo of and collect future visions regarding Chiquitano governance. The general objective of the project was to elaborate a proposal for future governance structures which would allow for the consolidation of governance and a normative framework for the TCO Monte Verde (see CEJIS and OXFAM, 2006: 4-5).[30]

CEJIS and Oxfam also stressed the 'political intentionality' of the project: strengthening governance and governability would mean that Chiquitano could exercise their collective rights over the territory which, according to the project partners, would guarantee 'the full exercise of autonomous development'.[31] And as Elba Flores, the CEJIS project coordinator from the Santa Cruz office, stressed: it was also supposed to be 'empowering the *comunarios* of the TCO so that they, with us, define territorial politics'.[32] Further, CEJIS and Oxfam reasoned that the process in Monte Verde would serve as a case study, an example for other indigenous groups and their NGO allies in similar situations.[33]

The CEJIS research team was composed of three permanent staff and various other individuals, who were responsible for certain aspects of the project. Firstly, permanently occupied with the project, was Margoth Céspedes, the head of the

[30] This, CEJIS and OXFAM reasoned, would 'contribute to securing the means of life and well-being of the indigenous communities of Monte Verde, through the strengthening of their capacity for governance and governability, for their autonomous and sustainable development. …Reconstructing the process of the construction of governance for the territorial management of the TCO Monte Verde in a critical way [is] directed at contributing to the exercise of collective rights over the territory and their auto-determination' (CEJIS and OXFAM, 2006: 4).
[31] From the project summary *'Sistematización Participativa: Proceso en Construcción de Gobernanza y Gobernabilidad en la TCO Monte Verde'* (November 2006).
[32] Field note: Santa Cruz, 24 November 2006.
[33] From the project summary *'Sistematización Participativa: Proceso en Construcción de Gobernanza y Gobernabilidad en la TCO Monte Verde'* (November 2006).

CEJIS Concepción office, a bright and ambitious sociologist in her mid-twenties.[34] A second member of the 'governance' research team was Lorenzo Pasabare, a Chiquitano veteran of the CICC and former CIDOB leader in his late thirties. Permanently employed by CEJIS, his main area of work was 'land and territory' (*tierra y territorio*). He worked closely with the CICC, the CIP-SJ and the CGTI-MV, gave legal advice, and shared information about the progress of land legislation and other intelligence he obtained from the staff of the CEJIS Santa Cruz office. He frequently travelled into the territory to help *central* and *comunarios* to 'expel' third-party intruders and he informed *comunarios* about the progress in the territorial claim and incipient collective action, such as, for example, the Territorial Encounter. A third member was David Rivero, a Chiquitano in his early forties and CIP-SJ veteran, who was employed by CEJIS, primarily for the governance project. He was experienced in 'participatory methodologies' and popular education techniques. The team received support from several other individuals during the workshop phase of the project. These mainly took up roles as workshop facilitators and transcribers.[35]

During the planning stages of the project, which involved holding meetings in the CEJIS Santa Cruz office in early and late November 2006, the project drew on additional know-how. Firstly, present was Elba Flores, a sociologist in her early forties and the 'governance project' coordinator. Overseeing the project and liaising with Oxfam America were only some of her tasks: she was also busy with other projects, such as working on the legal side of the territorial claim. Secondly, there were two consultants. CEJIS had hired them to help the rest of the team refine the project objectives and clarify the conceptual framework ('governance and governability') and suggested improvements to the methodological framework the research team defined.[36] They were also responsible to check research output and propose suggestions regularly and for checking the final document. This document

[34] Margot was originally from the rural Chaco region of Bolivia. She had previous experience working for CEJIS in the Beni department. Her role was that of the head of office and the coordination of various projects. Her wage was paid partly by the German DED, for who she was working mostly in issues of conflict resolution

[35] Additional researchers who supported the three permanent staff in carrying out the research workshops were Chiquitanos Pedro Solís Pinto (OTB Santa Rita, former CICC leader), Jesús Macoñó (former CIP-SJ leader) and William Roca (former CIP-SJ leader). Present in some of the workshops where also Elba Flores, Margarita (CGTI-MV Coordinator), Mercedes Nosta (consultant anthropologist) and two further CEJIS workers form Santa Cruz. See Appendix 1 for information on which individuals were present in the respective research workshops.

[36] The consultants were anthropologist Mercedes Nostas Ardaya and sociologist José Vicente Chazarreta form Santa Cruz.

was to be presented to Chiquitano leaders and communal representatives so that they could provide feedback to complement the data, adding another 'collaborative' and 'reflexive element' to the document and to 'validate' it.[37] Then, the document would be diffused among the leaders, *comunidades* and supporting NGOs.[38]

Present in the planning stages were also four Chiquitano members of the CGTI-MV and the *central*. This was in line with the project's premise that this project was supposed to be carried out in collaboration with the *centrales* and CGTI-MV whose members should help define, 'validate' the framework and project methodology and feed-back results to their Organisations and feed their reactions back to the research team.

While all team members present at the meeting contributed to question design, Chiquitano team members and the input of the four CGTI-MV and *central* members was especially crucial when it came to wording the questions so that Chiquitano leaders, technicians and *comunarios* could easily understand them. A difference was, for example, that questions addresses to the former two groups could include some political jargon and concepts, as they would generally be familiar with such terminology. Further, research team members involved in carrying out the field research, held regular reflexive meetings to assess the wording of the questions, the research progress and the execution of the methods (i.e. assessing the way they the researchers carried them out and if need be, adjusting execution or a researchers' individual behaviour).

[37] From Project Summary *'Sistematización Participativa: Proceso en Construcción de Gobernanza y Gobernabilidad en la TCO Monte Verde'* (November 2006).
[38] Another plan that emerged at a later stage was to take elements form interviews and workshops and turn them into radio clips, as experiences in *comunidades* showed that such documents were seldom read, and the emphasis on written documents marginalised those who could not read.

Photo 16: Reflexive Team Meeting, CEJIS Office Concepción

Reflexive team meeting after workshops in Makanaté and Palestina with (from left) Patricia, Lorenzo, David, Jesús and the author.

Photo by Margoth Céspedes

I started participating in the CEJIS governance research project from mid-October 2006 until July 2007. I attended two planning meetings in Santa Cruz in November 2006 and contributed to the discussions regarding methodology and conceptual framework. I assisted David and Margoth in obtaining and reviewing resources from the CEJIS and APCOB libraries, other NGOS, the *centrales* and the CGTI-MV.[39] Further, I participated in many of the projects' research activities. I returned to England, however, before the implementation of the last two phases of the project (elaboration of the document and dissemination).

[39] Getting hold of secondary material is not always easy, as a proportion of it is distributed over the libraries of different NGOs. Documents that feature the results of previous research projects are often kept in individual's offices, and might just be accessed by chance. There might only be a single copy of a book or document in one of the libraries. Thus we maximised our efforts by sharing the material that any of us could get their hands on.

CEJIS Project Methods: Interview, Focus Groups and Socio-Dramas

Short-Structured Interviews

One of the research techniques employed in the project was that of short-structured interviews. During December 2006 and January 2007 David and Lorenzo conducted such interviews with 24 leaders, former leaders and technicians from San Javier and Concepción. Only six of the sample group were women, reflecting the fact that female leaders and technicians are generally in the minority, although the *centrales* are working to change this trend. The team had delegated the task to David and Lorenzo, because they knew the sample groups well from their past experience of working with the *centrales*. This meant that they could quickly seek out this judgmental sample group on their motorbikes.[40] They had easy access and a high rate of willing respondents.

The question catalogues addressed 'self-identification', what the territory meant to the interviewee, how s/he explained what a '*comunidad'* was, the workings and performance of the *centrales*, control and ideal characteristics of *central* leaders, *central* and *comunidad* interactions with different state administrative levels, and lastly, visions regarding future Chiquitano governance structures.[41] Questions were open-ended, but intended to collect standardised data. The aim was to achieve a degree of generalisability and see trends in the responses. The team built on the results to refine the question sheets for the semi-structured interviews and used the opportunity to identify key individuals willing to be interviewed in a longer sessions. Generally, Lorenzo and David noted down the answers on their questions sheets. This thesis draws on the data thus gathered and as answers generally took the form of short statements, attesting for some of the short quotes that appear in this thesis.

Focus Groups

A second research technique was that of focus groups. The team carried out focus groups in early March in two *comunidades* that would not be able to participate in

[40] Judgemental sampling (also purposive sampling) involves seeking out particular people who are 'specialists' in an area of interest to the study (Agar, 1980: 121; Arber, 2001: 77). This is also often referred to as 'purposive sampling' defied as: 'studying the entire population of some limited group, or a clearly defined subset of the population. A purposive sample is one in which each element is selected for a purpose, usually because of the unique position of the sample element' (Schutt, 1996: 164).

[41] The list of questions varied slightly according to whether those interviewed were leaders or technicians (see Annex 1, for a list of these Interviews).

the following research workshops, as the logistics would have been too difficult: La Embocada and San Miguelito Sur. Lorenzo and David carried out the group in La Embocada, and Lorenzo, David and I carried out two further groups in San Miguelito Sur the following evening.[42] To carry out the focus group, we split the community into two groups. Lorenzo and I facilitated one focus group and David the other. Lorenzo read out the questions and I had the tape recorder walking around to tape answers and asked back up questions.

We overcame the problem that women were generally less happy to participate than men, by encouraging their participation and calling on them to answer as a group, rather than picking on individuals. We felt that this caused awkwardness to women, who could or did not want to answer. Further, it was beneficial to have a male and female facilitator, as this increased the level of female participation (Lorenzo and David attested that in comparison to the previous night, the level had increased by my presence).[43] We subsequently used these strategies in subsequent focus groups ran as part of the communal workshops. However, it should be pointed out, that in some *comunidades* there were not enough female researchers to team a male and a female researcher. Further, sometimes even extra-encouragement of female participants remained fruitless.

The CEJIS project attempted to counteract male bias in the data by running women-only workshop, which Lorenzo and David ran with Chiquitano *comunarias* and former female leaders in San Javier.[44] In Palmira, in Lomerío municipality, enough *comunarios* participated and we had sufficient research staff to divide Palmira *comunarios* into two groups – one composed of men and one of women (see photo 17). In this occasion, the type of information women shared with the (female) researcher differed significantly from that women had provided in 'mixed' workshops. For example, when it came to talk about different conflicts that existed in the *comunidad*, *comunarias* talked freely about intra-family conflicts that they faced,

[42] I had just returned from my week-long stay in the *comunidad* Palestina, thus missing the first focus group.
[43] Field notes: Concepción, 9 March 2007.
[44] Here it should also be added, that while in many workshops children and teenagers were present, CEJIS also scheduled a young person's workshop, which Lorenzo and David ran in San Javier. This was to ensure that young Chiquitano voices were not excluded from the data, as young people would be less likely to contribute during the workshops. Unless younger people were directly prompted, adult Chiquitano commanded the authority to speak in these occasions.

and violence that women at times experienced – testament to the importance of running women-only workshops to avoid male biases in the collected data.

Photo 17: Women-Only Focus Group, *Comunidad* Palmira

The researchers also encountered the problem that leaders of the *comunidad* were more willing and keen to participate, drowning out the voices of other *comunarios*.[45] While leader's statements were very informative, we took care to encourage the participation of other *comunarios*. However, this did not solve the problem that *comunarios* might be less willing to talk (critically) about their communal authorities if they were also present in the workshop. While there was nothing we could do about this, communal authorities were not present in all workshop groups and some *comunarios* voiced critical opinions either way. If there was a strong discontent with leaders one of the Chiquitano team members would get usually get wind of this by socialising with *comunarios* throughout the workshop. In general, we also made sure

[45] See, for example, a note I made after participating in a workshop with *comunarios* in San Miguelito Sur: 'One of the people who answered a lot was a community leader; he was the *Corregidor* of the community. I wondered whether his presence would influence the answers of the group on community authorities, their performance, community participation in assemblies, and mechanisms of control of the community authorities. Would people be honest if an authority was present? Would they openly criticise them? They did not. We do not know whether this is due to the presence of the community authority'. Field notes: Concepción, 9 March 2007, edited.

that non-Chiquitano researchers teamed up with a Chiquitano colleague. This seemed to increased confidence of *comunarios* and meant they were more willing to answer questions and engage in discussions (this issue is explored in more depth below).[46]

Research Workshops

A core strategy the CEJIS team employed as part of their methodology were research workshops. The research team carried out ten research workshops with *comunarios* from different *comunidades*: four in the area of San Javier (one inside the TCO, three outside), five in Concepción (two inside the TCO and three outside), and one in Lomerío (for a list of the dates, location, participating *comunidades* and staff, please see Appendix 1). While research team composition varied slightly from workshop to workshop, it was always composed of a minimum of six researchers. In average four researchers' were Chiquitano and a minimum of two were women (see Appendix 1). I participated in eight of these ten workshops.[47]

The workshops were deemed important for gathering data that captured 'different visions and experiences' of *comunarios* and emphasis was on participation by *comunarios* from 'different age groups, genders, leaders and non-leaders' (CEJIS and OXFAM, 2006: 12). They generally ran for two days and involved a variety of research techniques, from focus groups to socio-dramas and interviews. Lorenzo or David delivered the invitations for the workshops to the four or five participant *comunidades* about ten days before the workshop would be held. The invitations asked the *comunidades* to chose up to eight participants, of which half should be women. *Comunidades* generally adhered to this, sending fairly equal numbers of women and men. *Comunidades* also generally adhered to the demand that the group

[46] This is not to confirm a simplistic assumption that that 'case study initiatives should have been researched by a research team whose composition mirrored the race and ethnic mix of the participants within the initiative (Hoggett et al., 1994: 64). This is implies a rather simplistic view of 'identity', and does not fully explore the dynamic between researcher and researched, what information researched will share (and what not) with the researcher, how and why, of which Berreman's (1962) work is a great example. While Hoggett et al. point out that their case study research they 'were led to question simplistic assumptions which insisted that 'black on black research or community development was politically, logically or socially imperative' (Hoggett et al., 1994: 63), they stop short of actually exploring the researcher-researched dynamics and why, in their case 'mirroring' did or did not work.

[47] I missed one, because I had accompanied *central* leaders to Sucre, where they were debating their demands for the Constituent Assembly, and the other, because I was taken ill. Also note that the first workshop had a very different composition. There were 11 researchers of which five were Chiquitano and eight were women. The high number of researchers was due to the fact that this was a type of 'pilot' workshop. Project coordinator, consultants and additional staff had come along to see how the methodology worked out in practice and subsequently carry out adjustments.

should not overwhelmingly be composed of leaders. Eight participants was a guiding number for larger *comunidades* – some smaller *comunidades* could not spare that many participants.[48]

For the workshop sessions, we divided the *comunarios* up according to the *comunidades* they had come from – to achieve *comunidad*-specific, comparable data (for the matrix featuring the order of themes and questions, see Appendix 2). Often this meant that the focus groups had greatly differing numbers of participants. The hosting communities did generally not stick to the eight-participant-rule, with more participants attending the workshop. For example, in El Carmen, the *comunidad* with the highest level of participation, eighteen *comunarios* showed up to participate, in contrast to one participant from San Isidro and two from El Encanto. If there were very low numbers of participants from one *comunidad* we combined participants from two *comunidades* into one focus group while collecting the data for each of the *comunidades* separately.

Workshop sessions lasted from one, to one and a half hours, interspersed with refreshment breaks. We aimed to close the workshop at 6 o'clock in the evening, when the sun started to set. We started the second day with a breakfast for everybody at about seven, an hour after sunrise. At the end of the workshop, usually in the afternoon of the second day, we held a plenary with all participants. As in the CGTI-MV project, the idea was that the different groups would present their results to each other and discuss them. In this we concentrated especially on discussing and complementing each c*omunidad*'s visions for a future TCO governance structure.

[48] For example, the *comunidad* Manantial in San Javier with six families and ten people in total.

Photo 18: Co-Facilitating a Workshop in Las Abras

Margoth and Lorenzo co-facilitating a focus group session in Las Abras

Photo 19: *Comunarios* in Plenary in Makanaté

Photo by Margoth Céspedes

Socio-Dramas

A valuable research tool during workshops was that of the socio-drama. These are a type of role play during which, a group of workshop participants were asked to act out a certain situation, imaginary or taken from a real-life situation. In most socio-dramas that we carried out as part of the research workshop, two or three (or sometimes more) research team members would also take up roles. This way they could help to advance the play, in case it got stuck or derailed.[49] After the role play, the actors and the rest of the participants were asked to discuss the plot in a plenary. The research team taped the play and noted down how it developed. We used this technique to gain insight into certain conflicts within the community and into problem-solving mechanisms, communal norms and principles, and forms of punishment. Information on these topics would have been hard to obtain through other means, as *comunarios* were often reluctant to talk about inner-communal conflicts. Topics were chosen after we had spent several hours or a night in the *comunidad*, giving team members time to chat to *comunarios* and find some area of potential conflict and would provide a socio-drama topic.

That a workshop situation is not the best way to collect data on such sensitive topics shows up the flaws in this way of conducting research. Arguably, *comunarios* would share this type of information with researchers who spent more time in the *comunidad* and who *comunarios* get to 'know'. An indication of this is that *comunarios* were much happier to talk to Chiquitano colleagues about such issues (see below). Still, a benefit of socio-dramas, was that *comunarios* often acted slightly different to the way that they verbally stated when asked about such topics. Getting *comunarios* to 'act out' how they solved conflict of punished wrong-doers put an element of 'imponderabilia of everyday life' into an otherwise quite artificial research process. It also helped to circumvent a problem we encountered with the use of the term 'norms', when we collected information regarding certain rules and principles of behaviour in the *comunidad* (see Annex 2). The term meant nothing to many the *comunarios*, some of who would jokingly point out '*conosco a una Norma'* ('I know a Norma'), referring the name. Alternatively, they referred to the '*Normas*

[49] Even if the plot at the time of acting seemed to go off on a tangent, upon later analysis of the generated data, this often revealed some insights into the community logic. My participation in sociodrama generated some interesting information on how *comunarios* perceived themselves and me as community outsiders and foreigner (which features in a later chapter).

de uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales en la TCO Monte Verde' (CGTI-MV et al., 2006c) ('The Norms of Use of Natural Resources in the TCO Monte Verde') that the *centrales* had elaborated with input from the *comunidades* and distributed as leaflet among them.[50]

Photo 20: Sociodrama in the *Comunidad* Las Abras

Five research team members participating in socio-drama. From the right, the author, Lorenzo, Elba, William, Margarita, and Pedro taking notes.

Photo by Margoth Céspedes

Semi- and Unstructured Interviews

A last method the CEJIS team employed was semi- and unstructured interviews. The interviews were carried out with 'key people' from May to July 2007 and were supposed to shed more light on topics that we felt we did not, or could not, get covered in enough depth in previous research activities.[51] A first group of key people were *comunarios*, who could tell us about the history of the *comunidad*, how it was

[50] A note of caution to those who might seek to replicate this technique: sociodramas, especially dealing with such topics of conflict have to be well thought out. A topic might be controversial and better be left alone. This was demonstrated clearly by one instance in the comunidad Candelaria, where I proposed to Lorenzo to make the topic of witchcraft the centre of the sociodrama. My interest in the topic had been triggered by the burning of an alleged witch in a comunidad in Lomerío some weeks before. Lorenzo went very quiet and told me to forget about the idea as this was a very delicate issue. He told me: 'Witchcraft is like the mafia. They are afraid of it, there are no problems, but the people do know that it exists. Witchcraft is bad, there is no proof. In these cases, justice is carried out only by the comunidad'. Field notes: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. The issue was too delicate to address.

[51] It should also be noted that they generated more critical voices, especially where the interviewees were the Chiquitano team members themselves and the interview built on the many informal conversations that we had had throughout the fieldwork process.

founded, by whom, how it had developed and what challenges it had faced. They were identified by the Chiquitano team members and helpful *comunarios* and generally held a one point during the research workshops. The project also scheduled interviews with current and former Chiquitano leaders, municipal officials, Oversight Committee members and members of NGOs that had been working with the Chiquitano Organisations. Again, these were selected in a judgmental sample after consultations with the research team.

Photo 21: Interviewing Key Informants

Elba in the process of interviewing a key informant in the *comunidad* Las Abras.

Interview topics with the second set of key people varied according to the expertise of the person interviewed, but generally covered how they saw role and performance of *central* leaders, how the *central* interacted with other public and private instances, the *comunidades* and so on. Interviews with Chiquitano key people also featured a section on 'power structures' within *comunidades*, the workings of the communal justice system and the way the Law of Popular Participation had shaped the organisational structures of *comunidades*. We also asked most interviewees about their visions for a future TCO management structure and their thoughts on the 'autonomy' question. Interviews lasted between fifty minutes to one and a half hours; the longest went on for over two hours. Lengths depended on amount of topics

covered, response details and how many follow up questions we could think of. All interviews were taped and like all other taped material, later transcribed by the team members or one of the staff that hired for transcription.

Of the thirty-five recorded interviews the Concepción CEJIS team conducted, Margoth conducted six, Lorenzo and David conducted two together, Jesús conducted one and I conducted twenty-three interviews and a further two together with Margoth (for a complete list of interviewees carried out, please see Appendix 1). There were several reasons why I conducted most of these interviews. Firstly, as part of my research agenda I had planned to carry out interviews with many of these individuals anyway. Secondly, by May 2007 the research schedule of the CEJIS researchers had grown very tight and they would have struggled to find the time. Apart from the research, they were occupied with preparations for the looming TCO Monte Verde titling ceremony and ongoing juridical and more hands-on conflicts with *terceros*.[52]

Thirdly, the research team reasoned that my persona was less 'suspect' than CEJIS workers or Chiquitano in carrying out the interviews with Concepceño political figures. They thought their conducting interviews might cause tensions, as the aim of the research project was to *strengthen* the Chiquitano territorial claim, which many key political figures opposed. Further, the other research team members reasoned that I might ask more in-depth questions as I was less familiar with the way of life of Chiquitano *comunidades*, the functions and actions of the *centrales* and the local state administrative structures – in short, I would take less things 'for granted'. Lorenzo and David also reasoned that Chiquitano interviewees might talk more freely to me about the about the performance of their leaders as they would be less concerned to tell and outsider than a fellow Chiquitano who knew the same people (issues of 'positionality' will be addressed in more detail below).[53]

[52] For example, Lorenzo was helping the *central* to convince the inhabitants of several new highland immigrant settlements within the TCO Monte Verde border, to move their settlements out of the territory.

[53] The fact that different researchers with different positionality gathered data in the cause of the project means that we not only gathered a great quantity of data, but also data influenced by our various subject positions. Arguably, the fact that we obtained data through different mechanism and through different researches adds to data variety and some elimination of bias. After all, as Agar points out, if more than one researchers 'examine a similar area, the differences in their biases will generate contradictions in their reports' and these contradictions could be pointing to a more sensitive understanding of the phenomenon researched (1980: 49).

Reflecting on Research 'As Part of a Team'

Apart from benefitting from some of the data the CGTI-MV project and the large amount of data the CEJIS projects generated, I also benefited in less obvious but important ways: I gaining physical access to different *comunidades*, which are hard to reach due to the unpaved paths that lead to them. Especially in the rainy season when they turn into mudslides and even experienced drivers find them hard to navigate. Vehicles get stuck and trees fall over the path, requiring manpower of at least three to free the cars or move the tree (see photo 22). On a more personal level, especially during my first visits to the territory, other research team members taught me some do's and don'ts of community life. For example, which insects to avoid, where to go and bathe (i.e. is there a certain spot on the river/ damn where men or women go, or a certain spot to take your bucket with water to) and where to put up your hammock.

Photo 22: CGTI-MV Team Clearing the Path to Monte Verde

Most importantly, being part of the research project meant that I spent much time with very knowledgeable Chiquitano informants: my Chiquitano colleagues. Informal chats in the back of pick-ups, on the way to workshops, while relaxing in our hammocks, during breaks and in the evenings, were the most valuable sources of insights, which my thesis draws on heavily. In particular, my CEJIS team colleagues

became friends, as well as very patient informants. Also, other CEJIS staff in Concepción, Santa Cruz and Sucre provided me with many valuable insights. This generally took the form of analysis of, and comments on, the current Bolivian political situation, which was at times hard for me to grasp. Further, through the staff of the CEJIS Concepción and Santa Cruz offices, I learned about meetings of the lowland indigenous umbrella groups, planned protest action, and meetings of umbrella group leaders with state officials. Members of the CEJIS Santa Cruz team gave me lifts to such events, which allowed me to carry out observation and conduct some informal interviews.[54]

However, gathering data as part of a research team also threw up certain challenges, some of which closely related to those that collaborative researchers also may experience. Issues in collaboration and, in my case, cooperation, often emerge in areas of power and control, from decisions over methodology and practicalities of the research, to questions regarding 'who has the right to represent whom and for what purposes and whose discourse will be privileged in the ethnographic text'? (Lassiter, 2005b: 102).

A first issue in collaboration is, that it may require that anthropologists give up a certain amount of power and control over their work. This may present a problem for their ego, or may be seen critical by the academic establishment itself (Lassiter, 2005b: 102).[55] At times, I also felt that it was difficult to 'give up control'. In my case, this was related to the fact that my ideas of what information was 'relevant' to the project or what might be classified as 'thorough' data collection strategies, sometimes diverged from those of the other researchers. Researchers might take a different approach to asking question or take differing care to ask follow-up questions. Further, I did not agree with the rigid filling-in-a-matrix approach employed in the CGTI-MV project. I reasoned that more space should be given to *comunarios* to record the data in they saw fit and that techniques should aim to collect more qualitative data. I also felt that the data generated in the CGTI-MV

[54] I should also note that the CEJIS granted me the use of their library, where many publications and projects documents on the struggle for the TCO Monte Verde, as well as other socio-political processes in (especially lowland) Bolivia are held. It also facilitated my access to APCOB's library – which is also very comprehensive.

[55] Lassiter points out that, depending on the attitude of the thesis committee, this may be especially problematic for graduate students (2005b: 102).

project contained a gender bias as most of the facilitators were male.[56] The facilitators did not actively encourage women to take part in the discussion, and so women often would not. My raising this issue as a problem was largely ignored and all I could do was encourage women to participate in the sessions I facilitated.

I felt such issues more strongly during the CGTI-MV project than in the CEJIS project, because in the latter we had regular meetings that allowed us to discuss researcher's observations' and suggest ways of changing data collection strategies that would ensure sufficient depth of information. Again, such issues with data collection highlight the shortcomings of such structured approaches to data collection, and point to substitute or at least supplement them through ethnographic methods. Lastly, working with other researchers involves that you being dependent on their input and feedback and, more importantly, their timeframes. For example, sending results to head office in Santa Cruz, so that the researchers there could comment on the results and suggest changes to the question catalogue and methodology, led to great delays. After the first delays were threatening to jeopardize the project, project overseers agreed that field research team members could adapt questions and methods on their own accord in the reflexive meetings to avoid further delays.

Time delays, due to tight project deadlines, bad planning or external factors, such as bad weather, caused significant problems to the data gathering process. Arriving at a workshop late, meant that workshop sessions had to be rushed through, with fewer breaks which resulted in tiredness among staff as well as *comunarios*, affecting their willingness and ability to concentrate. After all, coca and sweets only helped to keep participants awake and concentrating to a certain degree. Further, *comunarios* got fed up waiting for the project team to arrive in their respective *comunidades*. They gave up valuable time they could spend working on their field or carrying out other necessary activities. Infringement on their time for no reason caused anger among *comunarios* and in two or three cases, where the team arrived late at a *comunidad* to collect the participants, they had gone off to their field. Finding replacements caused further delays to the start of the workshop.

[56] Apart from my presence, there was one other female researcher, Lily, a Chiquitana sociologist in her early twenties, hired by the CGTI-MV in the initial stages of the project to help with developing the project's methodological framework.

A further issue emerged in the area of power balances. As other researcher have noted, while ideally collaborative research should involve 'side-by-side work of all parties in a mutually beneficial research program' (Lassiter, 2005b: 84), the very real issue of persisting power and knowledge (im)balances between researcher and collaborators might impede a true equal partnership. No matter how hard researchers adapt their personal positions, the micro-politics of their relations may still reflect the power relations prevalent in social and political relationships the boarder 'system' (David, 2002: 13; Lassiter, 2005b: 83). I also perceived such issues among the CEJIS researchers. They came to the fore, for example, in May 2007 when Margoth's own commitment to multiple projects meant she had to attend meetings elsewhere. She was under much pressure and in haste, forgot twice, to inform the rest of the team of her absence. This caused her Chiquitano colleagues to feel that sometimes she was not pulling her weight.

The general complaints about this, fused with those of another nature: the Chiquitano team members felt that while they were meant to play a large role in developing the methodology, their opinions were not taken into consideration. They acted out their frustration by turning up late to set off to the workshop and by not pulling their weight during workshops, instead taking time out to socialise with other *comunarios*. While this may have been an important social activity, allowing them to share information about the activities of CEJIS, the *central*, and wider on goings in the political sphere of the country, this left the rest of the researchers with more responsibility and work than expected.

In hindsight, my Chiquitano colleagues' feelings and reactions can partly be attributed to the fact that they felt a lack of control over some aspect of the project. Although in the initial research team meetings, the CEJIS team had stressed that their expertise was crucial to the research process. Instead the final decisions in the project were still made by non-Chiquitano *mestizo* people, who, in turn had to answer to *mestizo* and foreign project funders, namely Oxfam. This links back to problems with projects' supposed collaborative or participatory nature and to questions whether this ideal can ever be achieved in a context where the project is ultimately aimed a satisfying the guidelines of funders. Nevertheless, the situation improved during the final two workshops, team members made an effort to socialise with each other, there was more story telling and joke making going on – likely because this contributed to

a feeling that this levelled out the differences between the researchers – and this improved the team morale.

Positionality/ Positioning in a Multi-Sited Context

The way I carried out research had implications for my positionality during fieldwork. That positionality (researcher place or origin, marital status, gender, race, class and cultural background etc) affected the researchers' relationships and interaction, as well as structuring power relations in the field, has been considered by researchers more vigorously since the 1980s (Busher, 2009; Evans, 2008: 124; Haraway, 1991a, 1991b; Howard, 1997: 20; Robson, 1997; Walker, 2009).[57] Disclosure of and reflection upon a researchers' position enables readers to follow the conditions in which researchers carried out the research and how the researchers' positionality affected the quality of the gathered data.[58] In multi-sited fieldwork the issue of positionality becomes further complicated, as the fieldworker's 'identity' requires re-negotiation in different sites. The fieldworker is likely to undergo 'a constantly mobile, recalibrating practice of positioning' (Marcus, 1995: 113). I also negotiated various identities depending on the context I was gathering data in: I was a PhD Student at the University of Liverpool carrying out anthropological fieldwork, a DED intern, a researcher for a CEJIS project and a workshop facilitator/ photographer in CGTI-MV research activities.

Fieldworkers have pointed to ethical dilemmas, emanating from a researchers' positionality and the power relations which shape the fieldwork and the post fieldwork stages. Among these, are the previously-mentioned dilemmas faced by researchers following collaborative approaches, which centre on the inequalities in knowledge production but also the researchers' ultimate control over the text (e.g.

[57] Especially influential in this have been feminist scholars in anthropology as well as other disciplines. See for example, Haraway (1991b) or Harding (1991).

[58] First of all, I am female, at the time of fieldwork 28. Although not married, I have a long-time partner who did not accompany me to the field. My nationality is German and I have lived in England since 1999. I speak German and Spanish with a noticeable German accent. To those who are familiar with foreign accents this makes it easy to detect my place of origin.

Field, 1999: 22; Walker, 2009: 3; Wolf, 1996).[59] More recently, some researchers have addressed dilemmas linked to adapting, or being ascribed, different identities. Such issues include that the way a researcher is perceived may positively or negatively affect the identities of people he or she associates with (e.g. Busher, 2009).[60] Researchers have also considered how adapting, or being ascribed, different positionalities or identities may interfere with the stance of University ethical clearance procedures, as well as ethical codes of the AAA, which 'coincide in their recommendation that the ethnographer maintain complete transparency in field relations, avoiding deception and thus suspicion of subversion through complete disclosure of the terms of the study' (Kovats-Bernat, 2002: 215). As a response, researchers have stressed that realities in the field, especially if they involve highly stratified or polarised social relations or conflict situations, may require a continued adaptation of research approaches and positionality, which may include 'misrepresenting' certain aspects of your identity. Generally researchers have done so, in order to behave ethically and minimised potential risks to self and, above all, others (also an AAA requirement) (see for example, Belousov et al., 2007: 156; Kovats-Bernat, 2002: 214; Sluka, 1995).

I suggest that, rather than considering hiding or misrepresenting part of your self as 'ethical dilemma', we can draw on the work of Georg Simmel (1906) and Gerald Berreman (1962) and recognise that 'disguising part of yourself' is inherent in *all* social interaction and that therefore the ethics of what can be revealed and concealed depend on the respective field site. Illuminating here is Gerald Berreman's remark:

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[59] For example, Les Field points to the asymmetrical power differential between him and the consultants (mostly Nicaraguan artisans) he relied on for essays on indigenous culture, class, gender that he draws on in his book. He acknowledges that he as American intellectual, had the power to present 'the last word about Nicaraguan cultural history', which lets him to agree with Spivak that academic authors should not pretend that 'the subaltern can speak' though their work (1999: 22). Further, while the book advances his academic career, while the participants in his research 'will not receive equal regards' (1999: 22).

[60] For example, Joel Busher found, that his own positionality also affected that of other people. This created an ethical dilemma for him, as local leaders used their association with him to justify their own positions in a formalised organisational hierarchy, while he, as he notes, was there to 'observe' the organisation , not to instigate hierarchical change (2009: 4-5). A second dilemma he faced that he was associated with HIV/Aids given 'the association that people often made between white researchers, orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) and, consequently, HIV/AIDS' (2009: 7). Consequently, his respondents might also be associated with the disease. Association may not even have to work through physical contact. For example Michael Walker notes that he was associated with the local priest because they share some social and physical characteristics, such as, having a beard, being white, speaking not only Portuguese but the Bantu language Shona etc. (2009: 1).

> Every ethnographer, when he reaches the field, is faced immediately with accounting for himself before the people he proposes to lean to know. Only when this has been accomplished can he proceed to his avowed task of seeking to understand and interpret the way of life of those people. … Both tasks, in common with all social interaction, involve the control and interpretation of impressions, in this case those conveyed by the ethnographer and his subjects to one another (1962: 5).

This is because all social relationships are based around the condition that individuals know something about the other, in the most basic sense of that interaction between them may proceed in the way necessary (Simmel, 1906: 441). This involves 'impression management' from the side of individuals, not just revealing, but also concealing aspects of the self from others.[61] In this process of revealing and hiding part of their 'selves' from each other, individuals may even lie.[62] In fact, Simmel notes that 'if there were such a thing as complete reciprocal transparency, the relationships of human beings to each other would be modified in a quite unimaginable fashion' (1906: 447-448). Naturally then, as Berreman notes, 'participant observation, as a form of social interaction, always involves impression management. Therefore, as a research technique it inevitably entails some secrecy and some dissimulation, unless the latter is defined very narrowly' (1962: 12).

Two further aspects of impression management are relevant in the research process. Firstly, the recognition that impression management is a reciprocal process. Others' perceptions of you will influence the role or identity that you can actually occupy, as they are likely to try to fit you into their social system. In the case of the

[61] Also Gerald Berreman (1962) and Robert Murphy (1964) follow this argument. Berreman, usefully, draws in his analysis of 'impression management' in a highly stratified Himalayan village on Erving Goffman's 'dramaturgical approach' as proposed in Goffmans' (1959) 'The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life'. He conceives sets of social interaction in terms of 'audience', 'performers' and performance 'teams'. Performance teams or 'own teams' cooperate in conveying a certain impression to the audience. In Goffman's words: 'We find a team of performers who cooperate to present to an audience a given definition of the situation. … We often find a division into back region, where the performance of a routine is prepared, and front region, where the performance is presented. Access to these regions is controlled in order to prevent the audience form seeing the backstage and to prevent outsiders from coming into a performance that is not addressed to them. Among members of the team we find that familiarity prevails, solidarity is likely to develop, and that secrets that could give the show away are shared and kept (quoted in Berreman, 1962: 11).

[62] Simmel notes with respect to 'lying' that is one of the possible forms of concealing things (another form, for example being 'secrecy'). Through a lie 'our fellow-man of his own motion gives forth truth or error with reference to himself. Every lie, whatever its content, is in its essential nature a promotion of error with reference to the mendacious subject; for the lie consists in the fact that the liar conceals from the person to whom the idea is conveyed the true conception which he possesses. …. Veracity and mendacity are thus of the most far-reaching significance for the relations of persons with each other' (1906: 447). He continues that as such then, 'we must take care not to be misled, by the ethically negative value of lying, into error about the direct positive sociological significance of untruthfulness, as it appears in shaping certain concrete situations' (1906: 448-449).

ethnographer this means that an initial response of those he or she encounters 'is probably always an attempt to identify him [or her] in familiar terms; to identify him [or her] as the performer of a familiar role' (Berreman, 1962: 13). Secondly, the impression that the ethnographer, or one of his associate, gives 'will determine the kinds of validity of data to which he will be able to gain access and hence the degree of success of his work (Berreman, 1962: 11). As in this process both, researcher and researched, are intent to 'convey to the other the impression that will best serve his interests as he sees them', this involves over and under communicating facts or even distorting them (Berreman, 1962: 11). As Berreman notes, 'this is just one phase of the general ethnographic problem of evaluating data in the light of informants' vested interests, sources of information, attitudes toward the ethnographer, and many other factors' (1962: 22). This means being 'constantly alert to the likelihood of such deceptions, using cross checks, independent observation and the like for verification' (1962: 16).

Of course, also in my different field-sites, actors were engaged in managing their 'identities' or 'subject positions'. This can be illuminated by considering the following examples. CEJIS workers among themselves would outspokenly discuss national politics and their involvement in advising and supporting different indigenous and peasant social movements and their political activities. In contrast, CEJIS workers managed their representations of self towards many Concepceños, and also often other Cruceños, typically by refraining from mentioning the name of the NGO that they worked for and the work that they did. This was because CEJIS workers are at best viewed with suspicion by many individuals in Concepción, as well as Santa Cruz department, as the organisation has supported the struggle for indigenous rights to rights and, importantly, land and resources over the past fifteen years. Negative feelings acutely intensified with the rising socio-political tensions which accompanied the Constituent Assembly and the Autonomy debated in Santa Cruz department – tensions that could also be felt in Concepción. Another trigger was that two former CEJIS employees were appointed Ministers under Evo Morales. Concepceños criticised CEJIS staff for politicising the local indigenous population. Strong testament to the negative sentiments is that CEJIS workers have experienced threats to life and well-being in Santa Cruz and Beni departments. The CEJIS Santa Cruz office has repeatedly been bombarded with Molotov cocktails and ransacked by

right-wing university students and the *Unión Juvenil Cruceñista* (UJC – Union of Santa Cruz Youth) in September 2008. In short, Concepceño elites saw member of the indigenous *central* in Concepción and any of their allies with misgiving.

Consequently, when people in Concepción asked Margoth Céspedes, the head of the CEJIS Concepción office, who she worked for, she would say such things as 'I work for an organisation over there' ('*trabajo por una organización por ahí*') and would wave her hand vaguely in the direction of the CEJIS office. Even when probed about what the organisation did, she said things like 'it is just one of those [organisations]' ('*es una de esas…*'). The likely explanation is that people would think that she was working for one of the more positively looked-upon NGOs located in the same area of town as the CEJIS office, such as Plan International or APCOB. These were seen to have a less political and more charitable and developmental agenda.[63] If people got Margoth to reveal the name of her employer, they often replied with a disparaging or mocking tone: '*ah, una de esas*' ('ah, one of these'), or '*de la izquierda*' ('from the left'). Experience had taught Margoth that openness about her profession would usually result in negative comments and an end to the conversation she was having. Even disclosing other aspects of her 'self' first and unmasking the nature of her employment after having become more familiar with the respective person would not have changed the situation. This revealed that working for CEJIS was 'unethical' in the eyes of many Concepceños and Cruceños.

This also highlights the second aspect, namely that impression management is not purely down to personal choice, but heavily influenced by the role that individuals actually *can* play in social interactions: impression management is a reciprocal process. This is also entails that 'the way researchers are viewed is also affected by the company they keep' (Howard, 1997: 33). As Berreman found, in cases of highly stratified or polarises localities this entailed that 'acceptance by one element of the community does not imply acceptance by the whole community and frequently … precludes it' (1962: 6). In Concepción the situation was similar. Acceptance by the Chiquitano organisations caused mistrust from the site of Concepceño elites. In fact, actors from both 'sides', the one of the *central* and the

[63] Plan International is primarily involved in service provision and APCOB is best known for their forestry projects and other productive projects.

one of the Concepceño elite, found that there could be no 'neutral ground'. This becomes evident when considering the following example.

One day in the CGTI-MV pick-up on the way to a workshop in the TCO Monte Verde I asked my fellow front-cabin passenger, a Concepceño *mestizo* forest engineer working for the CGTI-MV, how the situation in Concepción was for him and whether he felt that other Concepceño saw him critically for working with the *central*. He responded that at times fellow Concepceños called him *'traicionador de su clase'* ('traitor against his class'), as they perceived him to be working against the interest of his 'class' i.e. the fellow Concepceño elite. He added that some members of his own family were also 'against him'. As a matter of explanation, he noted that the conflict between Chiquitano and the Concepceño had gone 'too far and on for too long' for there be any neutrality in the matter. In this context, he included himself in the narrative by referring to 'us Chiquitanos', which highlighted further that you were either 'with the Chiquitanos' and therefore associated with them, or 'on the other side'.[64]

Another person who experienced that there was no 'neutral' way of positioning yourself in Concepción, even as a stranger in the locality, was a fellow female DED worker in her late twenties, stationed in Concepción from October 2006 to February 2007. Although she worked together with Carlos Echegoyen and closely with CEJIS, she had taken care to portray herself as a 'neutral' DED worker and taken up residence in a room rented out by a wealthy land and property owning, European descended family. Feeling the tensions in the locality she had explained to me that this was like 'living in the lion's den' and that being friendly with a powerful family would ensure a certain amount of protection and respect from Concepceño side. However, tall and blond, she was not easily missed. She walked to the CEJIS office most days. All this contributed to the fact that, as a mutual friend reported to us in February 2007, neighbours were commenting on her activities, stating things like: 'all gringos work for the other side anyway'.[65]

The third aspect of impression management, namely that an individuals' performance will determine what type of 'performance' those that encounter him or her will put on, and how much 'backstage' information she or he will have access to,

[64] Field notes: Puerto San Pedro, 13 February 2007.
[65] Field notes: Concepción, 22 February 2007.

is demonstrated by the following example. Chiquitano and non-Chiquitano CGTI-MV and CEJIS research team members were perceived vastly differently in Chiquitano *comunidades*, which was also linked to the fact that the *comunarios* knew (or could presume to know) more about Chiquitano team members than the others. *Comunarios* often had at least heard of the Chiquitano members of the team because most were former or current leaders. *Comunarios* could place the Chiquitano team members into the network of communities; their roles in terms of their former or current position in their Organisation (and therefore partly deduct their agendas); they might have met them at assemblies of Organisation members, political rallies, or encountered each other during past projects in which the researcher had participated. As former leaders, Chiquitano team members commanded respect as well as confidence, a fact which also played a role in convincing *comunarios* to give their time to attend two-day research workshops. Often, some *comunarios* would know the Chiquitano team member as kin and could place them as close or distant family member. This closeness and mutual identification was also reflected in the fact that *comunarios* and Chiquitano researchers had lively conversations with each other, shared jokes and anecdotes and referred to each by their names, with the respective title of '*Don*' for men, and '*Doña*' for women, for example 'Don Lorenzo'.

However, Chiquitano team members also fostered their rapport with the *comunarios*, especially in the non-official parts of the research workshop, they would make sure to socialise with *comunarios*, or as noted above, they would actually take 'time out' to do so. They did then not come across as official workshop facilitators or member of a research team, but were primarily perceived as fellow *comunarios* who possessed certain knowledges about local and national political events that were of importance to *comunarios*. As *comunarios* who shared much of their concerns, Chiquitano researchers then had access to certain 'backroom' information which *comunarios* were less happy to share with other researchers. This included information about conflicts in the *comunidad*, such as clashes due to witchcraft, quarrels with neighbouring *comunidades* or dissatisfaction with certain leaders.

In contrast, *comunarios* knew little more about the other researchers than their names or what they might deduct from physical appearances and accents. They indicated a formal distance, as well as respect, by referring to them as *'licenciada'*, or in short *'lice'* (female) or *'licenciado'* (male). While this usually refers to people

who have passed their *licenciatura* (university degree), it indicates here that they perceived non-Chiquitano researchers to have had a higher degree of formal education than themselves. As often transpired, this also included a presumed higher knowledge of the political system outside the *comunidades*. While sometimes lively conversations ensued between non-Chiquitano researchers and *comunarios*, they usually took a different and more formal level. Broadly, topics issues of interest to the research project, or involved more general conversations about where the researchers was from, what their family situation was, and at times, trying to establish mutual acquaintances and discussing their whereabouts. While non-Chiquitano researchers established rapport and got friendly with *comunarios*, they could not alter their images further than appearing as one more *mestizo* researcher (or NGO staff) who had come to the *comunidad* – friendly, respectful and respected but somewhat interchangeable. Most aspects as their persona and political motivations generally remained hidden to *comunarios*. In turn, *comunarios* were generally keen to hide certain 'backroom' aspects and portray their *comunidad* in ways that they saw as appropriate, to the 'outside world'.

This again highlighted the importance of working with Chiquitano colleagues, as the information they gathered, as well as their on knowledge of the backroom situation was a great asset for cross-checking statements. Chiquitano colleagues also revealed backroom secrets of another group: the *central* leaders. Themselves former leaders, they were no longer directly involved in the running of the *central*, felt less obliged to portray some ideal image of its work and were happy to provide their interpretations of leaders' activities. In turn, Chiquitano leaders were inclined to portray the *central* and its activities in a positive light. This coincides with Bergman's experience that 'many types of back region secrets were revealed only by people who were not members of the groups whose secrets they were' (1962: 18).

Important is also to consider how NGO workers and *central* leaders portrayed their selves to each other. As an onlooker, I perceived that NGO workers showed much respect to Chiquitano leaders. In the case of the NGO CEJIS, its workers assisted Chiquitano of Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío in the technical juridical battles that they had to fight with INRA, in courts and in tribunals in order to gain a legal title to their territory. They also show much solitarily for the political activities of the Chiquitano *central* and lowland indigenous movements in general. CEJIS

workers are present at almost all important events that lowland indigenous groups stage. They do these things despite the animosity that this brings them from other members of lowland departmental society. They very much purvey to Chiquitano leaders that they are 'on their side'.

Chiquitano leaders, in turn, generally showed respect to NGO workers. Similar to other *comunarios*, they often referred to NGO workers as *'licenciada' 'licenciado'* or *'doctor/a'*. Chiquitano leaders cooperated very closely with CEJIS and other NGOs and frequently invited NGO employees to attend *central* meetings. Further, Lorenzo Pasabare at the time employed by CEJIS, often dropped in to see what was going on in the CICC or the CGTI-MV in order to coordinate activities. Once a year the *central* held planning meetings with CEJIS (and some other NGOs) in which they discussed project progress, new projects and proposals. NGO workers and *central* members also met at the start and end of projects, as well as during other stages within project cycles.

However, NGO participation was not desired in all spaces. The *central* leadership also held closed meetings without the participation of technicians and NGO staff.[66] While the content of these meetings cannot be personally accounted for, it demonstrates that *central* leaders did not want to share a certain amount of 'backstage' information with the NGOs. Further, on certain occasions Chiquitano leaders took off the mask of cooperation. This occurred, for instance during the course of the CEJIS 'collaborative research project'. In its planning stages *central* leaders had agreed that at least one leader from a *central* would accompany the researchers to the workshops. They were to introduce the aims and objectives of the research project and to give an update of the work of the *central*, the TCO process and the Constituent Assembly, to *comunarios*. However, leaders were generally absent from the workshops, causing the CEJIS team some embarrassment and disappointment among *comunarios*, who had expected their presence.

CEJIS workers expressed their disappointment with this attitude. As they were often very closely cooperating with *central* leaders, and these had initially expressed interest in the project, they expected the leaders to share the same interest in the project and its execution. CEJIS workers were not the only researcher who fell into

[66] As I was never allowed to participate in such a closed meeting, I will concentrate on the description of the open *asambleas* and *reuniones* that I witnessed or heard about.

this ‘expected compliance’-trap. Also other researcher carrying out projects which leaders had sanctioned have subsequently expected the leaders’ actively support their respective research agenda or project – which they often do not, as they fail to attend planned meetings or activities (e.g. Amskov, 1999: 2). This feeling is heightened because *central* members can nevertheless at times be very demanding towards NGO workers, asking for funds, support, or information.

This example shows that the agendas of NGOs and *central* differed significantly behind the ‘mask of solidarity’ they portrayed to each other most of the time. In reality, *central* leaders juggle many parallel activities which demand their attention, making it hard for them to pay attention to a single project: they were, not least, constantly busy with administering and executing a variety of NGO funded projects in various stages of the project cycles as well as advancing the territorial claim. Further, *central* and NGOs did also not see eye-to-eye on the control of project resources. *Central* leaders expressed that NGOs were getting money in the name of Chiquitanos but then used them to run the NGO instead. *Central* leaders also resented the financial dependence on NGOs. Such resentments would sometimes come to the surface in arguments between NGO workers or *central* members.[67] Several NGO workers had stories to tell, where they had received a public scolding by leaders about supposedly hogging project materials bought with money destined for the *centrales*, treating *comunarios* badly, or for lack of informing the *central* about their activities.

My Multiple Subject Position

I managed my own subject positions very differently in front of different audiences. Like DED and CEJIS colleagues, I knew that to be seen to engage with indigenous movements would attract suspicion and criticism from many Concepceños and Cruceños across ethnic and occupational strata. Seeing that a white *gringa* in Santa Cruz as well as Concepción was constantly asked what she was doing in the area, I was thinking of an ‘identity management’ strategy which would allow me to carry out my research. This was also imperative as the aspect of my safety was of concern due to University and funding body regulations. Drawing on the works of others who carried out fieldwork in conflictive situation (e.g. Belousov et al., 2007; Kovats-

[67] For example, field notes: Concepcón, 27 February 2007.

Bernat, 2002; Sluka, 1995) and after consulting my supervisors, I decided to affiliate to an international NGO with a positive profile and good track record in the field site: kindly, the DED granted me the role of intern. This not only provided me with a type of 'safety net', or support network, throughout my fieldwork, but also with another identity or role to add to my 'repertoire'. After all, international and domestic development workers were generally respected in Santa Cruz, as long as they were 'developing' the 'underdeveloped hinterland' of the province and they did not appear to incite the '*indios*' to protest. Consequently, I stressed my DED affiliation when talking to members of the local white and *mestizo* population, who were opposed to the Chiquitano land struggle, or when I was not sure were a person's political persuasion lay.

Being affiliated to the DED and having the well-respected DED worker Carlos Echegoyen as my main gate-keeper also had another side effect, namely that Chiquitano leaders and technicians initially associated me more closely with the DED. Echegoyen took me along to meetings he had scheduled with the CICC, the OICH and the CGTI-MV in September 2006. Although I had already visited three organisations on my pre-field mission and gained their approval of my research project, Carlos reasoned that it would be good to introduce me and my project at formal events where most *central* and CGTI-MV leaders and employees would be present. This was to ensure that I would be as transparent as possible about what I would be doing and allowed me to ask for the consent to carry out the research from a larger group of individuals as the initial three leaders, as described above. My association with the DED and Echegoyen initially helped gain the leaders' support for my project.[68] Nevertheless, when dealing with *central* leaders, CGTI and CEJIS personnel, I managed my 'self' very differently. I informed them about my project and PhD student status, and repeatedly reminded them that the DED affiliation was only one of the identities I carried.

However, the subject position I could adopt vis-à-vis *central* leaders was also heavily determined by the role that I *could* play. As noted, CICC leaders maintained that research carried out in *comunidades*, the CGTI-MV and the *central* had to be sanctioned by the leaders and the *comunidad* in question, and should benefit the local

[68] The importance of ways of gaining access can be crucial to research results has been noted by many (for example, Burgess, 1986).

Chiquitano population in some way. Consequently, the only role that I could occupy was that of an 'advocate'. That it is difficult or impossible to carry out such research without an advocate position is evidenced by the fact that much of the research regarding Chiquitano communities and the *centrales* in San Javier, Lomerío and Concepción has been carried out by individuals working for NGOs or by researchers affiliated to the *central*.[69] Thus, most were what Nancy Scheper-Hughes called 'anthropologist-*companheiras*' (1995: 411).[70] While I am aware of more critical voices regarding the issue of 'side taking' (see below), a personal stance is that side-taking is not *necessarily* problematical, and in the case of my research unavoidable.

In the *comunidades*, my positionality was again another. As I was either with the CGTI-MV or the CEJIS team, I appeared as one more member of the research team. I was also in company of people known to many *comunarios*, which contributed to the fact that they were generally not very suspicious of the *gringa* that had come to their *comunidad.* This is not to deny that as the only European in the team I did not attracted some special attention, not least because my Spanish was at times clumsy, a source of amusement to *comunarios*. *Comunarios* would ask what I was doing there, where I was from, where my family was, how I liked their *comunidad* and so on. Still, *comunarios* generally put me into a similar category as non-Chiquitano researchers, evidenced by the fact they often called me *'lice'* or *'doctora'* apart from *'gringa'*.

However, I was still very foreign to *comunarios*. An indication of this is that during my stay in Palestina, I was invited to join a group of men to go fishing and chew coca in the evening as well as to go hunting, although I did not accept the invitation at the time. Both activities are generally more engaged in by male *comunarios.* This indicates that *comunarios* perceived me as I sufficiently foreign so that my participation in 'male' *comunarios* activities would have been accepted, resonating with the findings of other female researcher that a 'sufficiently foreign' status allowed them to participate in 'male activities' (for example, Howard, 1997:

[69] Most Studies or reports on Chiquitano have been carried out and written by members of the NGOs APCOB and CEJIS. Also Ditte Amskov wrote her Master Thesis while collaborating with the CICC. Her *'Monte Verde: análisis y discusión sobre las ideas de administración del territorio de Monte Verde desde el punto de vista de algunos comunarios'* (1999) is the summary of her work that she 'returned' to the *central*.

[70] As addressed below, this does of course not mean that researchers have taken up this role purely due to external circumstance. Often, as in the case of Nancy Scheper-Hughes taking up such a role is a mixture of 'assignment' by people and a personal political stance (see 1995: 411).

20-21; Siskind, 1973). However, the invitations may have also linked to the fact that I owned a large bag of coca leaves, which the respective *comunarios* knew I would share with them, if I came along.

This episode links to a last aspect, namely how my gender affected my positionality.[71] While foreignness might have meant that I could transgress *comunidad* gendered roles and spaces, it somewhat restricted me in terms of rapport with other CGTI-MV research team members. While carrying out research with the CGTI-MV team, in one trip I was the only and in another, one of two women. During both trips, I felt that interacting with the male Chiquitano researchers was reduced to sexist comments and bad jokes from their side. While sexist jokey banter is a part of many conversations male and female Concepceños and Chiquitano have among each other, and is such not unusual, in this case, the banter drowned out all other elements of the conversations. As I noted in my field-diary

> … there is hardly ever a normal conversation going on. If I try to talk about more serious issues that are of interest to my research, this is quickly stopped and the issues are diverted to the fact that I used a machete and am now fit to be married, if I would also learn how to cook, and so on.[72]

However, such talk did not mean that team members would not 'look out' for me. After all, they took me along, looked after me with food and drink and the odd ration of coca leaves. A likely explanation as to why their verbal engagement took the form of jokes is that they did not grow to know me further than my 'female *gringa*' mask – a person who did not know much about *comunario* way of live and somebody they did not know very much about. That they reacted like this whenever I tried to strike up amore serious conversation and ask them about *central* or CGTI-MV activities also implies that they did not want to share this information with me, presumably because they did not really know what to make of me and my asking such questions.

This assumption is supported by the fact that I did not have the 'sexist joke problem' with the one male *mestizo* research team member who could relate to me on a different level: we shared the experience of having lived in Costa Rica for some

[71] That a researchers' gender in combinations with gender norms prevalent in their field-site may affect what role they can occupy and what sort of backroom information they may have access to can be expected. As Robson points out, 'where women are culturally seen as unthreatening they may be able to obtain access and information more easily than a man. It is equally the case that, where gender segregation is the norm, men may find entry to the world of women impossible and vice versa' (1997: 55).

[72] Field notes: Concepción, 23 February 2007.

time and shared similar academic interests. Further, I did not encounter similar problems with male Chiquitano CEJIS research team colleagues. On explanation might be that there were more women researchers, meaning that I was not the only target of banter. However, I think that there more likely explanation s that I got to know my CEJIS Chiquitano colleagues to a deeper level. This meant that our conversations covered all sorts of personal and professional topics. It is highly likely that by spending more time with the CGTI-MV team on research trips might have changed the situation as the researchers would have got to know other parts of my 'self' and 'identity repertoire'.

The way that my gender influenced the shape relations could take with Chiquitano *comunarios* has already been indicated above. I should add that being a woman did mean that women revealed a certain amount of information to me as well as other female researchers, which they did not reveal to male researchers, or as long as male *comunarios* were present. The clearest example was that Chiquitanas talked about incidence of violence against women and Children more freely when men were absent. On the other hand, it can be assumed that a certain amount of male 'backroom' information was remained hidden from female researchers, which was, in turn possibly revealed to the male researchers.

The Politics of Fieldwork and Writing about it

Taking up the role of an 'advocate' had practical implications and raised certain moral dilemmas, especially during the writing-up process. Certain questions which were in my mind during the research process came to be more problematic in the writing up process. Such questions included: whose side am I taking? Whose agenda supporting, i.e. do I take the side of the *central*, of the *comunarios*, or the NGOs (which claim to be supporting the cause of the Chiquitano, but at times have a conflicting relationship with both)? Do you have to be loyal to 'the cause', or can you have your own 'cause'? Does this mean agents cannot be critically analysed in term of their roles or performance?

Anthropologists' engagement with such issues has focused on different problems and debates. One of the main debates has been between advocates of engagement in anthropological practice and/or writing and those who argue for

greater detachment. As Burr (2002: n/p) summarises, the main fault line in this debate runs among 'cultural relativists' who may 'take a firm stance on not becoming involved with difficult ethical issues at the local level' and those influenced by Marxist, post-Marxist, post-modern and feminist critiques. Highlighting the power inequalities prevalent in their field sites as well as in knowledge production, the latter strive for a 'greater accountability to the societies in which they work' (2002: n/p).[73]

Authors generally discuss 'engagement' as a moral issue and/or one of 'method', when debating appropriate standards for the discipline. For instance, Nancy Scheper-Hughes, advocate of an engaged approach, argues: 'cultural relativism, read as moral relativism, is no longer appropriate to the world in which we live, and anthropology, if it is to be worth anything at all, must be ethically grounded' (1995: 409).[74] In her fieldwork she acted as 'anthropologist' and 'activist', and she reflects her 'advocate' stance in her writing. For her, advocacy is a question of moral *and* method: she 'assumed the local *cargo* of anthropologist-*companheira*' during her research in Brazil, as the role was 'assigned' to her 'by activist women and men of the Alto' (1995: 411). Swedenburg (1992) is another author 'broadly concerned with studying and writing "history from below"' (1992: 482).[75] This convinced him that solidarity might require 'that we learn from, and be (tactically) complicit with, the silences and resistances of the people we live with and study' (1992: 484).

In contrast, some authors support activism in the field, but not in the writing up process and vice versa. For example, Shokeid, criticising Swedenburg's stance, opines that the role of an anthropologist is 'to describe and analyse – as honestly and compassionately as possible – the social manifestations of human experience as well as the work of other anthropologists' (1992: 465). He claims to adhere to an intellectual and professional ethos that is neither 'value free' nor ideologically committed, noting that we have to differentiate between 'involvement, advocacy, and

[73] When authors discuss this latter stance they use a variety of different and overlapping terms which also indicate some variation in method. Among these are: critical anthropology, applied anthropology, action anthropology, praxis anthropology, engaged anthropology, practical anthropology, as well as advocacy anthropology (see Kellett, 2009: 23).

[74] However, this is of course not to deny that taking an engaged role may not have political implications. As Scheper-Hughes points out: 'I assumed the local *cargo* of anthropologist-companheira, dividing my time (and my loyalties) between anthropology and political work as it was assigned to me by activist women and men of the Alto' (1995: 411).

[75] Also see, Swedenburgs' (1999) work on Palestine.

commitment' in anthropology. He explains that while 'many, if not most, of our colleagues are to some extent "involved," or "engaged," anthropologists', this does not mean that 'anthropologist's ideological and emotional agenda' should not be uncritically tolerated, as this might lead ideologically tailored 'truths' (1992: 466, 473).

Authors also point to a multitude of other problems that they associate with 'taking sides'. Some see it as a political problem. For example, Robins' (1996) critique of Scheper-Hughes' work, focuses on the fact that anthropologists can also intervene on the 'wrong side'. He points to South Africa where 'Eiselin and the Volkskundiges provided the intellectual framework for a segregationist ideology' (1996: 342). Secondly, he points to a moral issue, namely that depending on the context, 'the intervention of the "great white" anthropologist can smack of paternalism and elitism and may aggravate rather than alleviate the suffering of the "beneficiaries"' (1996: 343). Thirdly, authors point to methodological questions, namely that the notion of taking side with the 'oppressed' is problematic when such groups are treated as 'undifferentiated' categories, hiding multifaceted 'identities' as well as other axis of difference (e.g. Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 75; Scott, 1985; Vermeersch, 2005). A fourth aspect is the question regarding the 'authenticity' of voices (see Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 75; Scott, 1985; Vermeersch, 2005). Some authors note that after all, relatively powerless groups may either knowingly or unknowingly adopt the voices of the powerful (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 75; Scott, 1985). Lastly, we may add that morally committed advocates may face the issue that the line between their own agenda and that of the actors they claim to support may become blurred in the writing up process. Establishing one (mutual) agenda might become increasingly difficult upon in-depth analysis.

David somewhat side-steps these debates by pointing out that most of these problems are rooted in the relationship of 'knowledge' and 'social interest'. Social researchers might want to be on the side of the 'underdog' and see their role in advocacy, but 'how is the researcher to take a stand as advocate if every position is based upon social constructions based upon selections and interpretations based upon social interest?' (2002: 14). After all, as Swedenburg reminds, '*all* academic discourse is selective, conducted through arbitrary closures' (1992: 483 also see Hammersly, 1992: 2). It would be tempting to follow David's conclusion that this

means that if we recognise the close relationship between knowledge, the social researcher and it's constructed nature, then researchers can simply establish whose side they are on (2002: 14).

However, in the case of Concepción the act of establishing whose side 'I' am on is not as simple. As I have shown, those deemed to be on 'one side' are not a 'homogenous group' and cross-cut by various differing interests. As becomes clear in the case of the Chiquitano *central*, the CGTI-MV, CEJIS, APCOB and the Chiquitano *comunarios*, all these actors are not necessarily on the 'same side' although the seem to be from the point of view of the Concepceño elite. I argue therefore that taking on the role of an advocate can be just as unethical as not to do so in the light of a situation where the 'sides' are crosscut by many different interests. Further, we must distinguish between taking an advocacy role as moral stance or as methodological choice. As in the case of Scheper-Hughes' work, advocacy is often a combination of both. In the case of my research, where 'sides' become increasingly blurred the closer we look at actors' interests, I distinguish the advocate 'role' I occupied in the field from my moral position. Rather than 'taking sides' this thesis pays attention to the power relations between the various competing actors of the same, as well as opposing 'sides'. Further, I focus on how the agendas and actions of different actors influence each other. Through considering the 'state' as a power structure and analysing citizen engagement with different state actors, I hope to shed more light on the different citizen and state practices Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* engage in, and how different actors constitute the state for the Chiquitano.

Conclusion

In sum, my research focused on the Chiquitano organisations' and communities' interactions with each other and with different governmental and non-governmental state actors. This meant that my fieldwork necessarily took the form of what may be described as a 'multi-sited' ethnography (Marcus, 1995). My presence in different sites was necessary, not least, because the different actors –Chiquitano *comunarios* one the one hand and state actors on the other – are dispersed among different geographical sites. Through observation, informal talks and interviews in Chiquitano *comunidades*, I gained a greater insight into Chiquitano-state interactions and the

functioning of communal political structures; the way *comunarios* interacted with each other; how they perceive and interact with the *centrales* and other state actors; as well as getting a deeper insight into communal life.

With respect to CEJIS and the CGTI-MV, I became a researcher in research projects that each was carrying out. Two of the reasons why I saw collaborating with these two organisations as beneficial were, firstly, because they were part of the state legibility project (Scott, 1998), and secondly, both research projects aimed to gather data, which coincided with data I aimed to gather, thus cooperation on gathering data avoided unethical research repetition. My thesis therefore not only draws on the ethnographic data I collected, but also on data collected through methods as diverse as structured interview, focus groups and sociodramas.

This data is portrayed in this thesis by moving beyond simply taking sides by instead shedding light on the different interests and agendas aligned each 'side'. Looking at the interaction of Chiquitano *comunidades* and leader with state actors such as NGOs and state bureaucratic institutions, allows for an analysis of some of the enabling aspects of these relations, areas of cooperation and where this interaction leads to paradoxes, as well as modes of Chiquitano resistance. The following chapter addresses the historical dimensions of Chiquitano – state engagement, by considering the Chiquitano ethnogenesis sparked by the arrival off Jesuits in the region, the changes in Bolivian citizenship regimes and the emergence of contemporary patters of land ownership in the region.

Chapter IV

History of the Chiquitano: Ethnogenesis, Land Loss and Citizenship

The previous chapter introduced the methodological choices made during fieldwork and argued that what constitutes appropriate research ethics and methodology depends on the socio-cultural context a researcher encounters in the field. This chapter turns to the history of Chiquitano people and the Chiquitanía by focusing on changing actors of governance and emerging citizenship regimes, which in Bolivia as in other Latin American countries, have been closely tied to landholding regimes and economic activity, and as such to racial categories (e.g. Harris, 1995). It also pays attention to Chiquitano ethnogenesis, understood as a continuing 'process of becoming' (Radding, 2005: 121; also see Veber, 1998).[1] In historical perspective, Chiquitano-state relations centre primarily on the struggle for land and different resources. While power structures and forms of 'governmentality' and elite composition changed over time, a constant has been the imposition of new meanings on the region's natural resources (such as land and forests), which were ultimately transformed into commodities in a system of private property to the overall exclusion of Chiquitano groups (see Ciccantell, 1999).

That memories and interpretations of people's histories are important for interpretations of their present social, political and economic circumstances, as well as the construction of their modes of identification, has been highlighted by different authors (e.g. Melucci, 1989; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Sider, 2003). Similarly, in the Chiquitano case, reflecting on their history shapes the contemporary Chiquitano self-understanding and (political) actions. This is perceivable, for example, in discourses and statements surrounding their territorial struggle (see Chapter VI) and in the way Chiquitano think about their future organisational structures. The following statement by one Chiquitano activist provides an example. In early June 2007, I sat on the patio outside the CEJIS office in Concepción with Lorenzo Pasabare, eating

[1] I follow Eric Wolf's definitions of 'race' and ethnicity'. Wolf marks the difference between the terms as follows: 'Racial designations, such as "Indian" or "Negro", are the outcome of the subjugation of populations in the course of European mercantile expansion. The term *Indian* stands for the conquered populations of the New World, in disregard of any cultural or physical differences among Native Americans. … Indians are conquered people who could be forced to labour or to pay tribute' (1982: 380). In contrast, 'ethnic categories express the ways that particular populations come to relate themselves to given segments of the labour market. Such categories emerge from two sources, one external to the group in question, and the other internal' (1982: 381).

cuñapés, (salty, hard little round maize buns typical for the region), drinking coffee and carrying out an informal interview. The CEJIS project team had singled him out as a key informant because he had been a local CICC leader as well as a key figure of the Santa Cruz based *Central Indígena de Pueblos y Comunidades Indigenas del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB – Central of Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Western Bolivia). It was his turn to answer the question that project team members had asked many current and former Chiquitano leaders, technicians and *comunarios* before him, namely: what he thought a future territorial government for the TCO Monte Verde should look like.

Popular perceptions held that a new government for the TCO Monte Verde would either be conformed by leaders of the three local Chiquitano *Centrales*, their representatives, or be directly elected by all Chiquitano living in the area. Generally, people had expressed that the organisational structure should be that of a 'syndicate' presided over by president, vice-president and secretaries for different working areas, for example, a secretary for land and territory. Lorenzo's opinion differed. He pointed out that such structures were particularly 'western' and different to the 'traditional' structures of the Chiquitano people: they were externally imposed. Lorenzo stated:

> In many of the *comunidades*, they only talk of a western authority, right? President, vice-president and so on. The people do not know anything else and I started thinking [about] how the very Chiquitano was in years before, how he was. I have read, I wanted to get somebody who tells me … I have gone to ask the old people how [it was], but there is nothing anymore…: they tell me that there were Caciques and all these things … But [even in] Palmarito and in other *comunidades* in one or another way, they were organised by their patrons or through the Church, this is not legitimate anymore … It is not the very legitimacy of the Chiquitano indigenous, or, well, they have not found what they were like… what type of authorities they had, right?
>
> And there the Chiquitano, they invented it. … Before they elected him because he was a good hunter, he fought with the jaguar *(tigre)*, he was elected authority of the Chiquitano people because he was good, fought with the jaguar and overcame and killed him. … And what is more, they say, he had the right to have three or more women. But who, who has told them that, who investigated this exactly? Might this not have come from the side of the Guarani people? We know that the Guarani people are another culture in the lowlands, right? And they cannot attach something from another culture to us. The Chiquitano people might not have been like that or they might have been, because there were some parallels. …in reality, it is the case that nobody tells it any more … They are telling us only from the time when [we] were colonised…and … it is my thinking that unfortunately *(desgraciadamente)*

> right up to the state, power takes this form … [and] we are almost also structured like syndicates, right? … Should it be that we simply copy what we see, like [this form of] organisation, let's say president, vice-president, secretary…? But it is a syndicate, I don't know but it is not legitimate of the Chiquitano now. …the only way that I can think of is that the *cabildo* remains *(prevalecer)*, because the *cabildo* is what they dream of in the indigenous *comunidad* of Palestina.[2]

Apart from illustrating how thinking about the past influences contemporary Chiquitano political strategies and considerations of what will be appropriate for the future, this statement shows a sense of uncertainty that comes from a recognition that their history has been heavily constructed in interaction with outside forces. An uncertainty perhaps stemming from the fact that 'indigeneity' – in the sense of tracing ancestry and cultural practises to pre-conquest populations – is one pre-requisite for indigenous citizenship, and the rights that depend on it. The statement reflects Lorenzo's awareness of the lasting legacy of the Jesuit mission system, introduced with the arrival of the Jesuit missionaries in the Chiquitanía in 1692, as well as the way that living with 'patrons' influenced Chiquitano culture and organisational structures.

This chapter is structured according to 'stages', i.e. the early Conquest, concentration in the Jesuit missions, the republican period, the rubber boom and the construction of the Corumbá Railway and the effects of the 1952 Bolivian

[2] *'En mucho de las comunidades hablan de una autoridad occidental nomás… presidente, vicepresidente, ta, ta nada mas saben la gente y yo me puse a pensar, como era pues el propio chiquitano en años antes, como era. Yo he leído he querido sacar alguien que diga yo como promotor tengo que ir ha preguntar a los viejitos como, nada ya, no hay: me hablan que habían caciques y tanto todas esas cosas hasta en Palmarito digamos no, pero en Palmarito y en otras comunidades eran algo así de autoridades que de alguna y otra manera eran organizados por su patrones o por la iglesia no es legítimo pues ya no, no es una legitimidad propia del indígena chiquitano o sea no se han encontrado como eran ellos… que tipo de autoridades tenían ¿no? O por ahí nomás se la invento el Chiquitano… antes se elegía porque era buen cazador porque peleo con el tigre, era elegido autoridad del pueblo Chiquitano porque era el bueno digamos peleo con el tigre lo venció y lo mató. … y además tenia dizque derecho a tener a tres o a más mujeres. ¿Pero quién, quien lo dijo eso, quien lo investigo exactamente? ¿Eso no será un, no será que eso viene de repente eso es del lado del pueblo guaraní? sabemos que el pueblo guaraní es otra cultura en tierras baja, no, y no nos pueden meter algo del otro pueblo a lo que es. El pueblo chiquitano de repente no ha sido así o de repente también fue así, porque casi habían algunas cosas homogéneas. …pero en realidad de los casos es que ya nadie lo cuanta pues no están contando nomás de lo que fueron desde que lo colonizo nomás ya, hacia arriba ya y yo veo y en mi pensar mío desgraciadamente hasta el poder del Estado pues esta así no con esa forma de estructura y casi estamos estructurado como sindicato también no … será que copiamos nomás de lo que vemos porque por decir este la organizaciones esta digamos este presidente, vicepresidente, secretario…? Pero es tipo sindicato, no sé pero no es lo legítimo del Chiquitano ahora. La única manera que me queda pensar seria prevalecer, por que el cabildo algo que como se suena digamos en la comunidad indígena de Palestina'*. Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007.

Revolution.[3] It concludes with a brief overview of the situation of Chiquitano *comunidades* in the 1970s, which witnessed the emergence of the Chiquitano movements in Ñuflo de Chávez province (addressed in the following chapter).

Pre-Jesuit Contact: The Early Conquest

At the eve of contact, in the Andean sphere, the Inca Empire engaged in efforts to create a state apparatus, seeking to control the population and exploit local resources of the different ethnic groups whose social and economic organisation took the form of the *ayllu*.[4] In contrast, societies in the Paraguayan-Chaco-Chiquitano lowlands were organised in a more egalitarian manner (Freyer, 1997: 43-44; Radding, 2005: 50). Authors coincide in noting that Chiquitano social life was nomadic or centred on small semi-permanent settlements (Freyer, 1997: 24; see Krekeler, 1993: 145-146; Schwarz, 1994: 26).[5] As Radding notes:

> the physical spaces created by these settlements linked them integrally with the forest … their skills for building, fashioning tools, procuring food, healing, and conserving the biota of their world grew out of their intimate knowledge of the *bosque* and the *pampas*. Just as forcefully, the spiritual guardians (*jichis*) who inhabited their cosmos derived their form and meaning from the natural environment of the forests and streams in the Bolivian lowlands (2005: 43).

[3] The description of the situation of the pre-mission, mission, and post-mission era in this chapter draws largely on the works of four authors: anthropologist Jürgen Riester (1968; 1976), historian Brigit Krekeler (1993), anthropologist Burkhard Schwarz (1994) and historical ethnographer Bärbel Freyer (1997) (Freyer's *Magister Arbeit* was later published as 'Los Chiquitanos: Descripción de un pueblo de las tierras bajas de Bolivia según fuentes jesuíticas del siglo XVIII' (2000)). I acknowledge the weakness in this approach. It is due to a lack of access to mission and other historical documentation, and the fact that an in-depth analysis of these accounts is outside the scope of this thesis. The authors' writings draw on the mission history of the region, as well as descriptions of the area before and shortly after the mission period, and are based on a revision of texts produced by Jesuit missionaries. The most commonly cited accounts are by the Jesuit priests Julian Knogler, Juan Patricio Fernández, Francisco Burgos, Martin Schmidt, and Pierre François Charlevoix. Authors also rely on the descriptions of Santa Cruz and the Chiquitanía compiled by Alcides d'Obigny as a result of his tour through the area in 1830-1831. The newer publications sum up historical descriptions covering several centuries, which often makes it hard to distinguish to which timeframe a particular statement belongs. Illuminating, however, is the well-researched work by historian Cynthia Radding (2001; 2005) which addresses many of the themes this chapter covers.

[4] In the *ayllu* structure, agricultural land was owned by kin-based communities, although held by individual households. Labour intensive tasks, such as agriculture, house building and maintenance of irrigation systems were carried out jointly, with the main beneficiary providing food and drink for the other workers (see Patterson, 2000: 1-2; Stern, 2000). Also see Klein (2003a: 13-20) for Aymara Kingdoms and Quechua speaking nations and their relation to the Inca Empire. See Clastres for egalitarian societies (1989).

[5] Radding calls these *'rancherías'*. I refrain from using this term, to avoid confusion with the term *'rancho'* which Chiquitano informants used to denote the small Chiquitano settlements tied to cattle farms and agrarian enterprises.

The longevity of the settlements depended on patterns of mobility linked to swidden cultivation, the shifting location of the *chacos*, cycles of hunting, fishing and gathering, and changing political alliances and warfare (Radding, 2005: 41).[6] To establish a clear linguistic and ethnic affiliation of the groups that later became known as Chiquitano is difficult. Authors refer to as many as fifty different 'tribes' or bands (Krekeler, 1993: 26).[7] In terms of linguistic affiliation most authors cite *arawak, chiquitano* and *chapakura* (Lacroix, 2005: 14).[8]

The aim of Spanish conquest was to provide the financial means for the growing costs of the foreign policies of Spain as part of the colonial mercantilist system, with differing results and strategies for the Andean highlands and lowlands. For nearly half a century after conquest in the Andes, the Spaniards depended heavily on already established labour systems and the *kurakas* (native lords) which they labelled *caciques*, for the operation of the *encomienda* system and colonial economy (see Stern, 2000).[9] Through the reforms of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581), the Crown set up the *república de los españoles* for Spaniards and the *república de indios* for Indians. In the highlands, this saw the establishment of a 'tributary citizenship' in which Indians paid taxes and supplied labour. It also entailed royal protection of their lands and a degree of local autonomy (Hylton and

[6] For a more detailed description of productive and hunting and fishing practices and changes according to location of the communities, see Freyer (1997), Schwarz (1994: 26-27), and Radding (2005: 38-41).

[7] Métreux mentions the Tobacikosis, Terrapekosis, Tamakocis, Cibarakoas, Penokis, Paranis, Subarekas, Palkonos, Gorgotokis, Zambikis, Kozos, Pakaras, Pinokos, while other authors refer to as many as fifty different 'tribes' (in Krekeler, 1993: 27). In contrast, Freyer notes that author's mention up to fifty groups that according to her do not belong to the Chiquitano groups (see 1997: 98). Radding reminds that most such anthropological classificatory lists draw on those that assume linguistic-ethnic linkages as 'established, in part, by imperial practices that defined ethnicity in terms of dialects that missionaries and secular officials set out to codify in written grammars and vocabularies in an effort to make sense of the tribal affiliations they sought to control' (2005: 119). This link has been taken up by newer publications (also Métreux, 1949). In contrast, Radding holds that neither geography and locality determine ethnicity, nor do 'ethnic identities conform neatly or wholly to specific languages' (2005: 119). Instead, Radding emphasises ethnic identity as a 'process of becoming' (2005: 120-121).

[8] Problems in drawing boundaries among the different groups, stem from the fact that chroniclers faced different dialects and altered their spelling of names they associated with a group (Freyer, 1997: 98). It is likely that chroniclers labelled social and political allegiances rooted local communities and chiefdoms as 'ethnic identities'. However, these alliances were often only temporary (Radding, 2005: 43).

[9] The *encomienda* system in the highlands involved the distribution of Indian communities into districts (the *encomiendas*), which were handed to Spanish grantees (the *encomenderos*). *Encomenderos* were charged with 'serving the crown's military and political needs in the colony, and attending to the material and spiritual well-being of the Indians "entrusted" to his care. In exchange, he was free to command tribute and labour from them' (Stern, 2000: 26). The system was finally abolished by Phillip V in 1720 (see Konetzke, 1998: 194-195). Also see Klein (1992: 37) and for a detailed analysis of the *encomienda* system, see Konetzke (1998: 173-195).

Thomson, 2007: 36; Platt, 1993: 161; Postero, 2007: 27-28).[10] The exploitative relations were primarily introduced to ensure a steady supply of workers for the Potosí silver mines, and in lesser degree, for the quicksilver mines of Huancavelica and to carry out public works in Lima and other cities. Bad working conditions meant that many lost their lives in the process (see Konetzke, 1998: 199-203).[11]

The two-tier colonial system was based on Indian labour extraction, 'naturalised' through the maintenance of social distance between superior 'white' and subordinate 'so-called Indians, Spaniards, Blacks, and mixed-race groups collectively named *castas*' (Radding, 2005: 121; also see Wade, 1997).[12] The system was combined with 'an intrinsic ingredient of humiliation in social treatment of the subaltern classes', based upon a widely held belief in a 'genetic inequality between the parts' (Postero, 2007: 29).[13]

Conquest of the more sparsely populated lowlands had a different trajectory. The two main goals for the *entrada* ('entrance' or 'excursion') originating from Río de la Plata into Chiquitano territory, were the search for gold, silver and precious stones, and later, territorial consolidation based on 'taking advantage of the indigenous workforce' and securing the border against the Portuguese (Krekeler, 1993: 57-58, 72). There were four *entradas* into the region, starting with that of Pedro de Mendoza in the early 1530s, whose orders were to colonise the region and secure it by building strongholds for future inland expeditions. The second was headed by Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca (1534-1544); the third *'gran entrada'* ('great entrance') was led by Domingo Martínez de Irala (1547-1549), the fourth by Ñuflo de Chávez (1557-1561) (Krekeler, 1993: 33-34).[14]

The 'entrance' of Ñuflo de Chávez ended with the first founding of a permanent city, Santa Cruz de la Sierra in 1559, located a few kilometres away from

[10] Also see Eric Wolf (1982) on this system.
[11] Although different colonial officials and priests began voicing concerns against *mita*, it was not until the Bourbon Dynasty that a review of the reforms was carried out. The *Cortes de Cádiz* finally ruled the abolishing of the *mita* in 1812 (Konetzke, 1998: 200).
[12] This led observers to conclude, that in fact, what was put in place was one and not 'two republics' as pointing to the existing interdependence of the systems. See Saignes (1995). Also Radding notes that the separation became blurred in practice through migration, labour demands and growing ethnically mixed populations (2005: 164).
[13] Also see Gilly, who refers to this as 'racial subalternity' (2003: 29-21).
[14] For more detailed description of the *entradas*, see Radding (2005: 45-52). The *gran entrada* carries this name because it was the one deemed to have had the greatest success. It resulted in the opening of a path and communication channels between the two administrative zones of Río de la Plata and Peru (Krekeler, 1993: 41).

the present-day San José de Chiquitos (capital of Chiquitos Province) (Riester, 1976: 122) .[15] Soon after its creation, the citizens of Santa Cruz divided indigenous groups from the surrounding area amongst their *encomiendas* and between 1561 and 1620, a class of feudal lords developed that oversaw varying numbers of servants (Krekeler, 1993: 43,70).[16] Additionally, Chiquitano were used in expeditions to find 'the land or gold of Mojos', in wars against the Chiriguano, as well as being sold off to highland mines (Freyer, 1997: 10; Krekeler, 1993: 70). Chiquitano groups frequently defied servitude through armed resistance (Krekeler, 1993: 46; Radding, 2005: 52). In fact, uprisings were one of the main reasons why in October 1582 Capitan Holguín received orders to re-locate the capital, later named 'the New' Santa Cruz de la Sierra, to a different, more easily defended position and better suited to fight and conquer the Chiriguanos (Krekeler, 1993: 46).[17] *Encomiendas* continued to supply the settlers with labour for the ranching and agriculture (see Radding, 2005: 67-68).[18]

As Radding points out, 'early colonial contacts in the Chiquitanía grew out of the conflictive demands of *encomienda* service, intermittent raiding and warfare, and the trade for iron tools' (2005: 53). This latter element had a lasting impact and Radding asserts that access to 'axe heads, hooks, steel knives, and scissors' certainly initiated 'a veritable technological revolution by altering methods for clearing the forest, hunting, fishing, and construction' (2005: 53). She adds that as the continued supply of these tools proved central to the diverse groups, which 'most likely intensified intertribal warfare' (2005: 53). It was also an important factor contributing to the continued contact between the groups and the Spanish (Freyer, 1997: 10; Radding, 2005: 53; Riester, 1976: 123). In this period, Chiquitano groups also faced Spanish and human traffickers, who bought children, adolescents and

[15] Krekeler gives another date, stating that Santa Cruz de la Sierra was founded on 26 February 1561 (1993: 42-43).

[16] Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa, who was named governor in 1580, described that in 1586, 160 Spanish lived in Santa Cruz. Of these, 65 were *encomenderos,* who together owned around 8,000 indigenous *encomendados,* while another 3,000 served as personal servants in houses in the city and the countryside (Krekeler, 1993: 45).

[17] Krekeler notes that not all Spaniards had retreated from the city of Ñuflo de Chávez and the eastern region until 1592 (see 1993: 47-48, 50).

[18] The form of *encomienda* that existed in Paraguay and eastern Bolivia was the *encomienda originaria* or *encomienda yanacona*. The 'Indians' worked and lived permanently in the houses of the Spanish. Entire families could be incorporated in the household as servants or workforce for the *campo* (Krekeler, 1993: 101-103; also see Villamarín and Villamarín, 1975). In contrast, the *encomienda mitaya*, practiced in the highlands, meant 'Indios' stayed in their home villages and owned their own land, to which they could return after having worked for the *encomenderos* (Krekeler, 1993: 102-103).

women and in exchange for axes and knives to be sold on as labourers or soldiers. Also Portuguese slave hunters (*bandeirantes paulistas* or *mamelucos*) took advantage of the uncontrolled frontier region to take prisoners (Freyer, 1997: 11; Krekeler, 1993: 50-51, 71-79; Radding, 2005: 130-131).[19] Native peoples resisted 'through flight, armed combat, and legal protest' (Radding, 2005: 133).

Authors conclude that apart from a growing reliance on iron tools, lasting effects of the period included that Chiquitano groups suffered a severe population decline, not least due to imported illnesses, a shrinking of the territory they could occupy due to Spanish and Portuguese incursions, and a fragmentation of the native communities (Freyer, 1997: 11; Krekeler, 1993: 51, 27-23; Radding, 2005: 130; Schwarz, 1994: 28). Schwarz also adds that this phase saw the rupture of exchange relationships with other groups and the highlands (1994: 28). For her part, Radding concludes that among the lasting results of early Conquest was that it showed the 'vulnerability of frontier outposts' demonstrating the 'need for missionary order to "reduce" native communities to supervised towns in fixed locations, a process that marked the transition from conquest as private enterprise to state imperialism' (2005: 54).

The Jesuit Period (1692-1767)

Consequently, the Jesuit missions in the Chiquitanía did not only have a religious function, but served to secure the Empire against attacks from the Portuguese, the 'uncivilised tribes' of the surroundings and to pacify the Chiquitano groups so that they could more easily be exploited in the colonial political economy (see de la Peña, 2005: 720; Freyer, 1997: 13; Krekeler, 1993: 81-85). In 1692, José de Arce founded the first Jesuit mission in San Javier de los Piñocos, in what is today Ñuflo de Chávez province.[20] Over the following years, Jesuits from Switzerland and Germany founded nine further *reducciones* ('reductions') (Freyer, 1997: 13; Riester, 1976:

[19] Krekeler (1993: 73) notes that until 1660 the incursions of the *mamelucos* were not registered with certainty. However, she points to sufficient indicators that Chiquitanos suffered these attacks.

[20] Krekeler notes that the *reducción* was among the Pinokas, Kimeras, Ponajikas, Guapakas and Poojijokas who spoke *chiquito,* and the Kibicikas, Paikonecas, Burecas and Itatines who spoke other languages. She notes that the dates on groups and subgroups vary amongst the authors (1993: 52). Freyer (1997: 13), however mentions the Piñocas and Xamaro who were later joined by the Penoqui.

123).[21] The reduction of La Concepción was established by Padre Lucas Caballero, among groups that spoke *chiquita*, and Paikonekas, Piokos and some Guarayus who spoke other languages (Krekeler, 1993: 53, 131).

An initial and ongoing task for the Jesuits was to search for converts. One form took 'holy hunts' that lasted for up to four months at a time and relied on 'missionised' groups to seek out and surround encampments in the forest. According to Radding, these hunts 'resembled indigenous practices for hunting, warfare, and taking captives' (2005: 59). Jesuits employed various mechanisms, including persuasion, false promises, brutal force and handing out presents. Especially effective proved the distribution of material goods, particularly iron tools (Freyer, 1997: 83-85; Krekeler, 1993: 124-134). Some groups sought out the mission settlements in order to escape Spanish slave hunters and *bandeirantes* (Krekeler, 1993: 124-129). Again other groups resisted the 'holy hunts' altogether and retreated to the hinterland (Schwarz, 1994: 29).

The Workings of the Mission System

Each mission comprised around a thousand inhabitants, headed by two Jesuit priests holding ecclesial and political authority as Crown administrators. In 1709, the Jesuits managed to get the reductions exempted from the *tributo de los indígenas* (indigenous tribute), they also achieved a ban on the distribution of 'Indians' among *encomenderos* for twenty years and Chiquitano groups were not to be recruited to the Potosí mines (Krekeler, 1993: 52).[22] The Jesuits imposed one single language, by elevating that spoken by the majority – '*chiquito*' – to the main language and pressured for it to be taught to all groups.[23] Their reasoning was that it would be more effective to teach and govern the different groups in one of their own

[21] The other reductions were San Rafael (1696), San José (1698), San Juan (1699), Concepción (1709), San Miguel (1721), San Ignacio (1748), Santiago (1754), Santa Ana (1755) and Santo Corazón (1760). The settlements were built for a maximum of 6,000 inhabitants. This meant that they needed to be located close to sufficient water and wood to cater for the high number of people away from temporarily inundated areas and those with mosquitoes. They were normally located on the top of hills (Schwarz, 1994: 29).

[22] Also see Finot (1978: 340).

[23] For a long time authors described *chiquito* as an isolated language, while in 1984 Müller linked it to the *Ge*-language family and within this to *bororo*, which forms its own language family. However, in 1987 Greenberg maintained that it does not belong to the *Ge* family, but that together with it, it should be linked to the Macro-*Ge* family (in Freyer, 1997: 21). Radding notes that religious rituals and languages and were gendered (reflecting the gendered nature of the chiquito language). For instance, young boys and men knelt closer to the altar, followed by rows of standing men, followed by kneeling young girls and standing women. Men appropriated the task of oral preaching (2005: 230-231).

languages. Even so, the various communities were allowed to speak their own languages amongst one another (Freyer, 1997: 21; Krekeler, 1993: 136; Radding, 2005: 227; Riester, 1976: 123; Schwarz, 1994: 32-33).

In terms of the architectural organisation of the missions, the Jesuits erected houses at three sides of a rectangular plaza, with further houses erected along streets that led from the square at a right angle. The fourth side of the plaza was reserved for the mission church, the missionaries' living quarters, workshops and schools (Freyer, 1997: 43; Krekeler, 1993: 137; Radding, 2005: 65; Riester, 1976: 124). As the missions were generally consolidated by the 1750s, Jesuits, lay brethren and native builders created the eye-catching churches which still exist in the ex-reductions today (albeit restored or fully or partly rebuild, see photo 23).[24] The various groups or ethnic bands that became know as Chiquitano, occupied distinct areas of the missions according to linguistic and cultural characteristics. The different sections were called *parcialidades* (Freyer, 1997: 40).[25] Concepción housed as many as eleven ethnic bands in different *parcialidades* at a time (Radding, 2005: 138).

[24] The churches followed a nearly uniform architecture. As Radding describes: 'the basic building materials comprised enormous carved wooden pillars of hardwood that supported their massive roofs, their walls enclosed with adobe; palm-and-thatch roofs were gradually replaced with fired clay tiles' (2005: 223). She adds that the similarity in design is likely due to the lack of stone and lime, the architects and builders therefore resorting to the use of earth and timber. The churches were distinguished, however, by the varied use of decoration in the form of floral designs and images of saints, which were painted on the walls by native artists using vegetable and mineral dyes. Also unusual was the technique of carving wooden pillars, pulpit, saint figures and other wooden elements in the church, and placement of features such as a bell tower or solar clock (Radding, 2005: 223).

[25] According to Radding, the term *'parcialidades'*: 'appears in different areas of the Spanish American Empire to refer to subunits with distinct residential and ethnic identities that either formed part of larger communities or were brought together by colonial policy in consolidated *reducciones.* She adds that: 'it is important to distinguish between the category as used by Spanish officials to designate a tribute-paying unit or a residential area and the changing indigenous meanings of *parcialidad* to establish reciprocal relations of support and political alliances' (2005: 137).

Photo 23: The Mission Church of San Ignacio de Velasco

The internal political organisation of the missions followed the *Leyes de Indias* (Laws of the Indies), according to which the reductions should be administered in the style of Spanish cities. Jesuit priests based the internal governance system on the *caciques* of the different *parcialidades* by devolving significant authority to them. As the missions reached a stable population, priests instituted a system where *caciques* took on administrative and military offices. Among the most important featured the *cabildo* (indigenous council) officers with the titles of *corregidor* (highest officer with administrative and judicial authority), the *teniente* (lieutenant, assisted the *corregidor*), *alférez real* (royal standard-bearer), *alcaldes*, *fiscales* (enforcement officers, two per mission), the *comandante* (commander), the *justicia mayor* (justice), and the *sargento mayor* (sergeant). A general *cacique*, helped by the *cabildo*, headed the settlement (Freyer, 1997: 45, 92-93; Krekeler, 1993: 136-137; Radding, 2005: 168-173; Schwarz, 1994: 33).[26] In sum, the tasks of these authorities included organising of and watching over the missions, supervising work and social

[26] These were all titles that appeared in the Indian pueblos of New Spain in general. For more information the *cabildo* system, see Schwarz (1994: 33), Krekeler (1993: 136-137), or Radding (2005: 168-173).

life, recording demographic developments, fulfilling catechism and liturgical ceremonies and enforcing attendance at religious services, ceremonies and communal work through moral suasion, but also threat of physical punishments (Freyer, 1997: 45, 92-93; Krekeler, 1993: 136-137; Radding, 2005: 168-173; Schwarz, 1994: 33).[27] Jesuits also integrated the 'most powerful and knowledgeable shamans' into a ranked order that paralleled that of the civil authorities (Radding, 2005: 202, also 204).

Jesuit missionaries strengthened the leaders' authority not only by delegating special functions to them, but also through providing privileges, such as assigning them the house closest to the *plaza*, providing extra rations and gifts, permitting the wearing of special clothing during *fiestas*, seating in an elevated position in church and distinguishing them through a silver-tipped staff (Freyer, 1997: 45, 86-87; Radding, 2005: 172-173).[28] Nevertheless, as Radding reminds, the 'missionaries, shamans, and caciques were engaged in a power struggle in parallel planes of symbolic intercession and political authority' (2005: 204). As will be addressed in the following sections, *cabildos* not only functioned as 'vehicles of social control', but also 'forums of protest' and at times instigators of uprisings against ecclesiastical and imperial authorities, especially in the period after the expulsion of Jesuit priests from the missions (2005: 177).

Importantly, the work of the missionaries involved converting the 'reduced' groups to Christianity and authors point to different techniques that Jesuit priests employed for this end. For example, they interpreted catastrophes such as illnesses, droughts and contamination of water or foodstuffs as 'punishments by the Christian god', while Christianity offered the salvation (Freyer, 1997: 74; Krekeler, 1993:

[27] Punishments played a large role in religious education. Knogler notes that small offences, such as leaving out several paragraphs in the Catechism, or inappropriate behaviour of children in church, were punished with beatings. Breaking the Ten Commandments was punished by locking the perpetrators in a dungeon, beating them with sticks, or expelling them to another reduction. Other chastisements involved having to confess your sins in front of the whole community before being whipped (in Freyer, 1997: 86-87). Radding mentions that punishments took the form of whipping or 'confinement to the stocks'. She notes that 'fear and resentment of physical punishments punctuated Indians' written protests, providing a recurring theme in their acts of resistance and open rebellion' (2005: 172).

[28] Sinclair Thomson observed that colonial officials handed a staff as well as other symbols of power to 'ethnic rulers throughout their American dominion', as a sign of colonial state sovereignty as well as ethnic authority (2002: 41).

134).[29] Additionally, they used the language of prayers, music and dance as more 'theatrical' elements of religious practice, as well as the 'liturgical imagery that adorned the mission churches' (Radding, 2005: 196). They introduced processions, which involved singing hymns and carrying crosses, evoking 'both solemnity and festivity by announcing feast days thus marking the cyclical recurrence of special events in the Catholic liturgical calendar' (Radding, 2005: 226, also see Krekeler, 1993: 134).[30] Feast days proved significant, as they brought together different kinship networks and as such affirmed communal identity 'under the auspices of Catholic rituals' (Radding, 2005: 226). In addition, choral and instrumental baroque music (with European orchestral stringed and wind instruments) figured prominently in the missions. As Radding notes: 'formal choirs intoned polyphonic liturgical songs, often accompanied by instruments, which served to teach Catholic doctrine and dramatize the solemnity of religious holidays' (2005: 235).[31]

Administratively, the Chiquitos mission province was tied to the Jesuit provinces of Paraguay and Tucumán, although it was geographically close to the Moxos Missions of the tropical savannas of northern Bolivia (Radding, 2005: 62). The Jesuit Colleges of Córdoba provided manpower and some material support for the Chiquitos missions. Nevertheless, they also received a subsidy from the Spanish Crown under the terms of royal patronage that conceded broad powers over the ecclesiastical hierarchy and religious orders in the Americas, in return for monetary support for the evangelisation effort (Radding, 2001: 111).

Despite these external links, the mission settlements in the Chiquitanía were economically autonomous to a significant degree. Due to the large amount of people concentrated in one place, agriculture had to be intensified and the missionaries introduced storage methods and a system for controlling output. The missionaries

[29] Radding noted that the Jesuits attributed death due to imported illnesses to 'divine intervention against shamans who had tried to harm them' (Radding, 2005: 204). Knogler recorded that the priests themselves drew their authority form their 'capacity' to assimilate their role with that of the *cacique* and *bazübo* (Freyer, 1997: 88). Also, Métraux notes that the Jesuits managed to gain authority through assuming the role of an 'overall leader' who excelled in 'his generosity, magical knowledge, valour, and eloquence' (in Krekeler, 1993: 134).

[30] Krekeler records that through the introduction of such rituals, the Jesuits made themselves enemies of the 'shamans and medicine men' (Krekeler, 1993: 134).

[31] According to Radding, 'musicians who served in the missionary orders adapted European baroque operatic forms to compose operas, oratorios, and musical dramas based on themes drawn from biblical stories and classical mythologies' (2005: 236). These were rendered entirely or partially in native languages and the scenarios were adapted to the local natural environment (Radding, 2005: 236). Participation in the choir and access to choir lofts in churches was reserved for men (Radding, 2005: 235).

initiated cattle breeding, improved field cultivation, and introduced iron tools and looms. The groups worked the communal land for two or three days a week for up to eight hours. Produce was partly destined for the maintenance of the priests, the church, orphans, widows, the elderly or ill. Surpluses were distributed to individual families. The land of those occupied in artisanal activities or the militia was cultivated by others (Freyer, 1997: 90-91; Krekeler, 1993: 138-140; Riester, 1976: 124; Schwarz, 1994: 35).[32] In contrast to the core areas of Mesoamerica and the Andes, but comparable to other peripheral regions of Hispanic America, such as the deserts of north-eastern Mexico or the grasslands and forests of Chile and Argentina, such labour commitments substituted tribute payments in money, goods, or labour (Radding, 2005: 166).

By the eighteenth century, population levels had stabilised sufficiently to develop an economic system of commodity production, 'achieved through imposition of colonial policies and negotiated terms of exchange in the *pueblos*' (Radding, 2005: 69-70). Via trade links, the missions were connected to the mining economies of northern New Spain and the southern Andes. However, the shape trade took was conditioned by the ecological and cultural parameters of the mission frontiers, indigenous agrarian systems and technologies (Radding, 2005: 69-70). The main export items were cotton cloth and wax. Under Jesuit tutelage, women not only spun traditional cotton cloth for clothing and bedding, but produced varying sizes and qualities of *lienzos* (linen and canvas cloth) in workshops.[33] The wax Chiquitano had traditionally collected from different wild bee types also became a commodity, as it was used for lighting homes, churches and mines.

In the mission workshops Chiquitano practiced tanning, smelting, carpentry, lathe work and cabinet making, producing goods to be used in the missions

[32]In schools, children of the *caciques* learned to read and write maths and Spanish, while the others were educated in various occupations, for example, weaving or carpentry. Father Martin Schmid was one of the leading personalities in the introduction of European artisanal activities, as well as making musical instruments and playing orchestral music (Krekeler, 1993: 138).

[33] Women's cotton cloth in the form of clothes and hammocks was also used internally in the missions. According to Knogler, when entering the missions, Chiquitano were given a simple dress similar to the *tipoy* out of two pieces of cloth without sleeves or collar and openings for head and arms. For women, it reached to the floor, the men's ones over the knees. The women's robe maintained the name *tipoy* and the men's was called *camiseta* (Freyer, 1997: 64).

themselves, as well as export (see Radding, 2005: 77).[34] Items imported to the missions included cloth and textiles produced in the highlands, tools, wine, diverse utensils, ornaments and clothing for religious ceremonies, as well as diverse metal items (such as scissors, hooks, needles, etc.) (Freyer, 1997: 92; Krekeler, 1993: 138-139; Radding, 2005: 77).[35] Radding adds that the missionaries invested considerable sums to replenish the missions' cattle herds (2005: 77).

The groups' labour was 'compensated with semi-annual "gifts", or payment-in-kind that included metal tools, religious medallions, woollen and cotton cloth produced in the highlands, and rations of meat from the missions' herds' (Radding, 2001: 112). While indigenous families turned to the missions for meat and certain tools and commodities, basic needs were still met through their swidden plots, hunting, fishing, and gathering. Seasonal migration remained an important aspect of the socio-economic system of the mission and social reproduction of the groups (Freyer, 1997: 32, 91; Schwarz, 1994: 30, 35).[36] Radding notes that while this territorial mobility clashed with the colonial policy of retaining 'neophytes' in fixed settlements, the missionaries eventually reached a compromise and mission discipline adapted to the alternating seasons of hunting and cultivation with labour demands coming to include such fruits of gathering as wax (2005: 57).

Another reason for this tolerance was that the mission economic system, based on the introduction of small artificial lagoons for water supply and fishing, livestock rearing and agricultural practices, could simply not sustain the large population (see Schwarz, 1994: 31).[37] Freyer argues on similar lines. As the missions were surrounded by forests, there was not enough grazing space for large cattle herds

[34] Other items export items included 'inlaid boxes, strings of carved rosaries, canvas carrying bags, tablecloths, napkins and woven muslin produced by Chiquitano carpenters and weavers' (Radding, 2001: 112).

[35] Jesuit agents (*procuradores*) stationed in the mission district itself, as well as La Plata and Potosi, controlled the flow of goods and kept careful records of the volume and monetary value of mission sales and purchases (Radding, 2001: 112). For a more detailed description of exported and imported goods, and the workings of the system, see Radding (2005: 76-78).

[36] See Freyer (1997: 26-31) for agricultural and migration patterns and mechanisms and the agricultural calendar before and during the mission period.

[37] Schwarz argues that the new economic pattern was flawed as it concentrated a large population in one space. This meant that the amount of cattle raised led to over grazing. Additionally, the burning of fields that were now closer together and in higher concentration, meant that much smoke was produced in the dry season, which affected the health of the population. Over-fishing was probably also a problem. Schwarz notes that in Chiquitano eyes, the system must not have seemed viable over the long-term (1994: 32-33).

and foreign crops were not apt for the climate, leading to the continued cultivation of maize on the *chacos* (1997: 29, 32, 91).

In terms of the numbers of individuals 'reduced' in the missions, a census elaborated by Francisco de Palacios, auditor of the *Audiencia de Charcas*, in 1754 mentions '51 different reduced tribes with a total of 14,701 inhabitants' in all the missions (in Krekeler, 1993: 54). Freyer notes that between 1755 and 1766 the number of inhabitants in the reductions grew from 11,943 to 23,788 (1997: 15; also see Riester, 1970: 290).[38] Nevertheless, despite these numbers, in 1767 the Spanish Crown expelled the Jesuits from Latin America. Authors mention several reasons for this. Firstly, Madrid remained suspicious of the massive amount of land that the Jesuits had brought under their control. Secondly, colonial administrators feared the construction of a 'state within the state' by the Jesuits. A third concern was that the Jesuits protected the 'Indians' from *encomenderos*, who were thus deprived of a cheap labour force. Lastly, the Jesuits denied Spanish traders and visitors access to the reductions; merchants could only come to the missions for one day, denying them the possibility of uncontrolled trade (Freyer, 1997: 89; Krekeler, 1993: 86, 114-115).

Lasting Influences of the Mission System

Although the mission period lasted for only thirty years, authors agree that it had a fundamental impact on the Chiquitano groups, although opinions vary as to its nature and significance. They generally agree that the mission system sparked an ethnogenesis, leading the emergence of a shared 'identity', society or 'culture' and that 'Chiquitano' emerged as the generic term for the different groups (Freyer, 1997: 17; Krekeler, 1993: 27; Schwarz, 1994: 33-34, 36). However, as noted in Chapter II, other group names, such as Manazica, Manapeca, Paiconeca, Paunaca, Mococa, Morotoca, Zamuco, Covareca, Piñoca, and Guarañoca continued to exist for self-and group identification and it must be assumed that groups attached different meanings

[38] Freyer states that in the following year, the population sank to 19,981 due to an epidemic (1997: 15). Knogler, however, writes about 37,000 people, of which 22,000 were baptised, which was only 60 per cent of the entire population of the missions (in Freyer, 1997: 15). Radding points out that it is difficult to construct exact graphs of the fluctuation of population in the missions. Steep drops in population can generally be linked to epidemics, but also warfare (carried out as raiding and targeted homicide) and flight back to the forest by different bands (see 2005: 68-69). Freyer notes that the *padres* reacted to recurring disease with attempts to move the missions, as well as constantly looking for recruits to 'replenish' the missions in the face of high mortality rates (1997: 74).

the denominators that circulated (Radding, 2005: 124).[39] It also led to the emergence of *'chiquito'* as a shared language, which strengthened cohesion and solidarity at the interethnic level, although this did not entirely lead to the disappearance of the other languages, some of which are still spoken today (Schwarz, 1994: 34).[40]

Secondly, authors point out that the close physical relationship between different groups in the missions, led to a 'shared ritual model' which forms an important marker of Chiquitano ethnic identity today. After the Jesuits left, many groups maintained elements of the missions' religious and organisational system, including the *cabildo,* which still exerts the main religious and political functions in many Chiquitano *comunidades*. The authors coincide in noting that the observance of religious festivals and recitation of sermons 'sustain enduring traditions of cultural identity to the present day' (Radding, 2005: 232-233; also see Riester, 1976: 170-171; Schwarz, 1994: 34-36). Furthermore, the religious musical texts of operas, oratorios, and musical dramas, 'became treasured cultural artefacts of Chiquitano faith and identity', repeatedly copied and preserved (some until the present) together with sacred images for Mass and festival processions (see Radding, 2005: 236).[41]

While this might point to male dominance in cultural reproduction as 'oratorical skills of sermonising' and *cabildo* posts were reserved for men, Radding posits that 'women contributed in fundamental ways to cultural production and public life in the missions', as producers of *chicha*, which not only serves 'to enliven a good party' but also function as 'necessary ingredient for social conviviality; moreover, the rituals observed for their production and consumption offered conduits

[39] Schwarz argues that 'shared identities' emerged within each mission settlement, rather than being 'constituted at a global level of the whole of the Chiquitanos' (1994: 34-36). While a reasonable statement, this ignores that there was also a movement of groups between missions (see Radding, 2005: 68-69).

[40] There is some confusion in the literature on this matter. Riester noted that in 1983 in the zone of Concepción, some elderly people spoke paunaca, quitemoca, and yurucariquia. However, according to the CICOL and APCOB in 1984, in this sector there was only a small group of people in the *comunidad* La Embocada who spoke paunaca (in Schwarz, 1994: 34).

[41] She notes that: 'the chanted verses repeated in the sermons seem stilted and removed from the cadences of everyday spoken Chiquitos, converted into the privileged knowledge of male religious leaders. Nevertheless, their performance serves to reaffirm the bonds of community and to demonstrate the integrity of their culture to the wider Bolivian society in which the Chiquitanos are immersed' (2005: 233).

of spiritual power' (Radding, 2005: 234).[42] While missionaries sought to undermine drunkenness in the missions, *chicha* remains central to Chiquitano cultural practices and an important marker of Chiquitano modes of identification.

Additionally, for many groups the ex-missions came to form the local spiritual centre (and we may also add, state administrative centre) (Schwarz, 1994: 34-36). An indicator is that to present times the missions are the setting for certain religious rituals and performances. For example, acts undertaken by masked individuals, such as the clowns (*bufones*), or grandfathers (*abuelos*), are carried out in San Rafael, San Juan, Santiago, and San José; the *yarituses* (ostrich) perform in San Javier in the Saint Peter and Saint Paul festival (Radding, 2005: 226), or may perform at other festive occasions to express pride in Chiquitano-ness (see photos 24 and 25, below). The legacy of the mission system is also perceivable in the fact that groups who moved away to establish themselves in communities, choose 'their own patron saints and reproduced the spatial logic of the reductions at a micro level: with plaza, chapel and elongated houses' (Schwarz, 1994: 37).

What emerged and exists today as the 'Chiquitano belief system' is consequently a syncretism between Catholicism and different indigenous belief systems and shamanic ritual practices (Freyer, 1997: 94; Radding, 2005: 204; Riester, 1976: 170-171; Schwarz, 1994: 32). Radding points out that when analysing visual and textual elements like, for example, the Chiquitano *jichis*, it becomes clear that the languages of moral suasion and religious belief, as well as native traditions, were 'reworked in new combinations':

> … moral space, symbolic references, and spiritual concepts developed through both religious and secular experiences of the colonial past and recent historical periods. Demonology, sorcery and the spiritual forces of the natural world … to be feared, respected, and appeased – evolved together with Christian imagery and were adapted to Catholic doctrine (2005: 238).

[42] Radding expands, that *chicha* was (and still is) important in the context of visits from neighbouring villages, for example, in the context of patron Saint fiestas: 'caciques were expected to provide hospitality to visitors from neighbouring villages, symbolized by the *pozokas*, who would later reciprocate in kind. A good cacique served abundant food and drink, and thus needed a wife who knew how to make good *chicha*. … These social occasions at the same time proved deeply religious, linked to the Catholic liturgical calendar and to the Indians' moral universe' (2005: 234).

Photo 24: Evo Morales Being Dressed as *Yaritú*

A Chiquitana *yaritú* from San Javier dresses Evo Morales as *yaritú*. TCO Monte Verde titling ceremony, 3 July 2007, San Javier.

Photo 25: Evo Morales as *Yaritú*

With respect to a third area, the Chiquitano economic system, authors differ in opinion as to the scope of change. While Schwarz (1994: 31) concedes that transformations for nomad groups were more extensive, he coincides with Freyer (1997: 91-92) in arguing that the impact of the economic system was less drastic. Both hold that while economic self-sufficiency was 'reduced', many elements of the groups' previous systems remained intact. In turn, Radding records that the systematic trade of labour for goods introduced in the missions supplanted the barter system characterising early colonial relations (i.e. Indians seeking metal tools and *encomenderos* seeking bonded labour). She also notes that the Chiquitano relied on priests for access to colonial markets, as well as items that they had come to value, such as clothing, religious tools (2005: 84-85). Although economic relations were heavily determined by the traditional Chiquitano productive system, the Chiquitano came to identify with changes introduced during mission times (Radding, 2005: 84-85).

In terms of a gendered division of labour, Freyer posits that while labour sharing remained in place, the specialising in certain tasks (such as weaving, ironwork, woodwork, and dying leather), led to an increased labour division (1997: 32, 91). The gendered labour division was also reinforced by commodity production for Andean markets. Women's weaving and men's collecting wax additionally led to gendered differences in terms of freedom of movement: women's spinning and weaving was supervised in mission workshops, while men were free to visit the forests (Radding, 2005: 86).

Authors generally point out that although groups incorporated certain cultural practices from the Jesuit mission structure, there was a significant degree of continuity (Freyer, 1997: 88-89; Schwarz, 1994: 30). As mentioned, the mission system was based around compromises between colonial policies, Jesuit religious custom and the socio-economic practices of Chiquitano groups. The very spatial organisation of the reduction and the system of *parcialidades*, allowed continuity of the groups' *parentesco* (kinship) systems, organisational forms and practices. As Radding point out, 'nineteenth-century documents and ethnographic testimonies show persuasively that the importance of the *parcialidades* for the internal organisation of Chiquitos villages outlived the colonial order' (2005: 173). Moreover, even though by the mid-twentieth century political power and urban

property had passed over to non-Indian Bolivians and Chiquitanos had dispersed to live in *ranchos* and *comunidades*, 'contemporary Chiquitanos recall evidence … that associates residential blocks, or "sections", of their pueblos with family lineages and ethnic identity' (Radding, 2005: 174).

Another factor that contributed to the continuity of social practices was a lack of control over the population from the Jesuit side. One the one hand, groups left the missions to continue established hunting, fishing and gathering cycles (Schwarz, 1994: 31-33). On the other hand, the missions were isolated, with one priest being frequently absent, leaving the other to administer up to 4,000 people (Freyer, 1997: 95). Authors point out that away from the control of the Jesuits, the shamans (*cheserúrr* or *bazübos*) continued their practices (Freyer, 1997: 28; Schwarz, 1994: 31-33), which again strengthened cultural reproduction. Shamans, as 'media for spiritual powers that can bring healing, prophetic knowledge, endurance and triumph in the face of hardship, or, conversely, illness defeat, and death', served as 'guardians of cultural traditions and protectors against foreign invasions or alien spirits' (Radding, 2005: 198).[43] Authors also record that presence in the forest and absence of priests, led to a perpetuation of group leadership systems based on prestige though hunting success (Freyer, 1997: 28; Schwarz, 1994: 31-33).

Nevertheless, with regard to this latter point, there is some discrepancy among authors as to the effect of the mission system on Chiquitano leadership structures. Krekeler points out that the installation of *caciques* as *cabildo* leaders contributed to the formation of a more hierarchical leadership structure than was prevalent before life in the missions. Prestige and power was less 'gained' from peers, than 'granted' to *caciques* through the Jesuits (1993: 167). Radding concurs that this hierarchical structure was reinforced because *cabildo* members benefited to a higher degree than others from the mission economy. They were favoured not only through privileged living space but also in the distribution of goods (2005: 78). Several authors maintain, however, that this formalisation and the ban on polygamy, led to an overall weakening of *cacique* authority in the eyes of their peers (Freyer, 1997: 86-87, 92-93; Krekeler, 1993: 137; Riester, 1976: 124). In turn, Radding states

[43] As Radding points out, shamans had: 'the capacity to transport themselves spiritually into the natural domain of forests and deserts and the return to their communities, to the realm of human culture. … Shamanic knowledge established cultural norms for regulating hunting, fishing, gathering, sowing, and harvesting' (2005: 198-199).

that the ‘authority vested in the *cabildo* overlapped with native criteria of association and leadership based on kinship networks, ethnic alliances’ (2005: 173). Offices of internal governance ‘merged Iberian precepts of public order with indigenous practices of leadership, reciprocity, and redress’, as missionaries, and later colonial officials, had to negotiate ‘the boundaries of imperial dominion’, far from the centres of vice-regal power (Radding, 2005: 164). Through this system, *caciques* reasserted their own authority over the separate bands and they were installed as intermediaries between their kinfolk and church and civil authorities inside the missions (Radding, 2005: 171, 173).

Even so, the system introduced had a long-lasting legacy. As noted, *cabildo* structures exist to the present day and have responsibility for maintaining religious life in the *comunidades*, resolving disputes, organising *mingas* (communal work efforts) and defending ‘what remains of their land, water and forest resources’ (Radding, 2005: 174, see Chapter VII). It should be added, the leadership system thus instituted was gendered masculine (Radding, 2005: 195), a situation that also largely persists today, although the Chiquitano federations are working to change this.

To conclude this section, authors point to the extent to which Chiquitano groups appropriated and shaped the system to their own ends. Schwarz notes that the period is perceived positively in the long term collective memory, ‘a sentiment that is reproduced through the music, the logic of the fiestas, the persistence of spatial structures and other cultural elements’ (1994: 36). Radding concludes that ‘the colonial regime endured with remarkable stability, notwithstanding repeated episodes of local rebellion, because indigenous peoples became stakeholders in its judicial and cultural institutions and, no less significant, forced compromises in the political and territorial ambitions of the imperial project’ (2005: 166).

The Post-Jesuit Period

After the Jesuits were expelled, a formal civil government was instituted in the Chiquitanía and the mission towns were entrusted to secular priests and lay administrators. The province was converted into a civil governorship, separate from the administrative centre of Santa Cruz and the missions were placed under the

diocesan authority of the Bishop of Santa Cruz (Radding, 2001: 111-113, 2005: 58). Still, as Cynthia Radding comments: 'the Chiquitano missions continued to function under the corporate structures that the Jesuits had established' while 'the political and economic life of these *reducciones* was increasingly dominated by the conflicting policies that emanated from the ecclesiastical and civil authorities of the province' (2001: 111).

Contradictory demands emanated from the Bourbon administration and accompanying policies as implemented after 1768. Through the reforms, the Crown intended to implement economic and political changes aimed at modernising and stimulating manufacturing and technology in Spain as well as the colonies. The Audiencia of Charcas applied Bourbon policies to the Missions by charging the Governor of Chiquitos, as well as secular mission priests and administrators, with maintaining commercial circuits linking the province to the highlands, in order to guarantee 'the subsistence of the *reducciones* and to enhance their production while minimising the maintenance expenditures administered through the *Junta de Temporalidades*' (Radding, 2005: 78).

Export products continued to be wax, cloth and carved wooden rosaries. Efforts were made to make some aspects of production more commercially competitive.[44] Already in the latter mission years, the value of wax had increased and the value of the exported goods grown in comparison to those imported. Despite this, expenditures of the missions were generally higher than incomes. Mission ledgers show that from 1768, mission costs did not only include commodities imported into the mission, but also 'clerical stipends and local salaries, and administrative costs that extended beyond the region, including the governor's salary and merchant commissions' (Radding, 2005: 79). Radding shows that these salaries led to the expansion of mission costs, as 'the additional burden of administrative salaries

[44] Colonial officials took steps to enhance the variety and quality (and output) of lowland weaving especially during the late colonial period, as muslin declined in market value, most likely due to textile production in highland non-guild workshops and a clandestine import of British textiles (see Radding, 2005: 242-245). However, the introduction of mechanised workshops, together with demand for an increase of production and quality, met opposition as the spinners' and weavers' immediate rewards did not increase accordingly. Radding notes that 'in the absence of powerful incentives, on the one hand, or, on the other, means of coercion, Chiquitano women and men would have resisted mechanised production as alien to the bases of their gathering and weaving skills that, in turn, were closely linked to their gardens and the forest' (2005: 244-245).

during the post-Jesuit years surpassed the missions' capacity to generate surpluses by over 100%' (2001: 113).[45]

However, successive governors denounced priests to the *Audiencia*, claiming that they were plundering the missions' warehouses to clandestinely sell their goods. They also criticised that the distribution of goods in the missions had taken on the character of commerce. In turn, priests responded that they resorted to such means to contribute to their incomes, as their stipends were irregularly paid and often inadequate.[46] Whatever the reasoning, Radding notes that priests and administrators 'came from the same small circle of landowners and merchants based in Santa Cruz; through the collection of stipends and the exchange of mission products for trade goods, these families generated commercial wealth from the productive resources of the *pueblos*' (2005: 80). In short, while secular priests and administrators maintained the corporate mission economy, they took control over productive assets, appropriated goods and de facto exploited the Chiquitano workforce. Together with the emerging Cruceño elite, they engaged in trade and contraband, while siphoning off surplus production and wealth (see Radding, 2001: 81, 111-113; Radding, 2005: 85-86; Schwarz, 1994: 37). Lacroix highlights how the new governors 'turned into tyrants and appropriated individually the collective lands of the church', producing 'a general disorder' (2005: 20).[47] Not surprisingly, Lacroix (2005) and Tonelli Jusiticiano (2004) refer to this period as the '*decadencia*' ('decay' or 'deterioration').

The mission economies started to wither under the new regime, something the Chiquitano were aware of from its early phases. While they perceived the Jesuit period as 'good years of plenty', Chiquitano *cabildos* denounced mistreatment (including excessive corporal punishment and labour demands), privateering with mission property, neglect of religious care, aspects that they saw as infringing on their 'fundamental rights' (Radding, 2005: 82-83). Complaints, petitions, brief turmoil and rebellions also focused on the scarcity of tradable commodities, the

[45] She points to other costs, as from the 1790s, 'the missions were expected to support salaries assigned to the small detachment of soldiers stationed in the eastern frontier with Mato Grosso' (2005: 79).

[46] Priests claimed that they were not regularly receiving their stipends and in some cases payments were in array for years. Priests had to personally collect stipends in Santa Cruz or send authorised representatives, who for their service would charge part of the stipend (Radding, 2005: 80).

[47] According to Lacroix, the 'disorder' was so great that the first governor of Chiquitos asked to be released of his functions after only three months. In 1768, the bishop of Santa Cruz admitted his failure to establish order in the zone. Reinaldo Brumberger, a Catholic priest, observed that this 'constituted the beginning of slavery in the region' (2005: 20).

spoilage of other goods, priests' and administrators' illicit sexual unions with indigenous women and 'general misconduct and stinginess' (Radding, 2001: 114-118, 2005: 75).[48] Radding concludes that the mission-as-enterprise system as promoted through the Bourbon administration, 'contradicted the ecological and cultural foundations of the native communities. … the pecuniary demands for the market exchange overtook the bases of indigenous economies' (2005: 84).

Notably, to launch their complaints against civil governors and priests, Chiquitano authorities and officials turned to the defence of the missions' religious institutions and socio-economic system and took up the role of 'spokespersons and guardians of the communal property that they had understood to be the product of the labour of their people' (Radding, 2005: 86). Radding described that to legitimise their complaints and resistance, subalterns employed the 'language of religious convocation', which they endowed with their own meanings. They used it sometimes together with 'allusions to divine and earthly majesties that ruled the Spanish empire', to address colonial authorities in oral and written form (Radding, 2005: 232, also 156).[49] For example, in 1779, Manapecas of Concepción revolted against their priest as he violently flogged one of their kinsmen and allegedly kept a mistress in his quarters, 'violating the sanctity of the *colegio*'. The revolting Manapecas carried musical instruments and employed religious images and language in their 'inflammatory speeches', accusing the priest of 'immoral behaviour' (Radding, 2005: 236-237).[50] Reasons for complaint consequently mirror those recorded as triggers for rebellions and major uprisings throughout the Colonial period in the highlands (such as, the Great Rebellion of 1780). Still, protests and revolts were generally local,

[48] For accounts of specific cases of complaints leading to petitions or open defiance, see Radding (2005: 74, 79-83, 188-192). Lacroix points out that in a few cases protests against the 'new owners', provoked uprisings in the last decade of the eighteenth century. He reports that in San Ignacio, all the administrators were massacred (the priest was saved as the Chiquitano had 'respect for the Church') (2005: 21).

[49] For further examples, see Radding (2005: 232-233).

[50] The work of various authors has shown that not only religious language, but also the colonial policy of legal political separation, created a legal-discursive medium through which Indians could negotiate or protest colonial policy or local transgression. For example, by challenging land takeovers or inappropriate labour demands from Creole landowners (Langer, 2000; Larson, 2004; Postero, 2007: 29; Stern, 1987).

short-lived and aimed at temporary relieving tax or removing corrupt officials, never threatening government as such (see Klein, 1992: 75-79).[51]

In terms of landholding patterns, in the eighteenth century the Chiquitanía was characterised by the corporately held land of the Chiquitano *pueblos*, as well as private *estancias*, 'which overlapped in unevenly defined territorial spaces until after the mid-nineteenth century' (Radding, 2005: 114). With the arrival of the new mission administrators, other *criollo* (American-born people of European ancestry) and *mestizo* (mixed blood) Cruceños began to move into the missions. Authors also refer to them as '*vecinos'* (neighbours). In some cases they appropriated mission land and cattle, as well as central housing, displacing Chiquitano families or forcing them to abandon the *pueblo* altogether to escape *vecino* 'abuses' (see Lacroix, 2005: 21; Riester, 1976: 125, 141; Schwarz, 1994: 21, 37).

However, in contrast to the highlands, where 'Bourbon policies aimed to convert Indian commoners into individual labourers and petty commodity producers', the lowlands were more sparsely populated, including by Hispanic settlers, which reduced land pressures (Radding, 2005: 115). Consequently, as addressed below, the Chiquitanía was not directly under dispute until the 1850s. In turn, Cruceños 'sought enrichment and the accumulation of assets through livestock and the commercialisation of Indians' labour', which meant that they focused on appropriating the missions' commercial circuits before seizing resources, chiefly land, water and livestock (Radding, 2005: 115). When French naturalist Alcides d'Orbigny toured the Chiquitanía in 1830-1831, he found the missions largely 'intact', in that they counted among their assets cattle ranches (*estancias*), workshops

[51] Klein explains that rebellions most often took place among free communities due to abusive taxation by a local *corregidor*, conflicts over land with non-Indians, or local interference in the appointment of local *kurakas* by Spaniards (Klein, 1992: 74-75). He adds that the famous Túpac Amaru Rebellion of 1780-82, was a fundamental departure from this pattern. Firstly, it was large – encompassing over 100,000 rebel troops and covering an area from southern Peru in the Cuzco area through Upper Peru into the highlands of northern Argentina. Secondly, it was a well-coordinated multi-class and multi-caste mobilisation. Thirdly, it aimed to establish an 'autonomous region under the control of local classes to the exclusion of all Spaniards' (Klein, 1992: 75). The rebellion ended at the end of 1781, when it had been crushed in most areas and cities (see Klein, 1992: 75-77). See also Sinclair Thomson (2002) for a detailed analysis of this episode.

and a viable population, which had maintained its former level (see Radding, 2005: 106).[52]

Independence and the Rise of the Republic

Even though thousands of 'Indians', among them Chiquitanos, died in the independence war, rules for the new political system were dictated by Spanish and *mestizo* elites.[53] While authors note that Bolivian Independence in 1825 brought changes in economical patters, definitions of personhood and citizenship, legal and customary relations, they also argue that these have to be understood in relation to colonial foundations (Klein, 1992: 101; Radding, 2005: 240; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1990).

The philosophical and juridical principals that underlay the constitutions of 1826 and 1834, as well as the civil and penal codes promulgated by Andrés de Santa Cruz in 1830-1832, stemmed from enlightenment principles. These professed 'the equality of persons and the secularisation of culture' and suggested an apparent departure from the dual structure of *república de indios* and *república de españoles* (Radding, 2005: 268).[54] Radding summarises the faculties ascribed to 'citizens' and 'Bolivians':

> The category of Bolivians comprehended all those born within the territory of Bolivia and was extended to the children of Bolivian parents born outside the

[52] It should be added, however, that while most missions maintained their population and even grown slightly, a census featuring the population of the ten missions cited by Tonelli Jusiticiano (2004: 119), demonstrates, that some had already suffered a substantial population drop between 1805 and 1852. For example, San Rafael (2,729 to 900), Santa Ana (1,684 to 927), San Juan Bautista (1,584 to 707) and Santo Corazón (1,263 to 789). He explains this as being due to economic crisis and illnesses (2004: 118). Freyer observes that at the end of the eighteenth century, the population density of Chiquitano groups in general had declined following the activities of Brazilian slave hunters and illnesses that they carried. She estimates that generally groups were a fifth of their former size (1997: 39-40).

[53] Chiquitanos were caught between the fronts of the independence war and were divided between royalists and patriots. While republicans defended the 'liberation of the indigenous', they were also guilty of acts of massive repression. One example is the massacre of Santa Barbara in 1815. Ignacio Warnes, a republican from Santa Cruz, pointed to the manipulation of the Chiquitanos by the royalists after he had 'liberated' the mission settlement San Rafael. As a consequence, 'he ordered the burning of thousands of Chiquitanos because of their support for the royalists' in Santa Barbara (Lacroix, 2005: 22). Chiquitanos remember the story in different ways, and it has been retold by different authors. For a longer version of this event, as well as Chiquitano involvement in border conflicts in the 1820s, see Radding (2005: 282-284). For details on independence movements and struggles in Upper Peru, see Klein (1992: 89-98).

[54] These values 'were conveyed to the colonies through the Spanish Cortes of 1812 and the Constitution of Cádiz, a document created in the midst of the Iberian dynastic crisis that followed the Napoleonic invasions of Spain and Portugal' (Radding, 2005: 241).

> country, but who stated legally their desire to live in Bolivia; foreigners who obtained a letter of naturalisation or who established three years of residency (*vecindad*) in Bolivia; veterans of insurgent troops in the battles of Junín and Ayacucho; and, finally, slaves who, by the constitution of 1826, were declared free. Citizens designated those Bolivians who were married heads of household or persons over twenty-one years of age (legal adults), knew how to read and write, and had employment or independent means of livelihood without being in the service or pay off another. … Only citizens in full exercise of their rights (*ciudadanos en ejercicio*) could vote or be elected to public office (2005: 280).

As in other independent states that came into being in Latin America, liberal thinkers reasoned that such a citizenship regime was the road to 'progress'. The extension of civil liberties to indigenous people might lead to the abolition of 'archaic' indigenous communal institutions and allow for the conversion of indigenous individuals 'into a prosperous class of small landholders and artisans through schooling and access to the market' (de la Peña, 2005: 720). They saw the creation of the 'new Bolivian citizen' as linked to:

> the formation of the register of land-holdings (*Catastro*), and the administration of justice by white local Judges (*Jueces de Letras* and *de Paz*). As a corollary, the traditional tribute paid by the indians should be abolished and replaced with a new property-tax based on the annual income which could be expected from each holding (*predial rústico)* (Platt, 1984: 5-6).

Platt notes that this massive reform programme must be considered 'as a crucial instrument of 19th century nation-building (or, as it would be phrased today, of "National Integration")' (1984: 6). 'Freeing' the individual from the 'arbitrariness' of local authorities, for instance in the area of taxation, the 'nation' itself was to become to reference point for the property-owners registered in the *catastro* (Platt, 1984: 6).

As early as 1825, Bolívar decreed the privatisation of community land, along with the elimination of traditional communal authorities and obligations. In Bolivia, legislation in the *Decreto del Melgarejo* of 1866 and the *Ley de Desvinculación* (Disentailment Law) of 1874 confirmed these measures.[55] Nevertheless, the narrow definition of citizenship implied that it, together with formal political participation,

[55] General Mariano Malgarejo decreed the law of 20 March 1866, 'which declared proprietors of full rights all the indigenous that owned land of the state in the exchange for the payment of a low sum between 25 and 100 pesos. The indigenous had from then on 60 days to pay the first sum under the threat of confiscation. In 1868, Malgarejo decreed a complementary law according to which the lands of the communities owned by the indigenous "race" were property of the state and in consequence ordered them to be publicly sold to cover the internal debt and resolve the necessities of the national service' (Lacroix, 2005: 23). Of course, indigenous peoples generally lacked the money to purchase land, losing it to large landholders, forcing Indians to become *colonos* (Postero, 2007: 33). Also see Klein (1992: 135-141).

excluded the majority of (indigenous) Bolivians, i.e. women, non-property owners, those not literate in Spanish or with an independent status as artisans, professionals or merchants (de la Peña, 2005: 720, 723; Langer, 2000: 246, 263; Radding, 2005: 280-282). To compound matters, under the colonial system, Indians 'held a special, if subordinated status', which was subsequently removed along with obligations (such as the forced labour system *mita* and tribute payments) and specific protections, such as 'Indians legal standing in the corporate ownership of land and … access to colonial courts (at reduced costs) through the protector of Indians' (Radding, 2005: 281). Radding notes that this 'undermined the ancestral customs and cultural integrity of indigenous communities and threatened to dissolve their corporate patrimony' (2005: 281).[56]

In the long run, all over Bolivia the legislation resulted in an expansion of *haciendas* or *estancias* at the expense of indigenous communities (see Albó, 1987: 380-382; de la Peña, 2005: 720-723; Klein, 1992: 152-253; Lacroix, 2005: 23; Langer, 2000: 245; Radding, 2005: 281; Schwarz, 1994: 38). While the import of this legislation was most felt in the highlands, in the Chiquitanía fundamental transformations were underway. The regime change led to an expansion of role of the state bureaucracy in the province and its economy, and triggered processes which would lead to the dispossession of communal lands and livestock, which passed into the hands of Cruceño *estancieros* (Lacroix, 2005: 22-23; Radding, 2005: 106, 281; Schwarz, 1994: 39).

Nevertheless, the republican administration largely maintained the colonial mission economic structures for over fifty years after independence. The legacy of the mission economy supported in large measured the economy of Chiquitos province and the entire Santa Cruz Prefecture (Radding, 2005: 245, 279). The economy continued to be based primarily on 'bartering and trading goods for goods', with the commodities produced in the missions circulating as currency (Radding,

[56] Yet, in Bolivia, as in other Latin American countries, governments did not effectively abolish the Indian tribute system for several decades after independence, renaming the tax 'indigenous contribution', giving ongoing legitimacy to community governments and their land titles (Kicza, 2000b: xxiv; Klein, 1992: 106). This was because the independence wars triggered a crisis in the highland mining sector, stagnant international trade and temporarily weakened the *hacendado* class. Revenues from tributes presented an important income for the state, at the time accounting for around 60 per cent of government income. Land tenure legislation did not change until the 1860s and 1870s, when the contribution declined in importance and criollo 'capitalist demands for land, labour and raw materials pushed liberal reforms back onto the … agenda' (Postero, 2007: 32, also Klein, 1992: 105-107, Platt, 1984: 8).

2005: 247).[57] Furthermore, in this period, salt became an important commodity, especially in the eastern and southern *pueblos* of San Juan, Santiago and San José (see Radding, 2005: 245). While lowland indigenous peoples did not pay their semi-annual tribute payments like the Bolivian highland peoples, and therefore lacked special protection of their communal possessions, they supported the local economy through obligatory public service. This involved three days per week carrying out tasks such as maintaining churches, cutting roads through the forest and driving mule trains that delivered post or goods between the missions and Santa Cruz (Radding, 2005: 110-111, 248-249).

In the Chiquitanía, the national government's plan was to introduce a citizenship regime linked to the notion of private ownership of livestock. In 1833, it began distributing three head of cattle to each household, with the promise of more to be distributed if the initiative prospered. This, however, failed in the sense that the Chiquitanos 'never took that livestock as their property'; cattle came 'under non-Indian management, and the herds grew or diminished according to the individuals in charge of the livestock sections assigned to each *parcialidad*' (Radding, 2005: 112).

The population of the Chiquitos province suffered further when the region was affected by severe droughts in the 1820s and mid-1840s. These ecological crisis had 'repercussions for the artisanal and agricultural output of the pueblos and their subsistence' (Radding, 2005: 106, see also 251). Drought led to hunger and illness, loss in mission population and livestock, as well as weakening the structures of communal authority (see Freyer, 1997: 39-40; Radding, 2005: 107).[58] The records for the period show skewed demographic profiles for the missions, pointing to high morbidity and mortality, population movements from one mission to the other, and flight to the forest to search for subsistence (Radding, 2005: 252).

In the 1840s, the national government started paying increased attention to the eastern lowlands. President José Baliván (1841-47) attempted to bring Santa Cruz department (then including the provinces of Moxos, Chiquitos, Valle Grande and

[57] For more details on the mission economies at this time, see Radding (2005: 247-253).

[58] In term of illnesses, Radding mentions that in the 1820s, the mission populations of San Javier suffered losses due to chicken pox and the fires. In the 1830s Concepción suffered an epidemic (2005: 251). During the following decade, hunger and illness were so widespread through the missions, that Governor Marcelino de la Peña shifted resources to the most affected villages, imported livestock from Moxos province and traded mission cattle for maize to the Brazilian settlement of Casalbanco, which he could distribute among the affected population (Radding, 2005: 106-107).

Cordillera) 'under national sovereignty'. For this purpose, he encouraged projects for colonisation and road building, establishing military outposts and religious missions to 'control nomadic tribes of *salvajes*' (*savages*), and promote the regions commercial development through cacao plantations and gathering of quinine bark (Radding, 2005: 300).[59] Settlers were also accorded the right to extract labour power from the indigenous peoples living within the boundaries of the granted area, directly challenging the corporate structure of the Chiquitos mission settlements (Radding, 2005: 309). When Cruceños moved close to missions and boundary disputes ensued, mission land regularly passed to Cruceños, especially as Chiquitanos and priests often lacked legal titles and exact boundaries (Radding, 2005: 108-109).[60]

In 1852, voices grew loud in among the governors of Santa Cruz to convert the 'open lands', customarily held by the mission pueblos, into 'rental properties'. Arguments included that this would increase productivity of these underused lands, which were abused by priests who planted them for their own benefits, or lent them to *vecinos*. Rental would provide an income which could be partly dedicated to the upkeep of the cathedral of Santa Cruz and other parish churches (Radding, 2005: 108-109). Defence came from local priests (some of who defended their own positions as administrators in the missions), claiming that the Indians should be considered the 'rightful owners' of mission land as they had used it for subsistence cultivation and livestock 'since time immemorial' (see Radding, 2005: 108). Critics warned that if lands were put up for rent, Indians might move away from the missions. Agriculture in the Chiquitanía, contrary to the highlands, did neither benefit from irrigation nor the plough, and the worry was that without Chiquitano communal labour, the agricultural system would fall apart, among with the system of obligatory public works and services (Radding, 2005: 110-111).

Despite warnings, by autumn 1852, the prefect put his plan to lease the cattle into effect. Nearly 8,000 head of cattle from San Javier, Concepción, San Miguel, San Ignacio and San José were auctioned off to six bidders for a period of six years. In return for letting livestock graze on their *estancias* and their labour input, Indians were to receive cattle on feast days and tools, notably, to be bought with the proceeds

[59] It was also part of this drive, that in 1842, Baliván established the department of Beni by presidential decree, separating the Moxos province from Santa Cruz department. In an attempt to enhance colonisation and settlement in the new department, he 'extended full political rights of citizenship' to the Moxos Indian communities (Radding, 2005: 299-300).
[60] For examples of Cruceño land claims, see Radding (2005: 108-109).

of the livestock rental. Disregarding this, the proceeds of the rental were diverted to coffers in Santa Cruz, leading to verbal warnings and threatened uprisings from the Chiquitano side (Radding, 2005: 112). The state-sponsored auctioning of mission livestock effectively transferred the collective assets into private hands. This led to depleted mission herds and disrupted 'long-standing methods of remuneration and the reciprocal exchange of meat for measured labour output that had supported the moral economy of mission life' (Radding, 2005: 113).

Another change in this period concerned the sparse, but increasing presence of Spanish *vecinos* in the settlements and the spread of private property around the missions. These developments opened up important 'pathways of economic interdependency and cultural exchange' and more regularly travelled routes (Radding, 2005: 288). The social networks they fostered, for example, through the appointment of members of the Cruceño Creole families as mission lay administrators, had a visible and lasting impact on the region's socio-economic system.[61] Much like in the rest of Bolivia and Latin America, merchants and landholding families sought to maintain the formally abolished colonial system based in discourse around race and the distinction between *'vecino'* and *'naturales'*. Instead, the distinction that emerged was that between *'ciudadanos'* (citizens) and *'barabaros'* or *'salvajes* '(barbarians) (Postero, 2007: 35; Radding, 2005: 279; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987: 2). This served to legitimate and secure Cruceño control over public offices (and Indian labour force) (Radding, 2005: 268).[62]

According to the new constitution, the public administration was supposed to function in the following way: 'the prefecture of Santa Cruz became a department, Chiquitos remained a province, and the ten pueblos were designated cantons' (Radding, 2005: 285). The primary site of local governance became municipal corporations *(ayuntamientos)* and electoral assemblies. While Radding reports that records from the first decade of republican rule indicate that Indians and Creoles alike participated in an indirect mode of suffrage, where indigenous *cabildos* and

[61] Radding points out that 'the bonds *(fianzas)* that curates and administrators were required to present to the prefect of Santa Cruz in order to secure their appointments provide clear evidence of the kinship networks that hovered around the Chiquitos pueblos' (2005: 289).

[62] Regarding debates around Creole visions of republican citizenship, see, for example, Pablo Regalsky (2003). Indicative of the strong socio-political cleavages on race-lines is also that while mestizaje was recorded in the mid-nineteenth century, as Indians moved between pueblos and provincial capital to fulfil labour demands and as Cruceños in the pueblos, local officials recorded this 'in terms of social and racial distance, rather than *mestizaje*' (Radding, 2005: 292, also: 290-292).

representatives from each canton chose the electors for the province of Chiquitos, from 1839, 'Indigenous voices from the cantons are no longer heard … overtaken by the preferential civic role of the Creole citizen' (2005: 287).[63] Whereas the new republican order aspired to create of a body of equal citizens, hierarchies along ethnic and family lines remained entrenched, as did 'personal relations of clientelism and servitude … as indelible markers of prestige and governance' (Radding, 2005: 181-282).

While Creole elites were often divided among themselves and locked in 'disputes over power, the popular classes of indigenous *comuneros* (commoners) and mixed-race workers and peasants fought to exercise the rights of citizenship on local issues and joined shifting political alliances with different caudillos and political parties' (Radding, 2005: 282). Such practices show up the relations of mutual dependency, as well as the contested meanings of political practices, through which Chiquitano negotiated their relationship with state actors. As pointed out in the previous and following chapters, entrenched racial hierarchies, clientelism and localised citizenship practices could be discerned prominently in the Chiquitanía into the 1970s, while they still influence the socio-political system today.

Another thread of continuity that spans from the mission polity to today's Chiquitano community governance structures, is that Chiquitano traditions of local governance and political practices remained deeply anchored in the *cabildo* (Radding, 2005: 288). As elsewhere in Bolivia, the formal abolition of the communities' legal status did not lead to a disappearance of communal institutions and authorities (de la Peña, 2005: 722-733; Langer, 2000: 245).[64] Moreover, like in the Colonial period, Chiquitano groups developed a language to address

[63] Radding notes that records from the years 1826 and 1837 show that: 'electors chosen from the cantons included Chiquitano men [probably *cabildo* officers], but the electors chosen for the province invariably were Creoles, most often the priests who served in the pueblos. Each assembly required all participants to present their credentials and the appointment of a president, secretary, and examiners (*escrutadores*) to certify the electoral process' see (Radding, 2005: 286, see page 286-287 for more details).

[64] The extent of this, of course differed from region to region. While Chuquisaca communities were weakened to a greater extent and fell under white landlord control, in northern Potosí hacienda expansion and townspeople land acquisition was slighter, causing less disruption to communities. In the southern Bolivian highlands, communal authorities were more successful in resisting land measurement and acquisition by outsiders, as the decline in the southern region's main economic pillar – silver mining – weakened southern landlords, impeding their usurpation of communal lands (see Langer, 2000: 245).

ecclesiastical and secular authorities around their system of 'catholic ritual, labour discipline, and internal governance centred in the *cabildo*' (Radding, 2005: 279-280).

While some Chiquitano reacted to the influx of Cruceño *vecinos* and increasing labour demands by moving away from the missions (Schwarz, 1994: 37), returning to the forest was no longer a long term option Radding notes that 'stockbreeding, agriculture, mining, and road building' had not only 'changed the physical environments', but also altered the 'range of cultural alternatives for the indigenous communities' (2005: 293).[65] On the one hand, commodity exchange and livestock played roles in 'their internal economy and in their traffic with the Cruceños' (2005: 293). Chiquitano economic activities continued to support Santa Cruz commercials circuits and public finances (2005: 288). On the other, settlers continued to move into the provinces and penetrated ever more remote regions, with the aim of amplifying their economic activities and secure access to indigenous labour (Lacroix, 2005: 21; Riester, 1976: 125; Schwarz, 1994: 38). As noted, although Cruceños gained increasing control over the former missions, they continued to form the social and religious regional centres for the Chiquitano groups, visibly, as they continued to occupy the space of the ex-reductions symbolically or physically during Catholic *fiestas* (Schwarz, 1994: 38-39).

The above-mentioned developments explain the outbreak of uprisings, as well as other acts of protest, to defend communal lands and circumvent the destruction of indigenous livelihoods in the Bolivian highlands and some lowland areas, as well as several other Latin American countries (many ending in massacres carried out by armies at the service of the landowning oligarchy) (Albó, 1987: 80-82;

[65] In term of physical changes, Radding point out that these developments also 'set in motion ecological processes counter to the seasonal rhythms of chaco cultivation, fallow, and forest recovery' (2005: 302). The large clearings, intense cultivation and road building let to 'physical changes in soils, vegetation, and the morphology of lagoons and streams' (2005: 302).

Langer, 2000).[66] Authors note that these were moments that led to the emergence of a new collective identity or an 'oppositional indigenous identity', which would become important in the developing social movements formed on ethnic lines in the subsequent century (see Albó, 1987: 380-382; de la Peña, 2005: 721-722; Larson, 2004: 228; Platt, 1984: 15; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Stern, 1987). However, while uprisings are registered in the Chiquitanía region in the late 1700s, along with some minor instances of protests in the republican period, in contrast to the Bolivian highlands and Chaco region, no major uprising are registered to have happened in the Chiquitanía. Radding suggests that land tenure disputes did not often erupt in Chiquitos, because the attention of provincial governors, *vecinos*, *pueblo* administrators and *cabildo* officers was absorbed in defining the terms of debate around corporate mission economy, as this assumed 'fiscal and social importance for Indians and Creoles [alike] until the last third the nineteenth century' (2005: 293).

The Rubber Boom, Chaco War and the Santa Cruz – Corumbá Railway

The Rubber Boom and Forced Labour

Chiquitano peoples were severely affected by three further events: the rubber boom from the late 1870s, the Chaco War (1933-36) and the construction of the Santa Cruz-Corumbá railway (1945-1955). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, which in the highlands saw 'the ages of silver and tin' (1880-1932), in the lowlands growing demand from European markets and the United States led to a 'rubber boom' which resulted in a more intense occupation of the Amazon.[67] Between 1879 and 1885, the first foreign (mainly English and German) and Cruceño companies

[66] Platt states, that after all, what was at stake were the 'entire social and cultural orders' of regional societies (see 1984: 12). Platt shows that Indian communities in Northern Potosí, demanded the continuation of the 'tributary pact', seeking 'tributary citizenship': 'as "citizens" they could demand enlightenment, education and individual legal protection from the state and its judiciary, while as "tributaries" they could demand state recognition of their colonial titles to the ethnic territories (*repartimientos*)' (1993: 161). However, communities also turned to more offensive action. As Kicza notes, 'encountering politically divided elites, failing national economies, and ineffective governments, many Indian communities undertook to take lands away from nearby haciendas' (2000b: xxxiv). One Bolivian example of indigenous communities' desperate defence of their lands was the last Guaraní uprising of January 1892. The insurgents were defeated by the military, leaving an estimate of six to nine hundred dead and eight hundred wounded, most of who died later (Postero, 2007: 24, also see Pifarré, 1989: 385).

[67] This is to borrow the heading of Kleins' (1992: 149-187) chapter, which addresses this period for the case of the Bolivian highlands.

entered primarily the Beni, but also the north of Santa Cruz department and the Chapare region to exploit rubber (Lacroix, 2005: 23; Lema, 2006a: 63).

This also led to the *enganchamiento* ('hooking') of indigenous workers, who were recruited as rubber tappers from outside the region (Pacheco Balanza and Ávila, 2001: 56). Between 1880 and 1945, thousands of Chiquitanos were forcefully taken to the rubber areas from San Ignacio de Velasco in Velasco province and Concepción in Ñuflo de Chávez province (Riester, 1976: 126; Schwarz, 1994: 40). Chiquitanos were forced to work in the rubber zones by patrons, whether by direct enlistment or to pay off debts, but nearly always under intimidation (Riester, 1976: 126).[68] Authors describe that the rubber patrons controlled a network of *barrancas* (barracks). They also enforced a system of *habilito*, which forbade the practice of joint agriculture, while the patron supplied and rationed all foodstuffs and basic consumer goods, for which they arbitrarily fixed prices. This left the labourers permanently indebted. Patrons also ruled over labourers families in terms of the duration of their stay and general freedom of movement (Pacheco Balanza and Ávila, 2001: 56; Riester, 1976: 134).

Conditions in the rubber areas were similar to those described for other zones of rubber exploitation in the Amazon region, with the patrons maintaining a system of 'terror' (torture and physical punishments, killings and rape) to establish their hegemony – as has been described by Taussig (1987) for the Peruvian case. Authors point to poor working conditions, and low life expectancy in the rubber zones. This was no higher than two years, according to Riester, or three to five years according to Schwarz (Riester, 1976: 125-126; Schwarz, 1994: 40). Stories from survivors point to thousands of deaths due to lack of food, over exploitation and disease (especially malaria and beriberi). Flight was difficult, as rubber tappers stayed in the forest for an average of seven months while their families remained in the main barracks and worked for the patron (Riester, 1976: 126). Riester adds that those who did managed to flee were fiercely persecuted and often entire families would be 'eliminated through bullets' (Riester, 1976: 135-136).

[68] Few studies exist regarding the influence of the rubber boom on the Santa Cruz socio-economic structure or on indigenous communities. Accounts address social conditions only briefly, focusing on the labour system in the rubber areas, or details of rubber barons and their links to the international rubber trade. For examples, see Ximena Soruco's analysis of the international rubber trade (2008: 14-38). Exceptions are the more detailed studies by Fifer (1972) and, more recently, Roca (2001), who study the Bolivian rubber boom in more depth.

In cases where flight was successful, survivors retreated to zones that were hard to reach and far away from the former reductions, leading to the emergence of new communities along the River of Zapocó Norte in the sector of San Antonio de Lomerío (Riester, 1976: 135-136; Schwarz, 1994: 40).[69] Chiquitano today still recount the horrors of the rubber boom (see Chapter VI), leading Riester to conclude that 'the rubber areas represented and still represent today, a trauma for the Chiquitanos' (1976: 126).

Around 1910, growing competition from rubber plantations in South-East Asia led to a drastic decline in international rubber prices, while the appearance of synthetic rubber in 1926 eroded external markets for this product. As a result, the foreign capital that financed the extractive activities abandoned the Bolivian north, while simultaneously patrons made efforts to diversify the productive base through, for example, encouraging the small-scale exportation of *castaña* (chestnut) and lifting restrictions on agriculture in the barracks. By the 1930s rubber production had declined markedly in comparison to the previous boom period, although the Second World War allowed a small recovery of production, when it reached similar levels to those registered during the first years of the century. However, in the post-war years, prices fell sharply, producing a second rubber crisis (Pacheco Balanza and Ávila, 2001: 57). By the 1970s, rubber extraction had shrunk and by that time the number of Chiquitanos in the rubber forests had diminished significantly (Riester, 1976: 134).[70]

In the Chiquitanía, capital accumulated in the rubber boom was largely invested in cattle ranching, the production of sugar cane and commerce in Santa Cruz. New landowners settled in the Chiquitanía (mainly in Concepción, San Javier and San José) and recruited Chiquitano workers for the new *estancias*, establishing a system of debt servitude (Riester, 1976: 136; Schwarz, 1994: 40). If freed, Chiquitanos generally also moved south, although some decided to stay in the rubber area as the soil was better (Riester, 1976: 136). Riester's informants stressed that while the Chiquitano settlements that emerged through this migration faced problems in terms of high transportation costs to regional markets (e.g. San Ignacio was 400

[69] The founders of *comunidades* in that sector came from Concepción, San Rafael, San Ignacio and San Miguel (Schwarz, 1994: 40).
[70] In 1965, there were still 2000 Chiquitanos in Velasco, the number fell to 250 in 1970; in Ñuflo de Chávez the number halved to 100 (Riester, 1976: 134).

km away), personal freedom was more important than the benefits they could achieve by selling their produce (1976: 136).

Some Chiquitano, who returned from the rubber areas in the southern zone of Ñuflo de Chavez province, established themselves around San Javier and Concepción. However, the push to establish cattle ranches on land surrounding the ex-missions and the large size of existing *estancias,* meant that land to establish settlements was growing scarce. In some cases, local administrators put land at the disposition of Chiquitano groups, but this was generally of poor quality. Riester adds that the alternatives were to work for (and become dependent on) the patrons, or seek refuge in remote places, such as the area around Lomerío (1976: 141).

The Chaco War and the Construction of the Santa Cruz – Corumbá Railway

Another significant event for the Chiquitano was the Chaco War (1933-36) between Bolivia and Paraguay. Chiquitanos were recruited to fight (often by force) (Riester, 1976: 127). Consequently, Chiquitanos abandoned many settlements that had their origin in the ex-reduction of Santo Corazón, as well as many settlements in the sectors of Roboré, Puerto Suárez and Rincón del Tigre. A similar process took place around the ex-reductions of Santiago, San Juán and San José. However, immediately after the War, new settlements started to emerge in remote areas, above all in the sector of San Antonio de Lomerío (Schwarz, 1994: 41). In terms of other consequences of the War, Schwarz notes that although little data exists, 'it can be assumed that the large landowners took advantage … of the absence of [Chiquitano] men to achieve an even greater expansion of the *estancias*' (1994: 40-41).

A further important event that impacted on the Chiquitano communities was the construction of the Santa Cruz de la Sierra – Corumbá railway between 1945 and 1955. The railway was supposed to strengthen commercial exchange between the highlands and plains, as well as promote economic integration of east Bolivia into the national economy. It was also part of an effort to reduce dependency on imported agricultural products (Riester, 1976: 139). Creole and *mestizo enganchadores* attracted a large part of the Chiquitano from the area of the ex-reductions of Santo Corazón, Santiago, San Juan, and San José, to construct the tracks as low-paid workers (Riester, 1976: 41). This provoked the permanent migration of large numbers of Chiquitano *comunarios* from the north of the Chiquitanía to the south to

work on railway construction and thus escape their patrons (Schwarz, 1994: 41). Riester, nevertheless, observes that the Cruceño *mestizos* and Creoles took advantage to refine the economic exploitation of Chiquitano groups even more than in previous times. They signed contracts which obliged them to provide a certain number of Chiquitanos to work for the railway company in return for 30 - 50 per cent of their wages (1976: 126).

With respect to the consequences of railway construction for the Chiquitano population, authors paint a mixed picture. Schwarz observes that new settlements emerged along the railway line, which were not based on 'the traditional model' of Chiquitano communities, as they lacked a kinship system and put less emphasis on 'autochthonous rituals' or the use of the Chiquitano language (1994: 41-42). Riester stresses that, as a positive effect, the wages the Chiquitano earned as railway workers allowed them to buy weapons for hunting, clothing, and celebrate fiestas. However, he also describes how railway construction impacted negatively on Chiquitano peoples in terms of access to land: Creoles and *mestizos* occupied the 'best positions' north and south of the railway lines, so as to be close to transportation, as well as to be able to extract and sell wood (1976: 140).

The 1952 Revolution and Agrarian Reform

Two further events that had a huge influence on Bolivian citizenship regimes, Chiquitano spatial occupation and socio-political organisation, were the 1952 Revolution and agrarian reform of 1953. The Chaco War led to a shift in political objectives, protagonists, and allies in Bolivia (Albó, 1987; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 380-382). Anger against the *rosca* (the economic and political elite based around the tin-mining sector) had risen and governmental credibility severely been damaged during the war, which historians point out, was primarily provoked by the Bolivian government to cover up the economic crisis and growing social unrest driven by falling tin prices after 1930 (Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 44).[71] As the war revealed the weakness, incompetence and corruption of the state bureaucracy, ex-

[71] During the 36 months long campaign 250,000 men aged between 17 and 50 had been sent to the front, a significant percentage in a country with a population of around two million. Some 52,400 men died in combat or through natural causes, 21,000 were captured, 10,000 deserted and Bolivia lost thousands of square kilometres of territory (Dunkerley, 2003: 144).

combatants developed a common vision of an effective state and a unitary nation (see Dunkerley, 2003; Grindle, 2003a: 4; Klein, 1992: 44; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 45).

Contributing to the revolutionary tide figured the considerable political mobilisation and class conflict in the mining regions which predated the war, as well as unrest in areas of the countryside, particularly around Cochabamba and the northern highland plain. The revolution was preceded by more than a decade of uprisings, military coups and instability (Canessa, 2009; Dunkerley, 2003; Gotkowitz, 2003; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46).[72] The party to lead the revolution in April 1952 was the moderate left-wing *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR – National Revolutionary Movement), founded in 1941 by a core of middle class professionals, students, and intellectuals (Grindle, 2003a: 4). The MNR operated in alliance with the mobilised miners, workers in general and peasants and indigenous groups. They seized power through a three day confrontation in La Paz, Cochabamba and Oruro and installed Victor Paz Estenssoro as president (Albó, 1987: 380-382; Grindle, 2003a: 2-5; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46).

While the MNR itself was decidedly anti-communist and saw its goals primarily in securing the interest of the middle class, workers and peasants pushed for more radical legislation. Such pressures came above all from the newly (and with MNR backing) founded *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB – Bolivian Workers' Confederation), which brought together the (armed) workers organisations under Juan Lechín (Grindle, 2003a: 2-5; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46). Pressures were heightened through the activities of armed peasant syndicates and villagers, who had begun taking over hacienda lands on their own accord.[73] This forced the MNR to

[72] As Kohl and Farthing note, the four key mobilising sectors were firstly, university students who abandoned the politics of their elite parents ('the Chaco generation') and later constituted the core of the MNR. Second, junior military officers 'split between military socialists and nationalist fascists', who would lead the military dictatorships between 1964 and 1982. Third, the labour union based around mines, railroads and urban print shops, which emerged 'with strong influences from left-wing political parties' (2006: 45). Lastly, in the highlands indigenous groups began to organise. In the 1930s free indigenous communities had organised around Cochabamba to buy and lease land from agriculturalists suffering under the1930s economic crisis. The first congress of over 1000 valley and highland community leaders took place in La Paz in 1954. The president of the military government of the time, Gualberto Villarroel, promised schools and the end of *pongueaje* (bonded labour), which although not implemented until after the Revolution, legitimised and fuelled the demands of rural communities (Gotkowitz, 2003; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46).

[73] As Andrew Canessa points out, rural violence, 'was not evenly distributed through the county and was most concentrated in the Cochabamba valley and the rich agricultural lands of the altiplano around Lake Titicaca, where intense dispossession of Indian lands had taken place at the end of the nineteenth century and in the early decades of the twentieth, in particular around Achacachi' (2009: 177).

proclaim the 1953 Land Reform and the elimination of servile relations in agricultural production. The reform aimed to distribute large landholdings among former peons, rural workers and landless peasants (Canessa, 2009: 177; de la Peña, 2005: 730; Gotkowitz, 2003; Grindle, 2003a: 2-5; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46).

Additionally, in line with the populist and Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies pursued by Latin American countries (and beyond) from the 1950s to the start of the 1980s, the MNRs capitalist and partly statist modernisation programme included the promotion and expansion of the domestic market, through backing producers with credits, agricultural inputs, tariff barriers and the nationalisation of key industries (the mines formerly owned by the *rosca* were converted into the large state enterprise COMIBOL). Additionally, the MNR promoted the extension and diversification of the agricultural-geographical frontier through the opening of new roads to the east, where new productive possibilities arose in oil and agribusiness. Important was also the attempt to broaden civil, social and political citizenship rights through expansion of suffrage and the education system (see Albó, 1987: 382; Healy and Paulson, 2000; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 49; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987: 3).

A crucial aspect of the MNR project and one with far-reaching consequences, was the integration of Indians into the corporatist state system via *sindicatos* (state-sponsored peasant unions), which were incorporated into the *Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (CNTCB –National Trade Union Organisation of Bolivian Peasants) (Albó, 1987: 383; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 5; Postero, 2007: 38). Once hacienda lands were recovered, these *campesino* unions were to function in practice as a modernised version of traditional communal organisations (Albó, 1987: 382-383, 2002: 75). The idea was to integrate Indians into the corporatist state structure as 'producers', which involved the relabeling of 'Indians' as '*campesinos*' (peasants) (Albó, 1987: 381-382, 2002: 75; Ströbele-Gregor et al., 1994: 108). Significantly, this re-labelling exercise indicated a shift in the way that the country's elites thought about the 'Indian question'. It reflects the rising influence of *indigenismo*, an intellectual current propagated initially by white and *mestizo* Mexican writers and politicians and which gained momentum in many Latin American. It would influence white and *mestizo* attitudes towards indigenous

peoples and state policies in countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru throughout the twentieth century.[74]

Driving white and *mestizo indigenista* intellectuals and politicians was a nationalistic sentiment that Latin American states needed strong unified national identities, which they reasoned would be constituted through the inevitable emergence and ascent of *mestizos* as the true citizens of the new nations (de la Peña, 2005: 719-722).[75] This departed from the previous liberal stance, which dismissed past Indian cultures as barbaric and contemporary Indians as a hindrance to modernisation. Instead, *indigenistas* like the Mexican Manuel Gamio, valued some aspects of past 'Indian cultures', above all their artistic achievements (Brading, 1988; de la Peña, 2005: 727). Furthermore, contemporary Indians were seen as 'redeemable', with the capacity to exercise full citizenship if targeted with education programmes and special economic and social development initiatives (de la Peña, 2005: 727).

Indigenista intellectuals like Gamio, José Vasconcelos (the founder of the Mexica Ministry of Education) and Moisés Sáenz (who served as Mexican vice-minister of education) were influenced by the writings of Franz Boas and Dewey. They moved away from expressing distinctions between '*mestizo*s' and 'Indians' in racial or linguistic terms, to stressing their cultural and social content (Brading, 1988:

[74] One important Mexican figure, who helped to spread of '*indigenista* ideas' was Moisés Sáenz (who also served as Mexican vice-minister of education). He argued that *indigenismo* should rely not on 'incorporation', but rather on 'integration' policies based on active participation from the grassroots. He became convinced that *indigenismo* 'should become a well-structured continental movement', and was one of the main organisers of the 1940 First Interamerican Indigenist Congress, held in Pátzcuaro where over 200 delegates from 19 countries attended (de la Peña, 2005: 726-727). The Congress also led to the founding of the Interamerican Indigenist Institute, through which the think-tank of the Mexican *Instituto Nacional Indigenista* (INI – National Indigenist Institute, founded in 1948), spread several ideas which shaped the policies of many countries and the UN at the time and are still important in the 'indigeneity debate' today (see de la Peña, 2005: 729-730). According to de la Peña, the debates and resolutions of Congress 'completed the conversion of *indigenismo* into state ideology and anthropological doctrine' (2005: 719). For more details on the congress, see de la Peña (2005: 727). In Bolivia, an official *Instituto Indigenista Boliviano* was created in 1941, but it was superseded by the 1945 National Indigenous Congress convoked by the populist President Villarroel, and then by the 1952 Revolution (de la Peña, 2005: 730).

[75] For authors addressing *indigenista* mind set and policies and their effect on indigenous populations, see, for example, Friedlander's (2006) case study on Hueyapan and Alan Knight (1990) for the *Mexican* case. See French (2004), Souza Lima (1991) and Ramos (1998) for the *Brazilian* case and Marisol de la Cadena (2001) for *indigenismo* and it's legacy in *Peru*, but also other Latin American countries. *Indigenismo* and especially, the writings of Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui**,** also influenced various political movements, such as, for example the Apristas in Peru (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA – American Popular Revolutionary Alliance)), see Davies (1971) and Heilman (2006). One of the countries in which the ideology, aspiration and failure of social science of *indigenismo* was manifested in 'exemplary form' was Guatemala (see Wasserstrom, 1975). Also see Handy (1988).

78; de la Peña, 2005: 719). If 'contemporary Indians appeared sunk in rural idiocy, then their backwardness should be attributed to their poor diet, their lack of education, their material poverty, and their isolation from the stimulus of national life' (Brading, 1988: 79). 'To be Indian' meant to be subordinate in the colonial caste system, leading to a population with 'fragmented cultures' which persisted in regions where the modernising state had not yet percolated and who due to their isolation, lack of Spanish language skills, poverty and illiteracy did not participate in 'national life' (Brading, 1988: 82; de la Peña, 2005: 729-130).

To achieve a culturally homogenous strong nation-state, *Indigenista* policies should therefore 'be directed toward breaking up the asymmetrical intercultural system' (de la Peña, 2005: 730), with the aim of 'cultural fusion, linguistic unification, and economic equilibrium' (Gamio in Brading, 1988: 82). States would have to provide for land distribution, agricultural extension, marketing facilities, literacy programmes, health campaigns and clinics, and schooling and encourage indigenous organisation and participation in municipal politics (de la Peña, 2005: 729). In short, *Indians* could be turned into *peasants* and be made functional to the economic development of the respective countries. Paradoxically, while *indigenistas* valued some of the pre-colonial aspects of indigenous cultures, this was simply the reincarnation of the early colonial idea that the Indian 'needed to be civilised'. As Brading summarises for the case of Mexico, the paradoxical objective of official *indigenismo* was 'finally to destroy the native culture which had emerged during the colonial period' (1988: 88). This would 'remove the obstacles to mestizaje, that centuries-long process which would eventually create a homogeneous Mexican nation' (1988: 84).[76]

The reforms significantly transformed the Bolivian citizenship regime. In the Bolivian highlands, destruction of the hacienda system and passing of land to those who had worked it as serfs and peons, effectively 'freed' this part of the population.

[76] The Bolivian *indigenista* brand must be distinguished from those of Mexico or Peru. As Ann Zulaswki (2000) points out, there was no political party like APRA in Peru or single political leader like Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who used indigenismo as their political bandwagon. She also argues that the ideology of *mestizaje* was less pronounced, as intellectuals like Bolivian novelist Alcides Arguedas saw *mestizos* as 'having all the defects of both Spaniards and Indians' (Arguedas in Zulawski, 2000: 111). Still, in their effort to culturally homogenise the nation, the MNR promoted the class-based term peasant over the culturally-laden and pejorative 'Indian'. Just as the term 'Indian', as defined by the Crown, and 'citizen', as defined by the republican state, had previously done, this codified a 'new social and political category' (Postero, 2007: 38).

They no longer needed to work under *pongueaje* (personal service system) in the patrons' house, ending the general humiliation and (threat of) corporal punishments associated with this (see Canessa, 2009; Klein, 2003b: 233). Through the elimination of literacy requirements, the voting population increased from 200,000 to nearly one million people (Klein, 2003b: 237). While voting might not have amounted to free and equal political representation, in the sense that votes were often traded for favours, this nevertheless presented groups and individuals in the highlands and lowlands with a degree of bargaining power. Through their participation in peasant unions and communal organisations former 'Indians' were able to organise projects for their communities and 'make demands for better health and educational delivery, even if they were sometimes required to pay for themselves' (Klein, 2003b: 238).

Rivera Cusicanqui is more pessimistic about the effects of the reforms. She argues that it undermined the *ayllu* economy's social and economic reproduction by encouraging individual landholdings and an emphasis on the petty-commodity regime (1990: 116). In the long run, changes in landholding patterns, and the increased land use encouraged through governmental programmes, led to depleted soils and *minifundismo* (Healy and Paulson, 2000: 9). State corporatist structures undermined the autonomy of Andean *ayllus* and other indigenous organisational structures and tied communities into clientelist networks of 'state' actors, including political parties and, more recently, NGOs (Rivera Cusicanqui, 1990: 116). Indeed, demands for independent organisational forms did not emerge until the late 1960s, when critical peasant leaders began exerting their autonomy from official Andean-based unions (see Chapter V).

In the Bolivian lowlands, MNR reforms had an entirely different trajectory. Most failed to reach the lowlands until the 1960s and 1970s (Riester, 1976: 177).[77] Landowners managed to largely block education and unionisation initiatives among lowland peoples. In Ñuflo de Chávez province, landowners forbade state authorities to enter their properties to inform themselves about the situation of the workers or to educate them about their rights. Jürgen Riester describes how Chiquitano families that laboured in a small *establecimiento* ten kilometres north of Concepción in the

[77] For example, the MNR's plan to construct schools largely failed and, especially in the lowlands, funds supplied to pay teachers often did not reach their destinations. This occurred in the patron-controlled rubber regions, but also in those areas that already had better lines of communication (Riester, 1976: 135).

1970s earned a shirt and a pair of trousers per year and the women a dress. For this, they had to toil for the patron throughout the year and additionally supply him with chicken and eggs as gifts for *fiestas* (1976: 138).[78] The minimum wage legislation of 1952 had more impact in the Velasco and Chiquitos provinces as the government insisted, raised awareness among and mobilised, the rural population. At times the military was employed to enforce the law (Riester, 1976: 137).[79]

The agrarian reform itself largely impacted adversely on access to land and resources for many lowland groups. This was because government policies aimed at promoting development and the expansion of the agricultural frontier. From the 1960s onwards, the government fostered large-scale development programmes and encouraged the expansion of cattle ranching, logging operations, mining and oil exploration (Yashar, 2005: 70).[80] The Santa Cruz elites also permitted access to other social and ethnic groups, such as highland immigrants, Mennonites and large-scale agro-industry entrepreneurs. The spreading of human settlements, plantations and cattle farms along with accelerated deforestation, impacted negatively on the Chiquitano groups' productive systems, as agricultural land grew scarce and access to rivers and lagoons for fishing, and forests for hunting diminished. Demographic pressures in the *comunidades* augmented causing an increase in Chiquitano temporary and permanent migration to the urban centres, particularly Santa Cruz de la Sierra, but also Brazil (Schwarz, 1994: 42-44). To compound matters, Schwarz argues that Chiquitano access to the ex-missions, 'their cultural centres', was undermined, weakening the Chiquitano political and social organisation. Further, it accelerated a disarticulation of the kinship system ('the base of the ethnic social organisation') in many *comunidades* (1994: 44).

Later than in the highlands, governmental initiatives led to the promotion of education and development projects among Chiquitano *comunidades*. A prominent actor in this was the prefectural development organisation CORDECRUZ. However, Schwarz argues on similar lines to Rivera Cusicanqui, positing that such projects

[78] Again, some Chiquitano families tried to flee to other provinces or to Lomerío, in the south of the Ñuflo de Chávez province, a region that was not easily accessible (Riester, 1976: 138).
[79] The MNR fixed the wage at five *bolivianos* per day for agricultural labourers with three meals a day, or alternatively, three *bolivianos* on top of the wage.
[80] The laws that accompanied development efforts and that legislated a bias against indigenous included the *Ley Forestal* (Forestry Law), *Ley de Fauna y Vida Silvestre* (Fauna and Wildlife Law) and the *Ley Mineral* (Mineral Law), all of which granted concessions to exploit natural resources (Yashar, 2005: 198).

aimed at assimilating *comunidades* into a non-Chiquitano productive system, functional to the national market (1994: 45). He holds that projects like PLAVERDE, TURBO and MINGA, provided parallel political organisations aimed 'at manipulating indigenous organisations directly from the *base*' and 'designed to keep Chiquitanos away from representation in the official political system' (1994: 45-47). Around the same time, diverse religious sets from Brazil and the Catholic Franciscan order stepped up efforts to establish links with the *comunidades*. Schwarz argues that the Franciscans tried to 'instrumentalise the *cabildos* as interparroquial organisations' and intended 'to increase their power through the training of the young [Chiquitano people] in the Seminar of Cochabamba' (Schwarz, 1994: 45).

However, there is also evidence that the new legislation and government-sponsored syndicates had some positive impact, resulting in the foundation of new *comunidades* by Chiquitanos that were 'freed' from *empadronamiento*. One of the *comunidades* that emerged in the area of Concepción was El Carmen. As a *comunario* remembered:

> With the revolution of 1952, here they just complied with the decrees that the President passed. In the year 1956 syndicates started to be formed. … after that they created the *comunidad* El Carmen in 1957. They made the territorial demand in 1967. Ten years after the formation of the syndicates. They just started processing documents [and] in 1967 they did the transaction and they obtained the documents in 1973.[81]

A second *comunario* added that the first *comunarios* came from different locations and as far afield as San Miguel de Velasco and Salinas. He described that syndicate organisers managed to bring together 47 workers from different properties to form the *comunidad*.[82]

In rare cases the emergence of *comunidades* was also aided by benevolent patrons, or the Church. For example, Candelaria *comunidad*, one of the largest *comunidades* in Concepción municipality, was created about 45 years ago by Chiquitanos who had moved from Candelaria *Vieja*, a cattle ranch. *Comunario* Udalrico Vargas Faldín described to me during an informal interview that the owner

[81] *'…con la revolución del 1952, acá recién se hizo caso a los decretos que hacía el presidente. En aquel entonces en año 1956 empezaron a formarse los sindicatos. … después llegaron a formar la comunidad El Carmen el año 1957. Su demanda territorial la hicieron el año 1967. Hace diez años de la formación del sindicato, recién empezaron a tramitar sus documentos [y] el 1967 hicieron la tramitación y obtuvieron los documentos en el año 1973'*. Workshop: El Carmen, 9 May 2007.
[82] Workshop: El Carmen, 9 May 2007.

of the cattle ranch gave them a plot of land before his death, as he feared that otherwise the land would be sold and the c*omunarios* expelled.[83] Luciano Nogales Toro, the 64 year old founder of the *comunidad* San Isidro, adjacent to Concepción, recalled that the *comunidad* was founded by Chiquitano who previously lived on the same hacienda. In 1973, a priest offered to put up the initial payment for measuring the *comunidad* so that they could get their legal titles to the land.[84] In a parallel development, when patrons occupied more favourable areas, spaces opened up for the formation of new *comunidades* in the most remote sectors of the ex-reductions. As a result, *comunidades* that already existed were demographically strengthened and new ones established (Schwarz, 1994: 43). On this phenomenon, Groten notes that a large part of the *comunidades* that exist today were founded between 1960 and 1987 as a result of land reform (in Schwarz, 1994: 43).

Conclusion

Over the history of the Chiquitanía different agents have exerted governance over Chiquitano groups, starting with the first Spaniards who began a regime of making the 'Indian workforce' functional to the colonial economic enterprise through the *encomienda* system and the Jesuit priests. After the departure of the Jesuits (1767), important state agents became cattle ranchers and other large-scale agriculturalists, as well as members of the colonial administration. While cattle ranchers and large-scale *hacendados* maintained their position, republican local administrators took over from colonial bureaucrats after Independence. In some areas of the Chiquitanía, new levels of governmentality were introduced following the 1952 Revolution (mainly through the establishing of agrarian syndicates). In the 1960s and 1970s, further actors and new structures emerged that shaped the lives of Chiquitano groups. Firstly, some groups came to incorporate syndicate structures as promoted by state organisers, and secondly, non-governmental organisations and development organisations linked to the state bureaucracy (such as CORDECRUZ), began to provide projects for *ranchos* and *comunidades*. Riester criticises such projects for imposing the 'material goods of Western civilisation' on the Chiquitano, along with 'new working procedures

[83] Interview: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.
[84] Workshop: El Carmen, 9 May 2007.

without considering whether the projects are good or bad for the indigenous *comunidad*' (1976: 175).[85]

Since the arrival of the Spanish, the Chiquitano have experienced various processes, which provoked displacement from their land. The 1953 Agrarian Reform sparked the latest processes leading to land loss and depletion of natural resources. However, another MNR policy which aimed at spreading state-organised agrarian syndicates, combined with action from the side of benevolent patrons and the Church, also stimulated the formation of new *comunidades*. These developments meant that on the eve of the emergence of Chiquitano organisations in the early 1980s, Chiquitano people faced a variety of different situations: differences existed between Chiquitanos living in *comunidades* and in former mission settlements in the same province, as well as between *comunidades* (Riester, 1976: 129). Economic exploitation, migration flows and land shortages provoked the disarticulation of kinship ties, put strains on the religious system, and led to a disarticulation of the productive relationships among some *comunidades*.[86] However, elsewhere they continued with considerable vigour. *Cabildos* were abandoned in some areas and exchanged for other forms of organisation (such as rural unions), while they continued to manage religious affairs and communal work in other localities. In yet other areas, they had been 'instrumentalised by the patrons' (Schwarz, 1994: 45). Authors also point to language loss, noting that inter-generational rupturing and discrimination against the Chiquitano languages are the causes (Schwarz, 1994: 45).

In Concepción municipality, communities close to agrarian properties (which required more workers), were under tighter control by the patron, while the ones adjacent to cattle ranches (with a smaller workforce) had generally more contact with outsiders. The patrons to the latter proved more forthcoming in demanding some of the rights promised by the 1952 Revolution, such as minimum pay, schooling for their children and freedom of movement. Chiquitanos who lived in the ex-mission settlements (or villages) faced another situation; they were at the bottom of the social

[85] As an example, he recounts the failure of the agricultural schools (*escuelas agropecuarias*) and comments that: 'to teach them to work with modern machinery is absurd, when it is possible to work the land in the settlements with rudimentary tools; to organise cooperatives does not make sense if the dominant commercialisation system is not changed' (1976: 177).

[86] For a more detailed description of the levels of 'destructuration' and 'restructuration' of Chiquitano space, such as the effects of migration on the various communities in the different regions of the Chiquitanía, see (Schwarz, 1994: 177-243).

hierarchy, often tied into a '*criado* system' and unequal trade relations (Riester, 1976: 137).[87]

While the twenty years after the agrarian reform were characterised by intense land loss, they also saw the spread of an awareness of basic rights among Chiquitano, mainly through the activities of NGOs and syndicate organisers. In the early 1980s, some Chiquitano decided to form a movement that would defend their interests. They would campaign against excessive labour tribute (*prestación vial*), demand an end landowner abuse, and land rights. They joined a wider organisational drive which was emerging at the same time in the Bolivian lowlands in the late 1970s and 1980s. As indicated by Lorenzo's statement at the start of this chapter, it is the long engagement with state actors – between accommodation and resistance – that Chiquitano confront when they position themselves as indigenous citizens to demand rights and land. It is to a consideration of these political strategies that this thesis now turns.

[87] According to Riester, *criados* were a type of domestic labourer, or rather servant, who lived in the house of the patron: '[they worked] from sun to sun and as payment they can sleep in some dirty corner in the kitchen, pigsty or chicken run. When he/she gets to a marriageable age, the patrons prefer them to have children out of wedlock ... The family rears these children as they provide a cheap workforce ... It is also possible to lend or rent these people out (my translation, 1976: 143).

Chapter V

Ethnic Politics and the Multiple Meanings of 'Indigenous' in Bolivia

The previous chapter focused on the history of the Chiquitano people until the 1970s. This chapter analyses the emergence of the Chiquitano movement of Concepción. Chiquitano political organising has entailed the spread of new identity markers among Chiquitano *comunarios*. Through adopting the indigenous label, the movement has joined the ranks of ethnic movements that consciously position themselves in the wider global struggle for indigenous rights. It also enabled Chiquitano to gain access to the neo-liberal multicultural rights framework introduced in Bolivia during the 1990s. While some of the meanings that are attached to the label by national and international state actors are reflected in the way Chiquitano *comunarios* talk about what it means to be 'Chiquitano' and '*comunario*', more rhizomic aspects (Rosengren, 2003) remain relevant. Further, this chapter shows that Chiquitano attach their own notions that what it means to 'be indigenous'.

The first part of this chapter situates the emergence of the Chiquitano movement in the wider context of the development of ethnic organisations in Bolivia. The Bolivian movements can roughly be categorised into three currents: firstly, 'indianism' which arose during the 1960s and enshrined identity over class as the prime mode of organisational identity. Secondly, the movements that explicitly stress ethnic identity as key collective identifier but still see class as relevant (i.e. Katarism). Thirdly, indigenous movements that frame their political project more consciously in line with the domestic and international indigenous rights platform (Lucero, 2008: 81). Such movements emerged throughout Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter focuses on the second (katarism) and third currents (indigenous movements). Firstly, I address the rise of the Katarist movement in the highlands in the late 1960s, as its legacy shaped Bolivian politics and partly set the scene for the emergence of subsequent movements. This is followed by an assessment of the genesis of the Bolivian *cocalero* movement and the lowland indigenous movement which arose in the late 1980s and strategically positioned

themselves as 'indigenous movements'.[1] The last section addresses the birth of the Chiquitano *central* of Concepción municipality.

Authors have pointed to several factors to explain why such movements appeared in the second half of the twentieth century throughout Latin America, and why ethnicity became a powerful collective identifier.[2] These include the demise of the Left in Europe and Latin America, the importance of allies (often in the form of NGOs or the Catholic Church), threats to a peoples' resource base – including land loss, human rights abuses, a new generation of educated leaders, demise of the hacienda system and a linked reactivation of kinship ties. Different combinations of these factors meant that indigenous groups became more aware of their common situation, which enabled them to look at themselves as a different 'category' within the broader society (Assies et al., 2000; Korovkin, 1997, 2000; Maybury-Lewis, 2002; Postero and Zamosc, 2004b; Van Cott, 1994a; Warren and Jackson, 2002; Wearne, 1996; Yashar, 2005). Authors have also stressed the importance of forging alliances across national borders (Albó, 1996: 2; Brysk, 1994, 1996, 2000; e.g. Jackson, 1995; Jackson, 2001).[3]

Here I draw on the terminology and conceptual tools of political scientist Deborah Yashar (2005), who employs three variables to account for the emergence of contemporary ethnic movements: motive, social networks and political associational space.[4] She argues that the motive is generally linked to changes in citizenship regimes, which provide for, or threaten the autonomy of indigenous

[1] A movement which takes up a specifically indigenous agenda and modes of self-identification in the Bolivian highlands is the *Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo* (CONAMAQ – National Council of the Ayllus and Marcas of Qullasuyo). See Lucero's (2006; 2008) contributions regarding the rise of the CONAMAQ. While the case bears much resemblance to the emergence of the indigenous movement in the lowlands, it is beyond of the scope of this thesis to discuss it in more depth.

[2] In this respect, some authors point to out that ethnicity has 'superseded' class as a prime collective identifier (Ibarra, 1992: 17-36; Kearney, 1996a: 7, 1996b; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Selverston-Scher, 1993; Trujillo, 1994: 50), while others commentators suggest that 'class' still influences actors' perceptions of their situation (e.g. Hertzler, 2005: 47; Selverston-Scher, 1994). I coincide with this latter view. After all, as authors such as Jean and John Comaroff and Eric Wolf have stressed, class and ethnicity are linked, in that both stem from a certain groups subordinate position in a countries' political economy (and political and social hierarchies) (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992: 54; Wolf, 1982: 380-381), or in the words of the Comaroffs: 'the asymmetrical incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy' (1992: 54). Also see Pape (2009) for an historical analysis of organisational strategies based on ethnicity and class in highland Bolivia.

[3] For a more detailed analysis on the emergence of a 'new' ethnic discourse also in other Latin American countries, see Stavenhagen (2001).

[4] To develop her comparative ramework, Yashar draws on resource mobilisation and social movement theory (and contentious politics) (e.g. Cohen, 1985b; McAdam et al., 2001; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 1998; Taylor, 1989; Tilly, 1985).

communities (2005: 54-57). Earlier corporatist citizenship regimes unintentionally enabled indigenous communities to carve out spaces of local autonomy, with limited interference from the state in matters of local governance. Subsequent neo-liberal citizenship regimes, however, threatened the autonomy that had been secured and, consequently, politicised ethnic cleavages (2005: 54-57). This notion can be extended to include threats to community cohesion and resource base. Furthermore, 'political associational space' refers to the existence of freedom of association and expression, which creates the opportunity to organise (2005: 29).[5] But 'only where trans-community networks were in place could and did indigenous communities possess the organisational capacity to forge broad indigenous movements' (2005: 72). Such networks can take any organisational forms, but can also relate to intercommunications networks. They must already be in place, or created by allies or dedicated leaders.

The second part of this chapter addresses the way that the term 'indigenous' has found a broader use among Chiquitano leaders, who have employed 'indigeneity' as a political tool. As Kenrick and Lewis point out, 'indigenous rights' 'describes a strategy for resisting dispossession that employs a language understood by those wielding power' in the light of a situation where 'they have no other way to obtain recognition for their collective rights to their land and economy within structures of authority that systematically discriminate against them' (2004: 263).[6] Nevertheless, while *comunarios* and leaders at times use the term in a way that resonates the national neo-liberal multicultural logic and essentialising notions (Conklin and Graham, 1995; Povinelli, 1998; Ramos, 1998), some Chiquitano do not readily accept the term for purposes of self-identification. This challenges the power of the state to increase its populations 'legibility' (Scott, 1998) (see Chapter II).

The last section of this chapter addresses the fact that rather than calling themselves indigenous, Chiquitano continue to use other markers for self-identification, most notably, *comunario* and Chiquitano. While in some respects the meanings of 'being Chiquitano' and 'being *comunario*' resonate with the way national and international law defines 'indigenous people', Chiquitano put more

[5] Yashar notes that this is not reducible to regime type; it is not equal to democracy: 'The common denominator … is that the state does not trample on the capacity to associate and to speak out' (2005: 76).
[6] Also Povinelli makes this point (1998: 580, 590).

emphasis on the behavioural principles that compose their community (they stress the 'rhizomic' over the 'taproot' notion (Rosengren, 2003)). Lastly, under the circumstances where white and *mestizo* locals are also claiming a Chiquitano heritage, some Chiquitano use the term 'indigenous' to stress their difference to whites and *mestizos*. This point highlights that in the contested local political arena of Concepción, incorporating or creating distance to others are powerful weapons.

The Challenge of Contemporary Bolivian Ethnic Movements

Organising in the Bolivian Highlands: The Katarist Movement

The first Bolivian ethnic movement to emerge during the 1960s comprised the highland-based Katarists. It formed part of a broader trend in Latin America, where movements organised on ethnic lines to demand the recognition of 'cultural difference' and cultural practices, such as customary law, land rights and freedom from human rights abuses (Brysk, 1994: 33; Postero and Zamosc, 2004a: 15). Its organisational vigour revealed the failure of the state-centred 1952 MNR revolutionary project and the integrationist strategy of assimilating Indians into a homogenous national culture: 'instead, social and cultural difference took on a variety of new meanings and expressions' (Healy and Paulson, 2000: 7).[7] Additionally, its successes fostered the emergence of ethnic movements: Katarismo developed among young Aymara with secondary and university education from the provinces of La Paz (Albó, 1987: 391; Yashar, 2005: 168).[8]

Their early ideology was inspired by the writings of Quechua-Aymara intellectual Fausto Reinaga. In line with a broader intellectual trend in the highlands and his personal disillusionment with Marxist politics, Reinaga moved to an 'indianist' stance. Inspired by the writings of Franz Fanon, he criticised the assimilating tendencies of the *indigenista* corporate structures and reasoned that

[7] Authors have also stressed the importance of land reforms, or accompanying policies in the rise of ethnic movements in other countries. For example, for the emergence of ethnic movements in Ecuadorean highlands see Korovkin (1997; 2000; 2001) and Zamosc (1994).

[8] Authors have also stressed the importance of **t**he rise of a new generation of indigenous leaders and intellectuals - younger people with secondary or higher education and a good understanding of provincial and national politics – for the emergence of 'ethnic' movements elsewhere. See Korovkin (1997: 29; 2000: 18) and Yashar (2005: 5). For example, according to Selverston-Scher, such leaders proved important in the emergence of ethnic movements in the Ecuadorean highlands. She notes that they started spreading a form of 'ethnic ideology', most effectively through bilingual literacy campaigns and education (2001: 75-76).

'revolutionary *indianismo*' could overcome the 'yoke of long-standing colonial oppression': one day 'the Indian Nation' could win its state (Lucero, 2008: 81).[9] Primarily focused on the memory of the *Tupaj Katari* uprising in 1781, the group began to make clear reference to the ethnic basis of discrimination suffered by native peoples and stressed that their organisational strength lay in cultural and ethnic foundation, rather than primarily class terms (Behrendt, 2000: 6; McKee, 1999: 1; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 75-76; Van Cott, 1994b: 9).[10] Even so, unlike the radical indianist currents, Katarist strands maintained an element of class analysis, conscious not to alienate communities organised as unions (Albó, 1987: 409; Lucero, 2008: 82).

Katarism spread especially through the Aymara Altiplano because MNR-promoted unions penetrated to a lesser degree than in other areas. Pre-existing communal authority structures governed by *ayllus* persisted, and in many cases they simply changed their names to resemble the union organisations (Albó, 1987: 412; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 77-79; Yashar, 2005: 161).[11] As these groups had maintained a more autonomous political and cultural identity, they were 'more predisposed to organise around "Indian" demands – particularly once military reforms threatened to undermine the levels of local autonomy secured with the corporatist citizenship regime' (Yashar, 2005: 167). In contrast to Indianist activists, Katarists managed to build on and 'captured' union networks in the countryside (Yashar, 2005: 167-169). They employed radio stations and various types of groupings and cultural centres to create networks. In this they were aided by NGO allies, most notably, the *Centro de*

[9] As Lucero explains, Reinaga tried to put his beliefs into practice through the establishment of the *Partido Indio de Bolivinao* (PIB – Bolivian Indian Party), which, however 'never became a sort of vanguard party of the coming indigenous revolution' (2008: 81) Still, indianist thought has influenced most of the subsequent Bolivian ethnic movements, including the contemporary rhetoric of Bolivian President Evo Morales and Felipe Quishpe, the radical leader of the of the *Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti* (MIP – Pachakuti Indigenous Movement.

[10] In this respect, Silvia Rivera Cusicancqui (1987), has argued for the importance of historical memory to explain the emergence of ethnic movements in Bolivia. Also Alberto Melucci also argues that ethno-national movements must be seen in a historical context: 'It contains ethnic identity, which is a weapon of revenge against centuries of discrimination and new forms of exploitation…' (1989: 90). This opens up the debate about how societies remember and what collective memories might entail and how they have come to be constructed (e.g. Hill, 1988b; Whitehead, 2003).

[11] Authors remind that in areas like Cochabamba and Altiplano of La Paz, haciendas were historically most prevalent. Communal authority structures had been subsumed or replaced by the patron. Upon the demise of the hacienda system, these communities were most likely to adopt union structures and were therefore tied closer to the government apparatus. Where unionisation did not advance, ayllus consolidated their control over the land as distributed through the 1953 Land Reform, and they were often able to maintain and expand self-governance (Albó, 1987: 412; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 77-79; Yashar, 2005: 161-162).

Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA – Peasant Investigation and Promotion Centre) (Lucero, 2008: 83; Yashar, 2005).[12] While the military restricted political associational space, these activities were tolerated as they operated in a 'seemingly non-political sphere of popular culture' (Lucero, 2008: 83).

The prime objective of the Katarists focused on exerting organisational independence from official Andean-based state-organised peasant organisations (Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 75-76). This move came in reaction to the Military-Peasant Pact, which sought to maintain corporate relations with the peasantry after General Barrientos staged the coup of 1964 and ended the MNRs eighteen-year rule (Albó, 1987: 394). Katarists increasingly questioned the Pact, especially after the government moved to introduce tax on land owned by peasant communities and individuals (see Albó, 1987: 394; Yashar, 2005: 163-167).[13] Additional Katarist demands included greater self-determination, the recognition of communal lands, cultural pluralism, communal organisations, authority structures and autonomy for customary law. Materially, demands focused on access to services and resources for rural communities (Yashar, 2005: 179-180).

Throughout most of the 1970s and under the repressive regime of Hugo Banzer Suares (1971-1978), Katarism operated clandestinely, while gathering organisational strength.[14] Opposition against the government heightened in 1974 in response to the 'Del Valle Massacre' in Cochabamba 'where governmental forces killed hundreds of Quechua peasants who protested recent economic reforms that put added financial demands on rural populations' (Lucero, 2008: 84). By 1977, the government faced considerable opposition, and in line with other Latin American military regimes, felt increasing international pressures to democratise – a

[12] According to Yashar, CIPCA is a 'church-affiliated research-advocacy group' which 'conducted research and promoted development among the Aymara' (2005: 174).

[13] Governmental policies were under USA advisory and shifting towards down-sizing the public sectors and lowering wages, while this affected the miners and caused growing unrest, peasant sectors remained initially faithful – until the government intended to introduce the mentioned land tax (Albó, 1987: 394).

[14] Testament to their vigour was that Katarists managed to capture the presidential post of the state-organised *Confederacion Nacional Campesina* (CNTCB – National Peasant Confederation), and the publication of the Tiwanaku Manifest of 1973, in which Kataristas formulated their views. When the government called a National Peasant Congress 1971, Kataristas seized their chance to unite with individuals influenced by *indianismo* and Maoist sectors to push for the occupation of the presidential post of the CNTCB by a Katarist – which they achieved. First, Raimundo Tambo and later Jenaro Flores, were named president of the CNTCB. While this increased Katarist influence, corporatist structure had not been ruptured (Albó, 1987: 394). For more information on the Tiwanaku Manifest, see Yashar (2005: 175-176).

conjuncture the Katarists used to go public under the banner of ending the military-peasant pact.

They achieved this objective and after protracted negotiations with the main workers' organisation, the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB – Bolivian Workers' Confederation), merged to establish the *Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (CSUTCB - the Single Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers). The CSUTCB has subsequently coordinated indigenous interactions with the Bolivian state over the last several decades, primarily mobilising protests against government policies, seeking to improve the lives of indigenous highland peasants, as well as backing (or creating) different political parties – none of which managed to gain large support (Albó, 1987: 401-402, 2002: 76; Behrendt, 2000: 6; McKee, 1999: 1; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 76; Yashar, 2005: 24-25).[15]

The organisational base of Katarism began to dwindle when the Paz Estenssoro government implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1985 (see Chapter II). The closing of the COMIBOL mines, mass redundancies and growth of the urban informal sector 'undermined the strength of leftist sectors in civil society, including the CSUTCB' (Lucero, 2008: 87).[16] According to Lucero:

> the political syncretism of Katarismo, in which leftist politics met anticolonial, Indian struggles, was doing poorly in the new period of market reforms and electoral politics. … In the CSUTCB, the Katarista leaders also found themselves out of favour with the other sectors of the confederation. Beginning in 1985, the rural union network ceased to mediate relations between ethnic elite and Indian masses. In 1989, new non-Katarista leaders took control of the CSUTCB (2008: 88).[17]

[15] For different protests and the economic conditions of the 1980s, see Albó (1987: 405-406) on the protest in 1983, and Nash (1992) regarding the peasant /miners protests of 1986. Katarista-backed political parties included the *Frente Unido de Liberación Katarista* (FULKA – United Katarista Liberation Front), the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari* (MRTK), which gave a greater emphasis to class analysis and the *Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari* (MITKA) stresses the ethnic ('*indio*') dimension (Albó, 1987: 401-402; McKee, 1999: 1; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 76). Lucero points out that this lack of is not surprising, 'given the extremely patrimonial and weakly institutionalised nature of the party system. Parties have historically and primarily been clientelistic agents for the Bolivian political class' (Lucero, 2008: 83).

[16] As Yashar points out, the closure of the tin mines and COMIBOL ended in the dismissal of some 22.000 – 23.000 out of 28.000-30.000 workers (2005: 182).

[17] The *Katarista* crisis resembled the crisis of social movements in Latin America in the 1980s as a whole, see Hellman (1997). Further, many divisions existed within the Katarist movement, leading to regular splits, which caused its credibility among peasants to drop substantially (see Albó, 2002: 78; McKee, 1999: 2; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 73).

Katarism as an organisational force did not sustain political momentum, but political actors from all across the ideological spectrum demonstrated an increasing interest in indigenous matters. This became evident in 1993, when the MNR presidential candidate, Sánchez de Lozada, chose the Aymara Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as his vice-presidential candidate (Albó, 1996: 4; McKee, 1999: 3; Yashar, 2005: 24-25).[18]

Rising Organisational Tides in the Bolivian Valleys: the Coca Growers Movement

Among these newer actors (and perhaps the most successful) is the *cocalero* (coca growers') movement, which emerged in the 1980s. Migration to the subtropical valleys, most prominently the Chapare district of Cochabamba department, had grown following the closure of COMIBOL, as former miners searched for alternative means to secure their livelihoods (McKee, 1999: 3; see Yashar, 2005: 185).[19] However, the zone came under pressure from US-backed coca eradication policies from the mid-1980s onwards, a policy that trapped locals and highland migrants between a struggle for economic survival and being identified as the enemy in the war against drugs (see Albro, 2005: 437-438). Within this context, peasant coca-producers mobilised from 1985. They built on existing local unions and their umbrella Federations (there are currently six) which had formed during the 1960s and 1970s (Albro, 2005: 438). Militancy was fuelled by the arrival of former miners, many of whom carried their radical union tradition and tactics into the movement (Albro, 2005: 438; Yashar, 2005: 185).

In order to achieve their goal of legalising production and consumption of the coca leaf, *cocaleros* activists 'self-consciously started to talk about ethnicity as a key component of their political struggle' (Yashar, 2005: 187). They adopted some of the earlier Katarist rhetoric and articulated their case for the continuation of coca cultivation as an 'indigenous' issue, stressing that the leaf is sacred, important for cultural reproduction, ritual and daily consumption (Albó, 2002: 78; Albro, 2005: 438; McKee, 1999: 3; Yashar, 2005: 185). This reflects a move to frame policy objectives that resonate with the Bolivian states' multicultural language of

[18] According to Albó this was significant as it was under MNR tutelage that Indians had been turned into *Campesinos* and meant that 'Bolivia's oldest and most powerful party … finally appeared to realise the important role that the ethnic issue played at the national level and among potential voters' (1996: 4).

[19] Coca is produced for the domestic market, but since the 1970s illegal *coca* exports have been earning increasing amounts of foreign exchange as international demand continued to rise (McKee, 1999: 3; see Yashar, 2005: 185).

indigenous rights, as well as attesting to the *cocaleros* linkages to the pan-American and global indigenous movement and its allies. Consequently, they have 'articulated their goals with those of the hemisphere's indigenous organisation, namely self-determination, autonomy, recognition of cultural distinctiveness, political restructuring of the state, territorial rights, access to natural resources and greater control over their own local economic development' (Albro, 2005: 439). *Cocalero* tactics proved successful and they have become one of the most radical and best organised sectors in Bolivia, gaining a prominent position in the CSUTCB (Albó, 2002: 78; Albro, 2005: 438; McKee, 1999: 3; Yashar, 2005: 187).

Although the *cocalero* discourse has stressed a deep distrust with regards to political parties, the organisation had developed its own 'political tool', through which it could partake in electoral politics and take advantage of openings provided by the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (see Chapter II). Evo Morales who has led the Chapare Federations since 1988 (re-affirmed for the fifth time in his post in 2003), capitalised on this turn to electoral politics to establish the MAS party in 1999 (Albro, 2005: 438).

Drawing on these coca growers' roots, Morales has stressed the indigenous basis of the MAS. Apparently having learned from the problems of Katarism with establishing a lasting political base, he articulates an inclusive political project, careful not to rely on either ethnic or class lines. He has adopted an 'indigenous positioning' (Canessa, 2007b: 207) – by framing 'Bolivia's national crisis of political legitimacy' in general in terms of indigenous rights (Albro, 2005: 433). Canessa summarises:

> because they have been excluded from the processes of colonization and globalization, [indigenous peoples] are in the best position to develop critiques of neo-colonialism and globalization; and indigenous people, because they have been historically excluded from the nation state, are in the best place to understand other peoples' exclusion, be they workers, women or other political minorities (2007b: 207).

Such an inclusive project allows for broad national and international coalition-building. Morales has learned from the successes of the coca growers movement, which has long drawn strength from its participation in civil society networks, including links to church and human rights groups, domestic and foreign NGOs, labour unions, as well as sympathetic social scientists (Albro, 2005: 439).

While the indigeneity rhetoric resonates with the domestic multicultural neo-liberal rights framework, it also positions the MAS project in the broader international indigenous rights arena; the inclusive version allows for the articulation of rural with urban concerns and the creation of a board domestic support base. The MAS discourse combines an inclusive indigeneity with an anti-globalisation and –capitalism discourse, which attracts rural and urban *mestizo*s and 'Indians' who believe that the neo-liberal state project impacted negatively on their livelihoods (Albro, 2005: 442-446; Canessa, 2006: 248, 250-252). The inclusive indigenous project also resonates with many in Bolivia who claim indigenous ancestry, as well of those who can not, but identify with the political project. This is also reflected in the increasing use of the term 'indigenous' for self-identification, not only among rural but also urban populations, including those who would have previously identified as *mestizo*s and even embracing those of European descent (see Canessa, 2007b: 208).[20]

Indigenous Mobilising in the Bolivian Lowlands

Another powerful actor emerged in the Eastern Bolivian Lowlands. Paralleling developments in other countries whose national territories cover part of the Amazon, the Bolivian government undertook efforts to 'develop' the 'underdeveloped' lowlands through stepping up colonisation efforts in the 1960s (see Chapter IV). It fostered large scale development programmes and encouraged expansion of cattle ranching, logging operations, mining and oil exploration (Yashar, 2005: 70).[21] Consequently, settlement and economic concessions often surrounded indigenous communities and curtailed their access to resources, such as water, animals and forest products (Yashar, 2005: 198).

[20] Mark Goodale (2006) refers to urban expression of indigenous identity, which are inspired partly by different domestic, as well as expressions of indigeneity form other areas of the globe, as 'indigenous cosmopolitanism'.

[21] For purpose of comparison, the Ecuadorean government initiated similar measure in the 1960s. Andean small farmers and rural workers, as well as large landowners (especially cattle ranchers) started clearing land and laid claim to it. This politicised the indigenous communities as it affected the ways they lived and lands they lived off. It led the emergence of the first indigenous organisation 1964 in the form of the Shuar Federation, followed by that of the Quichua in Napo who organised 1968 (Yashar, 2005: 113). Further challenges arose after the 1967 discovery of large oil reserves, which domestic and foreign agents stepped n to exploit it – complete with the detrimental effects to the environments that this entailed (Sawyer, 2004; Yashar, 2005: 114-116). Similar types of encroachment on Amazonia peoples living spaces have been the main motive for mobilisations also in Peru, Colombia and Brazil, if groups could draw on or create the necessary associational networks (Postero and Zamosc, 2004a: 16; Van Cott, 1994b: 16).

Against this backdrop, the Izoceño-Guaraníes were the first lowland organisation to organise in 1979. Bonifacio Barrientos Lyambae, the *Capitán Grande* of the *Capitanía Izoceña*, played a prominent role in this (ALAS et al., 2001: 3). Between 1978 and 1982, Barrientos contacted different indigenous groups in the Chaco and Santa Cruz, including Guaraníes, Ayoreos, Guarayos and Chiquitano peoples; in their first official assembly (1982) they founded the lowland umbrella organisation, the *Central Indígena de Pueblos y Comunidades del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB - Central of Indigenous Peoples and Comunidades of Western Bolivia) (ALAS et al., 2001: 3; Yashar, 2005: 199). CIDOB's emergence predated (and influenced) the emergence of the Chiquitano organisations, along with other local indigenous entities, which arose in its image.

Yashar insists that this late emergence of Bolivian lowland federations, in comparison to their counterparts in the Ecuadorean lowlands (the Shuar organised fifteen years earlier) and the Bolivian highlands, can be explained because the challenge to 'autonomy' came later than in the Andean highlands and took a different form: 'while the state expanded in the three decades after World War II in the Andes, the Amazon remained relatively marginalised from contemporary politics, the market, and the state's role in each' (2005: 69). While the view of the state this implies is questionable (see Chapter II), we can agree with Yashar that the region was not favourable terrain for organising. Distances between communities can be large and there was often a lack of communication between them (2005: 195). Although in some regions trans-community networks existed (as in the Guaraní case), in other areas they emerged with the foundation of agrarian syndicates, or through the activities of allies. Like in other areas of Latin America, some networks were also (unwittingly) left in place through the (evangelising) activities of churches of various denominations (2005: 195).[22] Yashar concludes that 'what was missing

[22] As an example she states that the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) played such a role in the Bolivian lowlands 'it assumed a parastatal role – particularly in the areas of literacy, bicultural education, leadership training, and radio communication. They helped to create new communities. … In some cases they even aided Indians in the efforts to gain titles to land … those who attended SIL schools and programme had better skills and resources – including literary, professional training, and knowledge of their rights, etc.' (2005: 196). She adds that this pattern parallels the one found for the Ecuadorian Amazon (2005: 196). Churches also played a role in some Andean settings. During the 1960s and 1970s, Post-Vatican II, the Catholic Church was often a catalyst in the process of indigenous peasant mobilisation in Bolivia and Ecuador and it replaced such as actors as leftists groups. For the case of Ecuador see Korovkin (1997).

until the 1970s and 1980s was the *motive* to organise as Indians and the organisational *capacity* to do so' (2005: 179).

This changed in the 1970s and 1980s, when 'the option of fleeing the advance of outsiders became increasingly untenable as state reforms facilitated greater and faster penetration by these outside forces' (Yashar, 2005: 195). In Santa Cruz and the Beni, large tracts of land were distributed to large estates, causing indigenous movements to emerge (Yashar, 2005: 195).

Allies played a crucial role in facilitating the movement's emergence and supporting its organisational trajectory.[23] The founding story of CIDOB cannot be disentangled from the activities of the NGO *Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano* (APCOB – Support for the Indigenous Peasant of the Bolivian East).[24] APCOB worked directly with the *Capitanía del Izozog* and helped gain financial support, facilitating invitations to international indigenous meetings and invited foreign indigenous speakers (Yashar, 2005: 200-201).[25] From the outset, CIDOB leaders and APCOB worked to gain support and stimulation from actors in the global indigenous rights arena. This was noticeable in the development of the CIDOB's strategy for demanding territorial instead of land titles, which took inspiration from their cooperation with the *Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica* (COICA – Coordinating Body for Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin) (see Lucero, 2008: 92).[26] Leaders adopted the 'indigenous label' with the clear intention of 'constructing a new identity, to support

[23] As noted in Chapter II, Salesian priests facilitated the emergence of the Ecuadorean Shuar Federation. In the Chimborazo region of the Ecuadorean highlands liberation theology-inspired Catholic Priest Monsieur Proaño and his literacy campaign via radio schools linked highland communities and led to the emergence of the Chimborazo indigenous movement (Weber, 2003; Yashar, 2005: 102-106).

[24] According to Yashar 'APCOB saw itself engaging in a kind of research activism dedicated specifically to cultural issues such as the right to customary law and indigenous rights to territory – particularly as a space in which indigenous people could reproduce their sociocultural practices. Over the years, APCOB has focused on projects that addresses territorial demands, socio-political organisation, gender, and culture' (2005: 201). Also see Lucero (2008: 91-93) for more information on APCOB's relation to the CIDOB.

[25] For example, APCOB founded 'a Programme of Interethnic Relations in 1982 that organised a bulletin, meetings, and trips to facilitate the process of interethnic contact' (Yashar, 2005: 201). Indigenous leaders Urañabi, however, points out that while support from NGOs such as APCOB was important, equally crucial were the abilities of those indigenous leaders who administered the organisation, 'a skill without which the organisation would have floundered' (quoted in Yashar, 2005: 202). Also on other Latin American countries, NGOs saw ethnicity and building on the already existing 'traditional organisationl frameworks' as a useful tool in promoting a grassroots based self-management (Korovkin, 1997: 29-30, 2001: 57; Zamosc, 1994: 48, 53).

[26] As Lucero points out, this was indeed a strategy that 'owed much to the experience of the Iroquis Nation in Northern America' (2008: 92). Also see Healy (2001).

modern political and developmental activism and to rally dispersed ethnic minorities toward a common cause' (Healy in Lucero, 2008: 92).

The period of community organising coincided with military rule in Bolivia. To gain recognition and access to resources Barrientos was forced to negotiate with military leaders. These permitted the foundation of the CIDOB, while officially restricting its meetings. In practice, however, they did not enforce this rule. With the democratic opening, political associational space extended further and indigenous leaders began organising across the Amazon, often with CIDO assistance (Yashar, 2005: 200).[27]

Over the years, CIDOB developed into a national umbrella organisation that now represents more than thirty indigenous peoples in the departments of Tarija, Cochabamba, Pando, Beni and Santa Cruz. Due to this growth, during its Eighth Congress in 1989, the CIDOB chose to call itself a 'confederation', the *Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia* (CIDOB – Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian West, Chaco and Amazonia) (ALAS et al., 2001: 3; Yashar, 2005: 203).[28] CIDOB's role is that of a spokesperson for these organisations. Since the first Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993-1997), CIDOB negotiated with the government and demanded respect for internationally recognised (but domestically unfulfilled) indigenous rights, including the recognition of indigenous territories, the right to self-government, recognition of customary law, legal pluralism and the right to cultural survival and development (Yashar, 2005: 203).[29]

Among the CIDOB's successes figure the historic 1990 'March for Territory and Dignity' from the Amazon lowlands to the highland capital (650 kilometres),

[27] Particularly noteworthy was the *Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni* (CEPIB - Central of Indigenous Peoples of the Beni), who played a crucial role in the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity (2005: 202).The Izoceño-Guaraníes later formed the *Asamblea del Pueblos Guaraní* (APG – Assembly of Guarani People) and the *Capitanía del Alto y Bajo Izozog* (CABI – Captaincy of the Alto and Bajo Izozog), the Ayreos the *Central Ayorea Nativa del Oriente Boliviano* (CANOB – Central of Native Ayoreos of Eastern Bolvia), the Guarayus *Central de Organizaciones de los Pueblos Nativos Guarayos* (COPNAC – Coordinating Body for Guraryos Native People)), and Chiquitano who later formed the CICC and CICOL. These would all become active members of CIDOB (Yashar, 2005: 200).

[28] As the CIDOB moved to assume the role of the representative body for the lowland indigenous movement at national level, it left an empty space in terms of representing people from Santa Cruz. To fill the void, in 1992 a committee of organisations from Santa Cruz elaborated a proposal to create a departmental organisation. During a meeting in 1994, grassroots entities created the *Coordinadora de los Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz* (CPESC – Coordinating Body for the Ethnic People of Santa Cruz), which they ratified a year later in a *Gran Asamblea*. The CPESC is member of the CIDOB (ALAS et al., 2001: 12).

[29] For a debate on the Indigenous Law, see Chapter 8.

when the participating groups protested against the increased destruction of their living space and demanded territories. Attaining significant public support, they achieved the first official recognition of indigenous territories; shortly afterwards Bolivia became one the of the first Latin American countries to ratify ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Albó, 2002: 77; Ströbele-Gregor et al., 1994: 106). CIDOB political pressure and mobilisation later resulted in the inclusion of some of their demands (for example, the collective ownership of land), into the 1996 National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) Law. They have also proposed candidates for national and local elections (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 43; Yashar, 2005: 24-25).

Cooperation between Highland and Lowland Movements

While the agendas of the newer highland and lowland movement seemingly overlap, cooperation has not always been easy – with special tensions regularly ensuing between the CSUTCB and the CIDOB. In this regard, former president of the CIDOB, Nicolás Montero noted: 'We have never had a sincere relationship with the CSUTCB … it has a particular situation that is different to ours, their systems of government are very different from our own and for that reason they have reached the point of becoming a political party' (quoted in Lucero, 2008: 94). Lowland leaders stress that their movements organically grow out of the *comunidades* – less top-down (or 'taproot') than the union model they think highlanders use.[30]

Additionally, there is a mutual distrust and political differences between the various groups (see Albó, 1996: 3; Lucero, 2008: 94-96; McKee, 1999: 3-5). CIDOB and CSUTCB leaders have held opposing attitudes toward the government. While the CIDOB demonstrated a willingness to collaborate with the Bolivian government and were more pragmatic, the CSUTCB has generally opposed the executive (see Albó, 1996: 5). They have also exhibited different ideas about political priorities – throughout the 1990s 'territory' was less of a concern to highland groups, who were more focused on political and economic autonomy (Canessa, 2007b: 209).

[30] Still, as the comments by Lorenzo Pasabare's in the previous chapter indicate, in reality many lowland movements have also adopted a union organisational model. As Lorenzo's statements indicate, this creates a dilemma for lowland groups who in line with their 'indigenous' agenda are balancing between stressing their 'traditional' organizational forms based more on a rhizomic model and their social movements based on a union organisational (or taproot) model (see Chapter II).

There are also differences in the collective identifiers groups use and promote. Interestingly, during the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity, where marchers from high and lowlands participated, most highland group leaders 'passionately opposed being identified as indigenous on the grounds that this term was a colonial imposition, preferring to be known as "*originarios"*, originary people' (Canessa, 2007b: 209).[31] Olivia Harris notes in this respect:

> While in the early stages the Aymara movement appropriated the colonial term Indian for itself, rather as the black power movement had done in the USA, increasingly they have rejected not only this term but also the label indigenous, because of their racist connotations, Instead they have chosen the term pueblos *originarios* – first people – which places the emphasis on the legitimacy of their political claims rather that some racist essence (2000: 21).

However, no sweeping statement can be made that highlanders self-identify as *originario* and lowlanders as 'indigenous'. As Canessa points out, 'since Evo Morales' election, the use of "*indígena*" among highland populations has been spreading' (2007b: 209). Conversely, lowlanders may self-identify as *indígena*, but also at times as *originario* – attesting to the constant circulation of ideas and denominators among the movements.[32] While establishing a common coordinating body has failed in the past, at the time of fieldwork, highland and lowland indigenous organisations, union movements and the MST were all cooperating in the latest coordinating body, the *Pacto de Unidad* (Unity Pact).[33] Although they managed to

[31] On the rise of the term see also, Xavier Albó (1996: 2). This also becomes clear when considering statements of Evo Morales featured in recent publications, where he also often employs the term rather than 'indigenous' (for example, see Albro, 2005, 2006).

[32] Another area where this circulation of ideas is obvious, is in the meanings that highland and lowland attach to land and territory. Andean indigenous organisations have generally come to recognise that 'territory' signifies one's own space in which to live, not simply a parcel of land to cultivate (see Albó, 1996: 2).

[33] As part of the campaigns which marked the'500 Years of Resistance', in 1992 the CSUTCB and CIDOB began to demand the establishment of an *Asamblea de Nacionalidades* - a form of governing institution for the indigenous communities. In March 1995 the CSUTCB, CIDOB and other indigenous representatives organised a conference in Santa Cruz entitled *Instrumento Político - Tierra Territorio*. The *Instrumento Político - Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (IP-ASP) was formed as the indigenous people's latest representative body. It did not sustain political momentum (see McKee, 1999).

organise joint marches and assemblies, there was constant friction among the different members, which at times brought the alliance close to breaking point.[34]

The Chiquitano Organisation of Concepción

The situation prevailing in Ñuflo de Chavez department on the eve of the emergence of the movement in Concepción, largely fits Yashar's description of Bolivian Amazon lowland areas. Nevertheless, her claim that associational space has generally existed, while organisational capacity and motive were lacking until the 1970s and 1980s, can not unilaterally be assumed. The 1952 Revolution did not dismantle, but increased, cattle rancher and logger dominance over land, and while some *comunidades* obtained land titles, others stayed dependent for household reproduction on cattle ranches or other large-scale agricultural properties (see Riester, 1976: 129). Consequently, in the 1970s *comunidades* and *ranchos* found themselves in divergent circumstances: while some were relatively independent, others were tightly controlled by patrons. In the towns, some Chiquitano found themselves at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. While Chiquitano *ranchos* and *comunidades* were to a certain degree tied to the local administrative structure via labour drafts and other impositions, a number *comunidades* enjoyed a level of autonomy in running their own affairs.

Yashar's notion of an absence of trans-community networks rings true in the Chiquitano case. As the CICC noted, in Concepción: 'as every *comunidad* had their "ancestral" form of organisation, there was no communication between them and their daily problems were not known' (n/d: 1). Interaction was further impeded by the ban on public meetings imposed by successive oppressive regimes and restrictions imposed by the patrons, stifling associational space. What existed was discontent and a 'motive' for organising. This is indicated by the 'everyday' resistance expressed since the Jesuit times in the form of foot-dragging, stealing, feigning or rejecting submission, undertaking prohibited traditional practices,

[34] *Pacto de Unidad* (Unity Pact) is another name for the *Asamblea Nacional de Organizaciones Indígenas, Originarias, Campesinas y de Colonizadores de Bolivia* (The National Assembly of Indigenous, Originario, Peasant, and Coloniser Organisations of Bolivia), an alliance of indigenous, *originario*, peasant and coloniser organisations. It emerged in 2002, after peasant, *originario* and indigenous organisations had demanded a Constituent Assembly by marching from Santa Cruz to La Paz. On 3-5 August 2006 the organisations declared their common goals for the Constituent Assembly in the '*Manifiesto de la Asamblea Nacional de Organizaciones Indígenas, Originarias, Campesinas y de Colonizadores de Bolivia*', during a *Magna Asamblea Nacional* realised in Sucre.

contempt, suicide or flight; also certain dances during *fiestas* expressed discontent (Lacroix, 2006: 28-29; Riester, 1976: 36).[35] Chiquitano also retreated to isolated localities, refused to supply local markets or work for the whites (Riester, 1976: 36).[36]

The initial idea to organise was conceived by *comunarios* who had attended union workshops in the highlands with the help of the Catholic Church. As Nicolás Aguilar Faldín (a CICC founding member) records:

> Recently they began to want to organise the cooperatives. They came here to these parts, father Julio Tumiri [a priest from La Paz], who said to me: "… there are some congresses. We are taking people there and there are scholarships for those who are interested in going". So, in Concepción, they chose Umberto Baciar to study agronomy. And I went … to study to be president of a cooperative, an agricultural cooperative, yes.[37]

He recalled travelling to Cochabamba when he was seventeen and staying there from 1971 until 1974. Apart from studying agronomy, Aguilar learned to speak *quechua* and about 'politics'; which enabled him 'to fight for the simple people like me'. Upon returning to his *comunidad* with fellow activists, he:

> formed a consumer cooperative … here we sold plantain, maize, yuca, good business … [Additionally,] in 1952 … I got to know the part[ies] that [were] fighting, the MNR and FALANGE … I became more politically aware. I was still young, no? [I learned] what are good politics and the bad ones … and I said: "It cannot go on, we have to get to something, leaders, we have to do something" … So I went to Conce

[35] Lacroix mentions the 'dance of the *abuelos*' (grandparents), which portrayed the non-converted ancestors and 'constituted a reference to pre-Jesuit culture. They openly ridiculed the masked individuals that represented the Spanish' (2006: 29).

[36] That resistance is expressed in more subtle ways, including rituals, has been noted by authors such as Scott (1985), Dirks (1994) and, for the Ecuadorean case, Korovkin (2000). Comaroff posits that: 'when expressions of dissent are prevented from attaining the level of open discourse, a subtle but systematic breach of authoritative cultural codes might make a statement of protest which, by virtue of being rooted in a shared structural predicament and experience of dispossession … provides an appropriate medium through which the values and structures of a contradictory world may be addressed and manipulated' (quoted in Dirks, 1994: 487). Rituals can thus provide an expression of, and a safety valve for, conflicts within a community without questioning the basic order of society itself (Dirks, 1994: 485).

[37] '*Recién se estaba comenzando a querer organizar las cooperativas, se vino por acá por estos rincones el padre Julio Tumiri y me dicen ellos, "ejte hay unos congresos, estamos llevando y hay becas pa' el que tenga interés de ir", Conce pone a Humberto Baciar pa' ingeniero agrónomo, parte de Concepción. Y yo me fui… a estudiar ya para presidente de la cooperativa, cooperativa agropecuaria, ya'*. Interview: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

> with… my cousin. [When] we got there [we said] "why do we not organise ourselves through football?[38]

Opportunity to forge an intercommunity network arose in 1977, when the *comunarios* of Alta Mira (a *comunidad* close to Concepción) initiated work on a football field and, shortly after, arranged the first inter-communal football tournament in 1980. These seemingly inconsequential events provided the necessary political associational space and network in a political atmosphere characterised by deep-seated *hacendado* hostility and the ban on public meetings imposed by successive dictatorial governments (ALAS et al., 2001: 16; Lacroix, 2005: 49).[39] ALAS et al. also mention the enabling role of the *Corporación de Desarrollo de Santa Cruz* (CORDECRUZ – Santa Cruz Development Corporation), who in 1984 arranged inter-communal work groups to implement agricultural work projects (2001: 16).[40]

CICC founding member Udalrico Vargas Jaldín points to some of the main impulses for organising:

> Because in these times, they enslaved us through the labour tribute [imposed by the sub-prefecture]... They sent us to the Sub-prefect in those times, they gave us tasks, digging and sorting out the roads, with picks. … If you did not do [the tasks] in a week, you had to do them in a month until you finished the job, right? That's how it was… when we organised ourselves, this was the first battle that occurred to put an end to it.[41]

Such labour tribute also served to supply lands to private landowners. This grievance was compounded by the expectancy that they needed to 'respect' the patrons and it was a 'crime and forbidden to disobey their orders' (CICC, n/d: 1). As a *comunario*,

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[38] *'Exacto. De ahí ya fue. Formamos una cooperativa de consumo… acá se vendía plátano, maíz, yuca, buen negocio… Habían poderes políticos, estaba en el 52 y ahí conocí qué partido era el que luchaba, era MNR y FALANGE… Y fui conociendo a fondo la política… ya joven ya ¿no? Cual es la política buena y cual es la mala … y yo decía: "no pueda seguir, tenemos que llegar a algo, a algo tenemos que hacer, dirigentes"… Entonces nos fuimos a Conce con mi primo. Llegamos allá "¿porqué no nos organizamos en forma de fútbol?'*. Interview: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

[39] As McAdam et al. note 'under repressive regimes, authorised public ceremonies and holiday celebrations frequently provide occasions for making of claims, however fleeting, whose statement elsewhere would put the claimants at high risk to detection and punishment' (2001: 10).

[40] The Santa Cruz Development Corporation represents a technical arm of the Prefecture. This changed with the LAD-adm 1995 (see below), when tasks that CORDECRUZ had been responsible for passed to be directly undertaken by the Prefecture (Rivero et al., 2007).

[41] *'Porque en ese tiempo nos esclavizaban a nosotros en cuestión de prestación vial, limpiar los caminos. Nos mandaba el subprefecto en ese tiempo, nos daban tarea, cavar el camino arreglar, meterle palo, y era tarea pues si usted no lo hacía en una semana, tenia que hacerlo en un mes, hasta terminar la tarea, pues ¿no?, así era entonces cuando ya nos organizamos esa fue la primer lucha que hubo, a que se acabe eso, y algunos subprefectos así daban digamos el papel de la prestación vial para llevarnos a rozar potreros o tumbar chaco, así era antes'*. Interview: Candelaria, 10 May 2007.

recorded by ALAS et al., noted, the Chiquitano organised 'to defend ourselves against all the wrongs we suffer; to start to discover a better future for our families and *comunidades*, because the abuses … are many' (2001: 16).

The argument of Yashar (2005: 54-57) and other authors who emphasise a link between the emergence of ethnic movements and the 1980 economic recession in the sense that it led to a 'drawing back of the state', cannot directly be applied as a promoter of mobilisation in the Chiquitanía.[42] Services supplied by the government did not reach the environs of Concepción and many rural inhabitants suffered continued exclusion from many basic rights (such as health, education and political representation) which, in turn, white and *mestizo* ranchers and town dwellers enjoyed. Among the complaints featured often illegal conscription, that lasted for two years (ALAS et al., 2001: 17; CICC, n/d: 1). Linked to this high degree of social oppression, figured the complaint of arbitrary and 'illegal arrest of *compañeros*' (ALAS et al., 2001: 17). *Comunarios* protested against the 'occupation of the lands of *comunidades* by *latifundios* [large estates]' (CICC, n/d: 1). Lastly, and reinforcing the findings of other authors regarding the increased vigour of social movements during 'transitions to democracy', the CICC mentions in its foundation document: 'knowing that our national state now was enjoying a democratic life, in [which] the opinions and rights of the citizens were respected, to get these rights respected it was necessary to unite [our] efforts … of all the *comunidades* through a representative organisation' (n/d: 2).[43]

The *Central Campesina de Comunidades de Concepción* (CICC – Federation of Peasant Communities of Concepción) was founded on 4 June 1985, during a well-attended assembly of eight *comunidades* located close to Concepción.[44] Like many other lowland organisations that emerged around the time, the organisational model

[42] Korovkin (1997), Guerrero (2001: 221-222) and Zamosc (1994) highlight the role the 1980 economic recession and withdrawal of the state as one important factor in the rise of ethnic movement sin the Ecuadorean highlands.

[43] As mentioned, transition to democracy in Latin America generally provided increased organisational freedom or, in Yashar's words**,** political associational space. In Bolivia the consolidation of democracy in the 1980s opened up new opportunities for a greater spectrum of actors and perspectives (Albó, 1996: 2). Thus, the emergence of indigenous movements and the Chiquitano movement can be seen in the light of an 'explosion' of civil society and social mobilisation against military regimes in the 1970s, followed by demands for citizenship rights in the 1980s (see Foweraker, 1995; Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Waisman, 1999).

[44] The CICC (n/d: 2) calls it 'the first structural congress of our comunidades in the Ñuflo de Chavez province'.

chosen resembled that of a agrarian union (ALAS et al., 2001: 17).[45] The Chiquitano organisation came to formulate similar demands to those emanating from other lowland ethnic movements around questions of education, health, financial autonomy and rights to organise, although land came to constitute their principal priority (Lacroix, 2005: 49). In this respect, the CICC notes: 'Where *comunidades* existed, *mestizo*s, *criollos* and *caray* [white people] invaded. They then proceeded to take legal steps through the agrarian reform and appeared as owners of our lands' (n/d: 1). The problem became exacerbated by the fact that land was growing ever more scarce within Chiquitano *comunidades* due to natural population growth.

Between 1985 and 1989, the CICC set out to assist *comunidades* to solve their land problems through obtaining legal titles (CICC, n/d: 2). CORDECRUZ and sympathetic development NGOs stepped in to provide credit for agricultural input, productive projects, training and technical expertise. As a *comunario* noted in a document elaborated by the CICC: 'They gave incentives for training young technicians from the *comunidades*, in order to promote development and strengthen organisations among our Chiquitano indigenous *comunidades* in the Concepción zone' (my translation, CICC, n/d: 2). From 1989 to 1993, the CICC built a more consolidated 'platform', working with six secretaries designated specific functions, such as land, gender, education and health. From 1994, the struggle to establish the TCO Monte Verde started to dominate the agenda, while in 1995 the CICC decided to participate in local politics, through contesting municipal elections in coordination with CICOL (CICC, n/d: 2).

[45] The directory elected on 4 June 1985 was composed of the following members: President: Patricio Hurtado Tamo Coiné (Alta Mira), Vice-president: Udalrrico Vargas (Candelaria), Recording Secretary: Miguel Supepi Gaveta (Santa Rita), Treasurer: Agustín Supepi Pinto (Guayaba), (Public) Relations Secretary: Carlos Bailaba Mangari (A1ta Mira), Agrarian Reform Secretary: Basilio Mamata (San Lucas), Health and Education Secretary: Crisanto Chávez Núñez (Guadalupe), Sports Secretary: Pedro Supepi Pinto (Santa Rita), Organisation Secretary: Nicolás Aguilar (Candelaria) (ALAS et al., 2001: 17).

Chiquitano Modes of Group and Self-Identification

From Central Campesina *to* Central Indígena *and from 'Peasant' to 'Indigenous'*

Indicatively, in that year the TCO became the CICC's hot topic and the organisation changed its name from 'peasant' to 'indigenous': the *Central Indígena de Comunidades de Concepción* (CICC – Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Concepción). The CICC et al. (2007: n/p) explain that this was a reaction to the promulgation of multicultural laws in Bolivia, which also entailed the recognition of 'indigenous people' as subjects with rights. Through identifying as 'indigenous' and getting their communal organisations legally registered (becoming 'legible' (Scott, 1998) to the state), they could participate in the local political sphere (Chapter VII) and claim their own territory (Chapter VI). As CGTI-MV leader Carlos Leigue explained to me:

> Yes, it was parallel [to the territorial claim] that the workshops started … when they held the workshops in the *comunidades* they asked the people how they felt … if I call them 'indigenous'. Well, how does this person feel to be indigenous, if by calling them indigenous it could be that they get offended, or it could be that he does not like it. And so… we have been raising awareness amongst the people and the people have accepted it, and in reality, the people did not have [a reason] for saying 'well I do not want to be', because they originate from peoples who have always been at the forefront, right?[46]

He described that CICC, CIP-SJ, and OICH leaders travelled to the claimant *comunidades* and held workshops to inform the *comunarios* of Concepción and San Javier of their plans to claim the territory and raise 'indigenous' awareness among them. In the case of the Chiquitano *comunidades* around Concepción, this was relatively problem free, because, as Leigue pointed out, many had failed to achieve a legal registration and land titles as peasant communities, generally due to lacking awareness of the appropriate administrative procedures::

> … why have the *comunidades* not got their legal personality before? Because there was not legal accompaniment, there was no orientation that tells them 'well, we are

[46] *'Si fue paralelo, ya vinieron las capacitaciones… cuando se ha hecho así los talleres en las comunidades se le preguntaba a la gente cómo la gente se siente … que yo la diga indígena, digamos. Entonces, como se siente esta persona de ser Indígena, si es, si con decirle yo Indígena, este, puede ser que se ofenda, o puede ser que no le guste digamos, ¿no? Entonces en toda esa parte, digamos, se ha venido consientizando a la gente y la gente ha aceptado eso, y la verdad no tenía porque la gente decir 'bueno yo no quiero ser', porque han venido de un origen de un pueblo que siempre ha estado al frente'* Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

> going to get the legal personality for the *comunidad* as '*campesina*' … but when the demand of the *pueblo indígena* of Monte Verde is made, then the people start thinking and start creating other perspectives, right?. And their vision is not like it was [and] they say 'well, we do not want to be *campesino,* we want to be *indígena*, right? And this has stayed until now and the *comunidades* … perceive it; if one is called *indígena* there is no reason why one should get upset. That is ones origin after all.[47]

Carlos Leigue was clear about the fact that the Chiquitano *centrales* in Ñuflo de Chávez province were aware that this process had to be homogenous, to avoid contradictions:

> I think it is important to define a position as *pueblo* Chiquitano and so we have to be strong in the decision because we do not want to contradict ourselves with the *comunidades*, well, 'I am Peasant', well, or 'I am indigenous'. … But we in the Ñuflo de Chávez province, we have very much insisted [even if] some *comunidades* do not accept to be indigenous. [But we] have achieved it, because the people that have formed the *comunidades* have not come from another place….[48]

Creating homogenous Chiquitano indigenous people was, of course, important in the light of Chiquitano claim for territory and rights. After all, Article 171 of the Bolivian Constitution clearly implies that only 'indigenous peoples' can be legal claimants of 'original communal lands' (see Chapter VII).[49] Carlos Leigues' statement also indicates, that some Chiquitanos do indeed *not* identify as 'indigenous', a point discussed below.

Nevertheless, it is above all Chiquitano leaders who use the term in a way that resonates with the national multicultural rights framework, i.e. to express that Chiquitano have special entitlements by law, have collective interests, or when they stress certain collective achievements. In this context, they also often refer to the general economic and political circumstances embracing '*el pueblo Chiquitano'* ('the

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[47] *'… ¿Porque, digamos, las comunidades han sacado su personería jurídica más antes?: porque no había un asesoramiento, no había una orientación que le diga 'bueno nosotros sacamos la personería jurídica de la comunidad como campesina', no entonces, pero si cuando ya se hace la demanda del pueblo indígena de Monte Verde, entonces ahí la gente ya va pensando y va este, va creando otras expectativas, ¿no?, y la visión de ellos ya no es como antes, entonces ellos ya han renunciado a decir 'bueno nosotros no queremos ser campesinos, queremos ser indígenas', no?, y eso se ha quedado hasta ahora y que las comunidades hasta ahora las comunidades lo perciben eso y no hay porque molestarse cuando le dicen a uno indígena, no?, es su origen pues'.* Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

[48] *'… yo creo que es importante definir una posición como pueblo Chiquitano y entonces tenemos que ser, este, ser firmes en la decisión porqué no queremos, este, contradecirnos con las comunidades, bueno, "yo soy campesina", este, o "yo soy indígena", entonces no hay digamos una posición clara, pero nosotros como provincia de Ñuflo de Chávez, nosotros tanto hemos insistido, digamos, de que algunas comunidades no aceptaban ser indígenas, pero se ha logrado, por lo que la gente que han formado las comunidades no han venido de otro lado'* . Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

[49] Interview: Carlos Leigue (CGTI leader), Concepción, 26 October 2006.

Chiquitano people'). One indicative example of this is Carlos Leigue's use of terms in the following statement:

> The other governments that have passed never have wanted to recognise the rights of the indigenous peoples. Despite that the *Chiquitano pueblo* has reacted strongly and has made [them] respect the rights. Thus we … have obtained our territory ... We have achieved various things more, which belong to us as indigenous, as Bolivians, right? Because they have always taken advantage and the indigenous peoples have stayed in marginality, in poverty, while others live happily.[50]

Carlos Leigue links 'being indigenous' and 'Bolivian' to deserving entitlement to certain rights. His sense of Chiquitano groupness is partly informed by the feeling that they are 'marginalised'; as 'Bolivian' and 'indigenous', something is 'being owed' to Chiquitanos, which they now are claiming. Like the other Chiquitano leaders, he is aware that 'indigeneity' provides 'political arsenal' to claim rights as indigenous citizens and gain the instant solidarity of other indigenous movements (see Hale, 2009: 323).[51] The statement also implies that he perceives a sense of solidarity between all those (indigenous) peopleswho fought for land and struggled for rights: 'indigeneity' provides a banner behind which Chiquitano activists and other ethnic movements in Bolivia may unite to claim rights that they feel that they have been denied in their different localities.[52]

The Difficulty of 'Creating' Indigenous People

Nevertheless, the Chiquitano case also shows that getting people to adopt a particular identifier is not easy and that it is even harder to get people to associate terms with similar meanings.[53] The term 'indigenous' (as well as 'peasant') is associated with diverse meanings in different areas of Bolivia. As Canessa's case study of Pocobaya,

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[50] '*… los otros gobiernos que han pasado nunca han querido reconocer el derecho de los pueblos indígenas. A pesar de eso, el pueblo Chiquitano se ha movido fuerte y ha hecho respetar los derechos. Entonces hemos … conseguido nuestro territorio. … Hemos conseguido varias cosas más que nos pertenecen como indígenas, como bolivianos, ¿no? Porque siempre se han aprovechado y los pueblos indígenas han quedado marginados en la pobreza, mientras otros viven felices*'. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

[51] Jürgen Riester makes this point for the different Bolivian lowland groups who adopted the label (1976: 36).

[52] This resonates with Cohen's point that although a 'movement's programme may appear quite specific; … its component items are, like symbols themselves, amenable to idiosyncratic interpretation by the members in the light of their own circumstances and experiences … It fills a vacuum; without it, these feelings would only be expressed in a highly fractionalised and ineffective way, they should probably not be heard at all' (1985a: 108).

[53] The point that much work has to go into the creation and maintenance of collective identities has amply been made by analysts of social movement (see, for example, McAdam et al., 1996; McAdam et al., 2001: 6; Offe, 1985; Tarrow, 1988: 422; Tilly, 2004).

an Aymara-speaking highland community demonstrates, while Pocobayeños identified as 'indigenous' in the 2001 census, the term is not employed for self-identification. Instead, Pocobayeños generally refer to themselves as '*jaqui*' (people), a 'complex and ritually enforced identity which develops over time and can be lost with migration to the city' (2006: 258). Indeed, Pocobayeños reserve the Spanish term '*indígena*' for lowland Indians, who they deem less 'civilised' than themselves (2006: 257-258).

To complicate matters, in the Bolivian lowlands, not all of those who might be expected to identify as *indígenas* do so, including some Chiquitano. In my long interview with Carlos Leigue, throughout which we sat on the backsteps of the CGTI-MV office in Concepción and looked at the chickens patrolling the backyard, I addressed this topic. I had travelled to a meeting of the German Development Agencies' Chiquitanía group in San Ignacio de Velasco – a town in the Chiquitanía, which lies to the east of Concepción and can be reached via a dirt track road (around seven hours by pick-up). As part of the daily programme, we visited the small Chiquitano community of Guapamó located about half an hour from the town. When I talked to some of the *comunarios*, it became clear that *comunarios* in Guapamó did not identify as *indígena* but identified as *campesino* instead. One *comunario* told me that he did not really know why, adding that 'indigenous' carried a negative stigma.[54] Carlos Leigue offered the following explanation:

> … well, you have visited other *comunidades*, and to tell you the zone of Velasco, [it] is the same Chiquitano people, no? But what happens is that in San Ignacio there are now many people from other places, lets say … they come from the altiplano, well, or they come from the border with Brazil, therefore it is nearly not that strict anymore that the same Chiquitano people, or the person feels *originaria*. There are various factors that have to be analysed [as to why] sometimes people do not want to be indigenous any more and want to be *Campesino*.[55]

Leigue associates increasing in-migration with some loss of whatever attributes he associated with 'being indigenous' or '*originario'*. Alternative explanations might be that, firstly, these communities had received legal titles as peasant communities

[54] Field notes: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

[55] '*… usted ha visitado otras comunidades, y por decirle la zona de Velasco, es el mismo pueblo Chiquitano, ¿no? Pero lo que pasa que en San Ignacio ya hay mucha gente de otros lados, digamos, o si bien vienen del Altiplano, este, si bien vienen de la frontera del Brasil, entonces ya ellos, ya casi que no es tan bien regid que el pueblo mismo Chiquitano o la persona sentirse originaria de ahí ya no, entonces, hay varios factores que hay que analizarlos porque a veces la gente ya no quiere ser indígena, y porque quiere ser campesino'*. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

through the 1953 Agrarian Reform and they therefore did not need to adopt an 'indigenous' identity. Secondly, it may be that no consciousness-raising workshops took place in the *comunidades* of Velasco province. While in Ñuflo de Chávez 'educated' *comunarios* could thereafter be 'proud to be indigenous', in Velasco *comunidades* may have lacked the necessary leaders, pre-existing networks, interested NGO or Church allies, and resources, necessary to spread any collective identifier or, indeed, any kind of movement (cf. Yashar, 2005).[56] As social movement scholars and those working on communities in general have recognised, without such a mechanism, no new mode of collective identification can spread (cf. Anderson, 1991; Latour, 2007; Melucci, 1985; Tilly, 1984).[57]

'We are not indigenous…': Thinking About Antagonisms

There was also another group of people who questioned the 'indigenous' label for self-identification. One evening in early June 2007 in the Palimira *comunidad* (Lomerío), some Chiquitano colleagues that worked for CEJIS, Don Adriano (a *comunario* from Palmira) and I took some time out to relax in Don Adriano's patio after we had conducted some workshop sessions and interviews. After a while, we started talking about the way that we all self-identified.[58] First of all, the group agreed that they would tell somebody from another country that they were Bolivian, because these people would 'not know about Chiquitanos'. Don Adriano, Lorenzo, David, Jesús and Pedro further agreed that they would call themselves 'Chiquitano' in reference to other '*naciones*' ('nations'), such as the '*nación Aymara'* (Aymara Nation), or '*nación Guarani'* (Guaraní Nation). This demonstrates the relational and

[56] A similar case is made by Shannan Mattiace (2009) for the case of the Maya of the Yucatán, Mexico. Drwing on Yashar's framework she argues that what impeded the rise of an identity-based movement in this case was firstly, that Maya peasants had little relative autonomy under the corporatist regime (1940s–1980s), and secondly, that networks which might have been relied on the union networks and Catholic Progressive sectors (and 'ally') did not serve 'as vehicles for leadership training and organization' (2009: 137).

[57] This latter point is demonstrated by the fact that according to Carlos Leigue also another group of people that did not self-identify as *indígena* or in his words 'that do not believe themselves people that want to carry the *indígena* origin' (*porque la persona se cree ya no una persona que no quiere llevar digamos el origen indígen').* This group of people are Young people that had gone to the city to work, spent a long time there and upon return to the *comunidades* or the ex-mission towns did not call themselves '*indígena'* anymore. Carlos Leigue did not offer any explanations as to why this change in self-identification happens and whether dropping of *indígena* as self-identification also implies that they do not identify as Chiquitano either. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

[58] Field notes: Palmira, 6 June 2007.

contrastive way in which modes of self-identification are employed in general (see, for example, Cohen, 1985a: 115).

When it came to the term '*indígena*', the men agreed that '*indígena*' was something that people called the *centrales*, but that people were not *indígena*, people were Chiquitano, *Camba*, or Bolivian. They pointed out that the term *'indígena'* features in the names of the *centrales*, i.e. the *Central Indígena Chiquitana de Concepción* (Indigenous Organisation of *Comunidades* Concepción), or the *Central Indígena de Paikonekas de San Javier* (Indigenous Organisation of Paikonecas of San Javier). On this point, Don Adriano explained:

> They call us indigenous and things like that, but this is also a historical misunderstanding. Columbus found this continent on his way to India and this is why they call us "*indios*", and, well, now "indigenous". But we do not call ourselves "indigenous". Our organisation is called like that, but I am Cruceño, or also *camba*.[59]

With 'they', Don Adriano referred to certain NGOs that the *central* and the *comunidades* had cooperated with (for example, they mentioned APCOB) and anthropologists working for them. Don Lorenzo added that anthropologists were generally concerned with trying to categorise Chiquitanos and thought about whether to call them names like '*tribu*' (tribe), '*aborígenes*' ('aboriginals'), '*indios*' or '*originarios*'. They laughed about this and stated that they found these names ridiculous and that they were derogatory. Don Adriano explained that in the past they were given names such as *'Paikos de mierda'* ('Paikos full of shit', 'Paiko' is short for 'Paikoneka') and *'mozos'* ('slaves'), apart from 'tribes' and '*indio*'. He added that all these names had been devised to subordinate them to the 'whites', to make them inferior and 'classify them, like animals'. Lastly, Don Adriano pointed out that this did not exclude international law, which talked about 'the habitat of indigenous people'. He said 'habitat' was a word used for *'animales del monte'* ('wild animals') and the whites saw them like this.

These statements demonstrate several things. Firstly, it resonates with the point made in Chapter II that while the state has the potential to impose modes of identification, the labels states produce may be contested. Populations may attach multiple meanings to such terms, and engage it for different purposes at different

[59] *'Nos llaman indígenas y cosas así, pero eso también es una equivocación de la historia. Colombus encontró este continente en camino a la India y por eso no llamaba Indios, y bueno, ahora indígenas. Pero nosotros no nos llamamos indígenas. Nuestra organización, si se llama así, pero yo soy pues Cruceño, o Camba también'*. Field notes: Palmira, 6 June 2007.

times (see Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 16; Hale, 2009: 323). Accordingly, Chiquitano leaders tend to use the term *'indígena'* when making political claims, to establish an additional barrier to others, while it is deemed unacceptable for the purpose of self-identification by some Chiquitano. Additionally, this indicates that Chiquitano *comunarios* and CEJIS team members are well aware of the paradox and antagonism that the adoption of the label entails. While it can be employed to gain certain rights, this also means adopting a state-sanctioned reductionist and – in the eyes of some Chiquitano – racist, label. Adopting the label makes Chiquitano subject to rights, but also 'white' ideas and concepts. They interpret it as an attempt to categorise and subordinate them, to exert the power to impose a label, a function that other labels (such as '*indio*') have had in the past. Consequently, while the use of the term 'indigenous' does not preclude pragmatism and agency from the side of those who employ the term, it might still be 'unacceptable' to some.

Photo 26: Don Adriano's Family, Palmira

CEJIS team members with Don Adriano (centre) and his family, Palmira *comunidad*, Lomerío

Being a Comunario

Chiquitano are far more likely to self-identify as *comunario* or as *Chiquitano* than *indígena*. The meanings Chiquitano attach to these terms show evidence, of both, Dan Rosengren's 'taproot model', with emphasis on an organic link 'between people, place, and language' (2003: 222), as well as the 'rhizomic model', 'a nonbounded and expansive relational identification process …. that stresses similarities and links' (2003: 223). Different *comunarios* stress different meanings over others, which leads to a somewhat confusing picture – reflecting the negotiated and complex nature of the self-identification. These contradictions are rarely felt, unless politicians or researchers attempt to pinpoint the 'essence' of the fluid construction, because political projects and rights depend on them, while researchers try to make them 'legible'. I address the terms 'Chiquitano' and *'comunario'* separately, as Chiquitano attach differing meanings to them. To complicate matters, Chiquitano can either be *'de comunidad'* (from a *comunidad*) or *'del pueblo'* (from the village). Nearly all *comunarios* living in Concepción municipality are Chiquitano and Chiquitano make up 30.4 per cent of the population of the town of Concepción (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001).*

Most *comunarios,* however, live in Chiquitano *comunidades*. To present a general picture of *comunidades* (as a physical place) in Concepción, San Javier and the TCO Monte Verde at the time of field-work, the following presents an 'ideal type' description. In terms of their location, as already indicated, they are located at varying distances former mission settlements; *comunidades* inside the TCO are situated in clearings in the tropical rainforest. *Comunidades* are generally located close to rivers, lagoons or *atajados* (artificial lakes), or both, to secure the *comunidad*'s water supply, but also to allow *comunarios* to go fishing. Nevertheless, fishing has lost some importance, especially as *comunidades* are often 'encircled' by private cattle farms or logging concession and access to lagoons or rivers may require permission from the private owner (also compare Jürgen Riester's (1976:133) description of *comunidades* in the 1970s).

The *comunidades* in and outside the TCO Monte Verde and generally encompass rectangular houses with thatched *paja* (palm leave) roofs, with wooden slatts as walls build (e.g. see photo 27 below, and photos 8 and 9, Chapter III). Some dwellings are plastered with clay and a few are painted white. The bigger

comunidades have some more built-up houses, with stone or white-washed adobe walls. The frontage of the houses faces a rectangular cleared *cancha* (multipurpose field) in the middle of the *comunidad*, which also serves as a football pitch (see map 3). Characteristically, *comunidades* have one or several school buildings and a chapel made out of adobe bricks and painted white, the roof being tiled or made of metal and with tiled or concrete flooring (see photo 28). In *comunidades* in Lomerío chapels are often larger and build out of grey stone, with a tiled roof. Chapel, school building and and a *cancha* are elements that *comunarios* often stress as key elements of the physical appearance of their *comunidad* (see photo 29).

Map 3: Drawn Map of Palestina, TCO Monte Verde



Author: Samuel Massay, Palestina.

Photo 27: Houses in Candelaria

Candelaria is one of the larger *comunidades* in Concepción Municipality.

Photo 28: School Building in Candelaria

Photo 29: Church in Palmira, Lomerío

Stone-built Church in Palmira, a *comunidad* in San Antonio de Lomerío Municipality.

In terms of infrastructure, the larger and more established *comunidades* have water pumps, while smaller, newer ones have waterholes. There is generally no electricity, but some *comunidades* possess a battery or a generator for the school building or meeting hall, and some households own a battery-powered radio. Each *comunidad* has a radio system (which does not always work). Another essential part of the *comunidades* are the *chacos* (fields), where *comunarios* plant their crops, chiefly rice, maize, yucca, plantains and papaya. Lastly, most *comunidades* possess '*tierra de la comunidad*' or '*tierra comunal*', i.e. a certain amount of collectively owned land. *Comunidades* located outside the TCOs are normally surrounded by lesser amounts of *tierra communal* than those inside the TCOs. Older *comunidades* within the TCOs usually have more '*tierra communal*' than the newer ones.

Returning to the term *'comunario'*, firstly, *comunarios* themselves hold differing notions about the relevance of place of birth and residence in defining a *'comunario'*. While some stressed the 'taproot' idea of having been born in a *comunidad*, those that were either born in the ex-mission settlements of Concepción or San Javier where the hospitals were, or on private estates or *ranchos*, proved more likely to stress residency in a *comunidad* as crucial. Others, like Chiquitano leaders

and municipal officials, lived most of the time in Concepción. This meant that they stressed different reasons for identifying as *comunario*. A common theme was 'relational connectedness'. For example, Don Basilio, a *comunario* from Las Mercedes de Guayaba, noted:

> For me a *comunidad* means where various families are living, and based of this family, the *comunidad* constructs itself. It is founded with various people, above all with various families. Some two or three families I think [this] is not *comunidad*. It has to be with some ten families and if there are more, even better … it is where we are together, or united.[60]

While Don Basilio provides a guideline for the size of *comunidades*, the actual number of households or families in a *comunidad* can vary greatly. There are *comunidades* of five families or less.[61]

Not all *comunarios* saw relational connectedness as imperative, but instead stressed the importance of being 'recognised' as *comunario*. The *comunarios* from Turux Napez accepted a man in their *comunidad* who had immigrated to the area from the highlands.[62] A *comunario* from Las Abras stated: 'when other people come to the *comunidad*, then one notifies the authority, then [he or she] calls us to a meeting, so that we decide whether [he or she] stays or whether we throw them out'.[63] Other *comunarios* added that it involved the promise to live by the rules of the *comunidad*, which are closely linked to the way that Chiquitanos sanction certain uses of *communal* land and resources. This 'rhizomic notion' model' can indeed overrule the above-mentioned 'taproot' indicators.

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[60] '*Para mi una significa donde varias familias entonces vivimos ahí y a base de esa familia entonces la comunidad se construye. Se levanta con varias personas, más que todo con varias familias, Unas dos o tres familias yo creo que no es comunidad, tiene que ser con unas 10 y si hay más mucho mejor … es donde estamos juntos o sea unido*'. Workshop: Guayaba, 12 May 2007.

[61] Chiquitano normally refer to 'family' as comprising one 'household' within the *comunidad*. A family in this sense will usually be composed of a husband and wife (although not necessarily formally married) and their children. When asked to list their family or household members, *comunidades* of Palestina, Makanaté and Monte Verde in the TCO Monte Verde listed all their children, including the ones that lived in a different household or elsewhere duets work or study. Field notes: Palestina, 16 February 2007. It is normal for a family to have ten or twelve children, 'twelve children for the twelve apostles' as some *comunarios* told me, although the younger families will have less. In some *comunidades* there are households with single individuals, who are generally related to other people in the *comunidad*. One family occupies one house within the *comunidad*. The *comunarios* usually build a new house for those family members who have found a partner and plant their own *chaco* (field). Some of the single older *comunarios* might have a house to themselves.

[62] It is unknown whether he self-identified as a *comunario*.

[63] '*Cuando viene otra gente a la comunidad, entonces uno les avisa a la autoridad, entonces el nos llama a una reunión, para que decidamos si se queda o lo sacamos*'. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.

Comunarios stressed that the *comunidad* itself was a place where one lived and carried out everyday activities to maintain the household. As Don Esteban from Santa Ana noted, the *comunidad* is 'where one has things to do, where ones *chaco* [field] is'.[64] This idea was especially expressed by women. For example, Doña Dominga from the *comunidad* Santa Ana recorded:

> [In a *comunidad*] one works with all the people … and, well, one goes home to make the lunch for one's husband and makes food for them, rests and goes back to work and goes to help him for a little while and if one has another thing to do, one does it … with the children who are in college, one has to get up early to make them breakfast, so that they eat it and then send them to college.[65]

Importance was also given to 'working together'. As William Roca, a Chiquitano CIP-SJ technician opined, a *comunidad* is 'where [they] form a group of people that want to work together and in an organised manner'.[66] This reflects the fact that *comunarios* carried out tasks together, such as mowing the field in the middle of the *comunidad*, looking after schools and chapels, repairing rain-damaged paths, bridges or dams. *Comunarios* aided each other in some of their agricltural chores, such as harvesting. This type of communal work is also referred to as *minga*. Don Juan, from Makanaté, held that *comunarios* participated 'out of solidarity' and 'out of custom'.[67]

This type of reciprocal labour (the Andean Aymara version of which is called *ayni*) is stressed by national leaders like Evo Morales and Felipe Quishpe as something especially 'indigenous' – and something that stands in contrast to western capitalist values (Canessa, 2006: 258).[68] As Quishpe remarked: 'there is no money involved in *ayni*: we do not count (value) money; you cannot buy the physical strength of another person. Anyone who goes to perform *ayni* does it with all his heart' (quoted in Canessa, 2006: 258). Canessa makes the point that while Pocobayeños will sometimes 'mention *ayni* as something that distinguishes them from *mestizo*s but it is given far less prominence than the rhetoric from indigenous

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[64] *'Donde uno tiene su ver que hacer, su chaco'*. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007.

[65] *'… uno trabaja con toda la gente también, todo eso, y ósea uno se va a su casa a hacer el almuerzo pa' su marido y le da de comer, descansa y se va vuelta a su trabajo y ya uno va un ratito a ayudarle y si uno tiene otra cosa que hacer, uno lo hace, … con los niños que están en el colegio, uno tiene que levantarse temprano a hacerles el desayuno pa´ que tomen y de ahí a mandarlos a su colegio'*. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007. See also, Workshop: Doña Maria Makanaté, 10 May 2007.

[66] *'Donde forman un grupo de personas que quieren trabajar en forma conjunta y de manera organizadas'*. Interview: San Javier, 12 December 2006.

[67] Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007.

[68] Of course, this is a stark simplification. However, a deeper engagement with the notion of *ayni* is beyond the scope of this discussion. See Gose (1994).

leaders might suggest' (Canessa, 2006: 259). In contrast, in Concepción municipality, where *comunarios* often confront the effects of commercial exploitation of land, the notion of reciprocal work versus labour for cash has a stronger meaning.

Linked to this is also the commonly held notion that what differentiates *comunarios* from others was communal landownership.[69] As Patricio Hurtado (former leader of the CICC) stressed, this land 'cannot be sold'.[70] As will be discussed below, Chiquitano *comunarios* also have other rules regarding land use.

Comunarios are not only united through communal landownership and communal work practices, but also through a general concern for the *comunidad.* For example, Fermín from San Pablo Sur noted:

> To be a *comunario* is to be united through all the problems that exist in the *comunidad*, so that we can advance in our *comunidad*, so that it gets bigger and [to] have some legacies that remain for our children … we are already on our way down.[71]

According to former CICC leader Daniel Leigue, living in a *comunidad* meant that *comunarios* had 'the right to everything and to be free'.[72] This reflects the fact that many *comunidades* emerged when the Chiquitanos moved away from cattle ranches and large agricultural properties to settle in *comunidades* after the *empadronameinto* (debt peonage) system was largely dismantled in the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter IV). Older *comunarios* especially perceive *comunidades* as spaces where they can be free from abuse and influence of the *patrones* (bosses). The statement of Doña Catalina from San Lucas reflects this outlook:

> Not to be in an alien place or, let's say, like that of a boss. In one's *comunidad* one works calmly, doing what one wants, keeping animals and one is calm [*tranquilo*].

[69] For example, workshop: El Carmen, 10 May 2007.
[70] Interview: Alta Mira, 25 January 2007. These comments show that Chiquitano *comunidades* have communal landownership and restrictions on the sale of land as described by Wolf for the corporate community (see 1955: 458).
[71] *'Ser una comunidad es ser unido a través de todos los problemas que haya dentro de la comunidad, para así llevar adelante a nuestra comunidad, para que se haga más grande y tener algunos recuerdos que haya para nuestros hijos así. Ya nosotros estamos yendo pa' abajo'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.
[72] '*Es donde vivimos, donde tenemos derecho a todo, y es estar libre*'. Interview: Santa Mónica, 26 January 2007.

> In contrast, with the boss it is practically impossible that one is like that because at any moment, he kicks you and throws you out with all your belongings.[73]

In the hacienda, the rules of behaviour are determined by the owner.Breach might lead to dismissal, or as many other *comunarios* report from their past experiences, physical or psychological violence.[74] Canessa describes similar notions for Pocobayeños in the Bolivian highlands, who also perceive the end of haciendas in the early nineteen-fifties as the crucial 'anti-colonial moment' (Canessa, 2009: 182). For this reason, *comunarios* differentiate between 'being a *comunario*' and 'being *empadronado*'. *Comunarios* do not only use the term '*empadronado'* to refer to the debt-peonage system, but to depict a situation in which a *comunario* becomes a contractual worker who resides on the land owned by white or *mestizo* Cruceños or Concepceños, only visiting the *comunidad* occasionally. Many *comunarios* view 'being *empadronado*' in a negative light and associate it with 'voluntarily' entering into 'slavery'.[75]

Like Ignacio Macoñó (former CIP-SJ leader), many *comunarios* noted that they shared a certain 'culture': 'It is where [they] have their customs, their own languages, their dress and their way of working, music'.[76] These are also elements that *comunarios* stress as relevant for 'being Chiquitano' (and are addressed below). Lastly, a few *comunarios* mentioned that notions of '*comunidad*' involved 'faith'.[77] Most Chiquitano *comunarios* are Catholics, although there a small number of

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[73] '*No estar como en un lugar ajeno, o digamos, así de un patrón. En su comunidad trabaja uno tranquilo, haciendo lo que uno quiere, criar animalitos y uno esta tranquilo. En cambio uno con el patrón ya casi no es dable que uno este así, porque cualquier ratingo a uno le tira una patada y lo botan con todas sus tenencias ahí*'. Workshop: Las Mercedes de Guayaba, 12 May 2007.

[74] See for example: Interview: Udalrrico Vargas Jaldín (*comunario* from El Carmen, CICC founding member), El Carmen, 7 May 2007; Interview: Isidro Pasabare Castedo and Nicolás Yurrupi (*comunarios* from Santa Mónica), Concepción, 19 June 2007; Nicolás Aguilar Faldín (*comunario* from El Carmen, CICC founding member), El Carmen, 7 May 2007.

[75] Don Diego, Don Dago and Doña Hilda from Palestina told me that there are many Chiquitanos who are *empadronados* (i.e. living under a patron). They noted that they worked from dawn to dusk, mostly as cowboys, without earning much. I asked why these people wanted to be *empadronados* rather than having a *chaco*. Don Diego answered that they just 'needed' a patron, somebody to order them around. Hilda was more of the opinion that having a *chaco* was harder than earning cash. Diego argued, however, that they needed somebody to tell them what to do and order them around. Both did not like the idea of being *empadronando* and saw this related to loosing ones freedom *(perder la libertad)*. Don Dago concluded that they (the Chiquitanos) had been *mozos* (slaves) long enough. Field notes: Palestina, 6 March 2007.

[76] '*Es donde tienen sus usos costumbre, sus propias lenguas, su vestimenta, su forma de trabajar, su música*'. Interview: Del Rancho, 7 December 06.

[77] For instance, workshop: Makanaté, 10 May 2007. It is not clear whether those people that referred to *comunidad* as having to do with 'faith', referred to a 'community of faith', i.e. a Christian community, or whether it was just one more commonality of what many other Chiquitanos saw as '*comunidad.'*

evangelicals exist. Observers point out that the religious beliefs and practices of Chiquitano *comunario*s are a syncretism of Catholicism and other practices, which can be traced to the time of the 'reduction' within the Jesuit missions (see Chapter IV).[78] Whatever the precise elements of importance for each *comunario*, all in all, we can say that the *comunidad* and being a full member of it – constitutes the prime sphere of citizenship for *comunarios.*

Being a Chiquitano

While the notion of '*being comunario*' features many elements that point to a more rhizomic definition of who can or cannot be a *comunario* – with the key aspect of having to live up to other *comunarios*' rules of sociability and engaging in communal work practices – 'being Chiquitano' had more specific taproot connotations, such as language.[79] Following the rules of sociability is seen as essential, but the borders defining who is 'Chiquitano' or 'other' are less permeable than in the case of *comunario*.

Chiquitano often stressed the importance of birth for defining who was or was not Chiquitano. However, the emphasis was not on decent, but rather the birthplace being somewhere in the Gran Chiquitanía. For example, *comunario* Pedro Soliz, CEJIS researcher and *comunario* from Santa Rita stated: 'I am a native Chiquitano from here, from Concepción, because I was born here. That is why I am Chiquitano'.[80] Indeed, this draws the circle widely, to include everybody born in the

[78] *Comunarios* attend mass in their chapels, celebrate events of the Catholic religious calendar and have their patron-saint *fiestas* of each *comunidad*. Most *comunidades* possess their own patron saint in the form of a statute or icon. In many *comunidades* the statue is attributed with bringing luck, for example, for hunting (also see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 288-289). Syncretism is especially noticeable in Chiquitano myths and *cuentos* (stories), in which the *Jichi* or *Jichü* features as a prominent protagonist. The *Jichi* lives mostly in water holes and possesses the power to control the force of nature and is therefore often referred to as the 'owner of the forest', or the 'owner of the animals'. He appears to Chiquitano *comunarios* most frequently in the form of a snake, but also as a frog or a human persona (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 256-282). For more information and Chiquitano belief systems, see Riester (1976: 142) and Freyer (1997: 96).

[79] Chiquitano from San Javier and Lomerío at times further differentiate that they are Chiquitano Paikoneka (in San Javier) and Chiquitano Monkox (in Lomerío) – names that, as stated in Chapter II, have circulated at least since the arrival of the Jesuits. Lacroix notes that 'the Chiquitano of Lomerío have constructed their history and their identity considering themselves Monkox, "Man of the land, the place, form here" ["*Hombre de la tierra, del lugar, de aquí*"], "Inhabitants always in this place" ["*Habitantes de siempre de este lugar*"]…' The term apparently comes from 'the *Moncoma*, that lived in the zone at the time of the entry of the Spanish into the region, called *Moncocas* by the missionaries' (2005: 33).

[80] '*Yo soy nativo Chiquitano de aquí de Concepción porque he nacido aquí por eso soy Chiquitano*'. Focus group: La Embocada, 8 March 2007.

geographical territory. As addressed below, also some white and *mestizo* locals take this view. However, Chiquitano also add other markers to narrow the catchment area.

Frequently stressed was the notion of sharing a language (i.e. *chiquitano*, which is also sometimes referred to as *bésiro*). For example, during a workshop in San Miguelito Sur, a small *comunidad* a twenty minute pick-up drive from Concepción, Justina noted 'I am born here in Concepción and am proud to be Chiquitana because I still speak the language'.[81] Another *comunario* agreed and noted something similar:

> Because our, my grandparents taught us to speak the *besiro* language, now what we speak is not correct, this Spanish, it is our native *besiro* language that identifies us as true Chiquitanos and this is what they want to recover.[82]

Despite the fact that many Chiquitano see language as such a strong indicator for 'being Chiquitano', only around a third of Chiquitano speak it. Of course, diverse actors, from anthropologists, to those involved in the sphere of international 'indigenous rights', or local and national NGOs, emphasise language as an important 'cultural marker' and indicator of 'cultural distinctiveness', and as such, of truly 'authentic' indigenous peoples (cf. Graham, 2002).[83] Perhaps not surprisingly, many Chiquitano share such notions. As one Don Udalrrico a *comunario* from Candelaria noted during a workshop session:

> Because it depends on the language that [he/she] speaks, because if one from Cochabamba or La Paz speaks, well, it is another language. However, here the Chiquitanos we know that every one, well, each *pueblo* has its' language. It is how they say, if an Ayoreo enters, we know that he his one, because he has another language.[84]

Comunarios and leaders regularly stated that they wanted to 'recover' the language, while the *central* and municipal government placed emphasis on teaching it in

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[81] '*Soy nacida aquí en Concepción soy orgullosa de ser Chiquitana porque hablo todavía el idioma'*. Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.

[82] '*Porque nuestros, mis abuelos nos enseñaron hablar el idioma besiro, ahora lo que hablamos no es correcto ese español, es nuestros idioma besiro nativo es el que nos identifica como verdaderos Chiquitanos y eso es lo que se quiere recuperar'*. Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.

[83] Anthropologist Laura Graham's (2002) study regarding the strategic language use of different indigenous spokespeople in Brazil shows that language, along with other markers of 'indianness' may be used to live up to Western audiences' visions of authenticity, to legitimate or disqualify 'Indianness'. Nevertheless, she asserts that strategic language use remains an important symbolic medium through which to assert identity.

[84] '*Porque depende del idioma que hable, porque si habla uno de Cochabamba o de La Paz, entonces ya es otro idioma pue'. Sin embargo acá los Chiquitanos sabemos que cada uno tiene, su pueblo tiene su idioma. Es como se dice va a entrar un Ayoreo, ya se sabe que es el, tiene otro idioma'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.

comunidad schools. It is certainly a policy in line with the *central*'s stress on recovering and preserving Chiquitano 'indigeneity'. As former CICC technician Dina Ramos stated: 'now they are recovering the culture because it was already completely getting lost. What is most recoverable is the Chiquitano talk. It is also taught in the colleges as one more subject'.[85]

'Being Chiquitano' also meant sharing and appreciating a 'culture' and 'identity', which was also a source of 'pride'.[86] Don Manuel, a *comunario* from La Embocada, mentioned the most common elements in this regard:

> I am Chiquitano because this entire zone is the Chiquitanía, and I identify myself as Chiquitano since the moment that they taught us that one belongs to this race from here. Those who taught us were our parents, because they were always from here and we feel proud to be from here, living with our traditional customs, dances, typical music with drums. [87]

Chiquitano 'typical music' refers to the music played by Chiquitano bands, usually for communal fiestas, but also when white and *mestizo* Concepceños hire them to perform at their own functions (see photo 30, below). These bands are typically composed of three to five people, which always include a flautist, a drummer and optionally, various shaker players, smaller and larger drums and cymbals. Chiquitano bands and music are held to be vehicles that express Chiquitano 'continuity' and 'tradition', but can also been appropriated by Concepceños.[88]

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[85] '*Ahora ya se están rescatando la cultura porque ya se estaba perdiendo por complete. lo mas rescatable es el hablar Chiquitano. También se esta practicando en los colegios como una materia más'*. Interview: Candelaria, 24 January 2007.

[86] For example, Interview: Francisco Pesoa (former CICC leader) Limoncito, 24 January 2007.

[87] *'Soy chiquitano porque toda esta zona es chiquitana yo me identifico como Chiquitano desde el momento de nos enseñaron que uno pertenece a esta raza de acá. Los que nos enseñaron fueron nuestros padres, porque ellos siempre fueron de aquí y nos sentimos orgulloso de ser de aquí, viviendo con nuestras costumbres tradicionales, bailes, música típica con tambora, pero en mi comunidad ya los jóvenes tiene vergüenza de nuestra costumbre'*. Focus group: La Embocada, 8 March 2007.

[88] When employing these terms, I draw on Siders' notions of 'continuity' and 'tradition' – which can be oppositional or overlap, depending on the context. Sider provides an example to demonstrate the notion of continuity: an Indian sharecropper sitting down at the end of the day on the 'porch of a battered and worn farm house at the edge of a hot, dusty field, - the same, or a very similar house that his or her parents, grandparents, or even great-grandparents lived in' (2003: 10). In contrast, traditions are the often more flamboyant celebrations 'particularly the autonomy of the ceremonies and celebrations' (Sider, 2003: 11). The example he provides are powwow 'costumed dance display, perhaps with some travelling or visiting troupes, along with travelling craft-sale displays by Indian people working the powwow circuit' (2003: 11).

Photo 30: Chiquitano Band

Chiquitano Band Playing at the Patron Saint Festival of Limoncito,

Women overwhelmingly linked artisan activities to 'being *Chiquitano*'. For example, a *comunaria* from San Miguelito Sur pointed out: 'The women have their artisan work. They make clay pots, amphorae; they use them to store *chicha*. They make embroidery; we spin the cotton and … cultivate our *chaco* [field]'.[89] Large clay pots are important for brewing, storing and fermenting *chicha* in the large quantities needed for *fiestas* (celebrations) or *mingas*.[90] Cotton hammocks, embroidery and other woven cotton products, such as bags, belts and hats, were seen to be particularly 'Chiquitano' products – but less because they are used in the *comunidades*, but because they were sold as specifically 'Chiquitano' items in shops in the ex-missions. As noted, such efforts in commercialising Chiquitano products are often aided by the Catholic Church or NGOs. Nevertheless, woven products, such

[89] *'Las mujeres tienen sus trabajos artesanales. Lo que hacen es ollas de barro, cántaro, esto se utiliza para guardar la chicha. Se hace bordado, hilamos el algodón y es cultivado en nuestro chaco'*. Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.

[90] Some *comunarios* commented, with regret, on the fact that in some *comunidades* people were forgetting how to make the pots and that in some other *comunidades* people simply could not make the pots, because they could not find the suitable clay anywhere.

as hammocks and clothing, were already produced in the Jesuit missions and formed one of the main commodities that the Chiquitano produced for colonial markets (see Radding, 2005: 67-77). Chiquitano, Concepceños and tourists alike, associate them with Chiquitano 'tradition' and the mission history.

Photo 31: Brewing *Chicha*

Chicha being brewed in San Antonio de Lomerío in anticipation of the TCO Monte Verde titling ceremony.

'Being Chiquitano' was also often associated with wearing a particular style of clothing.[91] This refers to Chiquitano-style cotton shirts for men and the *tipoy*, a type of cotton dress, for women. Chiquitano *comunarios* wore neither shirt nor *tipoy* as everyday clothing in their *comunidades*. I only saw one elderly woman wear a *tipoy* in a *comunidad* in Lomerío, saw girls wearing it when posing as candidates in a 'beauty queen' competition in a *comunidad* close to Concepción, and several women wearing them during a political rally for indigenous autonomy staged in Concepción. I was told that those who own a *tipoy* would wear it on special occasions and *fiestas*.

[91] For example, interview: Ana Pesoa Cuasase (former CIP-SJ leader), Monte Christo, 30 January 2007; interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007.

This is a slightly different story from the Chiquitano shirt, which is worn by many (above all Chiquitano) members of the municipal government as a daily work uniform, as do CICC and OICH representatives. Chiquitano leaders noted that this was to express their pride in being Chiquitano. I assume that the women wear the *tipoy* for similar reasons. Cotton shirts and the *tipoy* are also items associated with the mission history, as they were produced and worn by Chiquitanos in the missions (see Radding, 2005: 67-77).

Photo 32: Wearing a *Tipoy*

Chiquitana wearing a *tipoy*, in Palmira, Lomerío. While *tipoys* today exist in different colours, they used to be white or beige.

Commonly, Chiquitano linked 'being Chiquitano' to working in a particular fashion, such as 'working to survive', 'working with other people', and 'working the land'.[92] Many Chiquitano perceive that their way of working the land actually differs from non-Chiquitano, particularly from *'terceros'* (white or *mestizo* third party intruders to community land or the TCO Monte Verde) or 'the immigrants' (i.e. highland migrants). As Chiquitano leader Carlos Leigue noted with respect to highland migrants:

> [They] are not similar to one, the Chiquitano, right? The Chiquitano works to maintain his family, but he is not a trader. The Chiquitano does not work an amount to be able to sell. He is not a trader, right? In contrast the one who has come from the interior … they work their fields in great quantity but it is for business, it is different'.[93]

Comunarios mainly work fields for their subsistence (while at times selling some of the produce for extra income, if *comunarios* needed it); 'outsiders' are considered to exploit the land for commercial gain.[94]

Chiquitano land and resource use is restricted by certain '*usos y costumbres'* (customary practices in the sense of 'norms' or 'rules').[95] For example, limiting the amount of hectares *comunarios* could privately plant.[96] The importance of adhering to such rules was demonstrated clearly during a sociodrama the CEJIS research team organised in Las Abras, one of the smaller *comunidades* in San Javier municipality: the plot was that a *comunario* and his gringo wife (unsurprisingly played by myself) had begun extracting wood from the communal land and were selling substantial quantities to Bolivian and international enterprises. The wife was also clearing large amounts of forest to produce commercial crops. As the *comunarios* discussed how they should deal with the rule-breakers, one *comunario* stated:

> … well, the *comunarios* have already said that one cannot clear more than five hectares, we just have to make [them] comply to the rulebook, and if he does not want to, well that he goes to another place, and we will not permit that he breaks the laws of the *comunidad*, well, and if he wants to help, that he puts the money for the

[92] For example, focus group: La Embocada, 8 March 2007; focus group: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.
[93] '*No es igual que uno, el Chiquitano ¿no? El Chiquitano trabaja es para mantener a su familia pero no es comerciante. El Chiquitano no trabaja en gran cantidad para poder vender. No es comerciante, ¿no? En cambio el que ha venido del interior … ellos chaquean en gran cantidad pero es para negocio, es diferente'*. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.
[94] For example, interview: Maria Chacón (CICC Vice-President), Limoncito, 23 January 2007.
[95] For example, interview: Facundo Rivero (former CICC leader), Santa Mónica, 26 January 2007.
[96] Sociodrama: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.

> sanitary post, and that he works like we all work … because the one who is Chiquitano has to think like a Chiquitano and act like a Chiquitano.[97]

Another *comunario* opined that his neighbour was 'appearing in the *comunidad* as if he were a *tercero'*.[98]

C*omunarios* stress that such rules are necessary, for clearing large amounts of forest disturbs wildlife and negatively affects hunting and fishing. Furthermore, Andrés Morobanchi (CIP-SJ Land and Territory Secretary) explained to me that treating land and forest 'like the *terceros*' caused resource depletion; where they operated: 'there is nowhere [left], all is plantations, thus, the land is not looked after.'[99] Where large estates farm for commercial purposes or graze cattle, they clear the land of most trees, except a few for shade. The land consequently tends to be dry. This creates a visually stark contrast with the Chiquitano *comunidades*, which are often surrounded by trees (or in the case of those in the TCO Monte Verde, forest) (see photos 33 and 34, below). Morobanchi added that 'splitting up the land' would 'cause conflict'. After all, *comunidades* outside the TCO Monte Verde are generally enclosed by large cattle ranches and agricultural estates; each *comunidad* has a limited amount of land at its disposal, while the population is steadily growing.[100]

[97] '*… entonces ya los comunarios dijeron que no se puede chaquear mas de cinco hectáreas, solo hay que hacer cumplir el reglamento, y ya si el no quiere pues entonces que se vaya a otro lugar, y tampoco vamos a permitir que el rompa a las leyes que hay en la comunidad, bueno y si el quiere ayudar, que ponga nomás la plata para la posta sanitaria, y que trabaje como trabajamos todos.…por que el que es Chiquitano tiene que pensar como Chiquitano y comportarse como Chiquitano*'. Sociodrama, Las Abras, 17 April 2007.

[98] '*…. el ya esta pareciendo dentro de la comunidad como si fuera un tercero'*. Sociodrama: Las Abras, 17 April 2007.

[99] '*…Ya no hay donde, todo es sembradío, entonces la tierra no está cuidada*'. Interview: San Javier, 8 June 2006.

[100] Because *comunarios* are aware that subsistence is not guaranteed in the long run, the *centrales* have instigated the demand for the Monte Verde territory (see Chapter 8).

Photo 33: Cattle Ranch, San Javier

Photo 34: *Comunidad* Palestina, TCO Monte Verde

In conclusion, the meanings attached to 'being Chiquitano' emphasise 'taproot' as well as 'rhizomic' criteria. Taproot indicators may rule a large number of individuals out from qualifying as Chiquitano, in contrast to *'comunario'*, which is more clearly linked to behavioural principles. Additionally, it is tied to valuing certain 'traditions' that may or may not form part of the continuity of Chiquitano *comunarios*' everyday life, sharing a production system and observing principles which ensure the continuity of the system. It can be assumed that some of these meanings spread among *comunarios* through the activities of the Chiquitano *central*, which has brought more *comunarios* in contact with each other and engaged in consciousness raising workshops regarding the value of Chiquitano 'culture'. Furthermore, as will be addressed below, Chiquitano stress that as they occupy a certain (marginalised) position within the local socio-economic hierarchy, they are different to the 'more priviledged' people.

'We Are All Chiquitano': Eroding the Community Boundary

Etablishing difference to certain local others became especially salient in a context where those that Chiquitano call '*ganaderos*' ('cattle ranchers'), '*gente del pueblo*' ('people from the town' i.e. the ex-mission settlements) or 'the whites' and that generally self-identify as 'whites', '*mestizos*', '*camba*' or 'Concepceños', launched their own version of identity politics by appropriating the label 'Chiquitano'.

Concepceños perceive the Chiquitanos in several ways. One is by describing and talking about Chiquitanos as 'uncivilised tribes'.[101] Another is to portray them as people who need protection, that need to be 'developed', that do not know how to 'work the land properly', or viewing them as some ancient people who were their

[101] The following is an example of such a view. One day in June 2007, a retired teacher form San Javier ask Margoth and me whether there were any descendents of tribes ('*descendientes de tribus*') living in Concepción and in San Javier. I noticed that this caused outrage in Margoth. On the way back to the office, she explained to me that the term 'tribe' the seen as very '*despectivo*' (disrespectful) in Santa Cruz. The day after Margoth told Lorenzo about the incident. He noted that the woman must really be one of 'the old brigades' and he laughed about the fact that *Chiquitanos* had been called tribes. He too thought that the term was very inappropriate and that it had negative connotations. He noted that is was almost like calling them '*salvajes, no civilizados*' (savages, uncivilised). Field notes: Concepción, 20 June 2007.

remote ancestor.[102] This ancestral claim to Chiquitano-ness becomes visible on occasions such as the yearly carnival celebration and *concepceño* 'Day of Tradition', when many Concepceño girls and women wear the *tipoy*, and some Concepceño men don Chiquitano shirts and *camba* hats.[103] Concepceños wear these items to stress their pride in what they imagine their 'Chiquitano heritage' to be and celebrate Chiquitano traditions. While Concepceños might claim a common ancestry, what they are usually thinking of is a romanticised version of 'indigenous maidens' and 'warriors'. These are the images that they embody dressing up during festivities (see Gustafson, 2006: 356-357). This is in line with what Bret Gustafson describes for the discourses and symbolic embodiment that express Cruceño regionalism, or *'cruceñidad'* in general. Such displays of regionalism have been growing more poplar with the increasing political vigour of the Cruceño autonomy claim.

According to Gustafson: 'the idealised Cruceño Camba blends the defence of agrarian patrimony – territorial and cultural "property" including traditions, land, peasants, and Indians – with the tastes and acquisitive power of the cosmopolitan urban consumer' (2006: 356-357). The male *camba* is 'performed' by 'wearing straw hats, sandals, white peasant pants and shirt, and carrying a slingshot, machete, and a water gourd. Displays of *cambas* as warriors resisting Andean incursions complement this "peasant" character' (2006: 356-357). The female *camba*:

> … wears a *tipoi,* a dress said to be typical of indigenous women. She is sometimes called *kuñata-i,* (Guarani, "young woman"), to appropriate the authenticity and the sexual allure of the indigenous maiden. Yet, even when dressed as Indians or peasants, Cruceños tend to emphasize their urban, cosmopolitan whiteness as an expression of their aspiration to participate in an idealized "global" middle-upper class consumer society (2006: 357).

Indicatively, during such events as carnival or the 'Day of Tradition', Chiquitanos are conspicuously absent from the centre of Concepción, with the exception of

[102] The 'development refusal' attitude is reflected in the views of a judge that I encountered in Concepción. He mentioned that he judged a case involving a Chiquitano *comunidad* and a *kolla* (highland immigrant) who was living in the *comunidad*. The *comunarios* wanted the *kolla* to leave as he had taken land from the middle of the *comunidad* and was intensively cultivating it. The *comunarios* maintained that the land was not for that purpose. The *kolla*, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the land was there to be worked and additionally he claimed that the *comunarios* had eaten his cattle. The Judge noted that he had not punished the *kola*, but had rather 'congratulated him' and told the *comunarios* to follow his example. He ordered the *comunidad* to pay back the man's cows and to leave him in peace. Field notes: Concepción, 24 February 2007.

[103] *Camba* hats are straw hats that Chiquitanos and White and *mestizo* Cruceños associate with rural labourers. Chiquitano wear them, for example, on indigenous marches in which they participate to protect themselves against the sun, but also to identify themselves 'Chiquitanos'. Cruceños wear them to stress their 'rural' or *'camba'* roots. For *'camba'* see next footnote.

Chiquitano bands members who are invited to play on such occasions. *Comuanrios* do not participate in the 'Day of Tradition' and celebrate carnival in their *comunidades*. Chiquitano who live in Concepción party in their houses, or travel to a *comunidad* where they have kin or friends. Another reason for non-participation is that for Concepceños such celebrations entail showing a 'nationalistic' pride in being *camba* and Cruceño (being from Santa Cruz department), which is hostile to and excludes Chiquitanos.[104] As Gustafson summarises:

> Cruceño regionalism opposes spatial, social, or subjective expressions of indigeneity or class that are not incorporated into folkloric niches of the dominant order. The regionalist cosmology thus seeks to absorb gendered hierarchies of class (landlord-peasant) and race (colonizer-indigene) to reposition lines of contention from within the region to its outer edges (2006: 357).

It is part of this effort to incorporate difference, which has led Cruceños to 'increasingly speak of themselves as *mestizos* who share the heritage of lowland native peoples of Santa Cruz. … Non-indigenous Cruceños view these peoples as "our ethnics" *(nuestras étnias)*' (2006: 357).

Gustafson adds that this can also be linked to a 'resurgence of indigeneity as a privileged marker of territorial rights' through the Bolivian multicultural rights framework (2006: 357). This becomes clear when considering Gustafson's description how in a civic parade on 25 September 2005 marchers from the Camba Nation (a think tank promoting *camba* nationalism) held aloft a banner quoting a passage of the Charter of Human Rights of the United Nations: 'All Peoples Have the Right to Self- Determination'. The slogan on another banner closely resembled that of the lowland indigenous movement: Territory, Identity, and Power: Bases of Camba Nationalism' (2006: 367). Similarly, in Concepción those that oppose Chiquitano claims to rights, and above all land, have taken to incorporating Chiquitano traditions as their own, claiming a common ancestry and, therefore, using such makers of tradition to erode the boundary between themselves and Chiquitanos.

Additionally, Concepceños discursively erode the boundary between themselves and Chiquitanos by denying that the Chiquitanos existed and stressing

[104] Chiquitanos as well as some NGO workers have told me that in the past, '*camba'* used to denominate 'peasants', or 'rural workers'. One Chiquitano told me, that it used to be a term with a negative connotation, and could mean as much as 'slave'. In the past, he noted, Chiquitanos were often referred to as '*cambas*' in a negative sense. More recently, the term has come to be used in Santa Cruz as a general term for 'lowland Bolivians', especially those from the Santa Cruz department. Its use often implies a patriotic sentiment.

that they all were *mestizos*, or claiming that a common ancestry and residence in the Chiquitanía made them all Chiquitano. An example of the first situation is a conversation I had with two self-identified *mestizo* men from Concepción one evening in 2006. The men told me that the Chiquitano people were just 'like them' and explained that over time, they all had become *mestizo*s. They added that those who claimed to be *Chiquitano* had no more right than them to go and claim land in the TCO Monte Verde.[105] This resembles the *indigenista* 'myth of mestizaje'- logic as promoted in the earlier half of the twentieth century. As noted in Chapter IV, this notion has proved pervasive and powerful, despite signs that 'indigenous' has replaced the twentieth century's '*mestizo*' as the 'iconic citizen' (Canessa, 2006: 255). The 'myth of mestizaje' still permeates the socio-political views of many (especially lowland) whites and *mestizos*.[106]

To some Chiquitano, denial of anything specifically 'Chiquitano' and appropriation of the term by white and *mestizo* 'others', proved disturbing. I discussed this issue several times with Chiquitano CEJIS colleague Lorenzo Pasabare. He noted that 'it was important to realise' that the 'whites' also called themselves Chiquitanos, even though 'they were not like them', what he called '*Chiquitano indígena nativo del lugar*' ('native indigenous from this place').[107] He reminded me that *comunarios* had also picked up on this phenomenon:

> I think that in the *comunidades* they have realised [it]. [They say] "put Chiquitano indigenous, not Chiquitano because even Don Natañel Castedo, the sub-prefect, says that he is also Chiquitano, but he does not feel what a legitimate Chiquitano feels" …we have learned this in the workshops that we have been doing…not even I myself could unravel myself from what I felt, and I felt it here. But these types also always say that they are Chiquitano, they also dress like Chiquitanos … the non-Chiquitano women and say that they are Chiquitanos. They also dress in *tipoy* and in their clothes, but there has to be a difference and exactly the very *comunarios* were the ones who put us in the direction, and recently "Chiquitano indigenous" because they also say that they [the whites] are Chiquitanos. Of course, they have been borne

[105] Field notes: Concepción, 6 November 2006.
[106] Political scientist Shannan Mattiace (2009) describes a similar phenomenon in the Mexican peninsular of Yucatán, where local and regional elites influenced by the Mexican *indigenismo* current appropriate Maya cultural markers such as language, folk dances and dress to express Yucatecan pride and distinctiveness. She argues that this poses obstacles to 'would-be ethnic entrepreneurs and leaders' (2009: 158). Firstly, non-Maya claim that they embrace Maya identity and that racial discrimination against them does not exist, and 'organizing around racial discrimination in a society that largely insists that there is none, requires tremendous personal and group resources, both monetary and emotional' (2009: 159). Secondly, it 'makes it more difficult for Maya to draw boundaries between "us" and "them" which, as Barth pointed out years ago … is essential to movement-organizing' (2009: 158).
[107] Field notes: Concepción, 20 June 2007.

> here… but they were borne with another privilege to the one that we have been borne with, no?.[108]

By blurring the boundary, white and *mestizo* Concepceños are denying Chiquitanos their history, as well as a better future by invalidating their claim to 'special rights', above all land. Firstly, through stressing a common ancestry, while evoking exotic and romanticised images and an idealised version of the mission history, they are filtering out the history of land loss, *empadronamiento* and enslavement in the rubber zones that Chiquitano groups have suffered. Secondly, current claims to rights by Chiquitano are generally constructed around the indigeneity rhetoric, so that they can have access to the Bolivian framework of neo-liberal multicultural rights. Any denial of the Chiquitano claim to 'difference' and 'indigeneity' represents an attempt to deny Chiquitano these rights.

As the following chapter addresses, in Concepción the issue of land rights is especially contentious because of the long struggle for the TCO Monte Verde, which white and *mestizo* Concepceños oppose. In response, many Chiquitano rebel against these attempts to 'blur the boundary', by employing additional terms, such as 'indigenous', 'native', or *'originario'*, to re-establish the boundary vis-à-vis those who are differently situated within the local economic, political and social hierarchy. These are all labels that have resonance in the context of the Bolivian law, as well as terms that carry negative meanings for white and *mestizo* Concepceños, as discussed in Chapter VII.

Conclusion

This chapter pointed to some of the multiple meanings that actors attach to the term *'indigena'* in the Bolivian political arena, as well as in the Concepción municipality. The term may be acceptable for political claims-making, but unacceptable for self-identification. It is seen as a racist and 'white idea', but may be drawn upon to

[108] *'Creo que en las comunidades se han dado cuenta no, ponga indígena chiquitano, no chiquitano porque hasta don Nataniel Castedo que es el sub-prefecto dice que es chiquitano también pero el no siente lo que siente el chiquitano legitimo …lo hemos aprendido en el taller que hemos estado haciendo ya ahora no, ni yo mismo también me sabia desenvolver yo lo sentía aquí. Pero estos tipos también dicen que son chiquitanos se visten también las mujeres no chiquitanas y dicen que son chiquitanas se visten también de tipoy y de su prenda pero como es que tiene que haber una diferencia y exactamente y los propios comunarios fueron los que nos dieron el lineamiento y recién nomás indígena chiquitano porque también ellos dicen que son chiquitanos. Claro han nacido aquí tanto pero han nacido con otro privilegio a lo que hemos nacido nosotros'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

establish a difference to local white and *mestizo* 'others' who, are attempting to erode the boundary between them and Chiquitanos in an attempt to undermine their claim to rights and territory. This puts a new spin on identity politics. It contrasts with the behaviour of white and *mestizo*s in the highlands, who may adopt the 'indigenous label' to show solidarity with the MAS indigenous project (see Canessa, 2007b: 208).

The Chiquitano case also demonstrates that the creation of a collective identifier requires much work. It is even harder to attach any meaning to it. Many Chiquitanos who adopted the label in Ñuflo de Chávez province associate 'being indigenous' with the land claim and employ it to underline their difference to whites and *mestizo*s. They might also connect it to attributes they think they share with other Chiquitano, and indeed, 'indigenous people' elsewhere in Bolivia. In contrast, for the Chiquitano in Velasco province, and some young people in Ñuflo de Chávez province, the term did simply not mean anything relevant to their lives.

In conclusion, groups may employ 'indigeneity' as an identity marker (and/or might discursively stress elements that are seen to be 'indigenous') in order to communicate with the state in ways that it recognises, because this might be the only vehicle available to claim certain rights. Simultaneously however, it plays into state rhetoric and expectations (2003: 399-400) and furthers the state's attempt of increasing legibility among its population. Adopting the term has been a crucial strategy for Chiquitano movements to gain access to the domestic multicultural rights framework, as the Chiquitano have engaged in a long struggle to gain territorial title to the TCO Monte Verde. Nevertheless, as the following chapter shows, state actors have ultimately defined the terms of this engagement.

Chapter VI

Monte Verde: The Long Struggle and Meanings of Territory

The previous chapter addressed the emergence of the Chiquitano movement and the spread of indigeneity as an identity-marker among Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios*. This chapter addresses another aspect of Chiquitano-state relations: the struggle for the TCO Monte Verde. The three Chiquitano Organisations of Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío, have struggled for the fulfilment of their claims to indigenous territories since their participation in the 1990 'March for Territory and Dignity'. After the march, the Bolivian State incorporated the term 'indigenous territories' (coined by the ILO convention 169) into the Bolivian legislation and took steps to legally recognise eight 'indigenous territories'.[1] In 1995, the three *centrales* united their territorial claims for greater political leverage and jointly claimed the territory of Monte Verde. In June 2007, after years of legal battles, the *centrales* finally received its title.

Most Chiquitano and state documents on the Monte Verde territory state that the territory is an area that is located within Santa Cruz department, in Ñuflo de Chávez Province, in the northern part of the first Municipal Section of Concepción and the second Municipal Section San Javier. It encompasses roughly an area of one million hectares (e.g. CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 7; Martínez Montaño, 1998: 12) (see map below). However, apart from this geographical area with a certain size and a fixed location, actors within the different layers of the state, NGO workers, local cattle ranchers, logging companies, Chiquitano leaders, *comunarios* and umbrella organisations, attach different meanings to the space, which are shaped through ongoing processes and in interaction with other actors (cf. Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 2004). The meanings that Chiquitano attach to the space have been shaped through the discursive (and at times physical) conflicts, negotiations and collaborations with state actors (both departmental and various local actors, including NGOs), as well as through Chiquitano memories of land loss, being 'enslaved' to cattle ranches and agrarian properties. I argue that in the arena of competing meanings and definitions, those of the state actors are determining access

[1] The ILO Convention outlines the uses, meanings and rights attached to the term 'territory' in Articles 14–17.

to land and its usage. While the Bolivian legal framework seems to be responding to indigenous movements' claims to land and territory, groups can only gain territorial ownership if they administer the space as the state requires. These developments seemingly contradict the constitutional text, which defines TCOs as spaces where indigenous people 'maintain and develop their own forms of economic, social and cultural organisation'.

This chapter first addresses developments in Bolivian law in response to pressure from Bolivian indigenous movements and their allies. This is followed by an account of the history of the territorial claim and analysis of the struggle for the TCO Monte Verde. The third part analyses the way that the Chiquitano *centrals* and their NGO allies have been working to make the territory 'more legible' (cf. Scott, 1998) by introducing territorial management procedures, which also includes putting more emphasis on the territory's economic values. In order to have their rights recognised, the *centrales* (and some *comunarios*) have increasingly adopted a language and discourse that the state recognises, for example, by emphasising the 'sustainability' of their way of life in the territory. The final part considers some of the differing meanings Chiquitano *comunarios* and leaders attach to the territory, demonstrating that these are nevertheless heavily influenced by the above-mentioned memories and experiences, as well as the hope that it may serve as a space where Chiquitano can safeguard the continuity of Chiquitano life and sociability.

Constructing 'Indigenous Territories': Laws and Legal Discourses

The Indigenous Law Project

The precursor to the territorial demands of many indigenous groups affiliated to the *Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia* (CIDOB – Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the West, Chaco and Amazonia), was the land pressure that these groups experienced (Chapter V). From around 1986, the year of CIDOB's fifth congress, the organisation worked at developing legal proposals to incorporate the rights of 'indigenous peoples' (including territorial rights) into the constitution. In the following years, a CIDOB commission presented its proposals to the governments of Paz Estenssoro and Paz Zamora. However, it was not until the 1990 'March for Territory and Dignity' that serious discussions between the Bolivian

government and the indigenous movement regarding such laws were held. After the march, the government accepted the use of the term 'indigenous territory' in official documents, and in 1991 it ratified the ILO Convention 169 (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 35). However, the exact shape these 'territories' and other rights would take in the Bolivian legal context remained to be established.

Consequently, the MNR government formed a commission to formulate an 'indigenous law' (*Ley Indígena*), the product of indigenous-NGO-governmental negotiations.[2] The proposal drew on certain aspects of the ILO Convention and the indigenous claims platform, to give it more leverage and international recognition. Nevertheless, in 1992 the Chamber of Deputies rejected the proposal presented to them. According to Balza Alarcón, the entrepreneurial sector from Santa Cruz department played a crucial role here, arguing that it was 'in breach of the Bolivian Constitution' (2001: 41). The proposal was simply too threatening, as it lay claim to landownership and resources in a department where the economic elite relied on large-scale agrarian production (mainly cotton, soya and, to a lesser extent, cattle ranching and sugarcane cultivations) and natural resource extraction (especially natural gas, and some oil and logging) (see Urioste and Kay, 2005: 43-46).

The INRA Law and its Procedures

While indigenous and NGO analysts later criticised the law draft for ignoring many of the CIDOB's initial proposals, it nevertheless heavily influenced the subsequent multicultural laws, which reflected some of the proposal's initial flaws.[3] The Agrarian Reform Law 1751, also known as the National Institute of Agrarian Reform

[2] Such NGOs were *Apoyo para el Campesino–Indígena del Oriente Boliviano* (APCOB – Support for the Indigenous Peasant of the Bolivian East), *Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el Desarrollo del Beni* (CIDDEBENI – Investigation and Documentation Centre for the Development of the Beni) and the *Centro de Estudios Jurídico Investigación Social* (CEJIS – Centre for Legal and Social Studies).

[3] For example, the notions that the territory should provide for the 'maintenance and support' *and* 'growth and development' of 'a human population' was contradictory. Further, the CIDOB's notion of 'territory' excluded the possibility of recognising 'discontinuous territories', problematic for many indigenous peoples which occupy space in a discontinuous manner, such as the Guaraní people (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 37-38). Thirdly, the proposal contained contradictory statements about the ownership of the 'natural resources' within a territory. Article 22.2 granted indigenous peoples 'autonomy over their natural resources', while Article 24.1 limited these to the exploitation of renewable resources. Strategic mineral substances and hydrocarbons would remain with the state (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 38). Fourthly, Article 46 outlined the recognition of indigenous territories as 'autonomous', while there was no clause to define what this would actually mean (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 39). Lastly, the proposal failed to specify how a territory's size or location would be identified (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 41). A possible reason for the weakness of the law lies in the fact that it may have been formulated to reduce resistance from opposing groups.

(INRA) Law, passed in 1996, legislated for what had already been acknowledged by the 1994 Constitutional change in Article 171: the possibility of organised indigenous groups gaining access to *Tierras Comunitarias de Origen* (TCOs – Original Communal Lands) (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 43, 75). The precursor to the promulgation of the law was the 1996 'March for Territory, the Right to Political Participation and Development', which departed from Santa Cruz and headed for La Paz. One of the main factors that led the CIDOB to stage the march was the fact that the claims filed during the 1990 march still remained unresolved (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 45, 47-50; Flores, 2006: 3).

The CIDOB's strategy was to present as many additional territorial claims as possible, to create maximum political pressure. With the help of the NGOs APCOB, CEJIS, CIDDEBENI and CIMAR, CIDOB prepared sixteen territorial claims based on the same juridical bases: the fact that indigenous territories had been established via the Supreme Decree after the 1990 march, the 169 ILO Convention (ratified through Bolivian Law 1257) and Articles 1 and 171 of the 1994 Bolivian Constitution. The claims featured a historical and anthropological argument, which proved the 'indigeneity' of the claimants and highlighted the gradual reduction of the space they had historically occupied (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 45, 47-50).

The government responded by ordering that titles for the lands recognised after the 1990 march should be handed over within sixty days, that the initial sixteen territorial demands be legally titled within ten months, and by promulgating the INRA Law (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 51). The INRA law defined TCOs as:

> … geographical spaces that constitute the habitat of the indigenous and originary peoples and communities to which they have had access traditionally and where they maintain and develop their own forms of economic, social and cultural organisation in a way that secures their survival and development. They are inalienable, indivisible, collective, composed by communities or *mancomunidades* [groupings of communities]…[4]

INRA also established the right to the sustainable use of renewable natural resources within the TCOs.

As noted, the definition of TCOs in the INRA Law was problematic, reflecting unresolved conceptual problems with the notion of 'indigenous territories' as defined by the Indigenous Law proposal and the problematic nature of notions of

[4] Art 41.I.5 of the Agrarian Reform Law 1751.

'indigenous rights' within the international sphere. For example, as noted in Chapter II, by adopting the notion of 'traditional' lands there arises the problem of how to establish with precision the geographical areas to which peoples or communities 'traditionally' had access. Among some of the issues are a) a lack of clarity of the meaning of 'traditional' in this context, b) that claimed areas of different groups might overlap and c) that this notion presents special difficulties for displaced peoples or those living nomadic lifestyles (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 76; also Kuper, 2003).

The law also established procedures to determine the size of such territories: the *Estudio de Necesidades Espaciales* (Study of Spatial Necessities) and the process of *Saneamiento Especial de Tierras Comunitarias de Origen* (SAN-TCO – Special Indemnification of Original Communal Lands). The Study of Spatial Necessities served to calculate the de facto surface area to be defined in favour of the claimants. The *Vice Ministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios* (VAIPO – Vice Ministry for the Affairs of Indigenous and Originary Peoples) was made responsible for these procedures. In 1999, it formulated a guide for establishing these necessities.

Problematically, the guidelines were based on the premise that 'the indigenous' are 'poor', poverty being defined as having outgoings to cover basic necessities higher or equal to income.[5] It put monetary values on activities such as forestry, agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and fishing as well as 'alternative economies and associated traditional knowledge' (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 311).[6] The analysis was complemented by an estimation of the increase of the claimant population in a fixed amount of years, and the economic potential of the natural resources present in the territory (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 311-312).

Of course, applying notions of 'poverty', 'wealth', 'basic services' and 'social security' as key factors in defining the size of territories is highly problematic. How could these notions account for the complexities of the lives of different groups? How would groups and their members themselves interpret such notions? (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 313). Balza Alarcón points to the contradiction in

[5] The document lists the following categories as basic necessities: alimentation, health, education, housing, basic services, information, and leisure, clothing, transport and social security. However, in the guide later, 'basic services' and 'social security' were left out (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 311).

[6] Balza Alarcón points out that in reality the studies only considered forestry, animal husbandry and agriculture (2001: 312). It can be speculated that it was too difficult to attach any monetary values to other activities.

'applying some kind of monetary value to everything in an economy in which money does not take a privileged place' (2001: 315). Moreover, economic activities such as 'hunting' and 'fishing' were excluded from the final documents, as these activities relied on vast amounts of space. They were deemed 'unsustainable' in the designated area due to the expected population growth. The study instead suggested other activities (for example, forestry management), whose monetary value was higher than that of the activity it replaced. Lastly, the studies fixed the number of hectares to be designated, but not the territories' future location (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 316-318). In sum, these notions contradicted INRA's assurance of respect for 'own forms of economic, social and cultural organisation'.

The second step in the procedure was the SAN-TCO. It involved the 'immobilisation' of the claimed territories, which meant that activities such as handing out land titles, invasions and illegal logging were to be stopped. The different parties occupying the territory (other than the indigenous claimants) had to prove legal land titles, and could stay if they fulfilled the 'economic and social function'.[7] The rest were (supposedly) expelled. Hectares 'missing' from the designated territory after the process would be compensated in unoccupied areas adjacent to the TCO (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 51-53; Flores, 2006: 3). Problematically some of the resulting territories were discontinuous and fragmented, and spaces that groups relied on for hunting often remained outside the titled area. Designated compensation areas were often hard to access or not suitable. Lastly, the procedures were lengthy and costly, and groups had little prospect of being successful in the ensuing years of legal battles without some form of (NGO) assistance (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 53-54).

The territorial claims were in themselves problematic. Claims often focused on the size of the 'ancestral' land rather than its strategic use to the group. For example, to secure their livelihoods and trade, groups might need access to villages (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 23, 54, 60). Claims overlapped or failed to consider demographic developments. Such flaws attest to the fact that many claims were put together in a very short space of time: at least eleven of the initial claims were drawn

[7] The Bolivian Constitution (Art. 169) and the INRA Law (Art. 2) establish the 'economic and social function' as a pre-requisite to acquiring and preserving an agrarian property. With respect to *terceros*, this entails demonstrating that the land is put to 'agrarian use'. Those settlements resident in the territory longer than two years were also given the chance to gain a legal title; the remaining area would be titled in favour of the claimants (Tamburini, 2006: 251).

up within a month before the departure of the 1996 march (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 20-21, 320). In sum, all this meant that while indigenous groups identified territories they favoured (at least according to their hastily-developed proposals), the state administration remained the main shaper of the location and size of the territory (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 63). Furthermore, successive governments showed a lack of commitment to drive forward the process of entitlement. By 2006, lowland indigenous groups had filed claims for fifty-six TCOs and only a total of 31.9 per cent of the claimed area had been titled (Romero Bonifaz, 2006: 212, 220).

The Chiquitano Land Struggle 1973–2007

First Settlements in Monte Verde: a Chiquitano Subsistence Strategy

The first Chiquitano *comunarios* moved to the area of Monte Verde in 1973 from Lomerío, where they had suffered land shortages due to population increase and because the remaining land was of poor quality. Additionally, logging companies aggravated the situation by felling much of the forest, which resulted in chronic droughts. This undermined the possibilities for hunting and fishing that Chiquitano *comunarios* relied on.[8] During a long interview carried out by CEJIS colleague Margoth Cespedes and myself with José Massaí, a *comunario* from San Lorenzo in Lomerío municipality, José recalled some aspects of how he, his father and other *comunarios* first came to settle in Monte Verde. The interview took place at a table under the wooden porch of his stone built house. Like other *comunidades* in Lomerío municipality, most of the houses around the main square are built out of stone, while houses on the outskirts tend to be made of adobe. José Massaí recalled the immediate reason for the move:

> In those times there were many droughts around here. In those times we worked in a group, in a union. With the unions we formed groups like this, cooperatives, cooperatives, to make fields [*chaco*]. Together we sowed peanuts, rice. And in the lower part we sowed rice. In this area everything dried out. Well, it was a time of droughts. We lost [it], right? Our time…, not as much our time, [but] our investments. So we were somewhat demoralised because our products had dried out and we had not harvested anything. And in those times there was this NGO in Concepción, the Bavarian Foundation. And there was this *gringo* who lived in Concepción who was called Don Bole. And he said: 'to the north of Concepción, at

[8] Interview: José Massaí, San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

> the side of the Rio Negro, there you can [plant], nothing gets lost that one plants in the *chaco*', he said.[9]

José Massaí recalls that Don Bole's proposition sparked some initial suspicion: 'And those who are against everything said, "he is taking them as his slaves, to pick rubber in the Rio Negro", well, no? [Still] we went …'[10] While initially the *comunarios* declined because the area was unknown to them, Don Bole finally managed to recruit thirty-three volunteers, including José Massaí and his father:

> Until my father, my father lives still, says to me "listen, I will go" and so I told him "how are you going to go, and us?" I told him. "No, but I will go and try" he said, "they have talked to me a lot, very good" he said, "everything grows", he said, "the production is there", he said, "there is fish and here there is nowhere to fish", he said, "there is a lot to hunt".[11]

After weeks of making their way through the forest, they arrived at the place that Don Bole had indicated.[12] When I interviewed Esteban Massaí, a *comunario* in his late sixties, also among the first settlers and the founder of Palestina *comunidad* (TCO Monte Verde), he explained that they called the new settlement 'Monte Verde' because of the 'beautiful green hills' in the area and because the trees there were evergreen (in contrast to Lomerío, where the trees drop their leaves in the dry season).[13] Don José describes how the settlers set about clearing two and a half hectares each for planting:[14]

> So we made a large *chaco*… and after that we went back, we left the chaco finished. And when we went back again, not all came. Some stayed [at home]. After we

[9] *'En ese tiempo había mucha sequía por acá. EN ese tiempo, este, trabajábamos así en grupo en sindicato'. En sindicato formábamos grupos así, cooperativas, cooperativas. Entonces, para hacer chaco. Así conjunto y sembrábamos maní, arroz. Y la parte más baja sembramos arroz. Y en esa parte todito se secó. Era tiempo sequía púe', sequía. Hemos perdido ¿no? El tiempo, no tanto nuestro tiempo, nuestros inversiones perdimos. Entonces de ahí ya hemos algo desmoralizado ¿no? por nuestro producto pues secó así que no hemos cosechado nada… y como en ese tiempo había una, una, por decir ONG en Concepción, la fundación Baviera. Entones había este gringo' que vivía ahí en Concepción, se llamaba Don Bole. Entones dijo "y por que no van a buscar un lugar especial para la producción, yo conozco" dijo "al norte de Concepción por el lado de río negro, y allá se puede, no se pierde nada lo que trabaja uno en el chaco" dice'*. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

[10] *'Entonces, estos contra–todos decían "lo está llevando pa' sus mozos, a picar goma en río negro" entonces ¿no? nos íbamos nosotros, y fuimos ¿no?'*. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

[11] *'Hasta que mi padre, mi padre vive todavía, me dice: "oye, voy a ir" entonces yo le dije "¿como vas a ir, pues, y nosotros?" le dije. "No, pero voy a ir a aprobar "dijo "me han hablado mucho, muy bueno" dijo "se da todo dijo la producción es allá" dijo "hay pescado y aquí no hay a donde mas pescar" dijo, "allá hay mucho que cazar"'*. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

[12] Interview: José Massaí, San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

[13] Interview: Palestina, 2 March 2007.

[14] Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

> arrived back there [in Monte Verde], we cleared the *chaco* and sowed, and sowed …. This large, large *chaco*. Then we harvested whatever large quantity of rice…[15]

That not all *comunarios* returned was likely because the area was remote and they did not want to leave their families and their *comunidades*. Those that returned did not produce purely for consumption. They wanted to generate cash to buy products that they did not produce, and also to take back money to their families in Lomerío. However, selling the produce was difficult as the settlement in Monte Verde was too far away from the closest market in Concepción. Don José recalled:

> …there was no buyer. It was difficult for the trucks to enter. Sometimes the way took ten, fifteen days … Well, it was … soft earth and they have to make bridges to cross, and … we got demoralised. Then we said "but now we want soap and we want sugar, it costs, it costs". And so, I was there for two years. Like that, the rice going off, nobody buys … and after we mowed and we sowed what they call *carioca*. We also had a large harvest, which was totally lost, it went off, nobody bought it.[16]

As it was impossible for trucks to travel over the muddy paths and makeshift bridges, many of the founders of Monte Verde later returned to Lomerío.[17] As already pointed out, while *comunarios* rely on land for subsistence, they also rely on access to the markets in the ex-mission settlements (in this case San Javier and Concepción) to sell their surplus for cash if they need it and to buy products that they do not produce themselves. Nevertheless, others stayed and started exploring the forest and consolidating the *comunidad*. Esteban Massaí recalled:

> … and this institution [the Bavarian Foundation] worked with us for about two years, and after that, the rich people denounced him here in Concepción. The *karai* [whites] said that it was communism, so that they get involved [the military administration under Banzer (1971–1978)], and they [the foundation] withdrew him. So we stayed on our own account and stayed for five years, suffering, abandoned. We thought about returning to Lomerío, but we thought and said, 'but this wood is

[15] *'Entonces hemos hecho un chaco grande…. Después volvimos ya, dejamos el chaco terminado. Y volvimos otra ves a irnos, ya no volvieron todos. Se quedaron ya, algunos se quedaron. Entonces después llegamos allá a limpiar el chaco y sembrar, a sembrar, a sembrar, a sembrar ese chaco grande, grande. Hay donde hemos cosechado cualquier cantidad de arroz, cualquier cantidad de arroz'*. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

[16] *'… no hay comprador, era difícil entrar los camiones. a veces tardaban de 10,15 días en el camino ¿no? es pué' tierra, no es como aquí tierra duro, en cambio allá es tierra blandita. Y los puentes tienen que hacer para cruzarlos y así pues nos desmoralizamos. Entonces dijimos "nada que hacer, bien" dijo, "pero ya toca que queremos jabón y queremos azúcar, cuesta, cuesta". Entonces yo estuve allá dos año'. Así el arroz fregándose, nadie compra … y después carpimos y sembramos, ese que dice, carioca. Hemos tenido también cantidad de cosecha, ese si totalmente se perdió, se pudrió, nadie lo compro'*. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

[17] Interview: José Massaí, San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007.

very good, better if we bear it for some years and the people will come, and great, now there are people.[18]

After the NGO workers had been withdrawn due to allegations of spreading 'communism' among the *comunarios*, the *comunidad* remained without any form of infrastructure. Later the *comunidad* received help from the Church and the Municipality to build infrastructure such as a pump and a school.[19]

Photo 35: Esteban Massai

Esteban Massai in his *chaco*, *comunidad* Palestina.

Following the emergence of the CICOL in Lomerío and CICC in Concepción in the 1980s, they promoted additional settlements in the area with the vision that this could solve the land problems of *comunidades* in Ñuflo de Chávez Province, caused by

[18] *'… y trabajo esa institución unos dos años y después lo denunciaron los ricos de aquí de Concepción los karai, decían que era comunismo para que se meten, y lo retiraron. entonces nos quedamos por nuestra cuenta y estuvimos durante unos cinco años sufriendo abandonados. ya queríamos volver a Lomerío, pero pensamos y dijimos, pero este monte es buenísimo, mejor aguantémonos unos año y va a llegar gente, cavalito, ya ahora hay gente'.* Interview: Palestina, 2 March 2007.

[19] Interview: Palestina, 2 March 2007.

population increase and the encroachment of cattle farmers (Flores, 2006: 2). In subsequent years, settlements emerged along the old rubber path which now lies in the southern part of the TCO Monte Verde, such as Makanaté, Santo Corazón, El Regreso and Puerto San Pedro (see map, below). Despite the land shortages, the settlement process was slow due to the remoteness of the area, lack of schools and access to the markets. Still, as some *comunarios* from Monte Verde decided to move closer to Concepción, some *comunidades* gained additional inhabitants and others (such as Palestina) were newly founded (Flores, 2006: 2).[20] While the CICC continued to encourage new settlements in the area, its main strategy became to increase the population of already existing *comunidades* such as Santa Mónica, San Pablo Norte, Palmarito, Palestina, Makanaté, Monte Verde, Limoncito, Puerto Alegre, and to gain communal titles for them (Flores, 2007b: n/p).

Following the foundation of the Chiquitano organisation in San Javier (CIP-SJ) in 1994, it supported the efforts of *comunarios* to gain communal land titles in the area of Turux Napex. With the help of the Catholic Church the *comunarios* managed to secure fifty hectares per family and some uncultivated land for new communal areas, out of the reach of the cattle ranches. The CIP-SJ's strategy was to 'occupy and defend' these lands against an increasing encroachment of cattle ranchers and loggers, through the promotion of temporary settlement by *comunarios* from already existing *comunidades* and San Javier (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 5; Flores, 2007b: n/p).

[20] For example, Don Esteban described how some *comunarios* founded Palestina in 1985 because in Monte Verde they felt too cut off from the markets. Interview: Palestina, 2 March 2007.

Map 4: The TCO Monte Verde and Chiquitano *Comunidades*



Source: CGTI-MV et al. (2006a: 12).[21]

[21] Used by permission of the CGTI-MV, Concepción.

The Territorial Claim: Monte Verde as 'Territory'

In 1990, twenty-four CICC delegates participated in the 'March for Territory and Dignity'. According to José Bailaba, after the march they realised that Chiquitano people 'could defend their territory as historic cultural right' (in Flores, 2007b: n/p). This meant that the delegates, together with CICC leaders such as José Bailaba and Vicente Pesoa, decided to claim 'indigenous territories' as a response to the growing land shortages rather than communal land titles as they had done previously.[22] Through the emphasis on claiming the geographical space as 'territory', the *centrales* drew on the concept as outlined by CIDOB and the ILO. The *centrales* framed the land claim in terms of a 'struggle to defend the territory as a zone of ancestral use' which was the 'last space … to recover the indigenous historical memory and have a space for the development of the claimant *comunidades*' (my translation, CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 5). As outlined in the previous chapter, this also involved ensuring that the claimant population identified themselves and their communities as 'indigenous'.[23] As CGTI-MV leader Carlos Leigue noted:

> … between the CICC, the CIDOB and the CPESC then, they thought … about "claiming a territory, why? Because they have seen the need of the *comunidades* … Because there are some *comunidades* that are around Concepción and they have no land any more… And the families multiply, multiply themselves… they thought this for the good of the *comunidades* but also…they had to get out … to the *comunidades* and tell [them], well, we want a claim, you know that here the families are multiplying, afterwards we will not have land anywhere. The business men will take over the lands, hence we will stay…with this very small space 24

Carlos Leigue pointed to another concern:

> … we are going to depend [on them] again, even though we have a *comunidad*, but we are going to depend again on a businessman, … we are going to be slaves of this businessman again. The leaders thought about that, well, we want to have our own

[22] Interview: Carlos Leigue (CGTI–MV leader), Concepción, 26 October 2006.
[23] Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.
[24] *'… entre la CICC, la CIDOB, la CPESC, entonces, se ha pensado… en demandar un territorio ¿porque?... Porque se ha visto la necesidad de las comunidades, ¿no? Porque hay algunas comunidades que están aquí alrededor de Concepción y ya no tienen tierras, ¿no? y las familias se van multiplicando, se van multiplicando, ¿no? … lo pensaron por el bien de las comunidades pero también, este, había que salir, digamos, a las comunidades y decir, bueno queremos una demanda, ustedes saben que de aquí las familias se van multiplicando, después no vamos a tener tierras donde. Los empresarios se van a apropiar de las tierras, entonces nosotros vamos a quedar, este, con un espacio muy chico'*. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

> territory to develop our own culture and develop in all that is the life of the *pueblo* Chiquitano.[25]

If *comunarios* lacked land to produce for self-subsistence they would have to go and find work on the bosses' cattle ranches, logging concessions, or in the towns. This would inevitably undermine their way of living as 'Chiquitano' and '*comunario*', i.e. their sociality (see Chapter V).

The CICC's initial vision was that the claim should cover the *comunidades* along the old rubber path (which runs south from Monte Verde and via Makanaté and Palestina and towards Concepción) including Monte Verde (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 5). However, in 1994 the CICC proposed to the CIP-SJ, which had also marked out a territory with the help of CORDECRUZ (Turux Napex, with 122,573 hectares), to jointly claim an indigenous territory: Monte Verde. The organisations hoped that this would increase their political leverage. The CICOL also joined the claim, although it maintained a separate claim to the territory that would cover what became the Lomerío municipality (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 5; Flores, 2007b: n/p).[26]

The *centrales* created the Chiquitano Indigenous Commission for the Territorial Claim of Monte Verde, composed of leaders José Bailaba, Rubén Suárez, Ignacio Macoño and Luis Poquiviquí. The commission's task was to develop and present the claim, to approve projects and organise a strategy for conflict resolution. They also received help from the NGOs *Asesoría Legal y Asistencia Social* (ALAS – Legal Consultancy and Social Assistance), CEJIS and APCOB, who formed a support commission to help in formulating the claim and to provide legal support (Flores, 2007b: n/p).[27] Others involved were the Chiquitano Executive Committee (which became the OICH), the NGO *Centro de Investigación y Manejo de Recursos Naturales Renovables* (CIMAR – Investigation Centre for the Management of Renewable Natural Resources) who supported the 'technical work', and Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) (Flores, 2007b: n/p).

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[25] '*…vamos a depender otra vez de si bien tenemos una comunidad, pero vamos a depender de un empresario, este, vamos a ser mozos otra vez de ese empresario. En eso pensaron los dirigentes, bueno queremos tener un propio territorio para poder desarrollar nuestra propia cultura, y desarrollar en todo lo que es la vida del pueblo Chiquitano*'. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006.

[26] The leaders associated with setting the claim in motion were, amongst others, José Bailaba, Carlos Cuasace, Ignacio Macoño (Flores, 2007b: n/p).

[27] Flores notes that it was especially the task of Dr Hugo Salvatierra to formulate the territorial claim document (2007b: n/p).

In September 1994, a group of leaders from the three *centrales* conducted an inspection of the territory to verify how much land was in the hands of *terceros* (third-party intruders). They also planted boundary stones (*mojones*) to delimit the territory and installed control posts to detain illegal loggers (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 5; Flores, 2007b: n/p).[28] On 25 January 1995, a commission composed of Chiquitano *comunarios* and CIDOB leaders presented the claim to Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, requesting an area of 1,082.334 hectares (see Flores, 2006: 3; Martínez Montaño, 1998: 12; Tamburini, 2006: 243).[29] However, by 1996 the *centrales* had not received a reply. After further pressure from the *centrales,* their NGOs allies and the CIDOB, the *centrales* managed to resubmit the claim on 8 March 1996 (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2007b: n/p).[30]

The territorial claim provoked a strong reaction from white and *mestizo* Concepceños and San Javiereños but, above all, from large landowners and individuals involved in logging companies. They perceived the claim to be against their interests as it affected an area they thought to be of economic value (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6).[31] They founded the Committee for the Defence of the *Pueblo* of Concepción, and its President, Juan Armando Antelo, presented a document to the Bolivian President, which rejected the claim and declared ownership rights over the area. While the document remained unanswered they resorted to other tactics. They

[28] The delimitation that was established was as follows: In the North the border was the start of the Los Rios Blanco and Negro reserve. In the East, it was ten kilometres from the path from Santa Rosa de la Roca to Piso Firme, which the *centrales* agreed with the Organisation MINGA, so as not to overstep the limits into the Velasco Province. In the West, the *centrales* agreed the border with the Guarayo Pueblo. Finally, in the South, in the zone of San Javier, the border was irregular, stretching from Turux Napex running parallel to the street from San Javier to San Ignacio to the *comunidad* Palmarito de la Fronterra (Flores, 2007b: n/p).

[29] The claim (similar to other claims developed at the time) is based on Article 171 of the Bolivian Constitution, the 169 ILO Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Pact for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The space was also justified through the argument that it considered the population increase of the claimant *comunidades* by year 2024 (Flores, 2007b: n/p; Lacroix, 2005: 49).

[30] The leaders who led the negotiations were José Bailaba (CICC Presidente), Miguel García (CICOL Vice-President), Ignacio Macoñó (CIP-SJ Secretary of Land and Territory) and Luis Poquiviqui (Flores, 2007b: n/p).

[31] It should be noted that since the end of the 1980s, virtually all the lands in the Bolivian East have owners or people who are claiming their ownership rights. While many of the cultivated lands and pastures in Santa Cruz have legitimate owners, a minority, generally attributed to large properties and haciendas, have documents which the state granted in 'less than clear circumstances' (Urioste and Kay, 2005: 43). However, Urioste and Kay note that this does not impede a very dynamic land market, with the principal investors being above all Brazilians. Consequently, in the Santa Cruz department (as well as other lowland departments) large landowners or land speculators confront lowland indigenous people and colonisers from the Andean region in a struggle over land (2005: 43-45).

threatened and intimidated Chiquitano *comunarios* and leaders, and promoted land take-overs by businesses and individuals. They cleared large areas for cattle ranching and initiated intense logging, especially around the *comunidad* of Turux Napex.

As an immediate reaction, the *centrales* put up control posts at the entry points to the territory (Flores, 2007b: n/p). However, Monte Verde reflected problems faced by other lowland peoples in similar situations. In 1996, the CIDOB together with *Campesino* and Coloniser Organisations organised the 'March for Territory, Natural Resources, and Popular Sovereignty' to protest against the ongoing conflicts in other lowland areas and to advance different territorial claims. The Bolivian government reacted by promulgating the INRA Law and recognising sixteen territorial claims, including that of Monte Verde. Initially, INRA carried out the study 'Preliminary Characterisation of the Communal Lands of Monte Verde', which established the size of the TCO at 865,000 hectares. A year later, INRA completed the mapping and Study of Spatial Necessities and re-calculated the size of the territory at 1,059.964.269 hectares (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 3; Martínez Montaño, 1998: 12).

The Phase of 'Immobilisation' and 'Indemnification': Ongoing Land Invasions

On 19 July 1997, INRA handed over the 'Resolution of Immobilisation' of the sixteen territorial claims which was meant to 'immobilise' ongoing land-entitlement procedures, take-overs and logging (Flores, 2006: 3). However, *terceros* kept up invasions and even managed to consolidate more land rights, with the complicity of INRA and other government institutions.[32] In May 1998, parliamentarian Juan del Granado visited Monte Verde in response to complaints the *centrales* made to parliament. He found that within a year the initial 21 private plots with a size of 20,000 hectares had multiplied to 159 plots with a size of 700,000 hectares (Flores, 2006: 4-6).

INRA did not initiate the *saneamiento* phase until the end of 1998, which provided more scope for land take-overs and conflict between Chiquitanos and their

[32] One example of this was when, on 1 August 1997, the *Superintendencia Forestal* violated the consultation rules established by the ILO Convention 169 as well as the Resolution of 'Immobilisation', by handing over around 120,000 hectares of TCO Monte Verde land to the forest concessions La Chonta, CIMAL and Cronembold-La Junta (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 3).

allies on the one side, and on the other the *terceros*, with supporters among state authorities (such as the sub-prefect and the INRA Departmental directive).[33] In reaction, from late 1997, the Chiquitano authorities exercised an increased vigilance over the territory. They carried out inspections and took over logging machinery as a means of pressure, blocked the access roads to stop *terceros* from entering the area and staged several local marches because of which the *centrales* officially denounced ongoing invasions and illegal logging. As Justo Seoane, Mayor of Concepción and Chiquitano activist, remembered:

> [They voiced] death threats against the *dirigentes* [leaders]… it was totally severe. We were all young people in this period; this gave us the strength… By foot we went to the *comunidades* to inform them about everything that was going on… we did a very large mobilisation and blocked the roads for the [land]owners so that they could not enter the territory any more, and could not split it up in one or the other way.[34]

Further, they denounced the cases of continued INRA-condoned logging operations by La Chonta, CIMAL and Cronembold-La Junta to the ILO and the Bolivian Supreme Court of Justice. Both authorities ruled in favour of the *centrales* (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 4).

Towards the end of 1998, the indemnification (SAN-TCO) phase began amidst a truce that the *centrales* had agreed with *terceros* (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 5). An INRA team measured the existing properties and verified if they fulfilled the 'social and economic function' required for legal consolidation. The *centrales* applied a new occupation strategy which involved establishing settlements to prevent *terceros* from recovering disputed areas (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 6). While legal processes were ongoing, on 28 July 2000, the CPESC and Chiquitano leaders led the 'March for Land, Territory and Natural Resources'

[33] In July 1998, Justo Seoane commented on the continued lack of support from the side of the sub–prefect: '...he is facilitating [the fact] that they [can] keep trading land in Monte Verde. At the moment the sub–prefect does not support us, this is very clear' (my translation, quoted in Flores, 2006: 5).

[34] '*En contra de los dirigentes, amenazas de muerte. Fue totalmente grave. Puros jóvenes en esa época es era la gran garantía que nos daban el esfuerzo sobre todos... y como les decía a pies le tirábamos a las comunidades para informarles de que todo iba… tales que así que hicimos una movilización bien grande y los bloqueamos a los propietario para que no ingresen mas al territorio de manera repartirse de una y otra manera.'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

from Riberalta to Santa Cruz. It protested the cutbacks of the claimed territory that the indemnification process had entailed (see Flores, 2006: 6). 35

In 2001, various *terceros* instigated trials before the *Tribunal Agrario Nacional* (TAN – National Agrarian Tribunal) with the intention of getting legal rights to their properties. One of these properties was the La Unidad Cooperative (*Cooperativa La Unidad*).[36] With the goal of consolidating 15,000 hectares, its proprietors caused large fires and cleared 450 hectares of forest (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 6). The case is noteworthy, as it led to significant physical violence between the different parties, including the kidnap and beating up of Leonardo Tamburini, a CEJIS legal assessor (now its Director) at the hands of members of the Cattle Ranchers Associations of San Javier and Concepción (see CEJIS, 2002; CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 6). On 24 May 2003, Chiquitano leader Manuel Dosapey stated:

> The *compañero* Carlos Cuasase, president of the Chiquitano indigenous Organisation, has recently received death threats, together with the *compañero* Juan Pinto, President of the CICC. When they left the Office of the OICH, a person had been waiting … to threaten Don Carlos with death, telling him, to stop denouncing him to the relevant authorities. If they would not stop the denunciations, they would kill him and would blow up the office of the OICH … Gabriel Bernales Burrneo, who is one of the functionaries of the Cooperative La Unidad … is threatening [him] because they have not let him enter with a thousand head of cattle to his illegal property, this 15,000 hectares of the Cooperative La Unidad (my translation, quoted in Flores, 2006: 6).

The case also involved allegations of corruption against certain Chiquitano leaders, which provoked the division and weakening of the *centrales* (Flores, 2006: 6). The case bore special significance for the *centrales* as the owners of the Cooperative were leading the alliance of *terceros* within the TCO. Losing the battle against the Cooperative would have most probably meant opening the territory to settlement by other *terceros* (Flores, 2006: 7).

[35] It also protested against the fact that SAN-TCO sought to exempt from the evaluation those properties with surfaces smaller than 500 hectares, and the intention of 'certifying' lands for commercial logging without previous indemnification. The march achieved its objectives and additionally managed to change the procedure for the identification of spatial necessities. The study could no longer be used to reduce claimed areas, that could only be done through SAN-TCO (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 56).

[36] For more information on the Cooperative La Unidad conflicts prior to 2001, see Tamburini (2006: 252-253).

The Final Resolutions of 'Indemnification'

In July 2003, INRA declared the existing land title of the Cooperative La Unidad invalid as it did not fulfil its 'economic and social function'. However, in February 2004, the TAN annulled this resolution and passed a decree favouring the proprietors of La Unidad. The CIP-SJ responded by occupying the heavily guarded property and recovered 15,000 hectares of the territory (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 7; Flores, 2006: 7; Tamburini, 2006: 251). To increase the pressure, a march by indigenous, *campesino* and landless movements departed from San Javier to Puerto Pailas, demanding movements in the consolidation process of the TCO Monte Verde and highlighting the agrarian claims of the other mobilised groups (Tamburini, 2006: 242, 252).[37] What followed was a series of rulings and counter-rulings. From November, INRA finally completed the re-settlements and ejections of the identified illegal *tercero* properties. By the end of May 2006, the only cases pending were that of La Unidad and El Refugio (Flores, 2006: 7).[38]

On 3 June 2006, after more than eleven years of struggle, the *centrales* and the claimant *comunidades* managed to consolidate 88 percent (over 947,440.8320 hectares) of their original claim through the Endowment and Titling of Monte Verde (*Resolución de Dotación y Titulación de Monte Verde*), which President Evo Morales handed over in Santa Cruz.[39] However, the owners of the forestry concessions La Chonta, Cronembold-La Junta, CIMAL-IMR reacted by contesting the decision before the TAN, which further delayed the handover of the Executive Title until February 2007, when the TAN passed judgement favourable to the Chiquitano claimants (Flores, 2007a: n/p).[40] On 3 July 2007, the three claimant *centrales* and *comunidades* received the legal title for the TCO Monte Verde from the hands of Evo Morales during a ceremony in San Javier (see photo 36). However, even at that point there were still some issues outstanding. INRA promised that

[37] The 'March for Popular Sovereignty, Territory and Natural Resources' had been staged in May 2002**.** Lowland indigenous, *campesino* organisations and the *Movimiento Sin Tierra* (MST – the Landless Movement) demanded a Constituent Assembly. However, neither the march nor the change in government in December 2002, changed the situation regarding the conflicts surrounding the TCO Monte Verde (see Lacroix, 2005: 51).

[38] The case of El Refugio was similarly as contentious and long-lasting as that of the Cooperative La Unidad. In 2006, the TAN ruled again in favour of the two *tercero* (third-party) claimants (see Tamburini, 2006: 256-258).

[39] The Administrative Resolution RADT-ST Nr 208/2006 from 26 May 2006 established 947,440.832 hectares in favour of the claimants (Flores, 2007a: n/p).

[40] La Chonta, Cronembold-La Junta, CIMAL-IMR together claimed around 120,000 hectares (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 8; Flores, 2006: 7; Tamburini, 2006: 261).

approximately 800 hectares of fiscal land would be titled in favour of the TCO retrospectively together with the land (about 27,000 hectares) that they hoped to recover from La Unidad, El Refugio, 8 de December, La Locura, La Penca and La Florestas. (Flores, 2007a: n/p).

Photo 36: Evo Morales at TCO Monte Verde Ceremony

Evo Morales hands the legal title the TCO Monte Verde to Chiquitano *central* leaders at a ceremony in San Javier, 3 July 2007.

Territorial Management and Planning

Through their territorial struggle, the Chiquitano Organisations have increasingly centralised decision-making power and have become more professionalised, paralleling the developments Steven Rubenstein (2001) has described for the Shuar in Ecuador and Rosengreen (2003) for the Matsigenka of Peru. Chiquitano organisations have taken on a 'taproot' model of organisations (see Chapter II).[41] They are the main entity dealing with NGOs, state officials and lawyers on behalf of

[41] Another reason is the aforementioned political participation, in and cooperation with, the municipal sphere (see Chapter VII).

the *comunidades*. They were, for instance, responsible in taking forward the legal battle, in calling for marches and organising the defence of the territory. The *central* has consolidated itself as a body that not only assists *comunidades*, but that can also take decisions on their behalf. Paradoxically, in the name of defending the territory, the *centrales* have also become part of the state project of making society more legible (Scott, 1998). In addition to the legal battle around the TCO, from 2000, the three organisations put an increasing emphasis on *gestión territorial* (territorial management). This was part of a broader development in the lowland indigenous movement. It had grown out of a debate among NGOs, who supported indigenous organisations in the late 1990s, about the 'management' or 'administration' (*gestión territorial*) of the claimed territories. Issues under consideration included *'autogobierno'* (self-governance) and its practicalities (see CPESC, 2003). NGOs such as CEJIS generally viewed territorial management as a

> … participatory process through which Chiquitano *comunarios* would define how they want to live in the territory and would reflect on how to construct and exercise governance, conserve and use the natural resources, generate production and strengthen the Chiquitano identity (my translation, Flores, 2006: 7-8).

SNV's reasoning to push for territorial management in Ñuflo de Chávez province was that the three organisations 'lacked the practical skills necessary to assume the challenge of autonomous territorial management'; and furthermore, 'there were no other, similar experiences in the region that could serve as reference models of TCO Monte Verde' (Tapia and del Pilar Valencia, 2007: 2).

The NGOs' vision of how Chiquitano should live in their territories seemingly coincided with the Bolivian government's definitions and vision expressed in the INRA Law. While they claimed that through 'participation' Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* would define how they wanted to live in the territories, the dictates were that this should entail the use *and* conservation of the natural resources, generate production *and* strengthen their 'identity'. This points to what William Fisher calls a 'paradoxical attempt to generate participation through a top down-down process of planning an organisation' (1997: 455).[42] SNV's vision was especially paradoxical: if Chiquitano should get territories in which they would live according to their 'own forms of economic, social and cultural organisation', how could they lack the practical skills to do so? This is a clear example of how

[42] See also Chambers (1995).

NGOs are involved in facilitating the state 'legibility project', as well as perpetuating the *indio permitido* logic of making land and social organisations functional to the neo-liberal economic system (cf. Hale, 2002, 2004; Scott, 1998), also recruiting indigenous people to become part of the process.

NGO aid focused on two aspects: firstly, the consolidation of the organisational structures responsible for the TCO, and secondly, conducting studies on the characteristics and economic potential of natural resources within it. SNV was involved in the first aspect and from 2001 aided in 'capacity development': 'strengthening the organisational capacities for territorial management of the TCO Monte Verde' through 'organisational development' and advisory services (Tapia and del Pilar Valencia, 2007: 2).[43] The belief of NGOs and the three *centrales* was that there was a lack of coordination between them, regarding policies towards the territory and the *comunidades* (CPESC, 2003: 31). Through 'organisational strengthening', they hoped to resolve the situation. The territorial management process also included workshops in which different indigenous lowland organisations exchanged experiences in organising, political participation and territorial management.[44]

In terms of the production of studies, SNV aided in conducting 'preliminary base-line studies' regarding the 'physical and environmental characteristics and the economic development potential' of the TCO. These were conducted by external consultants together with Chiquitano technicians. The NGO posited that with the generated information the *centrales* could take 'informed' decisions regarding appropriate land uses and the management of the TCO (Tapia and del Pilar Valencia, 2007: 9). For this purpose they produced the 'Diagnostic: The Socio-economic and Productive Situation in the Settlements and *Comunidades* inside and outside the TCO Monte Verde' (2004). A study carried out with another NGO concerned 'environmental planning', an initial evaluation of the biodiversity of the claimed

[43] The SNV Project with the CICC, CIDOB and CIP–SJ ran from 2001–2006. See Tapia and del Pilar Valencia (2007).

[44] For example the CPESC organised an exchange of experiences between the OICH, the CICC, the CIPSJ, the CICOL and the *Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni* (CEPEM-B – Organisation of Ethnic Mojeño People of the Beni). This was part of an OXFAM America financed and supported Project, 'Exchange of Experiences in Organisation, Citizen Participation and Territorial Management of Original Community Territories (TCOs) of Peoples from the Beni and Santa Cruz,' carried out in April and May 2003 (see CPESC, 2003). With the results, they hoped to 'propose strategic guidelines which direct the management and the administration of the TCO Monte Verde' (CPESC, 2003: 31).

area. It classified the territory according to six 'categories of use' according to type of soil and landscape (see RUMBOL, 2004).

Most NGOs were generally concerned with making the territory legible, and with this information they would define its sustainable uses. Their agenda was in line with the INRA Law, which sought to define the resources and their values in each territory and then aimed to introduce different techniques to exploit them sustainably. NGOs aimed to assist Chiquitanos to structure their lives accordingly. In turn, NGOs recruited the *centrales* to assist them in defining the available resources and then 'teach' *comunarios* how to use these resources properly.

While NGOs, in their function as facilitators of these processes, are not as 'non-governmental' as they might claim, they may do so unwittingly. Postero suggests for the case of CEADES that such NGOs may act as 'agents of government' because 'what runs through the trajectory of the NGOs is an overriding faith in democracy and participation' (2007: 176). They reproduce 'the discourse and practices of neo-liberal multiculturalism' because 'NGO workers are both agents and the subjects of the current regime of citizenship – they are constituted by the lived experiences of being citizens, and then they have a role in constituting what citizenship means' (2007: 176).[45] They may also do so because they bow to pressures put upon them by the international funders to follow what these see as the appropriate path for 'development'. NGO personnel may feel this more directly or more subliminally, as they take on funders' 'good ideas' and/or try to fit into the required funding criteria. The interest in 'indigenous territories' from international and national funders stems from the fact that they offer a range of possibilities for NGO-created projects – they are a 'hot topic' in the international funding arena in the light of the Western drive to 'protect rain forest areas', especially since the growing prominence of the campaign against climate change. In line with this, funders and NGOs were keen to get involved or undertake development projects in the TCO

[45] An analysis of the agendas of such NGOs as ALAS, CEJIS and APCOB, and their relation to international funders such as OXFAM Great Britain and OXFAM America is pending, and would surely be beneficial to understand the way in which they are influencing agendas, practices and discourses of Chiquitano organisations and *comunarios*. As Fisher notes, NGOs should be seen as a 'fluid web of relations' and the micropolitics of NGOs should be unpacked and placed in a larger context, 'understanding them not as local wholes subsumed within larger national and global political contexts but as fragmented sites that have multiple connections nationally and transnationally' (1997: 450).

Monte Verde. To illustrate this, we can consider a meeting between employees from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the *central* in late February 2007.

The WWF planned to implement a sustainable communal forestry project funded by the European Union with some *comunidades* in the TCO. APCOB was their national NGO of choice to implement the project. The meeting was tense as *central* leaders used it to vent anger at APCOB. Among the issues was that APCOB was accused of not letting *comunarios* travel in their cars and had not consulted leaders about the project earlier. This was one of the occasional *central*-NGO bust-ups mentioned in Chapter III, which often ensued due to resource management issues and when central *leaders* felt that NGOs were cashing in on their name. Nevertheless, the WWF employees managed to demonstrate their 'hyperreal Indian' logic (Ramos, 1998), partly to appease and flatter the leaders and *comunarios* present at the meeting. According to the WWF spokesperson, the Chiquitano were chosen for the project as they knew how to live in harmony with the forest and protect it. However, they still needed to be taught one or two things about logging, as their own techniques damaged the forest and lowered the quality of the wood. Probably feeling that their project was in jeopardy, they put more urgency into the matter: 'TCOs are large areas, how can you justify them? [Through] forestry management, selling oxygen, conservation of the biodiversity and even tourism. One can get many projects to preserve this territory'.[46]

The outcome of the meeting was inconclusive. However, NGO workers had already approached separate *comunidades* about the project, making it likely that they would deal directly with them, if the *central* refused. This incident provides insights into the force (international) NGOs might use to implement their projects and the lengths they may go to, to follow (and spread) their own vision of development and how people should live. It also shows how indigenous territories are increasingly becoming the focal point for international projects, as they are seen as crucial 'last reserves' for rescuing the climate and biodiversity of the planet.[47] As will be addressed below, in the fight for these spaces inhabitants and claimants have to 'justify' that they are worthy of the space and will guarantee its protection.

[46] Field notes: Concepción, 27 February 2007.

[47] This, of course, leads to the debate of how 'first world' governments are investing in such projects, as this is a more conflict-free route to be seen to be doing something about the perceived global climate threat, than actually driving change in their own countries. The in's and out's of the debate are beyond the scope of this text. .

The Role of the CGTI-MV

As part of the territorial management process, in 2001, the three Chiquitano organisations created a separate directory and technical support team to deal with the queries and problems of the *comunidades* within the territory. In 2004 they named the new structure *Comité de Gestión del Territorio Indígena de Monte Verde* (CGTI-MV – Management Committee of the Indigenous Territory of Monte Verde). It was made up of representatives chosen by each *central* and the technical assistance personnel that the CGTI-MV directory hired (Flores, 2006: 8).[48] The CGTI-MV received no decision-making power but was to administer activities to do with territorial planning, manage projects and economic resources, oversee the process of re-settlement and expulsion of illegal settlers, convoke the Great Assembly of *comunidades*, and interact with NGOs that supported the territorial management processes (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 31). This also involved the initiation of studies (*diagnósticos*) about biodiversity, economics and the establishment of norms for the use of the natural resources within the territory (Flores, 2006: 8).[49] Thus, the CGTI-MV was also the latest 'legibility'-facilitator.

However, the CGTI-MV and the three *centrales* admitted that the creation of this additional administrative body was problematic. While the three *centrales* expected the CGTI-MV to administer and execute projects in the territory, CGTI-MV staff maintained that its role was restricted to the 'administration' of projects. The CGTI-MV staff felt that they could not overrule the decisions of the *centrales* until its role extended to decision-making. CGTI-MV and the three *centrales* frequently noted that the lack of coordination between the *centrales*, and between the *centrales* and CGTI-MV had to be resolved. They suggested that the problems stemmed from the fact that the *centrales* had not appropriated the 'new organ' CGTI-MV sufficiently and that there was 'a lack of involvement and appropriation of the information gathered in diagnostics' (CPESC, 2003: 32).

[48] OXFAM Great Britain supported the organisations through the project 'Strengthening the CGTI', and by organising workshops, providing organisational support and financing the purchase of training materials.

[49] The CGTI-MV et al. states that 'the norms are agreements established in a consensus, by all those that live in the TCO Monte Verde. These rules allow us to live in harmony, conduct a better management and control of all that we have in the TCO, especially the Natural resources. … [and] also to avoid conflict between our *comunidades*' (2006b: 67). Some of these norms are: 'to defend the territory, to attend meetings, participate in communal work … not to bewitch people, not to steal, not to cut trees during full moon, not to hunt during Easter week, not to hunt indiscriminately' (CGTI-MV et al., 2006b: 73).

That the *centrales* did not coordinate their activities sufficiently with the CGTI-MV is not surprising, considering that they struggled to coordinate their activities among themselves already before its establishment. This was partly due to the fact that they were constantly busy carrying out various NGO-financed projects or liaising with other state actors, from municipal government to umbrella organisations like OICH, CPESC and CIDOB. Additionally, *comunarios* expected more than 'a mere administration' of projects from the CGTI-MV, leading to frustrations with its performance (see CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 31-32). When CGTI-MV leaders came to the *comunidades*, *comunarios* probably expected them to engage in similar project and service delivery activities as most of their other state visitors.

At times, the *centrales* and the CGTI-MV also found that 'there were not enough resources to carry out the work in a more participatory manner' (CPESC, 2003: 32). NGOs, their funders and the *centrales* face similar problems when they plan and carry out many studies and projects. After all, consulting most of the *comunidades* is time-consuming and expensive. Projects have very strict deadlines and budgets and they rarely consider logistical problems (from weather influences to petrol shortages) that might impede their execution. Facing time constraints, those who carry out such studies and projects must cut corners.[50]

'Ordenando nuestro territorio'

In 2005, the CGTI-MV started the OXFAM financed project '*Ordenando nuestro territorio'* ('Putting Our Territory in Order'), which was supposed to plan the establishment of settlements within the territory and to 'organise' the territory by, for example, predicting population growth and establishing the exact amount of land that each *comunidad* could use. This involved the setting up of communal management plans and statutes for 'indigenous territorial governance'.[51] The project also aimed at ordering the territory according to 'zones of use', by establishing conservation zones and zones for sustainable forestry. According to the CGTI-MV it serves as 'orienting instrument, to take decisions over the adequate use and occupation of the territory' to

[50] Similar constraints were faced during the research phase of the CEJIS Governance Project. See Chapter III.
[51] See CGTI-MV et al. (2006a: 32-33).

'guarantee the sustainability of the way of life of the current and future generations' (my translation, 2006a: 11-12).[52]

As part of this effort, in 2006, the CGTI-MV finished formulating a '*plan de gestión territorial*' ('territorial management plan'). It defined 'territory' as follows:

> [It] constitutes the historical and spiritual space, the large house of the indigenous Chiquitano people of Monte Verde, were they live grouped together in *comunidades*, reproducing their cultural identity, with their own forms of organisation, which are in charge of regulating their collective life based on consensus, and administrating justice … (my translation, 2006a: 11).

This definition implies the concept of 'self-determination', and that what is at stake is ensuring 'continuity' of Chiquitano life. It points to the very reason why Chiquitano *comunarios* and leaders originally felt that they needed to have access to more land, namely to be able to plant crops, hunt and fish, and to be able to subsist and live as *comunidades* with their own practices and authorities. Nevertheless, despite this statement, the document itself undermines this notion. Not only does it aim at increasing the 'legibility' of the space, but it also contains the idea that Chiquitano *comunario*s must be taught how to use land and resources 'sustainably'.

The CGTI-MV and the three *centrales* formulated the document as part of a strategy to declare the different possible and feasible 'uses' of the territory in the light of the need to 'justify' ownership of such a vast stretch of land. As indicated above, this is a powerful and pervasive notion spread by state agencies, employed by national and international NGO workers and taken on by Chiquitano leaders. During the *central*-WWF meeting, the CICC President at the time, Manuel Peña pointed out that INRA functionaries also put much emphasis on the notion of 'justification'. He went on to state that without such justification the INRA would ask: 'for what do these *Paicos*, the *Indios* need that much land?' He added that 'using the resources within the territory' meant 'giving work to our *comunidades*'.[53]

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[52] Drawing on a definition by CEDIB (2005), the CGTI-MV defined '*ordenamiento territorial*' as: '…the process of use and occupation of the territory, in terms of its biophysical, socio–economic, cultural and political-institutional characteristics. … [In order to] achieve the adequate use of the soil, according to its potentials and limitations, as well as the appropriate occupation of the territory, optimising the distribution of human settlements, the access to health services, education and basic services, the localisation of transport infrastructure and support for production' (my translation, 2006a: 11).

[53] Field notes, Concepción, 27 February 2007.

Like Manuel Peña, others pointed to the importance of territorial management. Elmar Massai (CGTI-MV technician) stressed that with the finances from OXFAM America, the CGTI-MV had produced reports and defined the objectives of territorial management:

> We started to implement a strategy of communication and diffusion through a radio programme. Through a local radio station, it reaches all the demanding *comunidades* [and] spreads the vision that the Organisations have in terms of the consolidation of the territory, the organic structure and the administration of the TCO Monte Verde. This was supported in the General Assembly where all the delegates of the claimant organisations participated, this strengthened us to carry out the projects which benefit the territorial management of the TCOs (my translation, in CPESC, 2003: 33).

He sees territorial management as important for 'consolidating the demand', which is an issue that other Chiquitano leaders and NGO workers also often stress.

As Elmar Massai's statement indicates, the *centrales*, CGTI-MV and NGOs have taken care to involve *comunarios* in the territorial management process, by drawing on their opinions regarding the territory and its uses and keeping them informed of the process through workshops. The CGTI-MV and the *centrales* produced (in a 'participatory manner' and with NGO support) three booklets that they distributed among the *comunidades* in the TCO Monte Verde. One concerned Chiquitano communal justice and another established norms for the use of natural resources in the TCO.[54] A third concerned territorial management itself. It explained the territorial management process and stated the 'principles' of territorial management as 'The foundations of our *casa grande* [big house] over which we are going to build our vision for the future, recovering our historical past and taking our present one into consideration' (2006b: 15). The principles are:

> … autonomy: which is to take our own decisions; participation, [which is] to have opinions, negotiate and decide with everybody; equity in the distribution of benefits means that not just a few can take advantage; transparency, which is the use of our resources in an honest way; sustainability, which means taking advantage of the natural resources thinking in the future of our children and children's children, etc.; cultural identity, which is to feel proud of our culture and to be Chiquitanos and Chiquitanas (my translation, CGTI-MV et al., 2006b: 17).

[54] The first booklet was titled: '*Justicia comunitaria pueblo indígena Chiquitano*' (2005); and the second: '*Normas de uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales en la TCO Monte Verde'* (2006c).

Chiquitano also express such notions when they talk about what it means to be *comunario* and Chiquitano (Chapter V). The booklet simply attaches 'development' terminology to these notions. It stated that the territory serves as a 'reserve', a 'source of economic income for the collective benefit of the TCO', a 'source of work for the Chiquitano families' (CGTI-MV et al., 2006b: 21). Further, it is:

> … a place where we can work, fish, hunt, recollect, and in this way we have a place were we can all live freely; To elect our authorities according to our *usos y costumbres*; … [to] strengthen our cultural identity; and additionally implement our economic, environmental, social and cultural development (my translation, CGTI-MV et al., 2006b: 57).

The booklet also states that ultimately this will help to 'strengthen our cultural identity' (2006b: 57). Some of these notions are taken from the domestic multicultural rights framework and international conventions, but it remains unclear what this means in terms of Chiquitano everyday lives.

Lastly, the booklet expresses a future vision:

> We are going have an autonomous government, elected by men and women, take decisions about how we are going to control and administer our territory, respect and strengthen our culture, apply our norms and rescue our knowledge (my translation, CGTI-MV et al., 2006b: 43).

This points to substantial changes, namely the introduction of an 'autonomous' government through which joint decisions over the territory will be taken, and the adherence to a universal set of norms within the territory. These norms are to be applied, while at the same time 'culture' is to be strengthened. The paradox is that *comunidades* have their own norms and decision-making systems (see Chapter V and VII). These might not always be written down, as they often take the form of 'behavioural principles' rather than expressed norms (see Cohen, 1985a: 16).

Questions also arise regarding the idea of a central governmental structure. While the *centrales* do fulfil certain functions with respect to the *comunidades* (for example as the legal body that carried the territorial claims, and as project coordinator and facilitator), much decision-making power regarding their everyday lives lies with *comunidades*. It remains to be seen what shape such a *central* 'government' for the territory will take and how much it will affect the *comunidades.* However, this makes clear how much the CEJIS governance project is actually part of the state legibility project. All this contradicts the initial idea of why *comunarios*

demanded the territory in the first place, namely to assure the continuity of their lives.

Pointing to the Paradoxes: Critical Chiquitano Voices

Some Chiquitano leaders saw territorial management in an outright critical light. Former *central* leader and Chiquitano representative to the Constituent Assembly José Bailaba Parapaino argued that what NGOs promoted as 'new' to Chiquitano organisations and *comunidades* was not so alien to them after all. He stated:

> For me territorial management is not what they are doing in Guarayos or Lomerío, plans to extract wood, which led to social problems. If this is territorial management, then excuse me, I do not agree, because it is generating social problems and not helping to strengthen our organisations, but rather only create divisions (my translation, in CPESC, 2003: 29).

The tension and problems concern resources and what they should be used for: economic gain or social reproduction. CICOL Chiquitano facilitator Anacleto Peña was another Chiquitano who voiced similar objections:

> We are talking of territorial management of the TCO, according to the dictionary this is synonymous with administration. We talk of indigenous territorial management, which we perceive to be different and it has another conceptual meaning. For us the concept of territory, in the vision of the indigenous people, is to say where one is born, one grows, one reproduces, one lives … And territorial management as we the indigenous peoples see it, we have realised the administration of our territories since time memorable, of the natural riches, the fauna, the flora, we have lived from fishing, hunting, and recollection. In Lomerío, they have implemented projects of forestry extraction … but the experience gained in all this process, created discontent among the *comunidades* … and they forced the closure of the sawmill (my translation, quoted in CPESC, 2003: 33).

José Bailaba and Anacleto Peña highlight two aspects; firstly, that they see it as paradoxical to 're-educate' Chiquitano *comunidades* on how to manage their territories, and secondly, that there is a problem with the emphasis on productive and 'development' activities, such as forestry management and agricultural activities. Don José added that he was worried that 'the government will want to implement territorial management in all the TCOs and this will be a grave problem for the indigenous peoples' (my translation, in CPESC, 2003: 33). These leaders point to the paradox of implementing 'territorial management', which they see as a system that perpetuates the productive interests of the Bolivian state bureaucracy.

The issue here is not that *no* income should be generated, but one of scale. As noted, *comunarios* supplement their subsistence activities with an extra cash income if they require it. Such projects as cattle ranching or possibly sustainable forestry management may provide such an extra income in times of need, so heads of families do not need to leave the area and work on the bosses' lands, as Carlos Leigue pointed out above. However, the 'current way of life' is not guaranteed if this entails a switch from subsistence activities to 'sustainable' economic activities, or, in other words, a shift from 'work' to 'production' (Sider, 2003: 12).[55] As José Bailaba and Anacleto Peña point out, productive projects have often failed or created conflicts in the past, for example, in the case of Lomerío (also see McDaniel, 2003). Examples from several *comunidades* show that communally managed productive projects often lead to conflict and corruption within *comunidades*.[56] In addition, other considerations complicate the picture. Some leaders and *comunarios* noted that carrying out at least some work to generate cash is necessary so that they can stop their dependence on NGO handouts and possibly the dependence on different state bureaucracies for resources. For example, Lorenzo Pasabare pointed out that moving away from NGO handouts was important because:

> From the moment that I'm begging somebody to give me [something] and submitting to their guidelines … I am not practising my own autonomy, I am submitting to norms. I am submitting to obligations and rights that others give me.[57]

These issues will preoccupy *comunarios* and leaders for some time to come. However, despite critical voices, the *centrales* are heavily influenced by the notions of their allies and INRA and prime actors in increasing the legibility of land and population.

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[55] Sider explains the difference between 'work and 'production' as follows: 'By work I mean the actual labour of fashioning something necessary or desired in the continuation of social life. … Production refers to the larger system in (and against) which work takes its shape and its pace, a system that includes both the work to produce goods and the cultural, social, political, and economic relations through which surpluses are formed, transferred out of the control of the people who did the work, and transformed' (2003: 12).

[56] For example, Lorenzo Pasabare, told me one day, that a forestry management project ran for six years in Santa Monica while the money it generated 'simply disappeared'. Nobody knew where it went; no *comunario* had significantly altered their living standards. He suspected somebody had squandered it on a good time in town. Fieldnotes: Concepción, 15 May 2007.

[57] '*…desde el momento que yo este de pordiosero pidiendo a alguien que me de y sometiéndome yo a su lineamiento … no estoy eh practicando mi propia autonomía, me estoy sometiendo a normas. Me estoy sometiendo a obligaciones y a derechos que otros me están dando.*' Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

Chiquitano Constructions of Territory and Monte Verde

To a certain extent, such notions as 'sustainability' and 'sustainable exploitation of the territories' resources' have also found their way into how *comunarios* talk about the territory. For example, when asked what the *comunarios* planned to do with their territory in the future, a *comunario* from La Embocada expressed: 'there we are going to manage it well, so that what is within the territory does not run out. Well, that we do not fell in large quantities and only use what we need'.[58] Also several *comunarios* from San Miguelito Sur expressed such notions during a focus group that CEJIS colleagues Lorenzo Pasabare, David Rivero and I carried out in San Miguelito Sur. One *comunario* pointed more explicitly to the idea of 'sustainability':

> I think that is also to know how to exploit the wood and making sustainable management of each *comunidad*, also to make new *comunidades* or new settlements within our territory, because the wood belongs to one.[59]

Another *comunario* added:

> …also in the territory there is much to hunt, one has to protect them from the fire because they can disappear, if us or our children go to the territory it is for them and this is why we have to look after it, we already have families there.[60]

When asked what he thought a 'territory' was, a third *comunario* was more concerned with the fact that 'in Monte Verde there are also natural medicines and one has to look after them, they can disappear when one burns the woods'.[61] When responding to the same question, Don Miguel from Candelaria somewhat moved away from the idea of 'sustainability' and protecting nature. He noted:

> Well, in my understanding, as you say what a territory is, well, [according to my understanding] a territory is where plants, animals exist, all that exists in the earth,

[58] *'Allá vamos a darle un manejo bien para no acabar lo que hay dentro del territorio, bueno que nosotros no desmontamos en cantidad solo utilizamos lo necesario'*. Focus group: La Embocada, 8 March 2007.
[59] *'Yo creo que es también saber aprovechar la madera que tienen haciendo un manejo sostenible de cada comunidad también hacer nuevas comunidades o nuevos asentamiento dentro de nuestro territorio porque el monte es de uno'*. Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.
[60] *'También hay en territorio harto para cazar hay que cuidarlos del fuego por se pueden desaparecer, si nosotros o nuestros hijos se van al territorio eso es para ellos y por eso hay que cuidarlo como ya tenemos familias allá'*. Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.
[61] *'Hay también en Monte Verde tenemos medicinas naturales y hay que cuidarlas puede desaparecer cuando se quema el monte'*. Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.

> water, wind, where there are humans, too, thus this is what I understand a territory to be.[62]

He shared this understanding with many others who highlighted similar elements (generally plants, animals and people). Again others saw these elements more in the sense of resources that they could use 'as a necessity'. For example Don Eduardo from the same *comunidad* added to Don Miguel's statement:

> Yes for me too, as they have already mentioned, a territory is where land, plants exist, all that, more than anything there is wood, traditional medicines, wood that is useful for the men, where the animals are, also sometimes one uses them as necessity and it is an immense quantity of land.[63]

Mostly leaders and a few *comunarios* also noted that a territory included the natural resources underneath the earth, i.e. minerals and hydrocarbons. Don Víctor noted in the same workshop session:

> The same, no? I think a territory is a large space where everything is, the wood, the minerals, and also the hydrocarbons, that might be underneath the earth, because the land is only on top, and a territory is everything, including what is underneath the earth, it is where animals are and much forestry, much wood.[64]

It can be assumed that this notion is partly influenced by the debate on indigenous territories, and resource ownership in the context of the Constituent Assembly.

However, the meanings Chiquitano attach to the space of Monte Verde are also shaped by other factors. They are influenced by Chiquitano memory of land loss, combined with the threat that this poses to Chiquitano livelihoods (see Chapter IV and V). Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* often emphasised that the claim to the Monte Verde territory is valid because this was ancestral land, in the sense that their

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[62] *'Ya bueno, yo a mi modo de entender, como dice que es un territorio, bueno lo que yo entiendo, un territorio es donde existen las plantas, los animales, todo lo que existe en la tierra, el agua, el viento, donde hay humano también, entonces eso es lo que entiendo lo que es un territorio'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.

[63] *'Sí también para mí un territorio es donde, como ya le habían mencionao todo, donde existe tierra, plantas, todo no, más que todo hay maderas medicinales, hay maderas que es útil para el hombre, donde están los animales también que a veces uno lo utiliza como necesidad, y es una inmensa cantidad de terreno'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.

[64] *'Lo mismo no, yo pienso que un territorio es un espacio más grande donde esta todo pues, las maderas, los minerales y también los hidrocarburos que puede haber debajo de la tierra, porque la tierra es encima nomás, y un territorio es todo hasta lo que hay debajo de la tierra, es donde hay animales y mucha forestación y maderables'* . Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.

ancestors moved through it on the way to the *gomales* (rubber areas) in the Beni.[65] As one *comunario* interviewed by Elba Flores noted:

> The old people said that there is a path that leads to the rubber areas, and we want to commemorate this path, so we have to demand this place. … There are good and bad memories attached to this path but it is our history, so the grandparents wanted to remember their passage, this is the reason that they demand these places. To this variable comes the natural resources, hunting, fishing, recollection, wood, and that we can preserve the fertility of the land (my translation, in Flores, 2007b: n/p).

The path was both a scene of suffering and an area of refuge. One night when we were driving back from Palestina to Concepción, Chiquitano colleagues told me that we were driving on a section of the old rubber path. The pick-up lights were broken and we stopped to fix them. Standing in the dark with all the noises of the rainforest around us, my colleagues took the opportunity to tell me that many *comunarios* (including themselves) had heard voices, screams and the sound of chains on the path at night from those that died along the path.[66] *Comunarios* remember the suffering of their ancestors who were deported to the rubber areas. Many died on the way due to illness, age, exhaustion, or because they were killed.

However, it was an area of refuge for those ancestors who managed to flee to the forest. For example, former CICC leader Facundo Rivero stressed the element of freedom over the suffering and subordination: 'one saw the necessity to have a space where our parents have taught us to be free. And we have [somewhere] where we can have our productive, educational and health activities'.[67] Through the path, history is inscribed in the landscape. We could also add other elements, or land marks, to this that act similarly: the mission settlements, the locations of former ranchos and current *comunidades*, the massive areas cleared for cattle ranching and the small amount of land that surrounds *comunidade*s. This shows what authors have also noted for other cases, how 'landscape … expresses, simultaneously, both the

[65] The rubber boom is, of course, a theme that recurs in many Amazonian societies that experienced this economic transformation, because it was a time of 'abrupt, violent change forced upon indigenous peoples from outside and above' (Hill, 1988a: 7; also see Reeve, 1988). That this is especially remembered, is, as Jonathan Hill points out, linked to the fact that historical consciousness of indigenous South American societies 'is understood in relation to a few "peaks", or critical periods of rapid change' (1988a: 7).

[66] Field notes: Concepción, 19 May 2007.

[67] *'Por se vio la necesidad de tener un espacio donde nuestros padres nos enseñaron hacer libres. Y tengamos donde hacer nuestras actividades productiva educación y salud'*. Interview: Santa Mónica, 26 January 2007.

imposed histories of changing systems of production and the claimed histories of daily life and work in families and communities' (Sider, 2003: 7).[68]

While the territory itself is linked to the history of land loss, the struggle for land is to guarantee the continuity of Chiquitano life. As a *comunario* explained to my Chiquitano colleagues and me during a focus group session one evening in San Miguelito Sur:

> I believe that the territory since we were born has always existed … here. The truth is that the land is like it was our mother and we use it to sow, to sustain our families. Our parents have always worked these lands and we follow the line, we are always going to work until we die, because we live here.[69]

Inscribed in Monte Verde are also visions for the future. *Comunarios* often stress that Monte Verde is 'where one lives, sows the things to eat and above all, for the animals and for us,'[70] where one can hunt, fish, recollect and have one's fields. These are all aspects that allow Chiquitano *comunarios* to live in the way that their parents lived, and having access to the space guarantees that these practices can be carried on by future generations – i.e. that it is a space to produce *comunario* social and cultural beings (cf. Conklin and Morgan, 1996). Another example is the statement by Don Miguel from San Miguelito Sur who said:

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[68] Landscape has recently become important in the context of the debate on how (literate and non-literate) societies remember (see Santos-Granero, 2005). For example, Joanne Rappaport finds in her study on the Nasa (or Paéz) people from Colombia's south-eastern highlands that 'Nasa locate their historical record in scared sites dispersed throughout the area, which serve as mnemonic devices for remembering history' (2005: 159). On similar lines, Burkhard Schwarz found that in San Antonio de Lomerío, Chiquitano have linked referents for 'space' and 'time'. For example, *'yabaicürr'* – *'yabaitucürr'* corresponds to the time-space until shortly before the start of the Chaco War (1933–36) – 'a time characterised by the free access to an ample space' (1994: 53). '*Chiyabaiturrüp'* is associated with the following period, marked by the invasion of landowners, the disarticulation of Chiquitano political organisation, and land and resource scarcity. Within these periods Chiquitano identify different sub-periods: for example, the time of slavery (in the rubber plantations) and the time of the agrarian reform (1994: 53). It would be a matter for future research to establish whether this is a similar case for Chiquitano in Ñuflo de Chávez Province.

[69] '*Y creo que el territorio desde que nacimos siempre ha existido en esta tierra aquí. La verdad que la tierra es como si fuera nuestra madre y la utilizamos para sembrar, para sustentar a nuestra familias. Nuestros padres siempre han trabajado estas tierras y nosotros mismo seguimos las cadenas siempre vamos a trabajar hasta que muramos porque aquí vivimos'*. Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.

[70] '*Donde uno vive, siembra las cosas pa' comer y sobre todo pa' los animales y pa' nosotros*'. Workshop: *Comunaria* from Rosario, Young Peoples' Group, Las Abras, 16 April 2007. Other examples: Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007; Focus group: La Embocada, 8 March 2007; Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.

> [The Monte Verde territory] is a very fertile land for cultivation. Here in our *comunidad* the land is very little and will not be enough for our children and this is why we have the territory and this is why we have to fight until we have the title.[71]

Many *comunarios* stressed explicitly, that Monte Verde is a 'reserve for future generations'. For instance, a young *comunario* from Rosario mentioned during a workshop in Las Abras *comunidad*, San Javier Municipality:

> … it is a place … which is reserved for the generations that come in future, for our children who are growing, we see for example, that here in our *comunidad* the land does not provide for all the *comunarios*, and they are fighting for a territory in Monte Verde so that our children have somewhere to live.[72]

The statement by a *comunario* from San Miguelito Sur provides another example:

> In two parts we think about or territory, here where we live and the territory of Montverde. Analysing it, here where we live the land does not provide, there is a big reserve for our children and the children of our children, they will be the beneficiaries of Monte Verde, and thus we have to defend it.[73]

These two *comunarios*, like many others, associate the territory with the ongoing struggle that Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* have wrought over the space. In their statements, *comunarios* often combined the elements of 'space for the future generations' with 'fighting for the space' and the need to protect it. The statement of Don Nicolás during a workshop in *Candelaria* sums up several of these themes:

> I think that a territory is what we really fight for, a land, this land which we call territory, is a land of large extension where we all struggle, not only for those that we are now, but also for the one that come alter, for the children, for the grandchildren. Territory, we are going to say, [is] where there is a reserve of woodland for afterwards, where the riches are…. Where the wood is, where the river is, where maybe mines are. A territory is where not only Candelaria will fight for it, but together, all that is the region of the Chiquitano area, to say Concepción, all its surrounding *comunidades* … and united we are going to defend this territory, because afterwards it will run out and where are we going to go? Territory is above all, to defend land in which the mother of the human is, because if there is no land,

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[71] '*Es un terreno muy fértil para el cultivo. Aquí en nuestra comunidad la tierra es muy poca y no va alcanzar para nuestros hijos y es por eso que tenemos el territorio y es por eso que tenemos que luchar hasta tener el titulo*'. Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. Also see Interview: Hugo Hurtado (CICC Health and Communication Secretary), Alta Mira, 23 January 2007.

[72] *'… es un lugar que está reservado para las generaciones que vienen en el futuro, para nuestros hijos que están creciendo, vemos por ejemplo que aquí en nuestra comunidad ya no abastece la tierra para todos los comunarios, y se está peleando un territorio en Monteverde par que nuestros hijos tengan donde vivir'*. Workshop: Las Abras, 16 April 2007. Also Workshop: *Comunario* from Rosario Las Abras, 16 April 2007; Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.

[73] *'En dos parte pensamos en nuestro territorio, aquí donde vivimos y en el territorio de monte verde. Analizándolo bien aquí donde vivimos la tierra no abastece allá es una reserva para nuestro hijos y para los hijos de nuestro hijos ellos serán los beneficiado del allá de monte verde así que eso hay defenderlo'*. Focus group 2: *comunidad* San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.

> where are we going to live? How are we going to cultivate to live? This is what it is for.[74]

In sum, the meanings that Chiquitano *comunarios* attach to the territory overlaps and at times competes with other notions of and visions for the territory's 'use' and future. As the statements of various Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* who live in and outside the TCO demonstrate, the way that they perceive the territory is influenced by their historical experience of land loss, the struggle for the territory and the effects of the struggle. The territory is a space to continue Chiquitano life. As some Chiquitano explained, what they needed to 'live happily' and *tranquilo* ('peacefully') was the territory and the territorial title.

Conclusion

When it comes to the territory of Monte Verde – and arguably virtually all lands claimed or recognised as TCOs in Bolivia – several processes of making 'places' into 'spaces' compete with each other and inform each other. To sum up briefly and in basic terms the notions of different agents, the Bolivian government sees the territory as a demarcated space for 'a people' that fit certain ideas of 'authenticity' and over whose natural resource it wants to keep control. Local cattle ranchers, loggers and other international and local economic players see it as an area of land, forest and other resources that should be economically exploited. This latter point is especially worrying considering the fate of territories and lands, and of the people that live in them who are subjected to international economic interests elsewhere, especially those linked to oil extraction and mining (see Ciccantell, 1999; Sawyer, 2001).

The way that Chiquitano *comunarios* and leaders construct the territory, points to pressure to conform to the government's legal criteria, in order to be recognised as legitimate claimants of an 'indigenous territory' (and later, a TCO).

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[74] '*Yo pienso de que un territorio es lo que realmente luchamos por una tierra, esa tierra que nosotros le decimos territorio, es una tierra de gran extensión donde todos luchamos no solamente pa' los que estamos ahora, sino también para que sirva para los posteriores, así para los hijos, así para los nietos. Territorio vamos a decir donde hay una reserva de montes para después, donde están las riquezas queremos decir, donde esta la madera, a donde esta el río, donde hay quizás minas. un territorio es donde no solamente Candelaria lo va a pelear, sino conjuntamente toda la que es la región de la parte chiquitana, como decir Concepción, todas sus comunidades de alrededores …y todos unidos vamos a defender ese territorio, porque después se nos va acabar ¿y donde vamos a ir?, territorio es defender tierras más que todo, en lo cual es la madre del humano, porque si no hay tierra, ¿donde vamos a vivir?, ¿como vamos a cultivar pa' vivir?, para es eso'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.

Supporting NGOs and some *central* leaders have stressed the need for territorial management in order to justify and defend the claim and, paradoxically, to counteract local and departmental economic interests. This has entailed stressing the importance of a market logic when it comes to defining the uses of the territories' natural resources and moving towards a construction of a more rigid governance structure in the territory. Thus again this shows how *central* leaders and NGO personnel may be perpetuating the state's neo-liberal multicultural framework.

The way many Chiquitano *comunarios* construct their territory overlaps and competes with such visions for the territory. Interestingly, *comunarios* resident within the TCO Monte Verde territory and those outside did not attach vastly different notions to the territory. Neither was the border itself of much relevance. Most Chiquitano see Monte Verde as their territory, where their children can have a future, even if they themselves may never have travelled there and may never move there.

Paradoxically, in order to 'keep' the territory and justify the claim, Chiquitano leaders and *comunarios* have to construct it in a way that state actors accept it. This contradiction might yet result in tensions over the uses to which the territory and the resources within may be put. Such tensions are perceivable in some Chiquitano leaders' comments on and mistrust of productive projects, which other leaders and *comunidades* embrace. This concurs with reports of authors writing on indigenous territories in other South American countries, that 'modern resource management schemes' might actually distort indigenous peoples 'territorial vision' that might be based in 'relational spaces' rather than a space 'divided into zones of utility' (García Hierro and Surrallés, 2005: 10-11). It can be expected that such tensions will be high on the agenda of the indigenous movements as these territories become recognised as 'autonomous'. Another aspect that needs further attention is the fact that the territory will only be a temporary solution to the Chiquitanos' problems; the Chiquitano population will continue to grow. Consequently, the question arises how much access to such spaces is a sufficient strategy to solve indigenous peoples' struggle to secure the continuity of their lives and sociality.

Chapter VII

Chiquitano in the Municipal Sphere

The previous chapter addressed the struggle for Monte Verde and the different meanings protagonists attach to the space. This chapter considers how the decentralisation reforms implemented by the Sánchez de Lozada (1993–1997) government in the 1990s have impacted on the Chiquitano *central* and *comunidades* in Concepción municipality. The *Central Indígena de Comunidades de Concepción* (CICC - Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Concepción) initially participated in local municipal elections because they saw this as an opportunity to advance their territorial claims. Laurent Lacroix stresses the success of this double strategy in achieving 'effective participation in the local scene' (2005: 64-75; 2006: 110).[1] Indeed, in 2004, the CICC achieved the election of Chiquitano activist Justo Seoane as Mayor, a significant achievement in the face of fierce Concepceño elite opposition. Nevertheless, obstacles remained which obstructed the efforts of the Chiquitano administration. These partly resulted from the limitations inherent in the multicultural neo-liberal reforms themselves (McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007; see Chapter II), and from ongoing local opposition to the Chiquitano political project.

The Bolivian decentralisation reforms and especially the participatory component, have received ample and ongoing scholarly attention (e.g. Calla, 2000; Cameron, 2009; Gray Molina, 2002; Kohl, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Lema et al., 2001; Van Cott, 2000). Most commentators highlight that the potential success and failures of the law depend heavily on local conditions. Often mentioned are: the relevance of size and location of the municipality, levels of corruption among council and mayor, attitudes of mayors and other local political figures, ethnic composition and involvement of the local population (see Faguet, 2003; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001; Hiskey and Seligson, 2003; Licha, 2002; Rowland, 2001).[2]

[1] While Lacroix notes that such a double strategy is used by some actors in Peru, the CICC and CICOL are the only organisations to employ it in Bolivia (2005: 3, 75). For the Peruvian case, see Chirif et al. (1991).

[2] Further, Seeman holds that not just local actors' attitudes play a role in determining outcomes, as municipalities are to a degree dependent on central government decisions (2003: 23).

The first part of this chapter addresses the Chiquitano manoeuvrings in the local political sphere and Justo Seoane's rise to power. Along with other popular actors in Bolivia, over time the leaders began seeing participation in the municipality as their right 'as Bolivian citizens' (see Postero, 2007). While in the Chiquitano case the strategy of presenting Chiquitano candidates with *Movimineto al Socialismo* (MAS - Movement towards Socialism) affiliation has been initially successful, I maintain that Chiquitano municipal functionaries have partly adopted the Bolivian neo-liberal multicultural rhetoric: the 'marginal' Chiquitano communities need to 'be developed' and, if possible, turned into market producers. The chapter also highlights a further paradox inherent in the multicultural policies: that to take part in the local municipal structure Chiquitano and other indigenous people had to ally themselves with an existing political party to be able to compete in elections. Chiquitano chose the MAS party, which, in turn, provided Concepceño elites with ammunition to discredit the Chiquitano political project.

The third part addresses the developments the Law of Popular Participation (LPP) sparked within Chiquitano *comunidades*. As a consequence of the LPP, Chiquitano *comunidades* became recognised as *Organización Territorial de Base* (OTBs - Territorial Base Organisations) and the CICC as an umbrella association of OTBs. While *comunidades* introduced the new structures partly due to pressures from political parties and Church members, this has not had the disrupting or homogenizing effects on the *comunidades* that authors have recorded for other areas in Bolivia (for example, Behrendt, 2000: 15; Calla, 2000; Lema et al., 2001). OTBs were generally introduced alongside the existing authorities of the *comunidad* ('*autoridades comunales*'); they serve not only to interact with the municipal government and other outside actors, but also to fulfil an important internal administrative role. In fact, their introduction has had certain levelling effects in terms of communal power relations.

Political Manoeuvrings: the 1995, 1999 and 2004 Municipal Elections

The 1995 and 1999 Municipal Elections

The two pieces of legislation aimed at substantially altering the country's administrative and political structure were Law 1551, the *Ley de Participación Popular* (LPP - Popular Participation Law), passed in 1994, and Law 1654, the *Ley de Descentralización Administrativa* (LDA - Administrative Decentralisation Law), passed one year later (Behrendt, 2000: 4; O'Neill, 2005: 125; Postero, 2007: 5). The Bolivian decentralisation reforms involved delegation of responsibilities to each of the nine departments through establishing *prefecturas* (prefecture administrations), and to new municipal structures.[3] Municipal governments were installed, complete with councils with deliberative and oversight responsibilities (their number depended on the number of inhabitants in each municipality) and a publicly elected mayor (Calla, 2000: 80). The LPP assigned the municipal governments' decision-making power in such areas as the promotion of rural development and the provision of health, education, culture, sports, local roads and irrigation facilities. They were also granted power to manage their own resources allocated to them based on the number of inhabitants (Calla, 2000: 79; Faguet, 2001: 4; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 7; Seemann, 2003: 16).

The participatory element lay especially in the creation of *Comités de Vigilancia* (CVs - Oversight Committees), civil society organs which would channel citizens' demands and have the power to monitor the municipal government's performance and financial dealings. For leverage, they could also 'freeze' municipal funds (Calla, 2000: 80; Faguet, 2001: 4; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 7). The OTBs instituted through the LPP were a further vehicle to institutionalise state-civil society relations. Together with the CVs and other state organisations working in the municipality, they were to be engaged in a process of defining the needs of its inhabitants. This took the form of a participatory planning process in which the actors would define a five-year strategic plan upon which municipal expenditures should be based, the *Plan de Desarrollo Municipal* (PDM - Municipal Development Plan). To

[3] Prefectures' responsibilities included formulating and designing departmental development plans, programmes and projects in coordination with the municipalities and national executive (see Seemann, 2004: 8).

this end, each municipality would develop an Annual Operations Plan (POA - *Plan de Operaciones Anual*), which detailed the objectives, activities, time scale, financial resources and persons responsible for the planned activities (Behrendt, 2000: 4-6; Gray Molina, 2002: 8).

Lastly, the LPP granted indigenous peoples the right to form *Districtos Municipales Indígenas* (DMIs - Indigenous Municipal Districts). DMIs were municipal administrative units (*subalcaldías*), in which indigenous people could nominate a *subalcalde* (a 'mayor' subordinate to the municipal mayor) according to their *'usos y costumbres'* (Calla, 2000: 84; Lacroix, 2005: 10). They received part of the co-participation fund of the municipality and 'freely' administered them (2005: 10).[4]

The LPP also inspired Chiquitano activists in Concepción to use the newly emerging formal political channels to advance their own agendas and, above all, to advance their territorial claim. As Justo Seoane described the Chiquitano rationale in standing for elections:

> …and we saw in one or another way that the mayor from here was the one who was invading the territory. So we said to 'yes or yes' occupy this municipal power, because there is no other way, because it is there where they define the politics, where the discrimination in education is, the discrimination in health [care]. Apart from that they are taking over our natural resources. [Because of] the issue of territory … we initiated an election in these months… in this time Paticú [presented himself] as Mayor. … I am talking about 1995, 1996, thereabout. So there we did not win the majority… but we tried, no?[5]

The CICCs political tactics were shaped by the local socio-political environment, and especially the municipalities' demographic profile. As noted, with 34.9 per cent, Chiquitano are in the minority in Concepción municipality (Instituto Nacional de

[4] Lacroix sustains that, the introduction of DMIs were supposed to be a response to Article 171 of the Constitution that recognised the right to indigenous autonomy in their own territory (2005: 10). He adds that theoretically 'the system of *mancomunidad* of the indigenous districts offers the possibility to maintain the traditional organisation beyond the diverse territorial administrations created by municipalisation' (Lacroix, 2005: 10).

[5] *'…que vimos que de una y otra manera como el alcalde de aquí, era el que estaba avasallando el territorio. Entonces nosotros dijimos si o si de ocupar ese poder del municipio, por que no hay otra manera por que es ahí que se define de las políticas, que hay discriminación educativa, discriminación salud, a parte de eso se están adueñando de los recursos naturales. El tema de los territorio entonces es tales así que se inicia una elección en esos meses… como alcalde era todavía en aquella época el Paticú y eso les hablo del 1995 o 1996, por ahí. Entonces no pues ahí no logramos la mayoría, pero ya intentamos nosotros ¿no?'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

Estadística, 2001).[6] Subsequently, the CICC's strategy centred on putting forward their own candidates for municipal elections and concentrated on 'political consciousness-raising' (*concientización política*) among *comunarios* to gain votes (2005: 65). They would also have to rely on coalitions with other parties to secure a majority position.

This differs from areas where one ethnic group, or those allied through a common agenda, hold the majority. An example of the former is neighbouring Lomerío, where 99 per cent of the population identify themselves as Chiquitano and indigenous (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001). The leaders claimed DMI status for the municipal district, which they gained in 1999 (see Lacroix, 2005). An example of the latter can be found in the Bolivian Chapare, where Quechua and Aymara were united through their coca growers' unions and political agenda (see Albro, 2005, also see Chapter II and V). This helped create the critical mass to tip the balance of power and capture local political positions. Another situation faces indigenous or *originario* citizens who live in urban areas, where collectivities (for example in the form of neighbourhoods) may have little chance to get their own candidate elected. Citizens often have to take other routes to get their demands met. As Lazar describes in the case of the Rosas Pampa neighbourhood of El Alto, locals counteract their neighbourhood being ignored by the respective municipal administrations by establishing personalised clientelist relations with party candidates. This 'coexists with a desire to gain collective benefit from the patrons and constitute the zone itself as client' (2008: 91-92). Lazar notes that 'the *vecinos* of Rosas Pampa practice their citizenship as much if not more through their preelection participation in clientelist politics as through infrequent, though the meticulous act of voting' (Lazar, 2008: 116).

As Justo Seoane indicated, in the case of Concepción, the CICC's success in the 1995 elections was minor; however, it represented the start of regular Chiquitano participation in municipal elections. The CICC was convinced that intervention in the local decision-making process was the way to advance their territorial demand. The *central* developed two key strategies. The first was based on training potential indigenous political leaders in a school the CICC had founded with the help of the

[6] This percentage is based on counts of the population that identified themselves as Chiquitano in Concepción and San Pedro canton in the 2001 Census, excluding the DMI of Zapocó. See *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (2001).

NGO *Asesoría Legal y Asistencia Social* (ALAS - Legal Consultancy and Social Assistance) in 1993 in Concepción. Here they prepared Chiquitano leaders to occupy posts in municipal government (Lacroix, 2005: 53-54).[7]

The second strategy comprised the formation of a political commission within the CICC. The commission was composed of five people who were responsible for proposing one candidate, who then had to gain approval of the assembly of *comunidades*.[8] It also developed an electoral strategy, presented a political programme and produced information material for the *comunidades* (Lacroix, 2005: 54).[9] Municipal Head of Human Development and Chiquitano activist Ignacio Faldín explained that the CICC formed the commission in order to avoid breaking its regulations (*reglamento*):

> What happens is that organisations like the CICC that are more or less civic, historic and have a concrete platform, are not for taking power. We have to create another organisation to participate and to take the power, that can discuss, that can debate with other political parties. There are various reasons for this. It cannot be that the organisation is constructed for somebody. … this organisation is respected by all the political and partisan civic institutions … because their demands are social and cultural (my translation, quoted in Lacroix, 2005: 54).

Perhaps this reflects a discomfort with hierarchical modes of organisation (Clastres, 1989) and taking part in the state power structure. However, being perceived as 'political' rather than 'social' or 'cultural' certainly carried the danger that people would associate the organisation with one political tendency, which could compromise support from Chiquitano who identified with other political preferences. Further, being explicitly non-political signified that the local elites perceive the organisation as less of a danger to the socio-political and economic status quo.

For the 1999 municipal election campaign, the CICC chose Justo Seoane Parapaino, a thirty-two year old Chiquitano with much local, national, and

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[7] Lacroix describes that sixty candidates are regularly selected to be educated in the school. The students take intensive courses in law, history, sciences and *bésiro* (Chiquitano language). At the end of the education, forty candidates are elected to dedicate themselves to political careers in municipal elections in the whole of the Chiquitanía (2005: 53-54).

[8] Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[9] Additionally, the *central* followed another strategy: to gain presence in the national parliament in order to achieve national publicity for the territorial demand. Vicente Pessoa participated in the national elections with MBL affiliation and gained a parliamentary seat. While Seoane Parapaino (former Mayor of Concepción) notes that they did not 'get to have a say' in parliament, they managed to successfully use the national media to 'publish our demands to the entire Bolivian country'. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

international experience, to run as their candidate.[10] The theme of the campaign was '*credibilidad social*' ('social credibility'), and the fifteen-page programme the commission produced contained three main goals: the equitable distribution of popular participation resources and thus an end to their centralisation in the municipal seat; the promotion of citizen participation in local decision-making combined with an orientation of municipal policies towards rural problems and those of the *comunidades*; and finally, a strengthening of Chiquitano presence in the municipal council and the Oversight Committee (Lacroix, 2005: 55).

Like indigenous organisations elsewhere in Bolivia, the CICC had to ally itself with a political party to be able to participate (see Behrendt, 2000: 14; McKee, 1999: 5).[11] It chose the newly-founded MAS party. Justo Seoane provided the following reasons:

> We went to speak with Don Johnny Fernández, the owner of the legal personality [i.e. the party leader] of the UCS; we spoke to Don Juan Carlos Durán…who was the owner of the MNR. We also spoke to Mister Jaime Paz Zamora, with the MIR. But well, everybody said that their candidates were the Cattle Ranchers Association of Concepción, their candidates were the President of the Civic Committee … In the end, we conversed with Don Hugo Slavatierra and in an office with Evo Morales … Don José Bailaba, too, and we decided to run … with MAS political affiliation.[12]

Lacroix adds that further incentives were that the MAS departmental leader was director of ALAS, an NGO that already worked closely with the CICC, and that the functionaries did not attach conditions to lending their affiliation to CICC candidates (2005: 55-56).[13] This was important. As other cases indicate, the fact that indigenous candidates ran as affiliates of diverse parties often meant that they felt pressured to follow the party line rather than presenting the agenda of the people they represented.

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[10] Seoane explained during our interview that he left his post in the Ministry for Indigenous Affairs, which he had assumed during the presidency of Carlos Mesa in order to take up the candidacy. He added that another reason was that Carlos Mesa was about to be ousted from his presidency in any case. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[11] Kathleen O'Neill describes the procedure of municipal elections as follows: 'If one party wins a majority of the votes for its list of municipal council candidates, the top candidate on that list automatically becomes mayor. If an absolute majority is not achieved by any party, then the municipal council chooses the mayor from among its members' (2005: 125).

[12] '*… fuimos a hablar con don Johnny Fernández el dueño de la personería jurídica de la UCS, hablamos con Don Juan Carlos Duran…que era dueño del MNR, hablamos con el Señor Jaime Paz Zamora también con el del MIR. Pero bueno, todo mundo dijeron de que los candidatos eran Asociación de Ganaderos de Concepción, los candidatos eran el presidente del comité cívico …y tales así que conversamos con Don Hugo Salvatierra en una oficina con Evo Morales… Don José Bailaba también y definimos candidatear… con la personaría jurídica del MAS'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[13] Interview: Justo Seoane, Concepción, 17 July 2007.

Nancy Postero provides the example of *originario* candidate Don Faustino, who tried to capture a local seat in a small constituency in Potosi department. He noted: 'we were conditioned … by our need to *prestar consignas* [borrow party insignias]. We had to vote for the interest of the party' (in Postero, 2007: 144). Also the study of Ana María Lema et al. (2001) of Urubichá and Gutiérrez in Santa Cruz department and Villa Montes in Chuquisaca department revealed that local partisans maintained their authoritarian and paternalistic style, marginalising indigenous candidates and their programmes. Like the Chiquitano candidates, many of those who were not dissuaded thereafter decided to run with MAS affiliations for local and national elections – boosting the party's strength.

Still, in the Chiquitano case, other obstacles remained. Among these were that Chiquitano leaders did not agree on the MAS affiliation, and some saw it as an 'extremist party' (also Lacroix, 2005: 55-56). As Seoane explained, people were reluctant to vote for the party as 'to be MASist was to be *kolla* [derogatory term for people from the highlands]'.[14] This is reflected in the fact that some Chiquitano also took up the *kolla/camba* rhetoric (addressed in Chapter V and below), which forms part of the *cruceñidad* 'nationalist' discourse and is generally wielded by the Cruceño elite. Seoane summarised some further obstacles that the *central* faced in the 1999 Municipal elections:

> … some did not have an identity card, nor birth certificate, or if they have the card or if they have the birth certificate, there are administrative errors due to a lack of *oficialia* [coll. inefficiency] of the civil register, that there is a letter missing, so the electoral court generally purges [them]. So many of our brothers were removed, but we got one councillor in that year. In 2000, we assumed the post of President of the Municipal Council.[15]

All over Bolivia, indigenous groups and individuals encountered similar situations. Consequently, voter absenteeism in rural areas was between 40 and 60 per cent (compared with 35 per cent of the national total) (see Albó, 1996: 20; McKee, 1999: 6). Further, Seoane mentioned that the Chiquitano population continued to vote for 'traditional' parties (i.e. well established parties) instead of the CICC-MAS alliance.

[14] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[15] *'…que algunos no tiene carnet de identidad ni certificado de nacimiento, o si tiene carnet o si tienen certificado de nacimiento tienen errores administrativos por falta de oficialia de registro civil que le falta una letra entonces ya eso se depura mayormente la corte electora. Entonces hubieron muchos depurados de nuestros hermanos pero sacamos una concejalía en ese año. En el 2000 asumimos como presidente del concejo municipal'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

In Concepción, the election results of 12 December 1999 showed the following outcome: two council seats went to ADN, one to MNR one to MIR and one to MAS. MNR, MIR and MAS formed a three-party treaty based on an agreement to rotate occupation of the position of Mayor, President of the Municipal Council and Secretary of the Municipal Council (Lacroix, 2005: 56-57). Following these manoeuvres, Justo Seoane came to be President of the Municipal Council and Ignacio Paticú, a former President of the CICC, directed the CV. For nearly two years there was good co-operation between the Mayor, the *central* and the CV (Lacroix, 2005: 57-58). However, when it became Seoane's turn to assume the mayoralty in 2002, the opposition launched a vote of censure against MNR mayor Carlos Peña (Lacroix, 2005: 59).[16] Subsequently, the MIR, ADN and MNR councillors joined in coalition and these shenanigans left the MAS in opposition. Commenting on these events, Lacroix notes that one reason for this outcome was that the mayor had received threats from the side of the 'dominant groups', who judged municipal policies to be too favourable to the indigenous groups (2005: 59).[17] Former President of the Municipal Council Pablo Mencarí put this move down to blatant racism:

> … they said that it was an insult to life that one of us was in the municipal government, because it is embarrassing for a municipality, because the municipality is stained by the *paicos*. Thus, 'the municipality smelled bad'. They want to preserve the power between themselves and for themselves (my translation, quoted in Lacroix, 2005: 59-60).

This episode demonstrated the ability and willingness of local elites to stop Chiquitano initiatives and to out-manoeuvre them in the municipal government.

The 2004 Municipal Elections

For the 2004 elections, the *comunidades* again supported Seoane's candidacy. Ignacio Faldín summarised the *centrals'* reasoning for participating:

[16] Lacroix argues that this was linked to developments at departmental level, where the MIR and ADN were preparing the ground as the next national elections were approaching (2005: 59). He adds that while Carlos Peña was suspended and the court case was ongoing, municipal funds were 'miraculously reduced' by about 300,000 *Bolivianos* (about $40,000) (Lacroix, 2005: 59). Such situations were not uncommon in Bolivian municipalities. A World Bank report found that the *voto constructivo* was used to replace 30 per cent of the country's mayors in 1997 and 25 per cent in 1998 (Hiskey and Seligson, 2003: 71).

[17] Lacroix notes that most of the *terceros* in Monte Verde were MNR supporters (2005: 59).

> For one, because of the right, because we felt Bolivian, and it is stipulated through a law that we all have the right to organise, [to represent] our way of thinking, our projections [for the future]. And we have to exercise this right in accordance with the legislation. … The other [reason] is … that [we were] downtrodden, right? Because we did not get the information, so they did not take us into consideration in the projections of the participation [the participatory planning process]. So, we came to think that we could exercise [a public function], that we could be more open, more participative in all the decisions. So we fought again so that we could be the protagonists in running an institution, to demonstrate that we are also capable to exercise [a public function] like any other person. [18]

This indicates a shift in emphasis from primarily focusing on territory and services to demanding participation as a right, as Faldín noted: 'we want participation, we want that they respect us', a right 'the parents' had not enjoyed.[19] This resonates with the discourse of other Bolivian local actors previously excluded from equal access to the political sphere and citizenship rights. Postero described how some of her Guaraní informants from villages close to Santa Cruz de la Sierra 'began to feel entitled to exercise the political rights that the reform offered' (Postero, 2007: 140-141). As her Guaraní friend, Pablo, noted: 'We have rights now … They can't steal from us like before' (quoted in Postero, 2007: 140).

Driven by this vision, the *central* and Seoane launched their '*Plan Político 2004*' (2004 Political Plan). Their strategy was that the forty indigenous *comunidades* would name ten leaders each to form a *Comisión Política Indígena Comunal* (CPIC - Communal Indigenous Political Commission). The CPIC would then assume the function of the CICC's Political Commission. Every representative would secure the support of ten people in his or her *comunidad* so creating a support base of 4,000 voters for the CICC candidate. Part of the CICC's strategy was also to attain backing from the urban areas.[20] To this end Juana Herrera Mendéz, a non-

[18] *'…uno por derecho porque nos sentimos bolivianos ya y esta estipulado a través de una ley de que todos tenemos un derecho de organizarnos de poder emitir nuestro criterio, nuestro pensamiento, nuestras proyecciones entonces y ese derecho obviamente pues tenemos que ejercerlo en función a lo que dice la legalidad. Entonces nos hemos propuesto a organizarnos y estamos ya ahora en función como estado. El otro es…por una necesidad de que ya nosotros sentíamos fuera de esos derechos y vamos a decir también pisoteado ¿no? Porque nosotros no alcanzábamos las informaciones entonces no nos tomaban en cuenta en las proyecciones en la participación. Entonces nos llega pues a pensar que ejercemos nosotros, que podamos nosotros ser mas abierto, mas participativos y todas las decisiones. Entonces donde hemos luchado otra vez por poder ser nosotros los protagonista de llevar una institución demostrar también que nosotros también somos capaces de ejercer como cualquier otras personas'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[19] *'Por eso queremos participación, queremos que nos respeten…'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[20] Interview: Justo Seoane: Concepción, 17 July 2007; Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007.

Chiquitano from Concepción, with no prior political experience, was invited to run for Councillor.

While that year social associations had also been permitted to register and present candidates for election, the *central* candidates were already inscribed through the MAS. Seoane and Faldín pointed out that therefore the problems remained in that many *comunarios* continued to support other parties they were set on. Faldín explained the problem:

> … this debilitates us in participating with our own identity as indigenous people... Because as you know, [in] our *comunidades* there are different ideologies and interests, where a brother of mine can be from another party, it could be my very wife [who] is from another party, apart from that we are one family, no? And this is where the weakness is, so I have to convince and convince that this is a project for our good, so this is a lot of work. This is now our weakness. [21]

He stressed that the matter was not to separate from MAS, but from any political party. Like Seoane, he hoped that the OICH could replace parties. Seoane noted that it was hard to convince *comunarios* that despite the MAS affiliation the candidates were actually participating 'with our own identity as an indigenous *pueblo*' (in other words, they were not promoting the MAS political agenda, but had their own 'Chiquitano' agenda).[22] This raises the questions as to why lowland indigenous groups had not earlier set up a MAS equivalent for local political participation. While this question deserves further attention, it is likely that this is linked to the fact that lowland indigenous groups have been generally more suspicious of political parties, perceive their structures as alien to their own more egalitarian way of organising (see Chapter V), and that this vehicle for formal political participation is of little use to lowland indigenous people who are in the minority in many municipalities. On the contrary they would have tried to gain DMI status, reminiscent of what the Chiquitano of Lomerío had done.

Again, many Chiquitano votes were declared invalid after the ballot, but despite the problems, the *central* achieved the election of three candidates: Justo

[21] '*…eso es que nos debilita nosotros participar con nuestra propia identidad como pueblo indígena… Por que usted sabe de que nuestras comunidades hay diferente ideología e intereses donde un hermano mío puede ser de otro partido puede ser mi mujer mismo de otro partido pese que somos de una familia no, ahí esta la debilidad entonces yo tengo que conversar y convencer de que este es un proyecto para bien de nosotros entonces es un trabajo amplió entonces donde eso nuestra debilidad ahora'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[22] '*…con nuestra propia identidad como pueblo indígena…'*. Interview: Justo Seoane: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

Seoane, Juana Herrera Mendéz and Benita Machicado, a *comunaria* from Altamira. Because they won with a narrow majority of eight votes, they had to enter into coalition with the MIR, so that Seoane could assume the post of Mayor on 10 January 2005.[23] Subsequently seventeen members of the CICC occupied positions in different areas of the municipal government administration.[24]

Photo 37: Mayor Justo Seoane

Justo Seoane, Mayor of Concepción, in his office in Concepción, 17 July 2007.

During an interview that my colleague Margoth Céspedes and I conducted with him on 17 July 2007, Seoane indicated that the MIR had broken this coalition during the presentation of the first quarterly report of the 2007 administration period (which

[23] The elections resulted in the appointment of two MAS, one MIR, one ADN and one MNR councillor (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 207).
[24] Justo Seoane explained that they occupied positions in the health division, as building supervisors, and as technicians in the cadastral, urban and rural infrastructure and forestry divisions. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

took place between 13-15 July 2007).[25] He also mentioned that this would make decision-making in the municipality difficult. He was still optimistic and noted that 'his fellow brothers' had given him 'legitimacy', which signified that he had to look for avenues to overcome this obstacle.[26] However, he did not surmount the difficulties and in early September 2007 he was 'censured' by the opposition and replaced by Widen Manuel Barbery, despite the protest of CICC, OICH and the OTBs who occupied the municipality for three days.[27] Once again the elite had demonstrated their political leverage and ability to oust Chiquitano politicians from power.

Workings of the 2004–2007 Administration

Under Chiquitano control, the municipal administration created a management plan with the input of the *comunidades* to which the municipal government added another five points. The plan addressed the issues of health, education, production, infrastructure and 'the right to identity'. They distributed copies to each *comunidad* and based on this, the *comunarios* together with other citizens could evaluate the municipal governments' performance. Ignacio Faldín explained that the *comunidades* also defined the priorities for the POA and 'play a part in the oversight over their own demands, works or projects'.[28] Juana Herrera Mendéz specified that 'oversight' involves writing the minutes on how the money is spent, recording what they did and evaluating the work undertaken.[29] Thus, this again demonstrates how the LPP draws *comunarios* into state administrative structures and promotes *indio permitido*-style (Hale, 2002, 2004) self-management and self-evaluation among the *comunidades*.

Apart from the c*omunidades*, the municipal government also interacts with a host of other actors that operate within municipal boundaries, through 'diverse formal and informal mechanisms' (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 207-

[25] In this meeting all the OTBs of Concepción and members of the municipal council and Oversight Committee were present. I also attended the meeting, but did not realise that there was a rupture between the MAS and MIR councillors. However, I felt a heightened tension between councillors and OTBs. After the meeting I was told that the ADN, MIR and MNR councillors were suspicious of my presence. Field notes: Concepción, 15 June 2007.
[26] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[27] *El Deber* (6 September 2007) and *El Deber* (7 September 2007).
[28] *'…, porque ellos mismos son parte de fiscalización donde de sus mismas demandas, obras o proyectos'* Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[29] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. Articles 7 and 8 of the LPP extensively outline the rights and responsibilities of the OTBs.

208). Indicative of the way such actors are tied into the everyday running of the municipality is the fact that already the PDM (and the Adjustment of the PDM) is elaborated:

> … with the participation of all the representatives of the indigenous *central* of Concepción CICC, rural communities and the urban sector of the municipality, in coordination with the Oversight Committee, health [and] education sectors, public and private institutions and, primarily, the municipal government of Concepción (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007a: iii).

Most governmental and non-governmental actors that interact with the municipality provide support in the form of finance or training. For example, the municipality receives financial resources from the national government for school breakfasts and lunches, from the Prefecture for infrastructure (such as their new sports arena), from the Spanish Government for promoting tourism, from the NGO APCOB for improving agricultural production, and from the North American NGO Plan International for the promotion of children's rights and improving healthcare and infrastructure.[30]

NGOs comprise an integral part of municipal government activities all over Bolivia especially in rural areas. For instance, Behrendt and Gray Molina point to the importance of NGOs in providing support to indigenous groups so that they can fulfil the 'participatory' components of the LPP (2000: 1; 2002: 8).[31] As state agencies have limited funding and capacities, NGOs embarked on the task of training citizens to take up their role in local administration processes. As Postero notes: 'the process of moulding new citizens is complex… and involves many actors' (2007: 139). She notes that in the case of the Guaraní of the Zona Cruz, *Colectivo de Estudios Aplicados al Desarrollo Social* (CEADES - Collective of Applied Studies on Social Development) took up this role (Postero, 2007: 140). In turn, in Concepción CEJIS was one of the NGOs that helped Chiquitano organise as OTBs and 'educated' them with regards to their rights as citizens (see below).[32] Significantly, this again points

[30] Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007. For a list of public institutions that operate within the municipality, see *Gobierno Municipal de Concepción* (2007b: 209-218), for private institutions such as NGOs, see *Gobierno Municipal de Concepción* (2007b: 218-222).

[31] Behrendt adds that on the other hand 'it is interesting to note that, while many critics of neo-liberal policies see decentralisation or other state reforms as leading to abrogation of state responsibility or to a dependence on NGOs for service delivery, to some extent decentralisation in Bolivia has meant the arrival of government orientated towards service delivery, and in many cases the displacement of NGOs in certain areas' (2000: 5).

[32] Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare (CEJIS), Concepción, 1 June 2007.

to the blurring between local governmental mechanisms and those of NGOs: they are effectively both involved in the same activities, forming citizens able to fulfil the requirements of the LPP. This is testimony to the narrow way that state actors defined citizenship. As Postero points out, participation in indigenous organisations, communities or trade unions was discounted even by NGO members 'who had worked with this sort of protagonism for years' (2007: 140).

The municipal government also interacts with the CICC and the OICH. It is the role of the CICC (as Association of OTBs) to organise meetings between the OTBs.[33] Secondly, the municipality becomes involved when the *central* (or any other 'social organisation') cooperates with any other development institution, NGO or 'state' administrative level. The aim is to coordinate activities and avoid duplication (see Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 207-208). During Justo Seoane's time as mayor, the CICC and municipal government also cooperated on issues related to the TCO Monte Verde. For example, Herrera Mendéz explained that at times they carried out inspections of Monte Verde together, for example, to find illegal *tercero* settlements.[34] Lastly, Benita Machicado noted that the CICC and OICH supported Chiquitano office-holders morally by encouraging them to 'carry on working', as well as providing ideas and advice.[35]

Seoane clarified that Chiquitano politicians operating within the municipal government were in charge of looking after the management of public resources, while the *central* performs the political function:

> The role of the Organisation is… to be a non-profit organisation…it has a legal personality (*personería juridica*) that we obtained in 1993, of course. That and mainly…the role of the organisation is the following…how to modify the norms that exist in our country, how to modify them that is the issue, that is it, and they mainly carry on this process.[36]

This is an interesting statement, considering that other *central* leaders stressed its 'social' character and see participation in the municipality as the 'political' route. Perhaps this statement reflects Seoane's realisation that in reality participation in the

[33] Interview: Juana Herrera Mendéz, Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[34] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[35] Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007.
[36] *'Los roles de la organización es… ser una organización sin fines de lucro…tiene personería jurídica la conseguimos en le 1993 por supuesto. Entonces eso y mayormente…el rol de la organización lo siguiente…de como modificar las normas que existe en nuestro país, como modificarlas ese es el tema, eso es y lo siguen como el proceso mayormente…'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

local government enables you to influence the distribution of resources, while there are no mechanisms to change the broader political and juridical order of the country. After all, it is the *central* leaders and *comunarios* that participate in marches, interact with umbrella organisations and travel to Sucre to exert pressure on members of the Constituent Assembly to insert proposals emanating from the lowland indigenous movement.

The Municipal Programme and the Production versus Continuity Paradox

In line with the stipulation of the LPP, during Seoanes' time as mayor the PDM and the POAs generally planned improvements in infrastructure and social and economic development initiatives. Deemed most pressing were infrastructural improvements, such as the maintenance of streets, bridges, schoolrooms, providing technical assistance in agricultural production, health services and providing clean drinking water for urban and rural areas.[37] In terms of education, Faldín explained that they had founded a '*Normal*' in Concepción, a training institute for teachers who would work in the community schools. They would also teach lessons in the Chiquitano languages.[38] Justo Seoane explained why education had a special priority:

> … of course in this village of Concepción, many *comunidades* were founded in private properties. Many property owners made their own schools; the landowner did it mainly as *compadre,* so that he could put free work in his bag and not pay them [the *empadronados*]... above all in the education there is total discrimination, no?[39]

Another policy initiative of the municipality was to improve its communications network, i.e. using local television channels and radio stations to inform citizens 'directly and personally' about its activities. Ignacio Faldín stressed the importance of this for publicising and legitimising the council's work.[40] Benita Machicado also opined that improved communication would help so that the grassroots could 'see the positive and not only the negative aspects, and get motivated'.[41] Considering the

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[37] Interview: Juana Herrera Mendéz**,** Concepción, 17 July 2007; Interview: Justo Seonae, Concepción, 17 July 2007; Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[38] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[39] *'…por su puesto en este pueblo de concepción, muchas comunidades se fundaron en propiedades privadas. Muchos propietarios hacían sus colegios y bueno pues ¿no? mayormente se lo hacia como compadre el propietario para poder meter ala bolsa su trabajo gratuito y no pagarle... sobre todo en la parte educativa hay una discriminación total ¿no?'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[40] Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[41] *'... que vean lo positivo y no lo negativo para que ellos se* animen'. Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007.

remoteness of some *comunidades* and their lack of electricity, radio communication was particularly important (still, most *comunidades* have at least one battery-powered radio).[42]

'Gender' formed Benita Machicado's main concern. She explained that they had founded a Women's Commission in the municipality 'that helps women, above all in the rural areas, in the *comunidades*'.[43] She added that in 2006, the municipal government supported an artisan project for women to produce weavings and embroidery with the help of the NGO Plan International. They had also launched a project in cooperation with the CICC which involved hosting workshops on empowerment issues and leadership training, as well as computing and artisanal production.[44]

Further, the PDM contained the following 'vision for development':

> Concepción constitutes one of the most important touristic municipalities of the Chiquitanía. It enjoys basic sanitation and takes advantage of its potential for cattle ranching, forestry, and agriculture. This generates a larger amount of economic activity, which improves the quality of life of the population, within a framework of sustainable human development (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007c: 271).[45]

Mayor Seoanes' vision was to combine economic development with the promotion of Chiquitano artisanal products and music.[46] He explained that Concepción had been declared the seat of the National Network of Jesuit Missions in the Gran Chiquitanía. In this context, the municipal government had promoted the sale of 'our Chiquitano shirt', which Seoane noted had the 'value of eighty *Bolivianos*' (about ten dollars).[47] The municipal government cooperated with the CICC in this initiative, and the *central* organised training courses for the manufacture of artisan products.

Ignacio Faldín explained that it was one of the municipal government's next projects to expand the benefits of tourism to the *comunidades*. So far, only the urban areas had profited, because they had the appropriate infrastructure (electricity, water

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[42] Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[43] *'… que ayuda a las mujeres mas que todo del área rural que son de las comunidades'*. Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007.
[44] Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007.
[45] This statement supposedly summarises the 'vision of development' realised in workshops held for the citizens of Concepción in order to 'validate' the PDM (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007c: 271).
[46] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[47] Every member of the municipal government has a Chiquitano shirt with the same design, which they often wear to work. It is their work uniform. The CICC leaders also have such a shirt, which they often wear.

and transportation). The aim was that *comunidades* would take advantage of their 'touristic features', such as their 'natural surroundings' or 'abundance of orchids'.[48] He thought that promoting tourism was closely related to 'developing culture' and hoped that the promotion of Chiquitano culture would lead to its appreciation by 'whites and mestizos' as well as Chiquitanos themselves:

> …because in the *comunidades* we are still preserving the culture and it is important to demonstrate this and we have done this as Municipal Government recently through a world-wide launch, as an opening to demonstrate our culture, our customs, our music, and above all, the preservation of our forests…and in truth this benefits all, let's say in the municipality.[49]

In other words, they involved *comunarios* in exploiting their own traditions and 'cultural resources' in a commercial way. The question is whether the *comunidades* benefit from this. There are indications that such projects may lead to conflict in *comunidades*, as the CEJIS team found out during a workshop in the *comunidad* El Carmen. El Carmen is one of the bigger *comunidades* in Concepción municipalities, with several adobe-built school and communal multi-function buildings. It had benefitted from Plan International projects which had resulted in the installation of a system of water pipes, leading water to taps and sinks around the communal buildings in the centre of the *comunidad*. Plan had also sponsored a library. During the workshop it transpired that there was some discontent among *comunarios* with regards to a tourist attraction close to their *comunidad*: an area of forest with large rocks covered in orchids. *Comunarios* told us that some tourists had come to visit. The *comunarios* wanted to charge them, but the tourists refused and argued that they had already paid a fee in the tourist office of the municipal government. The *comunarios* were unhappy about this. There had also been other problems: for instance, tourists had come to the *comunidad* and paid one *comunario* who did not want to share the proceeds, to the disgruntlement of the others.[50]

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[48] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. A whole discussion exists about the potential costs and benefits of tourism, for which there is no scope here.

[49] *'…por que nosotros todavía como comunidades preservamos la cultura y eso es lo importante de demostrar y lo hemos hecho ya nosotros como gobierno municipal a través de lo que es un lanzamiento mundial que se lo ha hecho recientemente ya como una puerta de mostrar a nuestra cultura nuestra costumbres nuestras música y mas que todo nuestra preservación de nuestros bosques que le damos no, entonces donde se le ha dao eso donde la verdad de que beneficia a todos digamos en municipio'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[50] Workshop: El Carmen, 10 May 2007.

With regards to this specific issue it remains to be seen how these ‘tourism projects’ get organised in the future and what the consequences may be. However, there are few indications that *comunarios* are actually benefiting from the commercialisation of ‘traditional’ products and environmental features, compared to the white and *mestizo* shop owners in Concepción, who profit from high mark ups. Further, the multicultural premise of valuing the country’s diverse cultures is turned into an economic project. Such projects face little opposition, especially if they provide local elites with economic gains. This resembles the *indigenista* project of valuing and promoting aspects of indigenous traditions of continuities that can be economically exploited, discussed by other authors in relation to Mexico (e.g. Brading, 1988; Mattiace, 2009).

Photo 38: Workshop in El Carmen

Facilitator William Roca and *comunario* with Plan International hat.

Photo 39: Orchids in El Carmen

One of the Orchid-covered rocks near El Carmen. Unfortunately not in bloom at the time.

Not only the municipal employees, but as indicated in the previous chapter and the 'Interlude', also NGO and Church activists followed the logic that *comunarios* needed to be 'developed' through 'productive projects'. Faldín acknowledges that there is a problem with this notion:

> Also in the area of production, we know very well that… we are not large-scale producers; we are just producers for the benefits of our family consumption. So this is what we have worked traditionally, our *comunidades*. However, the municipality takes a support strategy more in the direction of support for production, to look for alternatives, let's say, improvement of the grazing areas, because the *comunidades* now have cooperatives, but they are not looking after them, they are not supporting them. We can also talk about projects to do with milk, meat, so there are these projects and we are supporting them in that, so the municipal government is prioritising these needs to produce more. Also, not to forget, the traditional plots: improving the seed for them, giving them the maize, rice, bean seeds. We have the professionals that can provide the follow-up, but it is very hard, because our *comunidades* are not used to negotiating … to cultivating and selling. They are not negotiators, they are …. from a culture of survival. However, we are working in this respect, so that in this last prioritisation in the POA they see … that there is an

> interest in improving the production above all to being able to sell, because it is about selling and having resources for the family.[51]

While admitting to problems with the municipalities' emphasis on increasing production, he maintained that the solution is to 'try harder' to convince the *comunarios* that they should improve production, to sell produce in order to have additional family resources. Also Benita Machicado thought that the problem was that *comunarios* produce 'a bit for subsistence and this is why our people hardly ever grow, they do not advance because they really have nothing [so that they can] keep studying, i.e. they could not send their children to pursue advanced studies'.[52] Again, this is testimony to the pervasive nature of the neo-liberal multicultural discourse and the 'menace' that resides in its reductive nature (Hale, 2002): 'Citizenship' is participating in local level deliberation over the distribution of resources with the aim of economic advancement – neoliberal citizens can thus engage in their own development and become functional to the state's economic paradigm (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007).

Achievements and Obstacles: 'We are in government but do not have the power'

Chiquitano municipal government officials pointed to some major achievements during Justo Seoanes' legislative period. They stressed improvements in the areas of healthcare, education, assistance in agricultural production inside the *comunidades*,

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[51] *'También en la parte productiva sabemos muy bien de que…nosotros no somos productores en grandes, solamente somos productores para beneficio de la familia, el consumo. Entonces eso es lo que tradicionalmente se trabaja, nuestras comunidades. Pero el municipio agarra un estrategia de poder apoyar mas en cuanto al apoyo a la producción, de buscar alternativas digamos, mejoramiento de potrero por que las comunidades ahorita tiene cooperativas pero no se les esta dando seguimiento no, no se le esta apoyando. También se puede hablar proyectos como por decir leche, carne tambien entonces hay ese proyecto que se esta apoyando en eso, entonces el gobierno municipal esta priorizando esas necesidades para poder producir mas. Tambien no olvidando lo que es el cultivo tradicional mejorarles la semilla darles la semilla de maíz, arroz, fríjol tambien. Entonces tenemos la parte técnica que le puede dar seguimiento pero esta costando por que por que nuestras comunidades no están acostumbrado a negociar, cultivar y vender, digamos. No son negociante son nomás de culturas de sobrevivencia, digamos. Pero eso estamos trabajando al respecto de eso, entonces en esta ultima priorización dentro del POA ya se esta viendo, digamos, de que tienen interés de poder mejorar la producción mas que todo para poder comercializar, por que de eso se trata de que vendamos y tener recursos para la familia'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[52] *'…chaquear y sembrar ¿no? y dar lo poco para el sustento y es por eso que nuestra gente casi no surge, no sale adelante porque realmente no tienen para seguir estudiando'*. Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007.

and an increase in citizen participation.[53] However, they also pointed to problems. Justo Seoane explained that he felt a 'dilemma' when he occupied the mayorship:

> …it is really hard when you do not have the majority and when [you are] an indigenous authority. … When [one] enters as indigenous mayor, let's say, one is not simply mayor of the indigenous, no? But one is Mayor of the private investment, mayor of the public investment and is mayor, let's say, of the collective investment, no? … [I am the] mayor of the Chiquitanos, of the Aymaras, of the Quechuas, of the cattle ranchers, of the Cambas, right? The important thing is that in one or the other way one always tends towards the social wellbeing of the people who most need it, right?[54]

Ignacio Faldín noted that it was hard to balance the demands and needs of the urban and rural areas, especially given the deep economic, social and ethnic rifts that accompany division.[55]

Apart from municipal governmental shortcomings due to internal administrative difficulties, there were problems with citizen oversight.[56] One reason advanced to explain this state of affairs is that the system had not actually been implemented in Concepción until 2003, resulting in a lack of experience. Faldín explained that civil society in a large part of the municipality was not composed of 'professionals' and had minimal experience in financial auditing.[57] Herrera Mendéz also noted that 'the citizens do not know much about politics', which according to her, also included the newly elected OTBs.[58] This situation mirrors that of other municipalities in the Bolivian lowlands. According to Behrendt, the missing knowledge concerning the law and politics in general, combined with a general lack of education, posed obstacles to the working of the system in most indigenous areas.

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[53] Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007; Interview: Benita Machicado, Concepción, 16 July 2007; Interview: Juana Herrera Mendéz, Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[54] *'…cuesta realmente cuando no tenés la mayoría y cuando una autoridad indígena. … Cuando entra como un alcalde indígena, digamos, ya pues no es alcalde simplemente de los indígenas ¿no?, por eso es alcalde de la inversión privada, es alcalde de la inversión publica y es alcalde, digamos, de la inversión colectiva ¿no? … Soy el alcalde de los chiquitanos de los aymaras, de los quechuas, de los ganaderos, de los cambas ¿no es verdad? Entonces lo importante de que de una y otra manera siempre uno tira por el bien social de la gente que más necesita ¿no?'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[55] *'…como zona indígena de tener nuestra propia cultura, con nuestro propia demanda. Mala suerte pues que estamos con la zona urbana que no la diferencia que tenemos diferentes ideologías'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[56] Some of these were internal operational problems. For example, Benita Machicado complained that there is a lack of coordination between councillors and the mayor and sometimes between councillors. This, she noted, was restricted to formal appointments with the mayor, while in the past the relationship was closer friendship-facilitated coordination. Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007.

[57] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[58] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

It led to a lack of understanding of the functioning of the political system and how to use it to advance their position. Behrendt found in her study that most public and elected officials also lacked such knowledge (2000: 17; also see Lema et al., 2001).

Faldín and Machicado pointed to another obstacle: the lack of municipal resources. This meant the municipal council could not train people to fulfil the functions the LPP required.[59] Furthermore, *comunarios* lacked the resources to travel to the municipal seat to actually exercise their oversight function. For similar reasons, members of the municipal government could not visit the *comunidades* frequently to keep them informed about current matters in the municipal politics.[60] Further, Benita Machicado perceived a widespread lack of interest in the workings of the municipal government and a lack of support towards the councillors from the side of the public.[61] While authors writing on other localities have equally pointed to the unwillingness of citizens to use the newly available channels (e.g. Albó, 1996; Faguet, 2003), it is not clear where to draw the line between 'unwillingness', 'inability' (for example due to a lack of resources for travel), or a 'lack of knowledge regarding the system'. With regard to Chiquitano *comunidades*, the case is probably a mixture of these factors, combined with a general perception that it is the responsibility of the OTB to deal with the municipal government (see below). The solution Herrera Mendéz provides is more training and workshops to OTBs and other citizens; 'so that they can represent themselves as they should, knowing the law'.[62]

The lack of resources also meant that the municipality experienced delays in project delivery. This is likely to be due to its relatively small size. Rowland found that smaller municipalities in Bolivia face severe resource constraints under decentralisation due to limited local sources of finance 'because resource endowments especially taxable property and activities are unequally distributed across space' and rural areas and smaller municipalities are at a disadvantage (2001: 1376). Juana Herrera Mendéz complained, for example, that the municipality only owns one tractor.[63] While seemingly a minor point, it should be remembered that this tractor is employed to re-pave streets and paths to the *comunidades* after the rainy

[59] Faguet provides a good summary of the skills that need to be present in civil society for oversight to function (see 2003: 24-26).
[60] Interviews: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007; Benita Machicado, Concepción, 16 July 2007.
[61] Interview: Benita Machicado, Concepción, 16 July 2007.
[62] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.
[63] Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

season, one of the main annual demands on the municipal government from the *comunidades*. Accordingly, the problems in service delivery comprised one of the biggest complaints against the municipality. While the town hall was supposed to (or, in the eyes of the *comunarios*, 'had agreed to') assist the *comunidad* in maintaining paths, in building schools or classrooms and in paying for teachers, in many *comunidades* these initiatives had not materialised, i.e. the municipality did 'not do as it promised'.[64] Some *comunarios* acknowledged that the reason might be a lack of resources: 'the Mayor has no money'.[65] Other *comunarios* were more optimistic and hoped that the municipal government would still deliver.[66]

Lastly, some *comunarios* were more critical about the whole LPP process. For example, Lorenzo Pasabare noted:

> Nothing happens, because we carry on asking for favours. They make a POA, they reformulate a POA, but we carry on like before in an enormous bureaucracy in which one has to wait years to do a few things. [For example] in the maintenance of the paths of one *comunidad* another *comunidad* has to keep on waiting … it was only to hurry [us along to adopt the OTB system] … [but] after twelve, thirteen years, we just carry on, nearly nothing has changed.[67]

He concluded: 'We are in government, but we do not have the power.'[68] This demonstrates Lorenzo's feeling that participation in the local state bureaucracy had not actually brought any political changes. The municipal government simply distributed resources when *comunarios* defined their needs and 'asked for them'. This sums up the situation in many Bolivian localities, and points to the inherently flawed nature of the Bolivian decentralisation reforms and the LPP – they did not sufficiently alter prevalent structural inequalities in the municipalities and country as a whole and provided for very narrowly defined citizenship practices: deliberation over local resources. As noted, this was one of the key factors that led popular actors

[64] Workshop: Santa Ana, 1st group, 20 April 2007; Workshop*:* Don Miguel, Candelaria, 11 May 2007.
[65] Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007.
[66] *'…no creo que nos dejen de lado pues, porque ya en otras comunidades están lanzado su ayuda'* Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007.
[67] '*No pasa naranjas, por que seguimos pidiéndole favores, pidiéndole. Se hace un POA se reformula un POA, pero igual seguís en una burocracia enorme que uno tiene que esperar años todavía para hacer una poco cosa, por decir los mantenimientos de caminos una comunidad otra comunidad tiene que seguir esperando, cuando llegara la maquina, el otro dice también lo quiere, pero es ahí donde nos quedamos pensando, entonces…fue nomás como un apuro, fue nomás como un alboroto nomás, que después de doce, trece años seguimos casi nomás, casi nada a cambiado'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.
[68] *'Estamos en gobierno pero no tenemos el poder'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

to increasingly question the narrow channels from 2000 onwards and to demand Constituent Reform.

Concepceño Opposition to Chiquitano in the Political Sphere (or: the 'Indígenas del Evo')

Lorenzo's remarks also points to perhaps the largest obstacle to Chiquitano-led administration in Concepción, namely that those used to wielding local power saw their own position threatened by the indigenous leaders. Again, this resonates with the situation in other municipalities. Behrendt found that especially in the more heterogeneous lowland areas, outright discrimination and marginalisation of elected indigenous people comprised a severe problem (2000: 15).[69] Benita Machicado explained the situation for Concepción municipality:

> Above all urban people, councillors from the other side say that the indigenous are incapable of managing, that the Mayor should not be, [and] should rather give his post to another. … there is a lot of criticism … regrettably the urban zone will always see us as the negative part in administering the Municipal Government and they will always see us as if we were from the villages, the *comunidades* we do not have the capacity to advance. .... I have confronted the people… those from the council on the side of the opposition and I have told them… that we did not need to be professionals to work and lead a Municipal Government … and that it is all the other way round because we have an indigenous mayor who is not a professional but he is a very good mayor, or rather, he works for his people. And well, when they were Mayor and one heard that they were practically thieves …[70]

[69] Behrendt refers to a study carried out in a study of eighty different Municipal Governments with *campesino-indígena* representatives. The representatives identified four major problems: 53 per cent felt that they had too little preparation for their new role; 34 per cent named internal and party conflicts, 27 per cent stated that they felt marginalised as indigenous representatives, and 21 per cent felt that they lacked sufficient resources to be more effective (2000: 15). Behrendt adds that operational constraints were not limited to indigenous and peasant candidates only and notes that the lack of a professional civil service at municipal level was a general problem. He details that there is a clear lack of experience in directing meetings, organising discussions and reaching a consensus, and notes that these are skills that need to be developed but that training and capacity building processes were extremely time consuming. He found that there was therefore little continuity in policies and follow-up (2000: 15).

[70] *'…mas que todos gentes urbanas, concejales del otro la(d)o dicen que los indígenas son incapaces de manejar que el alcalde no debería estar debería mas bien dar el puesto a otro…hay un montón de criticas…lamentablemente esta aquí hoy, que es la zona urbana y siempre nos van a ver pues a nosotros, y siempre nos van a ver como la parte negativa para manejar un gobierno municipal y siempre nos van a ver como que nosotros somos de los pueblos, las comunidades no tenemos la capacidad para seguir adelante. …me confrontado con las personas mas que todos aquí con los del concejo de la parte opositora…le dicho de que no necesitábamos ser profesionales para trabajar y llevar un gobierno municipal… y eso es todo lo contrario porque tenemos a un alcalde indígena que no es profesional pero es una alcalde muy bueno ósea trabaja por su pueblo y este como ellos ha sido alcalde y que prácticamente este se ha escuchado que solamente han sido…de ladrones…'*. Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007.

According to Faldín, while the non-Chiquitano members of the Municipal Government formally accepted the indigenous authorities, they still had a disregard for them:

> Because we are in office and they take us into consideration in invitations and in participation, and to be part also of the execution of a plan, a treaty…but as such in valuing us as authority, let's say, they still feel it as a disturbance, they still do not take us seriously… because 'I am not going to be ordered around by a simple worker who has not been a professional who has not been to university, an intellectual'.[71]

Lacroix found that elite attitudes often translated into diverse accusations against *central* leaders and the NGOs that support them (with 'a lot of money'), as demonstrated by remarks from the former Sub prefect Suárez Flores (ADN):

> This organisation is more political than anything else. It is not a social organisation, but a purely political organisation, which is looking for any excuse to enter into conflict with whomever. The politicisation is such that it provokes a situation of chaos. They are always looking for shit [trouble] (my translation, quoted in Lacroix, 2005: 48-49).

Through their political manoeuvrings against Seoane in 2007, the elite acted on their discontent with the political status quo. Their actions may also have partly been linked to a perceived lack of experience of Chiquitano functionaries, and to the increase of budget expenditure in favour of rural areas and away from the municipal seat. However, as Justo Seoane indicated, he attempted to cater for all sorts of interests in the locality – the municipal budget was certainly not entirely spent on Chiquitano interests.

Instead, several political differences with high stakes had heightened Concepceño dissatisfaction with Chiquitano engagement in politics. These were generally linked to developments in the wider political sphere, where the Constituent Assembly was continuing. Firstly, the CICC, along with other local indigenous *centrales*, had campaigned for the proposal for indigenous autonomies to be included in the new constitution. Instead, the Concepceño elite along with *media luna* political leaders and the Civic Committees supported departmental autonomies and saw indigenous autonomies as a direct challenge to their own plans (also see Chapter III).

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[71] *'…por el hecho de que uno esta en función y lo toman en cuenta en lo que es invitaciones y participar y ser parte también de una ejecución de un plan o de un convenio… pero en si en darles valor como autoridad, digamos, todavía lo sienten como un estorbo, no lo toman como en serio todavía… por el hecho de que "yo no me voy a dejar mandar por un simplemente un trabajador, que no ha sido un profesional, que no ha sido un universitario un intelectual"'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

Secondly, Concepceño elite opposed a MAS Mayor – be he Chiquitano or not. In line with the departmental leaders, they had opposed the MAS-led initiative for the Assembly from the outset and tensions regarding the Assembly were also played out in Concepción. Because of their MAS affiliation, the elites increasingly connected the Chiquitano indigenous political project to that of the MAS and Evo Morales in the national sphere. The elites were deeply suspicious of MAS's anti-capitalist indigeneity discourse (Albro, 2005, 2006; Canessa, 2007b). The following episode serves to highlight Concepceño and Cruceño attitudes regarding MAS.

In late July 2007 I took the bus from Concepción to travel to a CEJIS meeting in Santa Cruz. Once I was in the bus, two women started to argue over a seat. One woman was from Santa Cruz and one from Concepción. The women from Santa Cruz insulted the Concepceña by saying that she sounded like a *'gaucho'* (a person from the Bolivian Chaco region or Argentina). To this the other woman replied, 'I am Concepcióneña and proud of it and I am going to die as Concepcióneña, Concepcióneña Chiquitana.' The other women retorted, 'Of course! You are an *originario* from the MAS'. She continued to bicker and inform other passengers that the woman was '*indígena*', '*Indio del Evo*' and just '*del Evo'* and 'in cahoots with the *Alteños*' (people from El Alto). The fight nearly turned violent: both women saw these terms as clear insults.[72] Thus, *indígenas* are '*del Evo'*. Worse, in Concepción this seemed directly confirmed by the Chiquitano-MAS alliance.

This episode also has to be seen in the light of the construction of the *Camba* regional identity and the departmental and local elites' own version of identity politics as described in Chapter V. Notably, the discourse draws strength from portraying the *kolla* (the *cambas* 'other') i.e. Quechua, Aymara and *mestizo* highlanders, as troublesome and threatening 'invaders'. Andean migration to Santa Cruz accelerated post-1960 due to the state-sponsored resettlement plans. Over 25 per cent of the department's two million inhabitants are now of Andean origin (Gustafson, 2006: 355, 361). Perceiving the immigrants as a 'threat', Cruceños portray them as 'trapped in a culturally conservative irrational collectivism derived from pre-Colombian and Spanish religious and bureaucratic centralism' (Gustafson, 2006: 357; also Plata Quispe, 2008: 104). In my conversations with Concepceños and Cruceños, *kollas* were often portrayed as left-wing Indians who wanted to turn

[72] Field notes: Santa Cruz, 20 July 2007.

the country into 'Cuba' – an accusation heightened by the arrival of Cuban doctors in the country's rural areas, including Concepción, as part of a recent governmental treaty with the Cuban leadership. Further, because of their perceived centralist stance Cruceños blamed them for blocking their own claim to departmental autonomy.

For Chiquitano, the MAS affiliation is another area where engagement with the state and adopting state-sanctioned forms of organisations (i.e. as party affiliates) leads to antagonisms. To participate in the local elections, Chiquitano had to ally themselves with a political party. None would accept their political agenda but the MAS. This alliance now provides further ammunition to delegitimize the Chiquitano political project in the eyes of the local elite. The overlap between lowland and highland demands during the constituent assembly, most notably on the issue of indigenous autonomies, provided further ammunition. They aligned the Chiquitano indigenous project with the MAS political agenda – an image Chiquitano activists had been trying to keenly avoid. Another indicator of the Concepceños reasoning was that they often stressed that lowland political mobilisations were sponsored by the MAS party and its foreign NGO allies – in contrast to their own 'authentic' pro departmental autonomy rallies. Paradoxically, the very success of the MAS project at the national level, serves to mute Chiquitano claims at the local level.

Chiquitano *Comunidades* and the LPP

Promoting OTBs as Communal Authority Structures

At communal level, the most notable changes instituted by the LPP were the *Organizaciones Territoriales de Base* (OTBs - Territorial Base Organisations). The OTB was introduced alongside other *autoridades comunales*, i.e. the *cabildo* and the *corregidor*. It replaced the *alcalde político*, a post introduced with the 1953 Agrarian Reform in its function of representing the *comunidad* before the state.[73] While the introduction of the new organisation structure led to tension and conflicts between the new and already existing authorities in some highland and lowland communities (Calla, 2000; Lacroix, 2005: 38), in Concepción implementation of OTBs went largely uncontested.

[73] *'El todo representaba, todo el solucionaba, educación, salud, caminos'.* Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

Still, my CEJIS colleague and former *central* leader Lorenzo Pasabare underlined that *comunidades* would not have needed to introduce OTBs, as the legislation recognised 'the existing authorities in an indigenous *pueblo* or peasant community'. He said that *comunidades* formed OTBs despite attempts from *central* leaders and their CEJIS advisers to 'educate' the *comunarios* in the wordings of the LPP, which would have accepted participation through existing organisational structures.[74] He added that the *comunarios* organised OTBs mainly due to outside pressures and manipulation:

> What happened here in the zone, in all our jurisdiction of Concepción, is that the parish priest was also confounding the *comunidad*, [by] saying: 'Form your OTBs because if you don't you will not get resources from Popular Participation' … 'The municipality will not help you to build your paths. The municipality will not help you in productive development. The municipality will not give you this or that.'[75]

He explained that apart from the Catholic Church, the 'traditional' political parties, such as MNR and ADN (Lorenzo calls them 'viruses') were influential in the zone. He added that the parties questioned 'the truthfulness and legality of the explanations that we [the *central*] were giving in the *comunidades* and promoted the introduction of OTBs.'[76] The likely reason that *comunarios* listened to the Church and party activists was that they had close relations with many of the *comunidades* (which Lorenzo compared with 'viruses'). Certain parties had a permanent following among the *comunarios* because they provided them with benefits.[77] Similarly, as mentioned in the 'interlude', the Catholic Church financed the construction of damns or wells and communal building, and had assisted some *comunidades* in gaining land titles (see Chapter IV).

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[74] Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. Grey Molina pointed out, that the group-level recognition via OTBs was 'meant to provide an inclusive category of existing community organisations, rather than create new ones' (2002: 6). However, not just in the Chiquitanía, but also other areas of the country this caused 'confusion'. According to Grey Molina '*Campesino sindicatos* and indigenous *ayllus* were not entirely sure whether this meant creating a new organisation of having their own recognised under a new name. The confusion was augmented by the generalised perception that the MNR might use this opportunity to expand its sphere of political influence through OTB recognition' (2002: 6).

[75] '*Que paso acá en nuestra zona, en toda nuestra jurisdicción de Concepción, es que desde el párroco fue también confundiendo a la comunidad, diciendo, formen sus OTBs por que si no van a poder tener los recursos de la Participación Popular,… el municipio no los va a atender para hacer sus caminos, el municipio no le va a ayudar para que hagan desarrollo productivo, el municipio no le a dar que uno que lo otro digamos por decir*'. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[76] '*… le hicieron frente ya a la legitimidad y a la legalidad de la explicación que íbamos haciendo en las comunidades…*'. Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare (CEJIS), Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[77] Pedro Soliz Pinto (OTB of Santa Rita) described such a situation for Santa Rita. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

While it is not clear why the parish priest was interested in undermining the communal authorities, it was the intention of political parties to 'capture' the OTBs and expand their influence in the *comunidade*s to enlarge their voter base. Again, this was a Bolivia-wide trend. The LPP devolved significant authority, political responsibility and, importantly, resources to rural areas, which the parties sought to gain control over (Calla, 2000: 87; Faguet, 2003: 20-21).[78] But there was also another reason. OTBs are in charge of voting for the CV. Julio Antonio Suárez (former Sub-Prefect of Concepción) explained:

> … the politicisation of the OTBs is a conscious factor on the part of the parties. It is not innocent when an over-politicisation happens at this level, because this is there where the votes are. It is the *base*. If you dominate the OTBs, this permits the control of the Oversight Committee. And when I came to be president, I had no problem [27 of 30 were ADN, his own party]. Now, the president is MNR and the president of the municipal council is MAS. This means that the majority of the OTBs are from the MNR (in Lacroix, 2005: 47).

In other words, parties tried to prevent CV's blocking their policies ('gridlock'). Also, during Just Seoane's period as Mayor, gridlock was avoided as OTBs were marginally dominated by MAS. Still, in the Chiquitano case, OTBs also fulfil many other functions in the *comunidades*, which suggests that party political tendencies of OTBs are of little relevance to their election and to the way that they perform their duties.

Communal Authorities and OTBs

In most *comunidades*, OTBs are composed basically of a president, vice-president and a secretary. *Comunarios* and *central* leaders generally refer to the President of the OTB simply as 'OTB'. The OTB was the authority that in most *comunidades* commanded the highest personal respect and had decision-making power.[79] As already indicated, it is the role of the OTB to interrelate with different 'levels' of the Bolivian state, but also with non-governmental institutions or businesses. The OTB is responsible for dealing with state entities when they come into the *comunidad*, as

[78] Faguet states that the prospect of benefiting from them pushed villagers and farmers into municipal politics and into the voting booth. In this way, the concerns and opinions of the rural 50 per cent of Bolivians were brought into the political mainstream. However, the amount of voter increase depends significantly on local conditions (2003: 20-21). See also Rowland (2001: 1381).
[79] See Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare (CEJIS), Concepción, 1 June 2007.

well as occasionally travelling to Concepción or other *comunidades* to meet them.[80] As Lorenzo Pasabare noted, they did this 'to search … [for] whatever development [as] it is its role to seek the wellbeing of the *comunidad*, to strive for the integral development of the *comunidad*'.[81] More specifically, this interrelation with diverse state representatives aims at getting hold of assistance in the form of resources and projects. Further, through the OTBs, *comunidades* participate in the municipal planning process.

Comunarios stressed that it is very important for *comunidades* to 'be organised' *('estar organizado').*[82] For example, Tomás Parachai, a *comunario* from San Juan stated:

> Well a *comunidad* is where there are various families and all the families get together and plan and choose their leaders and so like this they are recognised [by] the municipality, or [by] an organisation. Through the authorities, the very *comunidad* … represents itself, and so they say that 'they are a *comunidad* that is organised', or 'it is organised so that we take [the *comunidad*] into consideration'.[83]

This statement highlights something that many *comunarios* expressed, namely that through 'being organised' (i.e. getting together, planning and having authorities), state entities (including the municipality, NGOs and the Church) take them seriously, no matter how small the *comunidad* is, or how remote and far away from the municipal seat in Concepción. A *comunidad* that is legally registered and has communal authorities can get together, define its demands and then present them to NGOs or state institutions and lobby them for assistance, something that an individual can not do. Being structured in such a way, means that they are 'legible' to state actors. This recognition gives Chiquitano *comunarios* certain leverage and access to projects. As mentioned, this involves the *comunidades* having to coordinate, define their needs and demands and oversee the execution of projects. Moreover, without 'being organised' Chiquitano *comunarios* have little chance of

[80] Travel to other villages or even Santa Cruz happens very rarely, if at all, due to a lack of financial resources in the *comunidades* to pay for the fare. Travels to the San Javier municipality or Lomerío are more likely, as individuals might be able to get lifts on the pick-ups of the *centrales*, the Church, NGOs, or private enterprises.

[81] *'… bueno es su rol principal digamos velar por el bienestar de la comunidad, velar sobre el desarrollo mismo integral de la comunidad'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[82] For example, Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007.

[83] *'Bueno, una comunidad es donde hay varias familias y dentro de todas las familias se reúnen y planifican y ponen su dirigentes para que así mismo sea reconocida, o sea al municipio, a una organización. Mediante las autoridades que la misma comunidad pone entonces la persona va y se presenta, entonces ya dicen que ellas ya son una comunidad que también se han organizado, o esta organizada entonces para tomarla en cuenta'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007.

getting hold of land titles – which individual Chiquitano would be excluded from due to mere cost factors. The above statements also reflect the message of parties and the Church that without 'being organised' as OTBs, *comunidades* would not profit from popular participation resources.

Nevertheless, OTBs also fulfilled an important internal organisational function, coordinating and administering the internal affairs of the *comunidad*.[84] In most *comunidades* they carry such responsibilities alongside the *corregidor* and the *cabildo*. The *corregidor* acts as an assistant of the *corregidor* of the canton (hence in El Carmen and some other *comunidades* the official title used is *'sub-corregidor'*).[85] The departmental prefect appoints *corregidores* at canton level and these are responsible for settling disputes within their jurisdiction. The assistant *corregidores* in each *comunidad* are responsible for solving conflicts. Like the other authorities, they are elected in a community assembly.[86] Pedro Pinto noted that in his *comunidad* Santa Rita, they called the *corregidor* in cases of theft, or to investigate unauthorised logging. He added that generally *comunarios* try to solve problems in the *comunidad*, through holding a communal assembly and persuading the culprit not to offend again. He gave me an example of how the comunidad had avoided further legal action through resolving a crime in the *comunidad*:

> In the case of my *comunidad* there has been a case of major robbery … A case of stealing sheep. This was not decided in a reunion, this was solved conversing with the person who was part of causing the problem, and so they have solved it peacefully … I knew that this had its punishment. And in this case the problem was caused by a woman, a woman who has a family, and this problem was severe … this involves … years of imprisonment. But we were capable of solving [the problem], as OTBs, Cabildo, Corregidor.[87]

He added that if problems were unsolvable, they would call for the intervention of the cantonal *corregidor* or the police.

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[84] See various workshops.
[85] Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.
[86] This is the case in highland and lowland communities all over Bolivia. For a highland example, see Bigenho (1999: 963).
[87] *'En caso de mi comunidad ha habido un robo mayor ejemplo ¿no?, un caso de "ovejato" ¿no?...Eso no se decidió en una reunión, eso se ha solucionado así conversando con la persona que fue la parte que hizo el problema, entonce se ha solucionado así pacíficamente… yo sabia que tiene su condena y en ese caso el problema que ha hecho una mujer pues no, una mujer que tiene familia, y eso problema fue son grave pues… son años de cárcel. Pero hubo la capacidad de solucionar tanto como OTBs, cabildo y corregidor'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

In many *comunidades*, the *corregidor* together with the OTB was also responsible for overseeing the use of communal resources (natural or other). For example, if a *comunario* needed wood to construct a house, he had to inform and get permission from the *corregidor* and OTB. Further, the *corregidor* played a role in overseeing communal works. Lorenzo noted that the *corregidor* 'coordinates all these actions with the OTBs and together then, they work with the entire *comunidad,* no? Especially in communal works, in the benefit for all'.[88]

The *cabildo* represents the third set of authorities. A *cabildo* can be composed of anything between two and twelve *comunarios* (depending on the total number of *comunarios*) who are often called '*cacique*' (or '*consejero'* [councillor]). These are elected by their fellow *comunarios* generally for a period between 3 and 5 years. It is the *cabildo*'s task to collaborate with OTBs and *corregidor* in organising the administration of the *comunidad,* such as managing communal works. Overall, the *cabildo* is the body that is most concerned with the everyday internal organisation of the *comunidad,* and they are generally the enforcer of rules, as Lorenzo Pasabare described in his *comunidad* Altamira:

> The cabildo is composed of two Caciques. He is the one who collaborates [with] the OTBs and the *coregidor*… in any case that exists [for example] like disobedience, [not coming] to the reunion, these Caciques go to the house of the *compañero* to see what is happening, right? Why is he not in the reunion, maybe he is ill or he is unreliable and does not want to come… Then they are like the police.[89]

In many *comunidades* the *cabildo* is also in charge of upholding part of the justice system. In some *comunidades* the *cabildo* is especially responsible for religious affairs, i.e. organising communal fiestas, the weekly mass, etc.

In sum, these authorities are at times involved in fulfilling tasks required for *'indio permitido'* style self-management required by the LPP, while on the other hand fulfilling internal organisational roles. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that *comunidades* have also defined their needs and then lobbied state actors such as the Church, political parties, departmental development corporations and NGOs for

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[88] *'…coordina todas estas accionar de las OTBs y en conjunto entonces trabajan con toda la comunidad ¿no? especialmente en los trabajos comunales, en beneficio para todos'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[89] '*El cabildo es compuesto por dos Caciques. Es el cual los que colaboran al a la OTBs, al corregidor para cualquier caso que exista … como desobediencia a reunión, estos Caciques van a la casa del compañero a ver que esta pasando ¿no? Porque no esta en la reunión, por ahí esta enfermo y no asiste, o de repente esta caprichudo y no quiere venir también, entonces ya son ellos como policías casi así ¿no?*'. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

assistance and funds before the LPP (see Chapter IV). In the Chiquitano case, OTBs seem to have been integrated into communal life, rather than disrupting it as reported in other cases. They have replaced the *alcaldes politicos* as a tool for interacting with outsiders, while cooperating with other communal authorities in internally running communal affairs. They generally fulfil already existing authority functions; the process has been one of re-naming and re-arranging rather than one of 'displacement'.

LPP: Incompatible with the 'Indigenous Reality'?

Among the criticisms levelled against the LPP is that it establishes an inherently Western, bureaucratic vertical system, which is incompatible with 'indigenous reality' (see Calla, 2000). Lacroix points out that the very fact that the law has not been translated into indigenous languages raises doubts about the 'political will' of the government to allow for a 'true participation of the indigenous populations' (2005: 74-75). In turn, Ricardo Calla denounces the Bolivian decentralisation law for ignoring the highland *ayllu* cargo system consisting of male and female couples even at the level of the DMI (2000: 84)[90]. There are also reports that in some Bolivian regions the introduction of the LPP has led to the displacement of local 'traditional leaders' due to the new demands it imposes on these authorities, for instance knowledge of the local administrative procedures, ability to read and write and know Spanish (see Behrendt, 2000: 15; Blanes, 1999b).

While the LPP has presented challenges to many Chiquitano *comunidades*, they have nevertheless dealt with this in a creative and proactive manner. Pedro Solíz Pinto outlined challenges faced by OTB members of his small *comunidad* Santa Rita, about seven kilometres from the municipal seat Concepción:

[90] Further, he notes that new municipal jurisdictions have been demarcated according to the boundaries of the old provincial divisions. In the highlands, this meant that many *ayllus* found that their territorial discontinuity simply did not fit with the concept of territorial jurisdiction that characterises the municipal order. Calla notes that 'it is probable, in fact, that due to the LPP some *ayllus* will eventually lose their territorial control' (2000: 84). Calla argues that the 'reductionist *municipalista* tendency' tends to replicate Bolivia's experience of municipalisation in the 19th century when the country went through a process of municipalisation. This saw the introduction of *agentes municipales cantonales* into rural areas that were to be the institutional link through which mayors of towns and cities could intervene in rural development. The outcome, he sustains, was the impositioning of a municipal form of organisation on indigenous groups that disregarded their interests. Instead, it boosted the political and economic position of sectors of local *vecino-mestizo* elites who were – directly or indirectly – associated with the hacienda regime (2000: 86).

> They say that they are afraid, … 'look, I do not know, I cannot talk how you talk with the mayor, like that', eh…'I do not have the ability to speak, you are better known' …or above all it is the fear, the timidity to be able to speak with the people ….They are more concerned with their *chacos* [fields], no? However, when you have to do a thing we have to do it, no? And in the *comunidad* you also have to hold reunions, right?[91]

Consequently, Pedro described that *comunarios* often elected people who had attended more workshops, who were 'well trained' and 'knew more'.[92] While this seems to support the findings of authors that the LPP displaced 'traditional' leaders, it should be added that Chiquitano *comunarios* have generally tended to choose individuals as leaders who seemed to be the most eloquent talkers. These are probably the people that they send to workshops in the first place.[93]

Further, authors mention that given the predominantly oral tradition of lowland peoples, there are particular problems with the emphasis 'on all things written' in these new procedures (Lacroix, 2005: 75; Lema et al., 2001). This did not necessarily present a problem in Chiquitano *comunidades*. Several *comunidades* made efforts not to exclude illiterates from authority positions. As Pedro Soliz Pinto described for his *comunidad* Santa Rita:

> They say 'I cannot exercise because I cannot read'... [but] there have also been elections of authorities … who do not know how to read, but they always look for an accompaniment, their secretary should know [how to] write, so, this is also a way that exists in my *comunidad*…so that when he/she goes to a reunion, he/she is in charge of writing so that afterwards he/she can read it in the reunion, so it is a way we do it, and like that we manage it.[94]

Furthermore, analysts point out that the insertion of OTBs and electoral structures into indigenous communities has in many cases led to a profound politicisation and engendered internal divisions (see Behrendt, 2000: 15; Blanes, 1999b; Lacroix, 2005: 74; Lema et al., 2001). Behrendt finds that in many cases local authorities have

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[91] *'Ello dicen que temen… "mira yo no se, yo no puede hablar como voz habla con el alcalde así", eh… "no tengo la facilidad de hablar, a voz que sos mas conocido" … o sea, mas que todo es el miedo, la timidez de poder hablar ejemplo con la gente ahora ¿no?, …mas se abocan a su chaco no, pero cuando hay que hacer una cosa, tenemos que hacer también ¿no?, y en la comunidad es también hacer reunión ¿no?…'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[92] Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[93] See Interview: Pedro Solíz Pinto, Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[94] *'Dicen, "yo no puedo ejercer por que no se leer" ¿no?… habido también elecciones de autoridades… que no saben leer, pero siempre busca su acompañante, su secretario alguien que sepa escribir, entonces ese también es un forma de que en mi comuna hay…para que cuando vaya a una reunión el se encargue de escribir para que luego lo lea en la reunión, entonce es una forma que nosotros también eso lo entendemos y así no manejamos'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

historically been co-opted by the political parties, noting that this tendency has increased among candidates for office as well as members of CVs (2000: 15). As noted, parties were partly responsible for the introduction of OTBs into *comunidades* and had a vision of capturing them. However, this is not a new phenomenon. *Comunarios* engaged in clientelist practices before the LPP was passed. As my CEJIS colleague Lorenzo Pasabare explained to me:

> Look, the people…in nearly all that is the lowlands, the people like *preventa* [trade-off], give me something and I support you, they do not care whether it is for a little while or in the long run with what they give them… We are pre-sellers, we like it when they give us a hat in exchange for votes and how long does a vote last, how much is a vote worth? Millions of money that the corrupt ones take: this is what happens from the mayor's office here to further up, like this is Bolivia. …this is what has happened and keeps happening. … what happens in our *comunidad* is that there are still these *corazoncitos* [little darlings]l who always support the patron, '*pucha*, how would it be if my patron would always be good to me', right? … This is what [it] is like… here and in [the *comunidad*] La Guardia and in all the municipalities of the hundred and something municipalities of our country, up to the *central* power it is like that, right? [95]

Juana Herrera Mendez states that the situation is changing:

> Look, it is improving a lot, because in the past, for the elections… they took the *comunidades* to a house and they told them 'you are going to vote for this political colour'. Today it is not like that any more. They are the ones who decide, it is they who elect, they see what their programme is, the work plan of each political colour. They elect their representatives so that they can be candidates for councillor and mayor, so it has got a lot better, a thing that previous years they did not do, they simply named them.[96]

[95] *'Mire, la gente…en todo lo que es tierra baja la gente le gusta la preventa: "dame algo yo te apoyo". No le importa si es para un ratito o es para largo con tal que le den…que somos prevendalista no gusto que una gorrita no regalen a cambio de un voto y cuanto dura un voto, cuanto vale un voto millones de plata que se saquean lo corruptos eso es lo que pasa desde esta alcaldía de aquí hasta allá arriba, así nomás es Bolivia …'…lo que pasa que dentro de nuestra comunidad aun hay esos corazoncitos que siempre apoyan al patrón, '¿pucha como será pues si mi patrón fue bueno siempre conmigo?, ¿no?, … así no nomás es…aquí y en La Guardia y en todos los municipios de nuestros ciento y tantos municipios de nuestro país hasta el poder central es así, ¿no?…'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[96] *'Mire, va mejorando bastante porque anteriormente inclusive para las elecciones... las comunidades se lo llevaban a una casa le decían bueno "van a votar por este color político". Hoy en día ya no. Ellos son los que deciden ellos son los que eligen, ellos este ven este cual es el programa su plan de trabajo de cada color político. Ellos eligen a su representante para que puedan ser candidato a concejales y alcalde, entonces ha mejorado bastante, cosa que en años anteriores nos se lo hacia solamente se nombraba'*. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.

However, apart from this more optimistic view, it can be assumed that clientelist practices persist, as Lorenzo's statement indicates.[97] Lorenzo proved his point by noting that the departmental autonomy referendum had found support among Chiquitano *comunarios*. This was besides the fact that most *comunarios* at the time were generally not familiar with the term 'autonomy', nor its implications, as the statement of Doña Apolonía from Candelaria illustrates: 'Well, I, at the moment, autonomy, I do not understand it either, because we do not know very well what the autonomy is.'[98]

Lastly, rather than having a disrupting effect, the introduction of new structure in the *comunidades* seemed to have had a levelling effect with regards to *communal* power structures. Lorenzo Pasabare and Pedro Solíz Pinto revealed that after Chiquitano families left *estancias* and *establecimientos*, it was generally the founders of the new *comunidades* and their families who took over leadership roles and dictated party affiliation.[99] As Pedro Solíz Pinto stated:

> … they said, let's do this, and if the people did not want to, well they insisted, right? So they frightened them or something like that. 'If you are not for one political party', or … 'If you do not go, or do not want to work with me here in this, then there will be no help for you'. So the people just complied.[100]

Lorenzo added that this was at times to the detriment of others: 'there are also families who govern in their *comunidades* only to take advantage of the *comunidad*.'[101] He explained:

> Because he has influence or because he stands out … talks louder or because he thinks he has more initiative and the rest follow him and they name him authority …

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[97] In line with the citizenship and state conceptualisations developed in Chapter II, I concur with Lazar (2008) and Auyero (2000) that such clientelism may form a (collective) citizenship practice, as state actors, in the form of politicians or their assistants personally travel to the *comunidades*, and present *comunarios* with gifts in the form of portions of rice or hats to gain their favour for the next elections.

[98] '*Bueno yo aurita de la autonomía no le entiendo también yo, porque nosotros no conocemos muy bien que es la autonomía*'. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007. However, there was a growing awareness of what the term 'departmental autonomy' and 'indigenous autonomy' stood for, as they later turned into the main focus of the lowland indigenous movement's political activity during the Constituent Assembly, and a key point of contention with the Departmental elite and their supporters. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss this point further, and will be discussed elsewhere.

[99] Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007; Interview: Pedro Solíz Pinto, Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[100] '*…decían hagamos este y si la gente no quería hacer caso, bueno ellos insistían, ¿no? Entonce le metían miedo algo así. "Si no va por un partido político" o … "si usted no van o que no quieren trabajar aquí conmigo en este trabajito entonce no va haber ayuda pa' ustedes, entonce la gente pues hacían caso nomás*'. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[101] '*… pero también hay familias que gobiernan dentro de las comunidades nomás para aprovecharse de la comunidad*'. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

> And sometimes it comes from generations back … If the uncle is not elected, it is the cousin, if it is not the cousin, it is the grandfather… but now this is changing … because the people are different … now there are many young people, 'awake', let's say.[102]

Lorenzo noted that in his *comunidad* Altamira, the situation was changing because the founders of the *comunidad* were getting old. Younger people were taking up the posts and people from other families. Nevertheless, like in many other *comunidades*, the former authorities advised the younger ones:

> What is happening there is that there is always a consultation of the older person who has lead and who is still alive, and who knows the processes that have happened until they obtained a *comunidad*. From when they where slaves, until where they are now. And why is that? To not ignore what happened in the past and what is happening now and in the present and what will come in the future.[103]

Lorenzo Pasabare and Pedro Solíz Pinto provided another reason for why the system changed. Authorities are now chosen by majority consensus, or through a 'rotation system'. As Pedro Solíz Pinto stated:

> Now it does not exist any more, this power of family, or of certain groups. Instead, now there is a nearly majority consensus, to say if the corregidor, it is not family but is communal, now all elect him, 'well this *compañero* we are going to elect as Corregidor…'[104]

Doña Martha from Makanaté summed this up: 'One looks at the person that is responsible and who is interested to respond to the *base*, then one elects them.'[105] However, a system that sought periodically to redistribute offices did not function in all *comunidades*. Some were too small to stop members from certain families from repeatedly filling leadership roles. Pedro Solíz Pinto explained while he was OTB of Santa Rita, his brother was *cabildo* mayor. He stressed that they did not manage their

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[102] *'Por lo que tiene influencia o por lo que sobresalen …por que habla un poco mas fuerte o por que cree tener la mejor iniciativa y el resto lo sigue no, y como es el que sobre sale o es la que sobresale en caso si es mujer el resto lo sigue y lo nombran autoridad pues no… a veces como que ya viene de generación ya no … si no es elegido el tío, es el primo, si no es el primo hermano es el abuelo, … pero esta cambiando…por que ya la gente son diferentes pues… ya hay muchos jóvenes ya, ya despiertos digamos.'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[103] *'lo que esta pasando allá ,es que siempre hay alguna consulta a la persona mas mayor y que haya dirigido y que este en vida todavía, y que conoce los procesos que han pasado hasta conseguir una comunidad ,digamos ¿no? Desde que fueron esclavo, hasta donde están ahora, digamos ¿no?, ¿y eso es para qué? para no ignorar lo que paso en el pasado y lo que esta pasando ahora en el presente y que vendrá en el futuro…'* Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[104] *'…ahora ya no hay ese poder de familia, ni de ciertos grupos. Sino que ahora ya hay un consenso casi mayoritaria, como decir si al corregidor, ya no es familiar sino es comunal ya todo lo eligen a él, bueno a este compañero lo vamos elegir de corregidor…'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[105] *'… uno ve a la persona que es responsable y que tiene el interés de responder a las bases, entonces ya uno lo elige'*. Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007.

post to the benefit of the family, or 'impose on the people, to demand work that they did not like…but if there is a decision we all do it together'.[106] Thus, such a situation was acceptable as long as *comunarios* fulfilled their role properly and did not only work for the benefit of their own families.[107]

Apart from rotating posts, another way to prevent one individual always influencing decision-making was through controlling people's input in communal meetings, i.e. stopping a person from contributing too much, as Lorenzo Pasabare explained:

> … if he always wants to be, how we say vulgarly, the one who rules most, 'no, one moment, here we all decide and with our authority that we have put we are going to decide what we are going to do' no? Thus, that this stops a while, no? It is good to have a dynamic person…nobody says that this is bad, let's say, no? But when we see that he/ she wants to…'here I rule and here I order', nooo, one moment, no? Here nobody is a sheep to say…come here and where the shepherd indicates, that's where we all will go, it is not like that, no?.[108]

The change in the way that *comunarios* became authorities also had a gender dimension. Lorenzo Pasabare explained that in Altamira the OTB directive was composed of 'a group of young women, of twenty-three, twenty-four and twenty-five years, let's say. No? …the only man is the Corregidor…'. [109] He noted that the *comunarios* had encouraged women to occupy these positions. However, in most *comunidades* men still overwhelmingly occupied leadership roles. Pedro reported that also in Santa Rita women were now more involved in communal decision-making. While in the past the *corregidor* was involved in all decisions taken in the *comunidad*, now the women's group took decisions that concern them (albeit tasks

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[106] *'…si yo tengo familia, en mi caso tengo, yo aurita son presidente de la OTBs y mi hermano es cabildo digamos, es cabildo mayor pero no manejamos así este, a imponer a la gente a exigir un trabajo que no le gusta ejemplo no, sino que cuando hay una decisión todo lo hacemos en común ¿no?'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[107] Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007; Interview: Pedro Solíz Pinto, Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[108] *'… pero si es que el nomás quiere ser el, como decir nosotros vulgarmente el manda mas, "no, un ratito aquí entre todos decidimos y con nuestra autoridades que hemos puesto se va a decidir que se va hacer" ¿no?, entonces como que se para un rato eso también ¿no?, esta bien, digamos no una persona dinámica, que haiga todo eso esta bien, que nadie dice que esta mal, digamos, ¿no?. Pero cuando ya se lo ve también que ya, pucha, quiere mire "yo aquí domino y aquí mando" nooo, un ratito, ¿no? aquí nadie es ovejo para decir aquí se van acá y donde nos indique el pastor, nos vamos a ir todos, no es así entonces ¿no?'*. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.

[109] *'…un grupo de señoras, que son jóvenes ¿no? de veintitrés, veinticuatro y veinticinco años, digamos, ¿no? son los que están dirigiendo la comunidad, digamos, ¿no? y la mayor parte son puras mujer, es, el único hombre ahí es el corregidor nomás' ¿no?'*. Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare (CEJIS), Concepción, 1 June 2007.

that need to be carried out are done communally and in coordination with the *corregidor* and the *cabildo*).[110]

Finally, it is important to note that there are nevertheless some voices that see the introduction of OTBs into *comunidades* critically. Some *comunarios* hold that the communal authorities should revert back to what they were before OTBs.[111] Lorenzo Pasabare believed *comunidades* should re-adopt the *cabildo* system. In *comunidades* where the *cabildo* and OTB coexisted, the *cabildo* should take over the functions of the OTB.[112] Another example is the statement of Don Juan (from Makanaté):

> We want the name of the *originario* authority to [be] *cacique* not OTB, because this was what it was like before the Popular Participation arrived and changed it to OTB. But it is the same, the same function.[113]

It can be concluded that while OTBs have a hierarchical structure in themselves, rather than introducing a more pronounced hierarchical power structures in the *comunidad* as a whole, they actually function in a way to make decision-making more egalitarian (or: 'against the state') (Clastres, 1989). The reports by Chiquitano informants strongly suggest that the OTB system has served to undermine the positions of 'powerful families' who had gained their predominant positions as founders of *comunidades*. The introduction of OTBs has seemingly led to the re-distribution of communal authority functions, or the re-naming of existing posts, rather than an outright change or replacement. As the statements above demonstrate, even the critics are calling for a change in name rather than fundamental alteration of the authority functions themselves: they simply want the names changed back to their pre-OTB state.

Conclusion

While the election of the first Chiquitano mayor in the municipality of Concepción represented a major challenge to the local socio-political status quo, Chiquitano officials took their places in a system that was 'narrow and fraught with limitations'

[110] Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. Here it should be added that the gender dimension of communal decision-making certainly deserves future exploration and analysis.
[111] This development might be parallel to the move away from union structures in Andean communal organisation (see Calla, 2000: 91).
[112] Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007.
[113] *'…queremos que vuelva el nombre de la autoridad originario, que sea Cacique no OTB, por que así era antes hasta que llego la Participación Popular y lo cambio a OTB, pero es el mismo, la misma función'*. Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007.

(McNeish, 2008: 45). In line with a neo-liberal logic, strengthening of 'identity' and 'culture' were primarily seen in the light of the economic development and 'improvement' of the *comunidades*. In line with the argument of Charles Hale (2004), McNeish (2008), Postero (2007) and others, paradoxically, the very success of the decentralisation policy, and the *central* in gaining access to the state and advancing some of their social rights, means that Chiquitano leaders elected to the municipal government de facto become party to state interests.

Some *comunarios*, like Lorenzo Pasabare, perceive the limits inherent in this form of participation. While Chiquitano could influence resource distribution, there were no actual political changes or alterations to the established socio-political order of the locality. Even when Chiquitano *comunarios* fulfilled their roles, defined their demands and presented them to the municipal government, resource constraints meant there were no guarantees it could deliver 'as promised'.

Despite adopting this rhetoric, Chiquitano officials faced discrimination from Concepceño elites who continued to view Chiquitano personnel with hostility. Thus, in contrast to findings by other authors who note that indigenous citizens have been able to make use of the newly institutionalised channels, not least to push beyond their restrictive and limited nature (Albro, 2005; Lazar, 2008; McNeish, 2008; Postero, 2007), in the Chiquitano case there has been a remarkable degree of continuity to previous patterns of Chiquitano state engagement. Their project largely continues to be subordinated to that of elite interest.

Moreover, as Chiquitano leaders have had to run for political office with MAS affiliation, the advancement of the MAS political project in the national sphere has provided Concepceño elites further ammunition to discredit the Chiquitano political project. In an environment where Chiquitano interests are opposed to those of local elites on several fronts, the latter finally moved to oust the Chiquitano mayor of Concepción in a coup-style action, to replace him with a member of one of Concepción's most powerful families in August 2007. There is little indication that Chiquitano in Concepción have managed to overcome the *indio permitido*.

Still, contrary to the reports by authors from other areas of Bolivia, the adoption of OTBs into Chiquitano *comunidades* seems to have happened without any major disruptions to the existing authority system. The communal authority system

exerts governmentality (Foucault, 1991), while the OTB is additionally an intermediary that presents the demands of the *comunidad* to the local government and other official and non-governmental actors. It emerges that this supposed 'adoption' of 'western structures' was not a one-way process. Instead, the *comunarios* shaped the functions of the OTB to fit the roles of the previous communal organisation. Additionally, Chiquitano sources report that the system has served to dismantle the hold on authority positions by 'powerful families' who generally gained predominant positions as founders of *comunidades*.

Chapter VIII

Conclusion:

Chiquitano, the State and Prospects for Future Engagement

This thesis seeks to shed light on the relationship between the Chiquitano of Concepción Municipality in the Eastern Bolivian lowlands and the state. It conceptualises the state as a power structure as well as a process or on-going project (Abrams, 1988), which aims at expansion and making societies more 'legible' (Fried, 1967, 1975; Scott, 1998). This process may also lead to the creation of new identities or organisational forms (Anderson, 1991; Fried, 1975; Nugent, 1994a; Sider, 1987).

Along with other countries, the Bolivian government implemented multicultural reforms in the mid-1990s to 'expand citizenship' (including to the indigenous population). In many ways, this was a seductive project which succeeded in increasing legibility (Scott, 1998). That this project should prove so successful can be explained by drawing on Hale's (2002; 2004) concept of '*indio permitido*' as outlined in Chapter II. Hale and other authors have highlighted that such reforms have special coercive powers towards ethic groups, as they entail the acknowledgement of, 'a substantive, if limited, version of indigenous cultural rights' (Hale, 2002: 487; see also McNeish, 2008: 46), which seem to answer their demands for certain rights, resources, and access to political participation. Through neo-liberal multicultural legislation, 'those who controlled access to resources and rights were able to bind oppressed groups more tightly to the state and to looking to state law as the site from which a non-discriminatory politics could proceed' (Povinelli, 1998: 598).

Indigeneity has acquired powerful meanings, not only because it allows for national and international alliance building, but it has also developed into a label through which previously marginalised groups have gained access to privileged rights as indigenous Bolivian citizens. However, the state extends legibility not only through promoting state-sanctioned labels but also cultural and economic practices and organisational forms (Hale, 2002, 2004, 2005; Povinelli, 1998). The promotions of this label effectively 'empowered states to prohibit and (de)certify cultural difference as a right – and resource – bearing identity' (Povinelli, 1998: 582). The Chiquitano case shows, for example, how territorial titles are ultimately linked to the

premise of exploiting this land in a sustainable manner. In fact, the state-sanctioned economic forms under neo-liberal multiculturalism, not surprisingly, do not include self-subsistence practices. After all, the aim is to establish citizens as neo-liberal subjects who govern themselves 'in accordance with the logic of globalised capitalism' (Postero, 2007: 16).

The treatment of the state as a power structure also reveals the significantly multi-sited nature of the state and draws attention to the different actors that may form part of it. This therefore problematises a dichotomous treatment of the state and civil society. In the Chiquitano case, actors as diverse as the Chiquitano *centrales*, NGOs and different state administrative agencies, such as INRA – may all constitute the state. They are all also involved at times in the process of making Chiquitano socio-political and economic practices – as well as the land they live on –more legible. Especially pertinent examples are the work of the CICC and its NGO allies in spreading the indigenous label among Chiquitano *comunarios*, addressed in Chapter V, as well as the CEJIS governance project described in Chapter IV, which aimed to document Chiquitano authority structures and decision-making processes, so that more efficient (and possibly centralised) structures could be defined in future.

The groups or individuals who take advantage of the opportunities presented by state actors are often faced 'with *an unavoidable and irresolvable antagonism between their past and their present*' which emerges, for example, when the larger society 'simultaneously insists both on the "otherness" of dominated peoples and on their compliance with a larger set of constantly changing standards, laws, and practices' (Sider, 2003: 9, emphasis in original). Chapters V, VI and VII addressed different ways in which Chiquitano engage with the state, a well as areas where these antagonisms materialised. However, as these chapters also demonstrate (with the addition of Chapter IV), the maintenance of the social relations and the constant re-emergence of *comunidades* comprise a subtle but effective Chiquitano resistance strategy.

This concluding chapter presents the main findings of this thesis. These strongly suggest that while the Chiquitano oppose state impositions at the communal level, the *indio permitido* has not been overcome in Concepción municipality, as others have suggested by pointing to the vigour of indigenous politics in the national political sphere (McNeish, 2008; Postero, 2007). It also questions whether the *indio*

permitido syndrome can actually be overcome. Lastly, I propose some areas for future research, suggesting that the Bolivian autonomy debate is extremely relevant to indigenous-state relations, such as the recent debates around and recognitions of indigenous autonomies in the Bolivian legal framework.

Chiquitano, the State and Indigeneity

As Chapter V addressed, Chiquitano *comunarios* started to form the Concepción Chiquitano movement in the 1980s. It was initiated by individuals who had attended union leadership workshops in Cochabamba. Previously established communal and syndicate structures were also important for providing the necessary networks and associational space, as was the support from departmental development corporations, indigenous umbrella organisations and NGOs. These latter actors also provided necessary resources. Among the initial motives for organising were resistance to excessive labour tributes *(prestación vial)*, ending landowner abuses and encroachment of loggers and cattle famers on Chiquitano land. The Chiquitano organisation of Concepción has since taken on a role in administrating projects and organising the service delivery, which *comunarios* require. In this respect, their role and practices do not differ significantly from other state actors.

They not only provide similar services but, as mentioned above, strive to make the Chiquitano population more 'legible', through spreading state-sanctioned modes of identification.[1] The neo-liberal multicultural reforms inspired the *centrales* to adopt the term 'indigenous' as part of their organisations' name and they have promoted it for the purpose of self- and group identification among *comunarios*. While more recently Bolivians may choose to adopt this label to express their 'newly found indigenous roots' or to a display of support for the MAS political project (see Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006; McNeish, 2008), the Chiquitano case reflects the pressures to adopt this label in order to access certain rights and socio-economic entitlements. The fact that the term has become so prominent reveals the power of transnational governance, not only to influence national policy-making, but also the choices of modes of identification available to people at the local level.

[1] Scholars researching social movements have pointed out that it is not surprising that they should become more 'state-like', because a) they are shaped in relation to the wider political and institutional context and b) they endeavour to 'access' rights and resources from state administrative levels (Foweraker, 1995: 63, 2001: 842).

However, the state is not the only agent of identification and categorisation that matters, albeit it is an important one (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 16; also see Hale, 2009: 323). This is demonstrated in the way that the Chiquitano attach multiple meanings to the term 'indigenous' and use it for different purposes (for making political claims, to establish an additional barrier to others, etc.) and at different times. On other occasions it can be deemed unacceptable for the purpose of self-identification because it has the effect of muting the real issues at stake, namely their continued subordination to 'white' ideas, concepts and policies (cf. Suzman, 2003: 399-400). In a way, they question the *indio permitido* itself. Lastly, the fact that the *centrales* and their allies face certain problems in spreading the label, demonstrates how difficult it is to create a movement or community of people that all adopt a collective identifier and additionally attribute the same, or any, meaning to it (Anderson, 1991; Latour, 2007: 34-37; Melucci, 1985: 792; Tilly, 1984: 305), and that creating a homogenous community boundary is difficult (Barth, 1969).

It was not the scope of this thesis to further address the relationship between *comunarios* and the leaders of their organisation. This awaits further research to reveal the dynamic between the more 'rhizomic' communal organisation and the more individualistic and 'taproot' model of the Chiquitano *central* (Rosengren, 2003). As Rosengreen (1987; 2003) describes for the Matsigenka in Peru, the liekly friction between the two is likely to cause accusations of corruption and disenchantment with the organisation. I found that, as Postero (2007) describes for Guarani communities of the Zona Cruz, local communities in the Chiquitanía often judged their leaders harshly and according to how well they managed to secure services for the *comunidades*. However, the Chiquitano also have a somewhat idealistic vision of what a good leader should do and they criticise excessively individualistic behaviour. It is likely that as Lazar (2004b; 2008) describes for the case of members of neighbourhood organisations in El Alto, accusations of corruption serve to curb leaders' excessively individualistic behaviour. It seems that what *comunarios* most expect from their leaders is a personal relationship – which also entails being informed about the *central* and its activities. After all, creating a movement that the grassroots perceive themselves to be part of, requires a lot of effort – especially where there is a lack of communication technologies and face-to-

face contact is crucial (Anderson, 1991; Latour, 2007: 34-37; Melucci, 1985: 792; Tilly, 1984: 305).

The Right to Territory

The Bolivian multicultural reform package also contained the right for indigenous people to have access to 'their own space' (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 33-35, as some authors like to put it, in the form of *Tierras Comunitarias de Origen* (TCO – Original Communal Lands) (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 33-35). Discursive (and at times physical) conflicts and negotiations with state actors have shaped the meanings Chiquitano people attached to the TCO Monte Verde. It seems that in this process, state actors were largely able to impose their meaning on the space, as well as on the natural resources within it. Consequently, while it is the vision of some Chiquitano that the territory will be a space where 'Chiquitano identity' can be reaffirmed (as it serves as a space for communal reproduction and a 'space for the future generations'), other Chiquitano have come to stress the benefits of taking advantage of the natural resources within the territory (so that they can be 'the agents of their own development'). This latter vision reflects that promoted by the INRA Law and state actors: while these spaces are reserved for 'authentic indigenous people', they are to be made legible, demarcated, assessed according to their economic potential and 'sustainably' exploited for production. Authors have recorded similar attitudes of state agencies throughout Latin America (e.g. compare García Hierro and Surrallés, 2005; Hale, 2005). Chiquitano leaders and their NGO allies participate in these latter tasks, thus becoming functional to the *indio permitido* project. It remains to be seen, however, if the meanings imposed on the territory and resources will actually permeate the *comunidades* or 'fizzle out' like so many other projects have done in the past.

Chiquitano in the Municipal Sphere

As part of the Bolivian multicultural reforms implemented in the 1990s, the Sánchez de Lozada government introduced decentralisation reforms through the *Ley de Descentralización Administrativa* (LDA – Administrative Decentralisation Law), with a participatory component (through the Popular Participation Law) (Behrendt, 2000: 4; O'Neill, 2005: 125; Postero, 2007: 5). Chiquitano activists sought to take

advantage of the new political openings at the local level to advance their own political project. While Chiquitano activists have managed to capture municipal posts, including the position of Mayor in the 2004 municipal elections, this engagement with the state meant that they became functional to the Bolivian neo-liberal multicultural project and *indio permitido* by replicating its logic and rhetoric, i.e. that 'marginal' Chiquitano communities need to 'be developed' and, if possible, turned into market producers. It can also be assumed that this is a response to pressures from the Concepceño elite who they are trying to appease. Consequently, while the Chiquitano *central* has achieved a historic victory in challenging the local status quo, indigenous organising has currently not overcome either elite hegemony or the *indio permitido*.[2]

Among the criticisms levelled against the LPP is that it establishes an inherently Western, bureaucratic vertical system, which is incompatible with 'indigenous reality', has a disrupting and homogenising effect in terms of communal authority structures and led to the replacement of traditional leaders (see Behrendt, 2000: 15; Blanes, 1999b; Calla, 2000; Lema et al., 2001). However with regards to Chiquitano *comunidades* it cannot be argued that the implementation of the participatory component had such 'disrupting' or 'homogenising' effects. Instead, the newly introduced OTB structures of were incorporated in the *comunidades* and shaped in line with the roles of the previous communal organisation and made meaningful to everyday political practices. In fact, the comments by some Chiquitano *comunarios* suggest that the structures have successfully levelled out entrenched power structures and transform them from a more 'taproot' into 'rhizomic' structures (Rosengren, 2003). Furthermore, there is not yet sufficient proof that the productive projects the municipality or NGOs promote have endured, if *comunarios* do not need them to supplement their subsistence lifestyle.

Future Visions: Debates on Departmental and Indigenous Autonomies

An area for future research, which would shed further light on the discussions in this thesis, are the debates regarding different forms of autonomy within the Bolivian

[2] Analysts commenting on problems with participatory reforms in other Latin American countries, interpret this as a problem of decentralisation reforms designed to create a 'voice' model of participation rather than 'empowerment'. It aims to draw citizens into improving policy effectiveness and resource-distribution processes, rather than providing an actual space for political deliberation (Abers, 1998; Souza, 2001: 174; Thiel, 2003: 179).

state administrative structure. As indicated here, this was a highly contentious issue at the time of fieldwork and during the Bolivian Constituent Assembly held in 2006 and 2007. On one side of the debate were lowland and highland indigenous movements and their NGO allies who demanded indigenous autonomies. On the other, were the civic autonomy movement of the so-called *media luna* (departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija), the departmental political class and central government agencies, who instead demanded departmental autonomies.

On 14 December 2007, the MAS government celebrated the final draft of the new Bolivian Constitution, while tellingly, in Santa Cruz departmental elites celebrated their autonomous statutes (which, it should be added, had not gone through a public consultation process) (Plata Quispe, 2008: 155-157).[3] Significantly, the 'autonomous government' was declared the sole administrator of natural resources (including forestry resources and hydrocarbons) and land ownership, in contrast with the Bolivian Constitution, which attributes this power to the national government (Plata Quispe, 2008: 159-160).[4]

In turn, against the backdrop of the celebrations of the departmental autonomy statutes, on 31 May 2008, the Chiquitano, Ayoreo, Yuracaré-Mojeño, Guarayo, and Guaraní declared themselves and their TCOs 'autonomous', and began elaborating their own statutes and requested government resources. The CONAMAQ adopted a similar stance on 16 April 2008. They based this claim on the MAS constitutional project, the ILO Convention 169 and the declaration on rights of indigenous people that the UN adopted in September 2007. This declaration was confirmed law in Bolivia in October 2007.

Throughout fieldwork, it was clear that the term of 'autonomy' was not new to many Chiquitano leaders (this is a different story with *comunarios*, many of which were unsure about the term's meaning). This is not surprising as the autonomy debate is certainly not novel to Latin American indigenous movements (i.e. the cases of Mexico, Nicaragua and Colombia), while the departmental autonomy debate had

[3] Plata Quispe notes that the new statutes grant departments the status of 'federal states', with the prefect being elevated to 'governor', while the departmental legislative assembly acquires power to formulate and approve laws and determine the departmental budget (2008: 159).

[4] Article 102 of the statue states in this respect: 'right to land ownership, the regulation of rights, distribution, redistribution and administration of lands in the Department of Santa Cruz, is the responsibility of the Departmental Government and will be regulated through a Departmental Law approved by the Departmental Legislative Assembly' (my translation, quoted in Plata Quispe, 2008: 159).

gained much publicity since the autonomy referendum of July 2006. The different visions that circulated among the Chiquitano with regard to what such autonomies should entail, reflected the discourses in the wider political sphere.

However, they also reflected their concern not to lose control over the Monte Verde territory that they had finally received a title for on 3 July 2007. They were determined to preserve the space from the grip of departmental elites and their supporters in Concepción. The Chiquitano leaders' discourses around indigenous autonomy reflected those attached to the Monte Verde territory itself. On the one hand their discourse reflected the desire to achieve socio-cultural survival and securing livelihoods – a key struggle of so many indigenous groups (e.g. Conklin, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995; Graham, 2002; Hale, 2005; Jackson, 1995, 2001; Warren and Jackson, 2002). They linked their own claim to autonomy to the fact that they had their own 'principles', 'norms', 'authorities' and 'justice'. Others also added 'culture' or 'identity'.[5] For example, Ignacio Faldín noted 'because we have our principles, culture and identity, how we respect our authorities, how we elect our authorities. We have our processes to make our own laws [and] we have our own justice'.[6] Such attitudes indicate that for some leaders 'autonomy' is another name for 'continuity', or a way of legitimating the established Chiquitano way of living.

Other leaders, however, saw it more directly linked to the control of and defence of resources, as well as the right to take advantage of resources that 'belong to them'. As one informant noted: 'they tell us that we are incapable [and ask] "what do they have territory for if they are going to grow mosquitos?"… But if we have a right to decide about our resources, we are going to exploit them, and we are going to take advantage of them'.[7] Don Udalrico, a former CICC leader and *comunario* from Candelaria opined that:

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[5] Interview: Mauro Cuasace, Concepción, 23 January 2007; Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007; Interview: Vicente Pessoa, Concepción, 24 January 2007; Interview: Justo Seoane 9 (former Mayor Concepción), Concepción, 17 July 2007.

[6] *'…porque tenemos nuestro principio, nuestra cultura y nuestra propia identidad, como respetamos nosotros nuestras autoridad, como elegimos nuestra autoridad, tenemos nuestro proceso, como hacemos nuestra propia ley lo tenemos nosotros, nuestra propia justicia lo tenemos nosotros'*. Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17th July 2007.

[7] *'[Dicen] que somos incapaces… "para que tiene territorio si van a criar mosquito… pero si tenemos un derecho de poder decidir de nuestro recursos vamos a explotar y vamos a aprovechar…'*. Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17th July 2007. See also: Interview: Andrés Morobanchi, Primer de Augusto, 7th December 2006; Interview: Justo Seoane (former Mayor Concepción), Concepción, 17th July 2007.

> … because if we do departmental [autonomies] , then the prefect … will be a person that replaces the president. And this was the fight, that the autonomy has to come for all Chiquitanos, for all the most remote *comunidades* that there are, so that they know how to manage their affairs, what belongs to them. … It is because there are many riches. This is why they fight for the autonomy so much, because El Mutún will bring much money and they will grab it, while we poor here will not receive anything … They are already getting annoyed, they do not want autonomy for us.[8]

Certainly, the struggle over autonomies is, above all, a struggle over resources. However, the above comments indicate that, among the Chiquitano, the struggle will consist of how they will define these resources and to what use they will put them.

In January 2009, the Bolivians accepted their new Constitution via a referendum. It included four levels of autonomy: departmental, regional, municipal and indigenous. It recognised 36 distinct 'nations', elevated indigenous justice systems to the same level as the existing one, and established state control over 'key natural resources', such as gas.[9] While a more comprehensive analysis of the constitutional text and corresponding laws is not in the scope of this thesis, a brief examination reveals that the text of the Autonomy and Decentralisation Law (*Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización*) passed on 19 July 2010, places emphasis on 'the sustainable exploitation of natural resources' (for example, see Article 7.7).

Consequently, there is no sign that the state's legibility project is ceasing; on the contrary, it has accelerated. To gain autonomies, groups must develop statutes, define their authority structures, and show that they have viable governance and conflict resolution mechanisms in place. Anticipating this, CEJIS has advanced the 'governance' project described in Chapter IV, in which I performed a research role – thus playing my own part as state actor. This also shows how allies of indigenous movements (like NGOs) may often unwittingly perpetuate the political culture of the *indio permitido* (Postero, 2007: 176). The process of territorial management is well under way and NGOs and some leaders continue promoting sustainable forestry management. Additionally, if the inhabitants of an 'indigenous autonomous territory' are planning to become financially independent of NGOs and different state

[8] *'… si vamos hacer departamentales, entonces el prefecto ya… va a ser una persona que va a reemplazar al presidente. Y eso era la lucha pues que la autonomía tiene que salir para todo los chiquitanos, para todas las comunidades más lejanas que hay, que esos sepan manejar las cosas, que es lo que les toca a ellos pues. …es porque hay muchas riquezas, porque es que tanto luchan de autonomía, porque El Mutún va a dar harta plata y eso lo van a agarrar ellos y pa' nosotros acá que somos pobre no vamos a recibir nada. … ya se enojan, no quieren que haya esa autonomía para nosotros'*. Workshop: Candelaria, 11th May 2007.

[9] See *BBC News* (26 January 2009b); *BBC News* (26 January 2009a).

institutions but still want access to infrastructure, they may need to carry out some productive projects.

A closer examination of the autonomy legislation and the dynamics this has sparked among diverse now 'autonomous' groups will reveal how much this legislation perpetuates the *indio permitido* and to what extent Chiquitano *comunarios* resist it. While the introduction of autonomies served to re-define indigenous-state relations, a continuity seems to the that – like its predecessor laws – it denies the 'self-determination' that indigenous groups hoped 'indigenous autonomy' would provide.

This sheds a negative light on the prospects for postmulticultural citizenship (Postero, 2007) and overcoming the *indio permitido*. Hale suggests that ways to overcome this, include non-engagement, 'sparks of utopian politics that change the subject; carrying on the cultural rights discussion in a language fundamentally at odds with the neo-liberal multicultural frame; strategies for rearticulating cultural rights with demands for political-economic resources from the start' (2005: 13-14). However, none such currents are discernible among Chiquitano of Concepción municipality. The *centrales* with their taproot formation seem most efficient in perpetuating the *indio permitido*. Further, the contradiction between needing to engage with the state, in the face of domination and opposition, will not go away. No matter how much indigenous groups fight for a more inclusive or differentiated system, the state can only deal with legible populations. Consequently, indigenous groups who strive to perpetuate their liveways, will have to keep on negotiating and resisting through reproducing their socio-cultural selves.

Appendix 1

List of Workshops, Focus Groups and Interviews

CGTI-MV Project Workshops

Location	Municipality	Participants from …	Date	Type
Monte Verde	Concepción	Monte Verde	10-11 October 2006	Workshop
Palestina	Concepción	Palestina	11-12 October 2006	Workshop
Makanaté	Concepción	Makanaté	12-13 October 2006	Workshop
Puerto San Pedro	Concepción	Puerto San Pedro	13-15 February 2007	Workshop
Palestina	Concepción	Palestina	16-17 February 2007	Gathering additional data

CEJIS Project: Workshops, Focus Groups, Interviews

Focus Groups

Location	Municipality	Participants from …	Date	Staff
La Embocada	Concepción	La Embocada	8 March 2007	Lorenzo, David
San Miguelito Sur (group 1)	Concepción	San Miguelito Sur	9 March 2007	Lorenzo, Katinka
San Miguelito Sur (group 2)	Concepción	San Miguelito Sur	9 March 2007	David

Workshops

Location	Municipality	Participants from …	Date	Staff
Las Abras	San Javier	Las Abras, Rosario	16-17 April 2007	David, Elba, Katinka, Lorenzo, Margarita, Margoth, Mercedes, Ninoska, Patricia, Pedro, William.

Location	Municipality	Participants from …	Date	Staff
Turux Napez	San Javier	Tierras Nuevas, Turux Napez, Nueva Esperanza, San Francisco	18-19 April 2007	David, Lorenzo, Margarita, Margoth, Katinka, Pedro, William.
Santa Ana	San Javier	Santa Ana, Manantial	20-21 April 2007	David, Lorenzo, Margarita, Margoth, Katinka, Pedro, William.
Coronación	San Javier	Coronación, La Senda, San Juan de Limones, Esperancita	24-25 April 2007	David, Lorenzo, Margarita, Margoth, Pedro, William.
El Carmen	Concepción	El Carmen, Panorama, Medio Monte, San Isidro, El Encanto	8-9 May 2007	David, Jesús, Katinka, Lorenzo, Pedro, William.
Candelaria	Concepción	Candelaria, San Pablo Sur, San Juan de la Roca, Santa Clara, Guadalupe	10-11 May 2007	David, Jesús, Katinka, Lorenzo, Pedro, William.
Las Mercedes de Guayaba	Concepción	Las Mercedes de Guayaba, Santa Rita, San Miguelito de la Cruz, San Lucas	12-13 May 2007	David, Jesús, Lorenzo, Margoth, Patricia, Pedro, William.
Makanaté	Concepción	Makanaté, Puerto San Pedro, Monte Verde	15-16 May 2007	David, Jesús, Katinka, Lorenzo, Margoth, Patricia, Pedro, William.
Palestina	Concepción	Palestina, San Miguelito.	17-18 May 2007	David, Jesús, Katinka, Lorenzo, Patricia, Pedro, William.
Palmira	Lomerío	Palmira, El Puquio, San Lorenzo, Monterito, Salina	4-7 June 2007	David, Jesús, Katinka, Lorenzo, Margoth, Pedro.

Other Workshops

Location	Municipality	Participants from …	Date	Staff
San Javier	San Javier	Women from different communities.	31 May 2007	Lorenzo, David
San Javier	San Javier	Young People from different communities, selected from Normal School in San Javier	1 June 2007	Lorenzo, David
Santa Rita (Translation Workshop)	Concepción	Santa Rita	22 June 2007	Katinka, Margoth, Pedro.

Short Structured Interviews

Name	Who/ Occupation	Location	Date	Interviewer
Dionisio Roda	former CIP-SJ leader (Sport and Health)	San Javier	6 & 8 December 2006	David
Andrés Morobanchi	CIP-SJ Secretary of Land and Territory	Primer de Augusto	7 December 2006	David
Ignacio Macoñó	former CIP-SJ leader	Del Rancho	7 December 2006	David
José Paine	CIP-SJ technician	San Javier	7 December 2006	David
William Roca	CIP-SJ technician (communication)	San Javier	12 December 2006	David
Lorenza Rodrigues	CICC technician	Candelaria	19 January 2007	David
Guillermo Cuasace	OTB Santa Monica	Santa Mónica	22 January 2007	David
Lorenzo Pasabare	Former CICC and CIDOB Leader	Altamira	22 January 2007	Lorenzo
Agustín Supepi	Former CICC Economics Secretary	Guayaba	23 January 2007	Lorenzo
Carlos Leigue	CGTI Leader	Concepción	23 January 2007	Lorenzo
Maria Chacón	CICC Vice-president	Limoncito	23 January 2007	Lorenzo
Mauro Cuasase	CICC leader	Concepción	23 January 2007	Lorenzo
Isabel Pinto	former CICC technician	Concepción	23 January 2007	Lorenzo
Hugo Hurtado	CICC Communication and Health Secretary	Alta Mira	23 January 2007	Lorenzo
Pedro Mencarì	CICC/ APCOB technician	El Carmen	23 January 2007	David
Dina Ramos	former CICC technician	Candelaria	24 January 2007	Lorenzo
Vicente Pessoa Mendoza	former CICC and CIDOB leader	Concepción	24 January 2007	Lorenzo
Francisco Pesoa	former CICC leader	Limoncito	24 January 2007	Lorenzo
Patricio Hurtado	former CICC leader, 1980-85, 88	Alta Mira	25 January 2007	Lorenzo

Name	Who/ Occupation	Location	Date	Interviewer
Daniel Leigue	former CICC leader	Santa Mónica	26 January 2007	Lorenzo
Pedro Pinto	Former CICC leader	Santa Rita	26 January 2007	David
Facundo Rivero Leigues	former CICC leader	Santa Mónica	26 January 2007	Lorenzo
Ana Pesoa Cuasase	former CIP-SJ leader	Monte Cristo	30 January 2007	David
Angélica Tapia	former CIP-SJ leader	San Ramoncito	31 January 2007	David

Semi-and Unstructured Interviews (Formal)

Name	Who/ Occupation	Location	Date	Interviewer
Pedro Flores Flores	President Tierra Nueva	Turuz Napez	18 April 2007	Katinka
Demetrio Ortiz Ayarde	Founder Turux Napez	Turuz Napez	18 April 2007	Katinka
Udalrrico Vargas Jaldín	*comunario* from Candelaria, CICC founding member	Candelaria	10 May 2007	Katinka
Nicolás Aguilar Faldín	*comunario* from Candelaria, CICC founding member	Candelaria	10 May 2007	Katinka
Esteban Massai	*comunario* from Palestina	Palestina	17 May 2007	Katinka
Antonio Justiniano	*comunario* from Manantial, President Manantial	Santa Ana	20 May 2007	Katinka
Carlos Leigues	CGTI leader	Concepción	28 May 2007	Katinka
Lucas Surubí	*comunario* Monte Christo, founder of the CIP-SJ	Monte Cristo	29 May 2007	Lorenzo, David
Marcelo Surubí	*comunario* from Altamira, former CICC technician	Concepción	31 May 2007	Katinka
Tomas Choré Parapaino	President CGTI TCO-MV	Concepción	31 May 2007	Katinka
Pedro Solíz Pinto	OTB Santa Rita	Concepción	1 June 2007	Katinka
Lorenzo Pasabare	*comunario* from Santa Mónica, CEJIS employee	Concepción	1 June 2007	Katinka
Ignacio (Nacho) Soqueré Tomicha	CICOL General Cacique	Palmira, Lomerío	4 June 2007	Katinka

Name	Who/ Occupation	Location	Date	Interviewer
Agustín Choré	Former CICOL General Cacique	Palmira, Lomerío	4 June 2007	Lorenzo, David
Mariano Choré	Economics Cacique CICOL	Palmira, Lomerío	4 June 2007	Margoth
Delsy Macoñó Añez	Councillor San Javier Municipal Government	San Javier	5 June 2007	Jesús
Pedro Peña	*Comunario* de Palmira	Palmira, Lomerío	5 June 2007	Katinka
Esteban Choré	Former CICOL leader	San Lorenzo, Lomerío	6 June 2007	Margoth
Juan Soqueré Gomes	Former CICOL leader	San Lorenzo, Lomerío	7 June 2007	Margoth, Katinka
José Masaí	Former CICOL Leader	San Lorenzo, Lomerío	7 June 2007	Margoth, Katinka
Jesús Macoñó Añez	Former CIP-SJ technician	Palmira, Lomerío	7 June 2007	Katinka
Isidro Pasabare Castedo and Nicolás Yurrupi	*comunarios* from Santa Mónica	Concepción	19 June 2007	Katinka
Ángela Durán	Economics *Cacique* OICH	Concepción	20 June 2007	Katinka
Margarita Chuvirú	CGTI TCO-MV Coordinator	Concepción	1 July 2007	Katinka
Vicente Fernández Télmo	CICC Coordinator	Concepción	2 July 2007	Katinka
Pedro Mencarí Pessoa	ETA Technical Coordinator, APCOB, CICC technician	Concepción	16 July 2007	Katinka
Benita Machicado	*Comunaria* La Embocada, Municipal Councillor Concepción	Concepción	16 July 2007	Margoth
Justo Seoane Parapaino	Mayor of Concepción	Concepción	17 July 2007	Katinka
Ignacio Faldín	*Official Mayor* of Human Development	Concepción	17 July 2007	Margoth
Juana Herrera Mendéz	Councillor Concepción Municipal Government	Concepción	17 July 2007	Katinka
Facundo Rivero Leigues	President Vigilance Committee Concepción	Concepción	17 July 2007	Katinka
Eugenio Vicuña	PLAN International	Concepción	17 July 2007	Margoth

Name	Who/ Occupation	Location	Date	Interviewer
Melanio Quiroz Ibarra	*Corregidor* of Concepción	Concepción	18 July 2007	Katinka
Mario Antelo	Municipal Forestry Unit	Concepción	18 July 2007	Margoth

Semi-and Unstructured Interviews outside Projects (Formal and Informal)

Name	Who/ Occupation	Location	Date
José Lamas	Administrative Assistant INRA, Villa Tunari	Villa Tunari	6 June 2006
Raúl Maydana	FAM	La Paz	6 June 2006
Andrés Morobanchi	CIP-SJ Land and Territory Secretary	San Javier	8 June 2006
Rodolfo López	OICH First Cacique	Concepción	8 June 2006
Petrona Bruno	APG	Camiri	10 June 2006
Mario Gonzales	GTZ	Camiri	10 June 2006
Eduardo Anchorez	Nord Sud Cooperation	Muyupamba	12 June 2006
Janeth Carbollo Dávalos	Mayor Villa Vaca Guzmán	Muyupambpa	12 June 2006
Filemón Iriarte	GTZ/PADEP	Llallagua	14 June 2006
Raúl Maydana	FAM	Santa Cruz	9 September 2006
Carlos Leigues	CGTI leader	Concepción	26 October 2006
Juan Carlos Guerra	*comunidad* Agrológica Pueblos Unidos, MST	En route…	6 November 2006
Pedro Gonzalo Vargas	CEPIB	En route…	6 November 2006
Adolfo Chávez,	CIDOB President	Rn marcha	6 November 2006
Frederick Fromm	Forestry Student, affiliated to forestry Institute IBIS	Santa Cruz	11 November 2006

Name	Who/ Occupation	Location	Date
Oscar Tonelli	Historian, former CORDECRUZ Coordinator	Concepción	5 February 2007
David Rivero	Former CIP-SJ leader, CEJIS researcher		6 February 2007
Juan Lira	CIP-SJ, technician CGTI TCO-MV	Concepción	7 February 2007
Minor Payne	Peace Core Volunteer, Concepción	Concepción	10 February 2007
Vicente Lopez Ramos	*comunario* from Puerto San Pedro	Puerto San Pedro	13 February 2007
Kirsten Lattrich	DED Worker, Concepción	Concepción	13 February 2007
Esteban and Pedro Massaí	*comunarios* from Palestina	Palestina	2 March 2007
Hilda Massaí and Profe Uribaldo	*comunarios* from Palestina	Palestina	2 March 2007
Isabel Paz Patchurí	*comunaria* from Palestina	Palestina	3 March 2007
Hilda Massaí	*comunaria* from Palestina	Palestina	4 March 2007
Jose Bailaba Parapayne	Member Consituent Assembly	Sucre	16 March 2007
Lorenzo Pasabare	*comunario* from Santa Mónica, CEJIS employee	Concepción	16 April 2007
Don Luciano	*comunaria* from El Carmen	El Carmen	9 May 2007
Jose Bailaba Parapayne	Chiquitano Member Consituent Assembly	Santa Cruz	19 May 2007
Carlos Romero	Member Consituent Assembly	Santa Cruz	20 May 2007
Lazaro Gonzalo	CPESC	Santa Cruz	20 May 2007
Nélida Faldín	Chiquitano Member Consituent Assembly	Sucre	24 May 2007
Diego Jaldín	CPESC President	Sucre	25 May 2007
Hernán Ávila	CEJIS, Bloque Oriente Support Team	Concepción	15 June 2007
Claudia Montaño	CEJIS Santa Cruz	Santa Cruz	28 June 2007

Name	Who/ Occupation	Location	Date
Elba Flores Gonzales	CEJIS Santa Cruz	Santa Cruz	28 June 2007
Leonardo Tamburini	CEJIS Director	Santa Cruz	5 July 2007
Deborah Díaz	CEJIS Santa Cruz	Santa Cruz	7 July 2007
María Chacón	CICC Leader	Sucre	12 July 2007

CEJIS Project staff

Elba Flores (Governance Project coordinator), Margoth Céspedes (CEJIS Concpeción Coordinator), David Rivero, Lorenzo Pasabare, Pedro Solís Pinto, Jesús Macoñó, William Roca, Mercedes Nosta (consultant), Patricia Leaplaza , Margarita Chuvirú (CGTI-MV Coordinator), Ninoska.

Appendix 2

Methodological Matrix for Workshops in Chiquitano Comunidades

"Construcción participativa del proceso de gobernanza TCO-MV"

Objetivo	Tema – Preguntas generadoras	Técnica	Procedimiento	Tiempo	Responsables	Material
I. Historia de la comunidad	1. ¿Cuál es la historia de nuestra comunidad? - año de fundación - fundadores - numero de habitantes y de familias - acontecimientos importantes (creación de - organización, fundación de escuela, etc.)	Trabajo de grupo por comunidad o entrevista personal	Formar grupos por comunidad y asignarle a cada uno la pregunta -El grupo elige un relator y moderador. -El facilitador anota en su cuaderno toda la discusión -Los participantes escriben las respuestas en papelógrafos con ayuda del facilitador.	1/2 hora	David Lorenzo Pedro Willam Margoth Katinka*	Papeló-grafo Marcadores Masking Mapa
II. La **organización** y gobernanza en la **comunidad**.	¿Cómo manejamos la comunidad nosotros y nuestras autoridades? Identificar: ¿Cuántas organizaciones existen en la comunidad y cuales son? ¿Cuáles sus cargos, funciones y forma de elección de cada una? ¿En que instancias de la organización comunal se toman las decisiones?,	Trabajo de grupo por comunidad	**Preg. 1-3:** trabajar con la matriz de organización. **Preg. 4-9**: entrevista colectiva al grupo. (e.g. ¿Cómo era la organización	45 min – 1 hora	**"**	**"**

	¿Como participan los comunarios en la toma de decisiones? ¿Cómo se distribuye y ejecuta las funciones y actividades comunales? Pedir un ejemplo, tal ves de trabajo comunal u otro. ¿Cómo se controla a los dirigentes?. ¿Qué entienden por autoridad? ¿Por qué se cambia a las autoridades de la comunidad? ¿Para que sirve nuestra organización comunal?		en Lomerío y como es hoy?)			
II.a) Identificar los roles de la **organización matriz**, su coordinación y cuales las contradicciones del sistema de autoridades y su articulación externa.	¿Cómo coordinamos con instituciones y organizaciones afuera de la comunidad (organización matriz, ONG, instituciones estatales)? ¿Quiénes?´ ¿Cómo coordinan (para que sirve)? Ventajas, desventajas ¿Qué grado de coordinación existe con las instituciones? ¿Cuál es el objetivo que deben cumplir las centrales?	**“**	**Preg. 1 - 4:** Armar una matriz de doble entrada. **Preg. 5**: El grupo debe: -Identificar las principales instituciones en tarjetas. - En un papelógrafo con 4 diagrama sobrepuestos de menor a mayor, ubicando la comunidad al medio, dejar que los participantes ubiquen las demás fichas donde crean conveniente en base a una relación: débil, regular, fuerte; esto para ver el grado de coordinación que existe.	45 min – 1 hora	**“**	**“**
III. Normas comunales y conflictos		Sociodrama	Se elige a algunos comunarios y se les pide que ayuden en la dramatización de un problema	20 min - 1/2 hora	**“**	Grabadora

			mostrando como los resuelven.			
III a) Conocer **formas de resolución de conflictos** en las **comunidades**	¿Cuales son los principales problemas entre las personas en la comunidad y el territorio? ¿Cómo y ante que instancias/niveles son resueltos los problemas? ¿Que experiencias positivas y negativas se tienen con esta manera de hacerlo? ¿Cuales son las propuestas para resolver mejor los problemas?	Trabajo de grupo diferenciado por género o comunidad	Formar grupos por comunidad -El grupo elige un relator y moderador. -El facilitador anota en su cuaderno toda la discusión -Los participantes escriben las respuestas en papelógrafos con ayuda del facilitador.	40 min	"	"
III b) Conocer **las normas** de las **comunidades**	¿Qué es una norma y para que sirve? ¿Qué normas o estatutos existen en la comunidad? ¿Qué conflictos normativiza y que sanciones hay para esos conflictos en sus estatutos? ¿Qué normas deberían construirse o mejorarse en la comunidad? ¿Existen algunas normas inter-comunales en la zona? ¿Qué aspectos contempla?	"	"	30 -40 min	"	"
IV Recoger las diversas **visiones** y **perspectivas** del **territorio** MV	¿Qué es una comunidad para ustedes? ¿Qué es el territorio para los Chiquitanos? ¿Se sienten parte de la TCO Monte Verde? ¿porque? (para comunidades de afuera)	"	"	1 hora	"	"

	¿Cuál es la visión de futuro que tenemos los Chiquitanos de Monte Verde sobre nuestro territorio? ¿Qué es autonomía para ustedes? (en lo político, territorial y personal-familiar)					
V. Recoger **insumos para estatuto** de gobierno.	¿Quienes tienen derecho de ingresar y vivir en el Territorio? ¿Quienes y cómo están **administrando** o manejando actualmente el territorio de Monte Verde y cómo se piensa administrar en el territorio en el futuro? ¿Con que recursos financieros vamos administrar o manejar el territorio en el futuro? ¿Con que recursos institucionales vamos administrar o manejar el territorio en el futuro? ¿Qué **normas** existen en el territorio? ¿Quienes aplican las normas en el territorio? ¿A quienes se aplica la norma? ¿Qué normas deberían construirse en el territorio?	“	“	1 hora	“	“
VI. Propuesta del **gobierno territorial** indígena.	¿Qué tipo de gobierno-sistemas de autoridad u organización territorial indígena, sueñan tener en el territorio de Monte Verde? - Forma de gobierno (valores, principios, etc.)	Trabajo de grupo diferenciado por de mujeres, hombres, jóvenes y dirigentes o	Formar grupo de mujeres, hombres, jóvenes y dirigentes. - El grupo elige un relator y un secretario.	1 horas	“	“

	- Función del gobierno (para que?) - Forma de Elección (como se va elegir?) - Tiempo de gestión (cuanto va durar?) - Sanciones-normas (que derechos y obligaciones va tener? En caso de no cumplir o manejar mal los recursos, que sanciones aplicaremos?)	comunidad	- Exponer las conclusiones del grupo.			

Plenaria: se realizará solo de la parte de organizaciones (cuando hay confusión) y de la propuesta del gobierno de la TCO de la cual se debe debatir su viabilidad y formas en conjunto.

Objetivo II a), pregunta 5)
¿Qué grado de coordinación existe con las instituciones?

Diagrama de Venns



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